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THESIS ABSTRACT.
The thesis examines and accounts for patterns of income 
maintenance among elderly shanty town residents in Greater Buenos 
Aires (GBA), Argentina. It uses a framework which includes both 
macro-level institutional responses to ageing (such as national 
pension and assistance programmes) and responses at the micro­
level (individual and household strategies). First, the thesis 
accounts for the high proportion of elderly in Argentina and 
explains the origin of shanty towns in GBA. This is followed by 
an analysis of the evolution of official social security 
programmes at the national and local levels and the extent to 
which gaps in them have been filled by non-state institutions. 
Particular attention is paid to the up-grading of limited, 
pluralistic initiatives in the early twentieth century, the 
imposition of a public sector welfare monopoly in the 194 0s and 
the gradual reintroduction of the voluntary and private sectors 
since the 1970s. Despite the development of a complex 
bureaucratic apparatus, the mismanagement of insurance funds and 
an inconsistent commitment to assistance financing prevented 
universal state protection for the elderly. Case studies of three 
shanty towns draw attention to the significance of community 
initiatives for elderly welfare. Whilst these perform a number 
of functions, they serve primarily as conduits for resources from 
supra-local state and non-state agencies. A questionnaire survey 
and semi-structured interviews demonstrate the economic dynamics 
of individual households containing elderly members. It is shown 
that most elderly combine income from a number of sources, 
including pensions, continued employment and family support and 
that the relative importance of these different sources is 
strongly influenced by their gender and labour histories. The 
significance of bureaucratic obstacles and disinformation in 
preventing access to support from state programmes is also 
highlighted.
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Note on interviews and translations.
Interviews which were tape recorded are coded as follows:
By location:-
VA Villa Azul
VZ Villa Zavaleta
VJ Villa Jardin
This is followed by a number which refers to the individual 
interviewee and then, in some cases, by another indicating the 
precise position on the tape. On the counting device used 48 
units were the equivalent of one minute of conversation. Where 
an interview took up more than one side of a tape, the side 
number is indicated immediately before the precise position.
For example, Tape VJ3 1/200-210 refers to the first side of a 
taped interview with Ana Gorostiaga, a resident of Villa Jardin.
Quotations from taped interviews have been translated into 
English. The translations attempt to convey the style as well as 
the content of the conversations, which often included 
grammatical inaccuracies, slang and idiomatic expressions.
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LBN Lacking basic needs (a poverty indicator).
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.
1) Introduction.
This thesis addresses two separate issues. The first is the 
recognition that, in almost all countries, the state is unable 
or unwilling to provide for the income needs of all groups who 
are outside the workforce, be they children, the unemployed, the 
disabled or the elderly. This is particularly apparent in 
developing economies such as Argentina. It is, therefore, 
important to assess the degree to which the state provides for 
the income needs of these groups and alternative sources of 
economic support available to them. This provides an empirical 
basis for the current debate about the role of the public sector 
in welfare provision.1
The second issue reflects the rapid acceleration of demographic 
ageing which is projected to occur in many developing economies 
over the next few decades. As yet this has generated insufficient 
interest, either from academics or policy-makers. Increases in 
the number and proportion of elderly will further reduce the 
capacity of the state to support the non economically-active 
population. Argentina is one of the few developing economies 
which have already undergone rapid demographic ageing and it is 
instructive to examine how the state and other actors have been 
able to meet this challenge.
•^Recent contributions to this debate include World Bank 
Averting the old age crisis. Washington (1994) and P.Evans. 
D .Rueschmeyer and T.Skocpol, eds Bringing the state back in. 
Cambridge MA (1985).
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This chapter begins by reviewing the secondary literature which 
deals with the issue of economic survival of the elderly. Rather 
than restrict its scope to Argentina, it includes research about 
Latin America as a whole. This recognises the similarity of 
institutional traditions and structures that prevail in much of 
the continent. The review draws attention to appropriate 
theoretical and conceptual insights in existing work as well as 
to significant gaps and limitations. The chapter then explains 
the objectives and orientation of the thesis, putting these in 
the context of the broader literature. Finally, it provides some 
information about research methodology and the structure of the 
remaining chapters.
2) Literature review.
No single body of writing encompasses the overall concerns of the 
thesis. The research topic draws from material on social policy, 
demography, labour markets, organisational structures and other 
issues, produced by a wide range of academic disciplines. The 
most important of these are considered below and are loosely 
grouped into the following areas: social security, micro-level 
studies and surveys of other income maintenance institutions. 
Each of these areas makes some reference to the means by which 
the elderly may be able to obtain income, but do not consider the 
problem as a whole. As will be demonstrated, even taking the 
literature in its entirity, many issues of significance to the 
thesis receive scant if any attention.
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a) Social security.
Since the first influential publications of the late 1970s2, 
Latin American social security systems have generated an 
increasing amount of academic interest and a growing body of 
secondary literature. These have focused on a number of issues, 
including the historical evolution of systems, their financial 
foundations, organisational structures and the levels of coverage 
they afford. More recently, the literature has examined attempts 
and proposals to undertake sweeping reforms of beleaguered social 
security programmes.
The concept of social security is not easily defined, since it 
is understood in diverse ways by different countries or social 
groups. Whilst it generally consists of some form of income 
maintenance, this may be complemented by an array of other 
services: for example, the Mexican Institute of Social Security 
also provides medical care, vocational training and theatre.3 
The most widely-accepted definition has been put forward by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO):
..the protection which society provides for its members, through a series 
of public measures, against the economic and social distress that 
otherwise would be caused by the stoppage or substantial reduction of 
earnings resulting from sickness, maternity, employment injury, 
unemployment, invalidity, old age and death; the provision of medical
2C.Mesa-Lago Social security in Latin America: pressure
groups, stratification and inequality. Pittsburgh (1978) and 
J.Malloy The politics of social security in Brazil. Pittsburgh 
(1979) .
3J.Midgely Social security, inequality and the Third World, 
London (1984), p.79.
17
care; and the provision of subsidies for families with children.4
This definition emphasises objectives rather than techniques. 
Recognising this, the ILO identifies various approaches for 
achieving these goals, the most important of which are:
1)SOCIAL INSURANCE5 is financed from contributions of members, 
their employers and sometimes the state. It is a legal obligation 
and entitles affiliates, and often their dependents, to 
protection against specific risks which lower or place an 
additional burden on income.
2)SOCIAL ASSISTANCE is financed by the state alone. Benefits are 
generally available, though often means tested, and are usually 
paid as a legal right in prescribed cases of need. Often the aim 
is to bring income up to a community-determined minimum.
3)OTHER SERVICES, INCLUDING MEDICAL INSURANCE. Since this thesis 
is only concerned with income maintenance, forms of social 
security which perform other functions are excluded from the 
analysis.
Despite the general acceptance of the ILO definition, there 
remain some areas of ambiguity in the literature. Mesa-Lago
international Labour Organisation (ILO) Introduction to 
social security. Geneva (1984), p.3.
5The Spanish term for this is Sequro Social, not to be 
confused with Seguridad Social, which refers to social security 
as a whole (see CEPAL El desarrollo de la seguridad social en 
America Latina. Santiago (1985), p.3).
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regards social security as intrinsically universal, claiming it:
covers practically the entire population against all social risks.6
However, the ILO definition of social security does not
necessarily entail universality. Rather, it is presented as an 
umbrella term for grouping together various strategies which go 
some way towards providing protection. To avoid confusion, this 
thesis uses the ILO definition, whilst Mesa-Lago's is termed 
"comprehensive, universal social security". A second problem is 
a tendency to equate social insurance with social security. 
Whilst the former often comprises the bulk of social security 
expenditure this does not justify the exclusion of assistance and 
other programmes from general analyses.7 Likewise, the more
limited literature on assistance generally treats it as a
separate issue and not as part of social security as a whole.
These tendencies have contributed to a general neglect of non­
insurance programmes and a failure to integrate different strands 
of social policy. A final confusion concerns the role of the 
state in social security. The ILO definitions of both social 
insurance and social assistance implicitly restrict these areas 
of action to state agencies. This is echoed in the traditional
6C.Mesa-Lago "Introduction" in C.Mesa-Lago, ed The crisis of 
social security and healthcare: Latin American experiences and 
lessons. Pittsburgh (1985), p.3.
7There are many examples of this tendency, both in the 
Spanish and the English language literature: see G.Mackenzie
Social security in developing countries: the Latin American
experience, (IMF Working Paper), Washington (1988) and F.Cuvi 
Ortiz "La seguridad social y la tercera edad" Seguridad Social 
(1987) .
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Latin American view that social security was to be administered, 
if not always funded, by the public sector. However, as is shown 
below, recent debates about reforming social insurance schemes 
have posed a radical challenge to this view.
Most accounts of the historical evolution of social security 
systems in Latin America trace the up-grading of isolated 
charitable initiatives and occupational pension schemes into 
large-scale publicly administered programmes, embracing, in many 
cases, the majority of the population. The timing of this process 
varied by country, but occurred approximately from the end of the 
nineteenth century to the 1970s. Numerous explanations have been 
put forward to explain this development. The literature on social 
insurance stresses the importance of political factors, such as 
the actions of autonomous pressure groups or policies of 
cooptation.8 Revisionist accounts have laid more emphasis on the 
economic significance of social insurance as a means of 
generating forced savings.9 Studies of social assistance refer 
to a gradual change in attitudes towards poverty and public 
responsibility, although they also stress the significance of 
political factors.10
8Compare the arguments put forwards by C.Mesa-Lago in Social 
security in Latin.., pp.5-10 and those of J.Malloy in The 
politics of social... pp.3-10.
9C.Lewis "Social insurance: ideology and policy in the
Argentine c.1920-66." in C.Abel and C.Lewis, eds Welfare, poverty 
and development in Latin America, London (1993), pp.187-90 and 
W.Baer The Brazilian economy: growth and development. New York 
(1989), p.79.
10E.Tenti Fanfani Estado v pobreza: estrateaias de
intervencion, Buenos Aires (1989).
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The political origins of Latin American social security are 
reflected in the structures of the welfare organisations and the 
various services they provide. Whilst the administration of 
social security in developed countries is typically performed by 
single, centralised units, Latin American systems have been shown 
to be highly stratified and fragmented.11 They generally 
incorporate national and local agencies as well as bodies 
responsible for particular occupational groups or contingencies. 
These problems have been exacerbated by the tendency of Latin 
American governments to treat social security agencies as sources 
of privileged public sector employment, used to reward political 
loyalties.12
Most studies of social insurance schemes draw attention to the 
detrimental effects of their disorganised administration. First, 
they are shown to be inefficient: the share of budgets allocated 
to management has been significantly higher than in other 
regions.13 Secondly they are inegalitarian, enabling the 
survival of privileged funds.14 Thirdly, they are partly blamed
1:LC .Mesa-Lago argues that the degree of stratification of 
Latin American funds varies according to the period of their 
establishment, with countries such as Costa Rica with relatively 
recent, unified systems (see "Social security in Latin America 
and the Caribbean: a comparative assessment" in E.Ahmad, et al, 
eds Social security in developing countries. Oxford (1991), 
pp.358-362.
12J.Malloy the politics of social... pp.74-9.
13C.Mesa-Lago "Social security: ripe for reform" Inter-
American Development Bank Economic and social progress in Latin 
America. 1991 Annual report. Washington (1991), pp.201-3.
14H.Dieguez and H.Petrecolla "Estudio estadistico del 
sistema previsional argentino en el periodo, 1950-1972" 
Economica, Buenos Aires (1977).
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for high levels of evasion, both by employers and workers, thus 
reducing the revenue and coverage afforded by insurance 
programmes.15 Administrative stratification also fosters 
corruption. Unofficial estimates gauge that 40 per cent of social 
insurance contributions in Brazil had simply gone missing by 
1991.16 This undermines the credibility of the system and 
discourages participation.
The literature pays insufficient attention to one other 
potentially significant consequence of organisational 
fragmentation: the creation of obstacles and delays for pursuing 
benefit claims. The scant references to these problems may be 
because they are particularly difficult to quantify. These issues 
receive more detailed attention in later chapters of this thesis.
There are few studies of the organisational structure of social 
assistance agencies in Latin America. Given that assistance 
budgets are generally a small fraction of sums spent on 
insurance, it is unlikely that their administration is as complex 
or extensive. However, accounts of large-scale initiatives often 
draw attention to the high levels of wastage caused by 
inefficient implementation, clientelism and corruption.17
15C.Mesa-Lago Social security and prospects for ecruitv in 
Latin America. (World Bank Discussion Paper), Washington (1991), 
p.25.
16E1 Pais. Montevideo, 31st March 1991.
17G.Midre "Bread or solidarity? Argentine social policies, 
1983-1990" Journal of Latin American Studies. (1992), pp.343-73.
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Considerable attention has been paid to the ways in which Latin 
American social insurance is financed. This draws attention to 
the huge amounts of funds involved and the mounting financial 
crises faced by such systems. Problems of high administrative 
costs and corruption have been compounded by a number of other 
effects. These include a general failure to project the long-term 
financial requirements of pension schemes. This was 
understandable at the beginning of the century when the economic 
and demographic data needed for such forecasts was often absent. 
However, as this data became more available there have been few 
attempts to achieve long-run equilibrium. In the absence of 
effective taxation systems, social insurance contributions became 
a major source of public revenue in some countries. In others the 
problem was not so much state borrowing as its failure to meet 
its own contribution obligations. Whichever occurred, the direct 
result was public indebtedness and the depletion of the financial 
resources o£ social insurance programmes. As initial surpluses 
based on high ratios of workers to beneficiaries began to dry up, 
many programmes were forced to switch from fully-funded financing 
(which finances benefits from the interest accrued by 
contributions) to a pay-as-you-go system (which employs annual 
fund income to cover expenditure). Resistance to higher levies 
from both labour and employers meant that the main cost was 
usually borne by the pensioners themselves with benefits sharply 
devalued by inflation.18
18Nucleo de Estudos de Politicas Publicas (NEPP) Brasil 
1987: relatorio sobre a situacao social do pais. Campinas (1989) .
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The budding academic interest in Latin American social security 
had had very little time to debate possible solutions to these 
financial difficulties when, in 1980, a radical reform was 
implemented in Chile.19 This entailed the transfer of pension 
fund management from the public to the private sector. Following 
this, the focus of enquiry shifted towards assessing the relative 
merits of the Chilean reform and its potential applicability to 
other Latin American countries.20 By the late 1980s, advocates 
of the Chilean system had gained the initiative and similar 
reforms were being proposed for countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil and Peru.
Table 1:1 Economically active population covered bv social 
insurance in selected Latin American countries. 1960-1985.
1960 1970 1980 1985
Argentina 55 .2 68.0 69.1 79 .1*
Brazil 23.1 27 . 0 87.0 na
Chile 70.8 75 . 6 61.2 79.2
Colombia 8 . 0 22.2 30.4 30.2
Mexico 15 . 6 28.1 42.0 40.2
*1984
Source: C.Mesa-Lago Social security and prospects for ecruitv in 
Latin America. World Bank Discussion Paper, Washington (1991), 
p . 50 .
19R.Frediani Exiaencia v realidad de la politica social en 
America Latina: comparacion. capacidad v funcionamiento de los 
sistemas de secruro social de Chile v Uruguay. Buenos Aires (1988) 
provides a good comparison of the reformed Chilean system and a 
fairly typical example of the old-style model.
20D.Vittas and A.Iglesias The rationale and performance of 
personal pension plans in Chile. Washington (1992) give a very 
positive account of the Chilean reform. P.Lloyd-Sherlock Social 
insurance reform in an ageing world: the case of Latin America. 
London (1992) provides a more cautious analysis.
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The principal concern of this thesis does not lie with the 
evolution and structures of the institutions themselves but their 
impact on the economic welfare of the elderly. Coverage must be 
considered in terms of the proportion of the population included, 
the contingencies provided for and the value of benefits. Table 
1:1 provides an optimistic picture, indicating that, by the 1980s 
social insurance schemes included a substantial part of the 
economically active populations of the larger Latin American 
economies. However, this data should be treated with considerable 
caution. A general, undiscriminating use of top-line, official 
data may mask the true impact of such programmes on the 
populations they are designed to serve. Several studies have 
shown that the figures presented in Table 1:1 may be misleading, 
often underestimating true levels of evasion.21 Moreover, it is 
important to note that the most widely-used figures are based on 
affiliation to insurance programmes, not the receipt of benefits. 
Insufficient contributions, bureaucratic obstacles and delays 
could mean that the two do not automatically coincide.22
The literature makes some reference to those groups which lie
21E.Isuani provides an alternative figure of 42% for 
Brazilian coverage in 1979/80 in "Social security and public 
assistance" in C.Mesa-Lago, ed The crisis of social security and 
healthcare: Latin American experiences and lessons. p.95.
S.Lischinsky in "La afiliacion al sistema previsional (1944- 
1955). Logros y dificuldades en su expansion." (mimeo), Rosario 
(1989) shows that official Argentine data was very inaccurate. 
Also see C.Mesa-Lago Social security and prospects... pp.47-49 
for general criticisms of official data.
22P.Lloyd-Sherlock Social insurance reform... p. 20 notes 
that whilst Chilean insurance funds allegedly included 79 per 
cent of the working population in 1992, only 42 per cent of the 
total were regularly making contributions.
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beyond social insurance protection, stressing variations in 
affiliation between different occupational groups. A number of 
explanations have been put forward for this pattern. The first 
stems from the politicised, ad hoc extension of systems in which 
more powerful interest groups such as the military, organised 
urban labour and the civil service were able to command coverage 
superior to that of weaker groups, such as rural labour and the 
self-employed.23 Other explanations are based on economic 
factors. These include the difficulty of monitoring evasion in 
small-scale, informal production units and the inability or 
unwillingness of the poorest sectors of the population to make 
regular contributions.24 Consequently, the rise in poverty and 
expansion of the informal sector in recent decades have been 
identified as formidable obstacles to the diffusion of social 
insurance.25
Whilst the literature has gone into some detail in explaining the 
effects of poverty and informality on social insurance, there are 
a number of weaknesses in its interpretations. These result from 
the general tendency to consider these relationships from a 
large-scale institutional perspective rather than the users'
23This argument was originally put forward in C.Mesa-Lago 
Social security in Latin.., pp.5-14.
24See C.Mesa-Lago "Social security and extreme poverty in 
Latin America" Journal of Development Economics (1983) and 
V.Tokman "The informal sector in Latin America: from underground 
to legality" in G.Standing and V.Tokman, eds Towards social 
adjustment: labour market issues in structural adjustment. Geneva 
(1991) .
25These issues are considered in detail by C.Mesa-Lago in La 
seauridad social v el sector informal. Santiago (1990), pp.3-36.
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viewpoint. This deflects attention from a number of key issues. 
The first is an unresolved debate within writing on the informal 
sector about the extent to which informality is a safety net for 
inadequate welfare or is a means of avoiding payment of social 
security and tax levies: in other words, whether it is driven by 
inadequate protection or driven from inappropriate measures.26 
Other issues include the effects of education, access to 
information and bureaucratic obstacles to affiliation. This is 
particularly significant for self-employed workers, on whom falls 
the full burden of contributions as well as responsibility for 
handling paperwork and dealing with government agencies. These 
issues can only be examined effectively through micro-level 
studies.
Latin American social insurance systems often provide a narrower 
range of benefits than those in developed countries. For example, 
few provide effective unemployment benefits. However, those 
contingencies of greatest significance to the elderly: old age, 
widowhood and invalidity, are included in every country. Indeed, 
old age pensions account for the great majority of social 
security expenditure in the region.27 It is also important to 
consider eligibility criteria for such benefits. In most Latin
26See R.Hakkert and F.Goza "Demographic consequences of 
austerity in Latin America" in W.Canak, ed Lost promises: debt, 
austerity and development in Latin America. Colorado (1989), 
pp.23-24 and B.Roberts "The changing nature of informal 
employment: the case of Mexico" in G.Standing and V.Tokman, eds 
Towards social adjustment... p.100 for examples of these opposed 
interpretations.
27ILO The cost of social security. Thirteenth international 
enquiry. 1984-86. Basic tables, Geneva (1990).
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American systems these are based on a minimum period of 
contributions and a minimum retirement age. These compare 
favourably with systems in developed countries. However, it 
should not be assumed that eligibility for benefits automatically 
determines access to them. This relationship must be tested, 
again through the use of micro-level studies.
Whilst many published sources compare levels of quantitative 
coverage in different countries, regions and groups, very little 
has been done to compare and assess the real value of benefits. 
A small number of studies have demonstrated that values often 
vary widely between occupational groups in an individual 
country.28 Even less interest has been shown in changes in the 
real values of benefits over time and their capacity to meet the 
basic needs of their recipients. It is possible that the welfare 
gains from the expansion of nominal coverage in some Latin 
American countries may have been more than off-set by falls in 
the real values of pensions.
Thus, there are a number of significant gaps in the existing 
literature on Latin American social insurance. These often result 
from a preoccupation with the institutions themselves rather than 
their impact on individuals and households. They also reflect a 
failure to integrate analyses of social insurance with broader 
social policies and factors that influence the economic 
livelihood of target populations. The failure to combine studies
28H.Dieguez and H.Petrecolla "La distribucion funcional del 
ingreso y el sistema previsional en la Argentina" Desarrollo 
Economico (1974) provide a rare example of such a study.
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of public insurance and public assistance is particularly- 
puzzling. Mesa-Lago has argued that incomplete insurance 
protection should be complemented by up-graded, universal 
assistance programmes,29 but has published no empirical research 
about present relationships between the two. By focusing an 
enquiry on particular groups as opposed to a particular 
organisation, it is possible to examine these issues and to 
assess the consequences of macro-institutional failure at the 
micro level.
There is virtually no published material dealing with the 
coverage of social assistance in Latin America. The limited 
secondary literature places most emphasis on the rationale, 
organisational structure and efficiency of such programmes. The 
lack of empirical research on assistance partly results from the 
extreme heterogeneity of programmes, in terms of scale of 
implementation, problems addressed and methods applied. Official 
data sources are often less complete, accessible or reliable than 
those for insurance programmes. This thesis circumvents this 
problem by analysing assistance through both official statistics 
and data obtained from the users themselves.
Another weakness in the literature on both insurance and 
assistance results from a tendency to ignore initiatives which 
are not undertaken at the national level. Several Latin American
29C.Mesa-Lago "Social security: ripe for reform.", pp.211-
14. W.Schulthess and R.Lo Vuolo "Transformacion del sistema 
previsional de autonomos: paso inicial para una reforma en la 
seguridad social" Desarrollo Economico (1991) make the same point 
with specific reference to Argentina.
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countries have complex geographical hierarchies of social 
insurance which include provincial and municipal funds. In 
countries such as Argentina and Chile there has been a shift 
towards decentralisation of assistance schemes. There are, 
however, no generally available studies which make specific 
reference to these issues for Latin America. In order to develop 
more coordinated social policies, it is necessary to fill this 
gap in the literature.
b) Micro-level studies.
During the past twenty years increasing attention has been paid 
to the micro-level economic relations of individuals and 
households in Latin America. These have tended to focus on a 
number of specific issues, such as the role of women, kinship 
networks, employment strategies and nutrition.30 Very few of 
these make specific or even passing reference to the condition 
of the elderly. This reflects the fact that rapid demographic 
ageing is yet to occur in most of the continent.
The limited number of small-scale studies of the elderly in Latin 
America pay little attention to economic issues. Instead they
30For good examples of these see S.Chant "Single-parent 
families: choice or constraint? The formation of female-headed 
households in Mexican shanty towns." Development and Change
(1985) ; R.Martinez Norueiga Empresas familiares -su significacion 
social v su problematica. Where? (1984); L.Lomnitz Networks and 
marginalitv. Life in a Mexican shantv town. New York (1977); and 
P.Aguirre Impacto de la hiperinflacion en la alimentacion de los 
sectores populares. Buenos Aires (1990).
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stress psychological, sociological and medical aspects of 
ageing.31 The financial welfare of the elderly is presumed to be 
largely governed by macro-level factors.32 This view is clearly 
contradicted by the fact that large numbers of elderly do not 
receive insurance pensions and by surveys which draw attention 
to the importance of household relations, labour force 
participation and other issues.33
There are a number of reasons for making micro-level studies of 
the economic condition of the elderly. Projections of rapid 
demographic ageing indicate that the elderly will be playing an 
increasingly important role in the economic life of families and 
households in the near future. Given the large amount of 
financial resources devoted to social security provision for this 
group, it is important to examine the effects of these programmes 
at the grassroots level. Such studies provide insights into 
relationships between public policy and the complex dynamics of 
micro-economic behaviour. One study of poor households in Greater 
Buenos Aires, whilst not making specific mention of the elderly
31See M.Oddone "Ancianidad, contextos regionales y redes de 
intercambio" Revista Medicina de la Tercera Edad. Buenos Aires
(1986) or Pan American Health Organisation Mid-life and older 
women in Latin America and the Caribbean, Washington (1989) for 
examples of this tendency.
32This is most clearly the case in R.Knopoff et al 
Dimensiones de la veiez en la sociedad argentina, Buenos Aires 
(1991) in which the only chapter dealing with the material 
welfare of the elderly is entitled "El bienestar de los ancianos: 
un problema para la seguridad social"(Elderly welfare: a problem 
for social security).
33Centro Latinoamericano de Demografia (CELADE) Argentina: 
situaccion v necesidades de la tercera edad. Algunas ciudades 
selecionadas.. Santiago (1989).
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postulated that:
..in such conditions [of poverty] poor and marginal groups -excluded from 
effective forms of institutionalised social security- create their own 
social solidarity and mutual aid as a spontaneous response to a socio­
economic situation which imposes severe restrictions on them. The actors, 
confronting a situation of chronic economic insecurity, become aware of 
the need to create their own social network of mutual support as a means 
of adaptation.34
This implies that poor elderly excluded from social security 
schemes will seek to obtain support through informal networks 
with people experiencing similar economic privations. 
Unfortunately, the study provided no empirical data to back up 
this observation. To assess its validity, this thesis draws 
direct comparisons between the income patterns of those elderly 
included in social security schemes and those without official 
protection.
c) Surveys of other income maintenance institutions.
There are a number of institutions other than public sector 
initiatives or micro-level strategies which may affect the 
economic welfare of the elderly. These include non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), grassroots community initiatives and 
various forms of mutual aid. These issues have generated 
increasing academic attention in recent years. During the 1980s 
a trend towards redemocratisation in Latin America saw the 
appearance of new social movements concerned with a wide range
34S.Ramos Las relaciones de oarentesco v de ayuda mutua, 
Buenos Aires (1981), pp.19-20.
32
of issues and operating outside established political 
frameworks.35 At the same time, the general failure of states to 
mitigate the social cost of economic crises led to the emergence 
and rapid growth of NGOs and other voluntary initiatives.36
The literature on these emergent welfare structures generally 
places more emphasis on the evolution and nature of the 
organisations themselves than their concrete impact on their 
target groups. This is partly because they often provide indirect 
forms of assistance which are not easily quantifiable. Virtually 
no studies consider the importance of such initiatives for the 
elderly. This is surprising, given the prominent role played by 
the elderly in new social movements in countries such as 
Argentina.37 This thesis includes detailed accounts of a number 
of such organisations and asseses their capacity to meet the 
economic needs of poor elderly.
35E.Jelln Los nuevos movimientos sociales/2. Derechos 
humanos. obreros. barrios. Buenos Aires (1985); A.Escobar and 
S.Alvarez, eds The making of social movements in Latin America: 
identity, strategy, and democracy, Oxford (1992).
36L.Landim "Non-governmental organisations in Latin America" 
World development (1987).
37H.Leis El movimiento por los derechos humanos v la 
oolitica araentina, Buenos Aires (1989) refers to the central 
role played by elderly women in the human rights movement in the 
late 1970s. The high level of political mobilisation among 
elderly in the early 1990s is reflected in frequent newspaper 
accounts of protests and demonstrations against state pension 
policy (for example, see "Las protestas de los jubilados en la 
mira" Clarin. Buenos Aires, 20.10.92).
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3) Orientation.
As has been shown, most of the literature dealing with the 
economic welfare of groups such as the elderly is primarily 
interested in the institutions created to this end rather than 
their actual impact on the daily lives of these groups. Thus, 
micro-level studies focus on the form and dynamics of households, 
whilst analyses of social security systems emphasise their 
structure and organisational efficiency. These issues are 
important enough to justify the academic attention which has been 
devoted to them. However, the institutional focus has led to a 
number of gaps in research. Little has been done to assess 
relationships between the various forms of institutions and 
strategies or the ways in which they combine to form patterns of 
resource opportunities and constraints for particular groups. 
This can only be done by complementing an institutional approach 
with a group and problem-specific one.
This thesis focuses on a specific contingency (the maintenance 
of income when elderly) for a narrowly defined group (shanty town 
residents in Greater Buenos Aires). These parameters were 
selected for a number of reasons. As mentioned earlier, the 
elderly already account for the bulk of social expenditure in 
many developing countries. As demographic ageing accelerates over 
the next decades, this will pose even greater challenges. The 
elderly are in many respects more easily defined and identified 
than other groups which could have been chosen for study, such 
as the unemployed. Greater Buenos Aires was selected since it
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already contains far higher proportions of elderly than most 
other large Latin American and third world cities. In addition, 
Argentina has a long-established social security system which has 
suffered from problems characteristic of the region. To narrow 
the focus of enquiry still further it was elected to restrict the 
investigation to those elderly in a condition of poverty, since 
it is likely that this group suffers most hardship from any 
shortcomings in social policy. Thus, much of the thesis deals 
specifically with the cases of a number of shanty towns. This 
narrow definition of target group is coupled with a strictly 
economic focus. As such, the thesis is only concerned with the 
economic welfare of the elderly, excluding healthcare and other 
issues from its enquiry.
The thesis maps out the full range of income maintenance 
institutions and strategies potentially available to elderly 
shanty town residents, noting areas of complementarity, over-lap 
and conflict between them. In this way the thesis is able to 
integrate both micro and macro-scale perspectives of the same 
phenomenon. The research also clarifies the relationship between 
state and non-state action in the realm of welfare. Within this 
investigation a number of more specific questions are posed. 
These include the effect of gender and past employment on elderly 
income maintenance, gaps between potential and actual access to 
institutional support and the economic impact of local 
organisations.
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4) Methodology and structure.
The integration of data from macro, micro and intervening levels 
about elderly income maintenance presents a number of 
methodological challenges. The first of these is the availability 
of information. Whilst there are a large quantity of national- 
level data for social insurance coverage, these suffer from a 
number of weaknesses. As has already been mentioned, the 
reliability of these data has not been fully tested at ground 
level. Moreover, these sources are not sufficiently disaggregated 
to provide information about specific sub-groups such as shanty 
town residents. Data for social assistance and smaller-scale 
insurance programmes are much less complete and those for micro­
level institutions and strategies are almost totally absent. 
Thus, the problem is not just putting the various sets of 
information together, but how to fill the gaps in it.
In the absence of adequate primary data sources at the micro 
level, the thesis must generate its own. This can only be done 
by directly surveying and interviewing a representative sample 
of elderly. Since the thesis lacks the resources to conduct a 
full survey on a nationwide or even city-wide basis it focuses 
on case studies of three individual shanty towns with different 
socio-economic and institutional characteristics. These are put 
within the broader context of macro-level institutions. The case 
studies do not necessarily comprise a representative sample of 
all elderly shanty town residents, but provide numerous insights 
into how a complex array of phenomena interact and bear on the
36
economic possibilities of individuals.
The research is based on a wide range of sources, including 
archives, official data sets, newspaper articles, NGO reports, 
taped interviews and informal conversations with interested 
actors, direct (sometimes participant) observations and a 
questionnaire. Different chapters of the thesis tend to draw more 
on particular types of data. As such, it is more appropriate to 
examine problems relating to specific data collection methods at 
the beginning of those chapters rather than in the introduction 
to the thesis as a whole. Although this eclecticism of data 
presents a challenge when different sources contradict each 
other, it is a useful means of combining divergent perspectives 
of the same issue. Where problems of contradiction occur, they 
are dealt with on an individual basis.
One methodological point of relevance to the thesis as a whole 
is the way in which the "elderly" are defined. Old age is a very 
complex phenomenon, which cannot simply be reduced to the number 
of years a person has lived. Account must be taken of a person's 
physiological and psychological condition, their economic and 
social status and their self-perception. Whilst recognising the 
shortcomings of using age as a means to define elderly, no other 
definitions provide practical alternatives. A definition based 
on life-cycle stages might take into account when a person 
becomes a grandparent or retires from economic activity. However, 
this approach automatically excludes those people who never had 
a family and those who were never economically active in the
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first place. In addition, it could lead to socio-economic bias, 
since rich people can afford to retire sooner than the poor can. 
Likewise, definitions based on a person's mental or physical 
health are fraught with difficulties. Since all age groups suffer 
from health problems this would require the establishment of some 
form of morbidity threshold. Finally, a definition could be left 
to the individual him/herself. This approach is useful in as much 
as the self-perception of an individual has a strong effect on 
his/her economic behaviour. However, it may lead to considerable 
methodological difficulties, especially for quantitative surveys.
This thesis elects to define the elderly in terms of age. This 
does not necessarily mean that age is the best indicator, but 
reflects practical methodological considerations. The thesis is 
concerned with the plight of the elderly only in as much as they 
constitute a group which would be included in a universal social 
security programme. Since most social security benefits for the 
elderly set specific lower age limits, it is logical for this 
thesis to do the same. Furthermore, most of the available 
statistical data refer to age rather than other indicators. Using 
a more complex definition would have made the compilation of a 
significant quantitative survey impossible in the time available.
This still leaves the question of what age should be used as a 
cut-off point in defining the elderly. Since ageing is a gradual 
process any threshold will inevitably be artificial. Often, 
studies of ageing find it useful to distinguish between the 
"young old" and the "old old", arguing that the former group
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remains relatively fit and active, whilst the latter is highly 
dependent on the care and support of others.38 In many respects 
the "young old" group may have more in common with those in late 
middle age than with the "old olds".
Given its focus on income maintenance strategies, this thesis 
elects to define the elderly as those at or above the minimum 
retirement age in Argentina at the period of the investigation: 
65 for men and 60 for women. This definition is a general 
guideline rather than an absolute rule and the thesis draws on 
pre-existing research and official surveys which sometimes use 
different cut-off points. The questionnaire survey also takes a 
flexible approach including a number of respondents aged between 
55 and 60 who nevertheless were considered (both by themselves 
and by those living with them) to be elderly.
Chapter two provides and analyses background context which is 
required for a full understanding of the research. It examines 
the pattern of ageing which has occurred in Argentina and the 
evolution of shanty towns in Greater Buenos Aires. The subsequent 
chapters form a progression from macro to micro perspectives. 
They begin with an analysis of elderly income maintenance in 
Argentina and Greater Buenos Aires as a whole, then examine the 
cases of particular neighbourhoods and finally consider 
individual experiences. This hierarchical structure enables an 
accumulation of information so that the later chapters are
38K.Tout Ageing in developing countries. London (198 9) pp. 8-
10 .
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presented in the light of findings of earlier ones. Thus, 
although the final chapter is primarily concerned with the 
experiences of individuals, its findings are only meaningful when 
placed in national, regional and local contexts.
40
CHAPTER TWO: AGEING, EMPLOYMENT AND SHANTY TOWNS IN GREATER
BUENOS AIRES: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
1) Introduction.
This chapter is divided into a number of sections each dealing 
with a particular feature of Argentina's social and economic 
development in the twentieth century. Rather than considering 
these processes in isolation, this structure helps clarify areas 
where important inter-relationships occurred. The opening 
section charts and explains the growth of the aged population in 
Argentina, making comparisons with other regions and 
highlighting trends in Greater Buenos Aires (GBA). This reveals 
that the Argentine capital had a demographic structure more akin 
to Western Europe than Latin America, with a high proportion of 
elderly residents. Following this, the chapter examines the 
evolution of labour markets in the country, emphasising those 
developments most likely to affect the groups studied in this 
thesis. It then considers how Greater Buenos Aires was able to 
meet the housing needs of migrants drawn by employment 
opportunities and how the nature of this problem changed over 
time. Particular attention is paid to the origins and 
characteristics of shanty towns in the city, as well as the 
peculiarities of their demographic structures.
2) Demographic ageing in Argentina.
Figure 11:1 shows that gradual demographic ageing began to occur 
in Argentina from around the First World War, that this
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Figure i i : l  percentage of total population aged 
over 65 years old, 1870-2020.
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Figure i i  s 2 Crude birth rate per 1000 in Argentina 
and Italy, 1870-1990
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last two centuries. Princeton (1977), p.57; UN World 
population..., pp.370 and 510; S.Schkolnik "Los cambios en la 
composicion de la poblacion" in Z.Recchini de Lattes and 
A.Lattes, eds La poblacion.... p.34.
accelerated after the 1950s and is projected to level out by the 
end of the century. This pattern of ageing was closer to that of 
the United Kingdom (which, as the first industrial economy, 
established a trend that would become typical for north western 
Europe) than that of Brazil or Latin America as a whole. Since 
ageing began sooner and was more rapid in Argentina than 
elsewhere in Latin America, the country contained a 
disproportionately high number of elderly by the 1990s.
Table 11:1 Average life expectancy in Argentina. 1869-1948.
1869-1895 32.86 1959-1961 66.37
1895-1914 40 . 04 1965-1970 67.2
1913-1915 48.50 1975-1980 68.6
1946-48 61.08 1980-1985 69.7
Sources: A.de Lattes "El crecimiento de la poblacion y sus
componentes demograficos entre 1870 y 1970" in Z.Recchini de 
Lattes and A.Lattes, eds La poblacion araentina. Buenos Aires 
(1975), p.40; UN World population prospects 1990. New York
(1991), p.310.
Population ageing results from a combination of factors, 
including reduced fertility and increased life expectancy.39 The 
limited data available for Argentina before the 1950s (Table 
11:1 and Figure 11:2) indicate that both these trends were very 
pronounced in the first half of the twentieth century and 
subsequently levelled out. By the 1930s these changes had had a 
noticable effect on the composition of the population as a whole 
and the rate of demographic ageing had begun to accelerate.
39P.Johnson and J.Falkingham Ageing and economic welfare. 
London (1992), pp 18-48 provide a detailed analysis of the 
demographic causes of ageing.
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Figure ii:3 Net immigration to Argentina,
1860-1970.
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Argentine republic, Yale 1970, p.424; Academia Nacional de Ciencias 
Economicas Estadisticas historicas argentinas. Compendio 1873-1973, 
Buenos Aires 1988.
Fertility and life expectancy are, in turn, influenced by a 
large number of non-demographic factors, including urbanisation, 
living standards and healthcare.40 In the case of Argentina, 
particular attention must also be paid to the role of 
immigration, which was the dominant demographic feature of the 
late 19th and 20th centuries.
Figure 11:3 shows net immigration to Argentina. It is useful to 
break this process down into a number of waves. The first, and 
most substantial, occurred approximately between 1880 and 1930. 
During this period, net immigration totalled over three million, 
accounting for around half the country's population growth.41 
Overseas immigrants were drawn by and helped power the dramatic 
economic growth which Argentina experienced at this time.42 They 
also had a number of demographic effects. First, the great 
majority of immigrants were of working age, which initially 
reduced the relative proportions of children and elderly in
40S.Cochrane "Effects of education and urbanisation on 
fertility" in R.Bulato and R.Dee, eds Determinants of fertility 
in developing countries. Volume 2. Fertility regulation and 
institutional influences. London (1983), pp.587-626 provides a 
good analysis of these effects.
41G.Germani "Mass immigration and modernization in 
Argentina" in I.Horowitz, ed Masses in Latin America. Oxford 
(1970) and A.Bunge "Setenta anos de inmigracion" Revista de 
Economia Argentina. October 1926 provide good accounts of this 
wave of immigration. N.Sanchez-Albornoz The population of Latin 
America: a history. London (1974), pp.146-168 puts it in a
continental perspective.
42V.Vasquez-Presado El caso arqentino: micrracion de
factores, comercio exterior v desarrollo. 1875-1914. Buenos 
Aires (1971); D.Rock "The Argentine economy, 1880-1914: some
salient features" in G.Di Telia and D.Platt, eds The political 
economy of Argentina. 1880-1946. London (1986) and R.Cortes 
Conde El proareso arqentino. 1880-1914. Buenos Aires (1979) 
provide general accounts of this period.
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Argentina.43 However, these immigrants would themselves become 
elderly in subsequent decades, promoting the acceleration of 
ageing in the mid-twentieth century. Secondly, immigrants 
promoted urbanisation. The vast majority of newcomers settled in 
cities along the littoral, which served as export centres for 
wheat, beef and other agricultural products.44 Between 1869 and 
1914, the population of Greater Buenos Aires grew from 229,000 
to 2 , 0 3 4 , 0 0 0 . 45 An additional effect of immigration which is 
overlooked in the general literature was its lowering of 
fertility levels in the host country.46 The great majority of 
overseas immigrants were from southern Europe where fertility 
was low relative to Argentina at that time (see Figure 11:2) . By 
the second quarter of the 2 0th Century, low immigrant fertility 
had led to a noticable rise in the proportion of elderly in the 
population as a whole. This period of massive immigration 
occurred at the same time as initial steps were taken to develop 
effective healthcare and welfare systems,47 all of which 
combined to provide the basis of accelerated ageing in future 
decades.
43Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC) Censo 
nacional de poblacion v vivienda 1991 (Total del pais). Buenos 
Aires (1993), p.52.
44G.Germani Estructura social de la Argentina. Analisis 
estadistico. Buenos Aires (1955) p.296.
45J.Scobie Buenos Aires. Plaza to suburb. 1870 to 1910. New 
York (1974), pp.8-12.
46For example, A.de Lattes "El crecimiento..", pp.61-66 
analyses the demographic impact of migration but makes no 
reference to fertility.
47E.Isuani and H.Mercer La fragmentacion institucional de 
sector salud. Pluralismo o irracionalidad?. Buenos Aires (1988) , 
pp.45-8; H.Recalde Beneficencia. asistencialismo estatal v 
prevision social/l. Buenos Aires (1991), pp.63-84; and chapter 
three.
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Overseas immigration came to an abrupt halt with the World 
Depression of 193 0 and did not become significant again until 
after the Second World War. Although Argentina was unable to 
regain the economic momentum of the early 20th century, there 
were rapid increases in industrial employment, particularly 
around Greater Buenos Aires.48 These opportunities drew large 
numbers of migrants from the Argentine interior and the 
continuation of small but significant influxes from neighbouring 
countries. Whilst European immigration had again petered out by 
the late 1950s, internal and continental flows continued, 
largely uninterrupted, through to the 1970s. This was reflected 
in long-term shifts in the composition of the resident 
population (Table 11:2).
On one hand, the effects of continental immigration were similar 
to those of the earlier wave from overseas. It both increased 
the proportion of the population at working age and encouraged 
further urbanisation. On the other, it should be noted that the 
fertility levels in neighbouring countries were generally much 
higher than in Argentina.49 Thus, it is not easy to assess 
whether continental immigration accelerated or reduced 
demographic ageing in the mid-twentieth century. Whichever was 
the case, the overall effect was slight since, as shown in Table
48R.Walter "The socio-economic growth of Buenos Aires in the 
twentieth century" in S.Ross and T.McGann, eds Buenos Aires: 400 
years, Austin (1982), p.95 shows that industrial employment in 
GBA more than doubled between 1935 and 1946, rising from 3 07,818 
to 628,616.
49In 1940 the crude birth rate per 1000 was 24.0 in 
Argentina, compared to 33.4 in both Chile and Paraguay 
(Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Hacienda, Direccion Nacional 
de Estadistica y Censos Informe demografico. 1944-1955. Buenos 
Aires (1956) p.69).
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Table 11:2 Place of birth of the Argentine population. 1869- 
1990.
Year Native-born(%) Neighbouring 
countries (%)
Other (%)
1869 87.9 2.4 9.7
1895 74.6 2.9 22 .5
1914 69.7 2.6 27.7
1947 84.7 2.0 13 .3
1960 87.0 2.3 10.7
1970 91.0 2 . 0 7.0
1980 93 . 0 2.0 7.0
1990 95.0 3.0 2.0
Sources: Argentine Republic, Consejo Federal de Inversiones
Agunos aspectos cuantitativos de la poblacion extraniera 
oriainaria de paises limitrofes. Buenos Aires (1973); S.Torrado 
Estructura social de la Argentina. 1945-1983. Buenos Aires
(1992), p.77; INDEC Censo nacional de poblacion v vivienda 1991 
(Total del pais). Buenos Aires (1993), p.55.
Table 11:3 Age structure bv place of birth (%). 1895-1991.
1895 1914 1947 1960 1970 1980 1991
AGE Total
0-14 41.3 40 .1 30.9 30.7 29.1 30.3 30.6
15-64 56 . 6 57 . 6 65.2 63 . 8 63 . 7 61.5 60.5
65 + 2 .1 2.3 3 . 9 5.5 7.2 8.2 8.9
Native
0-14 50.9 52.8 36.1 34 . 6 31.9 32 .2 32.0
15-64 47.2 45 . 6 61.9 62 .2 63 .3 61.2 60 .2
65 + 1.9 1.6 2.0 3.2 4.8 6.6 7.8
Foreign
0-14 12.7 10.1 1.8 5.5 3.3 4.5 4.7
15-64 84 . 6 86.0 83.7 73 . 6 66.9 65.2 67.1
65 + 2 . 7 3 . 9 14.5 20.9 29.8 30.3 28 .2
Source: INDEC Censo nacional de poblacion v vivienda. 1991
(Total del pais). Buenos Aires (1993), p.52.
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11:2, the size of this continental immigration relative to the 
total host population was much smaller than the preceding wave.
Table 11:3 and Figure 11:4 disaggregate the effects of 
immigration and changes in the native-born population on ageing. 
Both show that the proportion of native-born Argentines aged 
over 65 in 1960 (3.2 per cent) was significantly lower than that 
for the total population (5.5 per cent). Thus, had no 
immigration occurred, Argentina's population would have been 
only marginally more aged than that of countries such as Brazil 
(2.9 per cent aged over 65 in 1960) .50 Therefore, although 
continued urbanisation, high living standards, the up-grading of 
the healthcare system and the development of nationwide social 
security systems encouraged the ageing of both native and 
foreign-born residents, immigration accounted for most of the 
difference between Argentina and Latin America as a whole.51
The high proportion of immigrants from neighbouring countries 
aged over 65 in 1960, shown in Figure 11:4, is something of an 
anomoly. A number of possible explanations exist. The most 
likely reason was that many such immigrants were not formally 
registered as being resident. Official reports estimate that
50UN World population prospects. 1992. New York (1993) , 
p.394.
51This point is not made in existing studies. For example, 
United Nations Economic and social aspects of population ageing 
in Argentina. New York (1991), pp.27-33, stresses the importance 
of urbanisation, education, healthcare and living standards, but 
makes no reference to mass immigration. M.Muller La poblacion 
anciana de la Argentina: tendencia secular v caracteristicas
recientes, Buenos Aires (1981), p.9 briefly 'alludes to 
immigration but makes no reference to its impact on fertility.
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limitrofes. Buenos Aires 1973, p.35; Academia Nacional de Ciencias 
Economicas Estadisticas historicas.., pp.40-41.
clandestine immigration and non-registered births accounted for 
9.6 per cent of population growth between 193 0 and 1950.52 
Immigrants who were registered had probably been in Argentina 
for a prolonged period and were therefore more likely to be 
elderly. Likewise, non-registration of births may partly account 
for the relatively low proportion of children in this group.
The acceleration of ageing in the mid-twentieth century was, 
then, largely the consequence of migrations and socio-economic 
changes which had occurred before 1930. These effects were 
compounded by the continued up-grading of healthcare, the 
expansion of social welfare and living standards far higher than 
those in Latin America as a whole.53 The impact of the first 
wave of overseas immigration had passed by the 1970s, since the 
majority of first generation immigrants were no longer living, 
and may partly explain the levelling off of ageing since that 
time. The slight acceleration of ageing projected from the end 
of the century will reflect both the impact of second generation 
immigrants and that of smaller, post-war waves.
3) Demographic ageing in Greater Buenos Aires.
Table 11:4 and Figure 11:5 show the pattern of ageing in Greater
“Calculated from Argentine Republic, Ministerio de 
Hacienda, Direccion Nacional de Estadistica y Censos Informe 
demoarafico... p.12.
“For examples of this, see ECLA Statistical yearbook for 
Latin America. 1980. Santiago (1981), pp.84-96.
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Figure II: 5 Population aged over 65 years old in Argentina and
Buenos Aires, 1869-1991.
%
20
Capital
Province15
Argentina
10
5
0
1869 1895 1914 1947 1960 1970 1980 1991
Sources:"Apendice" in Z.Recchini de Lattes, et al, eds La 
poblacion... p.2 01; INDEC Censo nacional de poblacion v vivienda, 
1991 (total del pais), p.52.
Buenos Aires.54 Not surprisingly, the Federal Capital displays 
a sharper rise in the number of elderly than the country as a 
whole. This results from a number of effects, including 
immigration, rural-urban migration, relatively high living 
standards, concentrations of welfare facilities and urban 
lifestyles.
Table 11:4 Population of Greater Buenos Aires. 1869-1991.
Year Total population Population aged over 
65 years old (%) *
1869 229,000 2.0
1895 782,000
COf—1
1914 2, 034,000 2.3
1947 4,722,000 4.7
1960 6,739,000 6.9
1970 8,435,000
1980 9,766,000 9.6
1991 10,935,000 10 . 5
*Data for Federal Capital and Province of Buenos Aires as a 
whole.
Source: Z.Recchini de Lattes "Urbanizacion" in Z.Recchini de
Lattes and A.Lattes La poblacion arcrentina, Buenos Aires 1975, 
p.124.; "Apendice" in Z.Recchini de Lattes and A.de Lattes, eds 
La poblacion... pp.201 and 205.
As mentioned earlier, Greater Buenos Aires and the surrounding 
region attracted the great majority of overseas immigrants 
before 1930. Table 11:5 shows that the combined influxes of 
immigrants and internal migrants continued to account for the
54As Map 11:1 shows, Greater Buenos Aires consists of the 
Federal Capital district (Capital) and neighbouring 
municipalities of the Province of Buenos Aires (Provincial 
Section) . In 1991 the Capital had a population of 2,965,403, the 
Provincial Section contained 7,969,324 and remaining parts of 
the Province 4,625,650.
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Table 11:5 Components of demographic growth in Greater Buenos 
Aires (%), 1855-1970.
Period Natural
increase
Internal
migration
Immigration Residual
1855-70 15.1 12.9 95.7 -23 .7
1885-95 30.7 12 .3 68.2 -11.2
1905-15 38.5 6.4 70.2 -15.1
1915-35 49.7 22.6 45.9 -18.2
1935-45 35.3 57.9 22.6 -15.8
1945-60 26 . 0 44.0 30.0 0
1960-70 46 . 9 47.2 5.9 0
Source: Z.Recchini de Lattes "Urbanizacion" in Z.Recchini de
Lattes and A.Lattes, eds la poblacion... p.131.
bulk of the city's growth through to the 1970s, as European 
arrivals were superseded by newcomers from neighbouring 
countries and substantial flows from the interior.55 As with 
continental immigrants, internal migrants included 
disproportionate numbers of under 3 0 year-olds from regions of 
relatively high fertility, which would have partly off-set the 
effect of residents born in Europe.56
Also, as stated above, the expansion of healthcare and other 
social welfare services was strongly focussed around Greater
55S.Torrado Estructura social de la Argentina. 1945-1983. 
Buenos Aires, 1992, pp.83-88 and W.Little "The popular origins 
of Peronism" in D.Rock, ed Argentina in the twentieth century. 
London (1975), pp.164-66 provide detailed statistical analyses 
of these internal migrations.
56For example, in 1947 crude reproduction rates in northern 
Argentina were 2.9, compared to only 1.0 in the Capital and 
Province of Buenos Aires (see A. Lattes "Cambios en la 
composicion de la poblacion" in Z. Recchini de Lattes and A. 
Lattes, eds La poblacion argentina... p. 51 and Z.Recchini de 
Lattes "Urbanizacion", pp.110-111).
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Buenos Aires.57 Whilst no regionally disaggregated data for
living standards (such as per capita income) are available
before 1980, indirect indicators show that standards in the
Federal Capital and, to a lesser extent, the Province of Buenos
Aires were significantly higher than in most other parts of the 
country.58 These factors served both to attract migrants and 
accelerate the ageing of the existing population.
Figure 11:5 shows that the Province of Buenos Aires contained a 
much smaller proportion of elderly than the Federal Capital 
district. Unfortunately, separate data for those sections of the 
Province which form part of Greater Buenos Aires do not exist. 
For the same reasons as in the Capital, it is probable that 
these would contain a larger share of elderly than elsewhere in 
the Province. Nevertheless, given that roughly two thirds of the 
Province's population lives in GBA, it is likely that the 
proportion is substantially lower than in the Capital.
Differences between the Capital and provincial sections of 
Greater Buenos Aires largely reflected the periods during which 
they experienced most rapid growth. In the Capital this occurred 
during the 70 years before the Second World War. Since then, the 
district's population suffered a gradual but steady decline. By 
contrast, the population of the provincial section roughly 
trebled between 1947 and 1960 and consequently contained a
57For example, in 1969 the Capital contained 7.8 hospital 
beds per 1000 inhabitants, compared to only 5.6 in the country 
as a whole (C.Escude Asoectos ocultos.. p.114). For regional 
comparisons of social security coverage see chapter three.
58For example, see INDEC Anuario estadistico de la Republics 
Argentina. 1979.1980. Buenos Aires (1981), pp.220-23 and 276-81.
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higher proportion of post-Second World War immigrants than the 
Capital (see Table 11:6) . As mentioned earlier, these tended to 
have higher fertility levels than previous waves and were less 
likely to have reached old age by the 1980s. Thus, whilst 
Greater Buenos Aires contained a larger proportion of elderly 
than Argentina as a whole, there were marked variations within 
the city. As will be seen later in the chapter, these variations 
make it difficult to predict the concentration of elderly living 
in particular neighbourhoods of the city.
Table 11:6 Place of birth of population resident in Buenos 
Aires. 1947.
Place of birth Resident of Federal 
Capital (%)
Resident of 
Province of Buenos 
Aires (PBA) (%)
Capital or PBA 67. 0 75.1
Elsewhere in 
Argentina
2 . 8 4.2
Elsewhere in the 
Americas
2.2 1.3
Beyond the 
Americas
28 . 0 19.4
Source: calculated from Argentine Republic, Ministerio de
Hacienda, Direccion Nacional de Estadistica y Censos Informe 
demoarafico de la Republics Argentina. 1944-54. Buenos Aires 
(1956), pp.38-9 and 44-5.
4) Employment trends and poverty in Greater Buenos Aires.
It is logical that the real incomes and occupations held by 
individuals during their prime working years have a 
considerableinfluence on their propensity to save, make pension 
contributions or accumulate other assets for later life. Thus,
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Figure 11:6 Average annual gross domestic product growth
rates, 1900-1990.
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the economic condition of elderly Argentines in the 1990s 
depended, to some extent, on the performance of the economy and 
the configuration of the labour market during the preceding 
decades. This section pays particular attention to employment in 
manufacturing and the urban informal sector since, as is shown 
later in the thesis, these were of particular significance to 
the groups studied.
Figure 11:6 shows that Argentina was unable to repeat the rapid 
economic growth it experienced before the First World War.59 
Despite this, the national labour market continued to expand, 
with the economically active population rising from 
approximately two million in 1900 (68 per cent of the total
population) to over ten million in 1980 (36 per cent).60
It is possible to identify a number of phases in Argentina's 
development„ and employment structure through the twentieth 
century. Initially, the country's economy was dominated by the 
export of primary produce, with agriculture accounting for the
r
largest share of employment (see Table 11:7). Urbanisation and 
the wealth generated by rapid growth had also led to the 
formation of a substantial tertiary sector. Manufacturing 
employment was relatively limited and fell into two separate 
areas: semi-artTsanal production for the domestic market and the
59C.Lewis "Cycles and macroeconomic policy since the 193 0s" 
in C.Lewis and N.Torrents, eds Argentina in the crisis years 
(1983-1990). London (1993), pp.103-23 gives a good account of 
the problems which beset the Argentine economy.
60Comision Economica para America Latina (CEPAL) Analisis v 
provecciones del desarrollo economico. V. El desarrollo 
economico de la Argentina. Mexico (1959), p.37.
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Table 11:7 Sectoral composition of the labour force. 1900-1967.
Agric­
ulture
Manufact­
uring*
Services Constr­
uction**
1900-04 783 396 723 94
1925-29 1, 539 890 1, 647 212
1947 1, 646 1,497 2,8201 304
1960 1,457 2, 014 3,549 459
1970 1, 411 2, 095 4,579 766
1980 1,306 2,270 5,347 1, 067
* Data from 1947 includes mine workers.
** Data up to 1929 includes mine workers.
Source: Calculated from UN, Comision Economica para America
Latina (CEPAL) Analisis v provecciones del desarrollo economico. 
El desarrollo economico de la Argentina. Mexico (1959), pp 37- 
39; S. Torrado Estructura social de la Argentina: 1945-1983.
Buenos Aires (1992), p.125.
processing of primary exports in large, modern factories.61 
Manufacturing was not particularly prominent in Greater Buenos 
Aires, which contained 21.5 per cent of industrial 
establishments by 1914, compared to 25.8 per cent of the 
national population.62
As shown in Table 11:7, the economically active population more 
than doubled between 1900 and 1930, with both manufacturing and 
services increasing slightly in relative importance. However, it 
was between 193 0 and 1955 that both sectors experienced their
61R.Sautu "Poder economico y burgesia industrial en la 
Argentina, 193 0-54" Revista Latinoamericana de Socioloaia 
(1968); B.Villafane "Las industrias argentinas y la politica 
nacional" Revista de Economia Argentina, October 1926.
62R.Walter "The socio-economic growth..", p.95. This figure 
may underestimate the true importance of industry in GBA since 
average firm sizes may have been larger than elsewhere. This 
indicator is used because data for personnel employed is not 
available.
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most impressive expansion. In this second period industrial 
growth mainly consisted of production for the domestic market, 
stimulated by tariffs and a range of other import-substituting 
policies.63 Much of this new industry consisted of labour- 
intensive, light consumer manufacturing and was highly 
concentrated in or around Greater Buenos Aires.64 The equally 
rapid expansion of the service sector was largely attributable 
to a three-fold increase in public employment.65
Although employment in both services and manufacturing continued 
to grow quickly after the mid 1950s, this belied important 
changes in the pattern of industrialisation. New policies began 
to emphasise high-technology, capital-intensive activities and 
afforded a greater role to foreign firms and investment.66 Thus, 
whereas manufacturing output rose by 123 per cent between 1950 
and 19 6 9 , 67 employment in the sector only increased by 32 per
“British Government, Department of Overseas Trade Report on 
economic and commercial conditions in the Argentine Republic. 
June 1939, pp.109-115; C.Diaz-Alejandro Essays on the economic 
history of the Argentine Republic, New Haven (1970), pp.106-26 
and P.Lewis The crisis of Argentine capitalism, London (1990), 
pp.79-98 and 184-88.
64R.Walter "The socioeconomic growth...", p.95. More detail 
about the composition of industrial growth around GBA is 
available in Provincia de Buenos Aires, Ministerio de Hacienda, 
Economia y Prevision Buenos Aires en cifras. La Plata (1947), 
pp.67-82.
65CEPAL Analisis v. . . . p. 39. A large part of this was 
accounted for by the expansion of social welfare agencies (see 
chapter three).
66L.Alschuler "Argentina: from egalitarian stagnation to
authoritarian growth" in L. Alschuler, ed Multinationals and 
maldevelopment. London (1987), pp.46-63.
67ECLA Statistical bulletin for Latin America, volume 8. 
Santiago (1969), pp.141-2.
61
cent, 1946 to 1973.68 Limited opportunities for industrial 
employment and acute cyclical recessions partly explain the 
persistence of a small but significant urban informal sector 
(UIS) (see Table 11:8).
Table 11:8 Proportion of total urban employment in the urban 
informal sector (UIS), 1950-1992 (%).
Urban
Informal
Sector
Domestic
Service
Other
1950 13 .2 7.9 78.9
1960 11.3 7.0 81.7
1970 11.6 7.5 80.9
1980 20 .4 6.0 73 .6
1985 22.9 6.5 70.6
1990 24 .7 7.9 67.4
1992 25.9 7.8 66.3
Note: 1950-70 = share of urban employment, 1980-1992 = share
non-agricultural employment.
Sources: PREALC Newsletter number 32. Santiago (1993), p.4;
PREALC Mercado de trabaio en cifras. 1950-1980. Santiago (1982) , 
p.34 .
A combination of economic bottlenecks and political unrest 
caused Argentine industrial growth to falter by the late 
1960s.69 As a result of deepening crises and, at times,perverse 
policies the sector declined in both relative and absolute terms 
during the 1970s and 1980s.70 Between 1960 and 1980, its share
68S.Torrado Estructura social.... p.217.
69R.Mallon and J.Sourrouille Economic policy making in a 
conflict society: the Argentine case, Cambridge Mass. (1975), 
pp.29-34.
70W.Smith "Reflections on the political economy of 
authoritarian rule and capitalist reorganisations in 
contemporary Argentina" in P. O'Brien and P. Cammack, eds
62
Figure I I : 7 Households below the poverty line in Greater
Buenos Aires, 1970-1992.
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Aires 1988-1992. Buenos Aires 1993, p.10; A. Minujim and P. Vinocur 
"Qui^nes son los pobres del Gran Buenos Aires?" Comercio Exterior. 
Mexico 1992, p.398; 0. Altimir and J. Sourrouille Measuring levels 
of living in Latin America: an overview of the main problems.
Washington 1980, p.42.
of total urban employment dropped from 20.2 to 14.6 per cent.71 
Since this fall was not off-set by substantial rises in formal 
employment either in agriculture or services, it encouraged the 
expansion of the UIS (Table II : 872), as well as unemployment and 
underemployment.73 These changes in the configuration of the 
national and local labour markets meant that a high proportion 
of those who had reached old age by the 1990s would have worked 
in a variety of activities, both formal and informal. The effects 
of this are considered in chapter five.
Faltering economic growth, deindustrialisation and the expansion 
of informal activities all contributed to significant increases 
in urban poverty from the early 1980s. As shown in Figure 11:7, 
in 1970 (the first year for which data is available) 5 per cent 
of urban households were identified as below the national 
poverty line. This proportion increased sharply to 11.6 per cent 
of Greater Buenos Aires in 1980 and 38.3 per cent in the
recession of 1989, but subsequently fell as the economy
recovered. Several studies have indicated that the bulk of
Argentina's "new poor" was accounted for by households of middle 
class origin, whereas there was little change in the number of
Generals in retreat. Manchester (1985), pp.67-70.
71S.Torrado Estructura social... p.207.
72A similar trend is observable for Greater Buenos Aires 
where informal employment rose from 39.0 to 47.2 per cent of the 
total between 1974 and 1988. A.Orsatti "Informalidad y 
estructura productiva en Argentina" in J.Schatan, D.Paas and 
A.Orsatti, eds El sector informal en America Latina: una
seleccion de perspectivas analiticas, Mexico (1991), p.173.
73R.Cortes "El empleo urbano argentino en los '80" in E. 
Bustelo and E. Isuani, eds Mucho. pocruito o nada. Crisis v 
alternativas de politica social en los '90, Buenos Aires (1990), 
pp. 223-54.
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Table 11:9 Age and poverty among household heads in Greater 
Buenos Aires. 1980-1987.
Age/status Under 60 Over 60
Not poor 1980 66.9 33.1
1987 66 .4 33.6
Below poverty line 1980 68.7 31.3
1987 71.0 29.0
Lacking basic 
needs74
1980 89.5 10.5
1987 84 . 8 15.2
Both 1980 90.9 9.1
1987 91.1 8 . 9
Source: A. Minujim and P. Vinocur "Quienes son los pobres del 
Gran Buenos Aires" Comercio Exterior, (1992), p.398.
those experiencing extreme, structural poverty.75 Thus, it may 
be the case that these recent trends were less significant for 
residents of shanty towns than for other sections of the 
population. Also, it is interesting that the proportion of 
elderly below the poverty line, whilst substantial, was slightly 
less than that of other age groups (see Table 11:9), suggesting 
that they were relatively succesful in obtaining income. 
Subsequent chapters examine the sources of financial support 
available to the elderly and ascertain whether the relative 
economic security of the group as a whole was reflected in the 
conditions of those living in shanty towns.
74This includes a range of indicators such as nutrition, 
quality of accomodation and access to basic education and 
healthcare (INDEC La pobreza en la Argentina. Buenos Aires 
(1984), pp.9-17 contains a detailed explanation of these).
75The most thorough of these studies is A.Minujim "En la 
rodada" in A. Minujim, ed Cuesta abaio. Los nuevos pobres: 
efectos de la crisis en la sociedad arqentina. Buenos Aires
(1992)
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5) The growth of and socio-economic conditions in shantv towns 
within Greater Buenos Aires.
Despite the existence of a large body of literature concerning 
the evolution of Third World shanty towns, there is no 
generally-accepted definition of what constitutes such a 
settlement. Most studies list a number of "typical 
characteristics", including poverty, a population composed of 
recent migrants and a predominance of self-built housing.76 
Argentine writers provide a rather different focus, emphasising 
illegality of tenure and give less attention to the presence of 
recent rural arrivals.77 These different emphases may reflect 
differences in the form and origin of shanty towns between 
Greater Buenos Aires and other Third World cities. Thus, one of 
the concerns of this section is whether Greater Buenos Aires 
constitutes an unusual or even unique case and, by extension, 
whether the general literature is of relevance to the thesis.
Problems of definition partly result from the heterogeneity of 
shanty towns and the cities in which they are located. As such,
76A.Gilbert and J.Gulger Cities, poverty and development. 
Urbanization in the third world. Oxford (1982), pp.87-88 and 
P.Lloyd Slums of hope? London (1979), p.39.
77For example, A.Ziccardi in Politicas de viviendas v 
movimientos urbanos; el caso de Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires 
(1977) defines shanties (known locally as villas de emeraencia 
or villas de miseria) as: "An urban enclave of poverty...formed 
by the peculiar conditions of a group of individuals or 
families, including precarious housing, a general lack of 
collective services and illegal tenure, and located within 
clearly identifiable geographical limits beyond which are found 
adequate housing, services and legal tenure." J.Imaz Los 
hundidos: Evaluacion de la poblacion marginal. Buenos Aires
(1974), p.83 uses similar criteria.
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more attention has been paid to categorising different types of 
shanty. One commonly-used distinction is that of "slums of hope" 
or self-help housing and "slums of despair". According to the 
general literature, the former enable migrants to adapt to urban 
life and are either up-graded over time or provide a temporary 
staging post to improved accommodation elsewhere in the city.78 
Conversely, the latter largely comprise of downwardly-mobile 
"dregs and drop-outs".
The presence of shanty towns in Third World cities can be 
explained in a number of ways. Radical writers argue that the 
urban informal sector and informal housing markets are a direct 
result of the cheap labour needs of the dominant capitalist 
sector.79 Others stress the failure of markets and the state to 
provide for housing needs following sudden surges in rural 
migration.80 It is important to assess the relevance of these, 
or other, explanations for the presence of shanties in GBA since 
they influence the economic conditions of their residents.
Table 11:10 summarises available data for the growth of shanties 
in Greater Buenos Aires. This data is both patchy and often 
contradictory. It is generally accepted by academics that
78W.Mangin "Latin American squatter settlements: a problem 
and a solution" Latin American Research Review. (1967) and 
P.Ward "The squatter settlement as slum or housing solution: the 
evidence from Mexico City" Land Economics. (1976) are good 
examples of this approach.
•79A.Portes and M.Johns "Class structure and spatial 
polarisation: an assesment of urban trends in the Third World" 
Tiidschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geoarafie. (1986).
80H.de Soto El otro sendero, Buenos Aires (1992), pp.7-10 
and A.Gilbert In search of a home. Rental and shared housing in 
Latin America. London (1993), pp.24-37.
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Table 11:10 The shantv town population of Greater Buenos Aires. 
1947-1991.
Year Source Capital Rest GBA Number of 
shanties
% total 
GBA
1947 NC 0 0 0 0
1956 CNV 33,920 78,430 21 -
1958 SAS 35,420 - 21 -
1959 MCBA 44,250 - 30 -
1960 NC 22,700 72,000 no data 1.4
1962 FP 50,000 - 32 -
1963 MCBA 42,462 - 33 -
1966 MBS 91,301 - 33 -
1967 MBS 102,143 - 33 -
1967 PEVE 80,000 200,000 - -
1967 CONADE 100,000 260,000 - -
1968 CMV 102,534 500,000 34 -
1968 MBS - 423,900 - -
1970 CONADE 106,776 344,589 23 -
1970 J . Imaz 127,815 265,179 - 4 . 7
1970 NC 109,651 - 27 -
1975 CMV 179,322 - 25 -
1976 CMV 224,885 - - -
1978 CMV 115,236 - - -
1979 CMV 51,845 - - -
1980 CMV 40,533 - 24 -
1981 PBA - 290,072 - -
1983 CMV* 12,593 - - -
1991 CMV 50,945 - 19 -
Key: NC=National Census
CNV=Comision Nacional de la Vivienda. 
SAS=Secretaria de Asistencia Social. 
MCBA=Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. 
FP=Federal Police
MBS=Ministerio de Bienestar Social.
PEVE=Plan de erradicacion de villas de emergencia. 
CONADE=Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo. 
PBA=Provincia de Buenos Aires.
CMV=Comision Municipal de la Vivienda.
[continued overleaf]
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* O.Yujnovsky suggests that this figure substantially under­
estimates the true size of the city's shanty population.81
Sources: M.Bellardi and A.De Paula Villas miseria: oricren,
erradicacion v respuestas populares. Buenos Aires (1986), pp.19, 
50 and 51; (Comision Municipal de la Vivienda (CMV) Censo de 
villas de emergencia, Buenos Aires (1992), pp.3 and 4, 
O.Yujnovsky Claves pollticas... p.3 54.
villas. in the modern sense of the term, already existed in the 
city during the 1940s.82 Likewise, there is no evidence that the 
shanty population of the provincial section of the city more 
than doubled between 1967 and 1968, as indicated. ^These 
inconsistencies partly result from differing methodologies and 
definitions of what constitutes a villa. In some cases, they 
also reflect the particular political objectives of the 
organisations responsible for the surveys.83 Whatever the 
reasons, it is evident that survey data alone cannot provide a 
clear account of shanty growth, making it necessary to include 
data from other sources, such as personal testimonies and non­
official documents.
The data in Table 11:10 also suggests that the proportion of the 
total population of Greater Buenos Aires living in shanties was 
relatively slight in relation to most other Latin American 
cities. By 1970 this had reached only 4.7 per cent, compared to
810 .Yujnovsky Claves pollticas del problema habitacional 
araentino, 1955-1981. Buenos Aires, (1984), p.359.
82For example, J.Scobie Buenos Aires, plaza-to suburb. 1870- 
1910, Oxford (1974), pp.180-81.
83As shown in Table 11:5, the 1981 figure has been strongly 
disputed. This probably resulted from a desire on the part of 
the MBS to play down the significance of villas. It is feasible 
that the sudden jump in the Capital's villa population between 
1970 and 1976 was partly an official exaggeration to gain 
support for erradication proposals.
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47 per cent in Mexico City and 59 per cent in Bogota.84 This
again indicates that the causes and socio-economic composition
of shanties in GBA may have been different from those elsewhere 
in the continent.
As mentioned earlier, Greater Buenos Aires experienced rapid 
population growth from the mid nineteenth century. This was in 
large part due to high levels of migration; initially from
Europe, later from the interior. The city's growth preceded both 
the accelerated expansion of most other Latin American cities 
and the appearance (at least according to survey data) of its 
own shanty towns. It is, therefore, important to consider to 
what extent Greater Buenos Aires was able to cope with the 
housing required for such large numbers of migrants from the 
late nineteenth century and what may have prompted the
appearance of shanties from the 1940s.
Table 11:11 The conventillo population of the Federal Capital. 
1880-1913.
Year Conventillo 
population (CP)
CP as % of total 
population
1880 51,900 20
1883 64,200 19
1887 116,200 26
1890 103,600 19
1904 138,200 14
1919 148,393 9
Sources: C.Sargent Greater Buenos Aires. 1870-1930. Arizona,
1974, p.33; J.Imaz Los hundidos: evaluacion de la poblacion
marginal, Buenos Aires, 1974, p.74.
84A.Gilbert In search. . . , pp. 22 and 119.
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During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Greater 
Buenos Aires did indeed suffer from a chronic housing 
shortage.85 Rather than leading to the expansion of shanties, 
the most frequent result was severe over-crowding in grim inner 
city hostels known locally as conventillos.86 Table 11:11 charts 
the growth of the conventillo population during this period. It 
shows that the numbers housed in these squalid conditions were 
far higher than the number recorded in Table 11:10 as living in 
villas by the 1950s.
The spread and persistence of conventillos were blamed on a 
combination of market failure and inadequate state intervention. 
Alejandro Bunge, the most prominent Argentine economist of the 
day, identified four key problems: the high wages paid
construction workers, technical backwardness, a shortage of open 
spaces near the city centre and inappropriate municipal 
regulations.'87 Government agencies did little to hide their lack 
of concern with these issues. According to the Municipality of 
the City of Buenos Aires:
. .we do not know whether it is more charitable to rent it [workers' 
housing] out cheaply or to give it away...We should leave this to those 
* people who are experienced in charity work, who do nothing else and give 
up their spare time for it. Let them do it in their own way and let us
85Between 1869 and 1914 the population of the Federal 
Capital rose by 132 per cent, compared to an increase of only 61 
per cent in the number of residential buildings. See F.Korn and 
L.de la Torre "Housing in Buenos Aires, 1887-1914" in D.Platt, 
ed Social welfare. 1850-1950. Argentina. Australia and Canada 
compared. London (1989), p.89.
86For good accounts of conditions in the conventillos see 
J.Mafud La clase obrera argentina. Buenos Aires (1988), pp.177- 
85 or J.Scobie Buenos Aires. . . pp. 148-55.
87A.Bunge "La carestia de la vivienda" Revista de Economia 
Argentina. Buenos Aires (1920), pp.389-401.
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trust that they do it well.88
Despite these problems, the proportion (but not absolute number) 
of the population living in conventillos had begun to decrease 
from the 1890s, as residents bought up plots of land in less 
central parts of the city. Several factors may have accounted 
for this, including improvements in the public transport system, 
rising real wages (between 1905 and 1912), easier access to 
credit and an increasing demand for family housing.89 Thus, it 
could be argued that conventillos performed a similar function 
to that of "slums of hope".90
The conventillos did not account for all the sub-standard or 
precarious housing in Buenos Aires at the start of the century. 
Scobie claims that the majority of the remaining population in 
the central city lived in similarly over-crowded and unhygienic 
conditions.91 Moreover he makes reference to a number of 
settlements of "temporary shacks" located alongside rubbish 
dumps and swampy areas.92 Similar settlements would temporarily 
appear in more central parts of the city at times of economic
88A.Ballent "La iglesia y la vivienda popular: la 'Gran
Colecta nacional' de 1919" in D.Armus, ed Mundo urbano v cultura 
popular. Estudios de historia social argentina. Buenos Aires 
(1990), p.216 endnote 26. For similar reports see L.Gutierrez 
and J.Suriano "Workers' housing and living conditions in Buenos 
Aires, 1880-1930" in J.Adelman, ed Essays in Argentine labour 
history 1870-1930. London (1992), pp.45-50.
89J.Mafud La clase.... pp.196-98 and C.Sargent Greater 
Buenos. . ♦ , pp.29-31.
90This interpretation is echoed in F.Korn and L.de la Torre 
"Housing in Buenos Aires...", p.94.
91J.Scobie Buenos Aires . . . , pp.146-47.
92ibid. pp.180-81.
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downturn.93 Unfortunately, there is little data for the total 
number which these housed or whether they were occupying the 
land illegally (although this was probable) . A survey of the 
Federal Capital conducted in 1936 found that over 10 per cent of 
homes were largely built of wood or metal and that 3 8 per cent 
were without running water.94 Thus, the "emergence" of villas 
in surveys from the 1950s may have simply constituted a new 
manifestation of an old problem or even the overdue recognition 
of a long-established phenomenon.
Most historical accounts link the appearance of villas to rural 
migration fueled by the rapid expansion of industrial employment 
in Greater Buenos Aires from the 1940s.95 This is evidenced by 
the positioning of many post-war villas alongside factories96. 
A survey of shanty towns conducted by the Comision Nacional de
93A.Rojo in Las villas de emercrencia, Buenos Aires (1976), 
p.34 refers to the appearance of "Villa Desocupacion" alongside 
the old port area during the economic recession at the time of 
the First World War. E. Pastrana in "Historia de una villa 
miseria de la ciudad de Buenos Aires (1948-1973)" Revista 
Interamericana de Planificacion. Mexico (1980), p.126 mentions 
that the villa reappeared during the downturn of the early 
193 0s, although a more permanent villa did not develop on this 
site until 1948.
94Argentine Republic, Departamento Nacional de Trabajo 
Condiciones de vida de la familia obrera, Buenos Aires (193 7), 
pp.65 and 68. The absence of more detailed information may have 
resulted from the disinterest taken by government agencies at 
this time. A 1932 report by the Comision de Estetica Edilicia 
claimed that: "Poor peoples' homes do not contain many luxuries, 
but this should not prevent their occupants from living there as 
happily as rich people do in their luxurious mansions, so long 
as they are virtuous and hard-working." (A.Rojo Las villas.... 
p.42) .
95For example, M.Bellardi and A.de Paula Villas miseria: 
origen, erradicacion v respuestas pppulares. Buenos Aires 
(1986), pp.10-12.
96Comision Nacional de la Vivienda (CNV) Plan de emeraencia, 
Buenos Aires (1956), p.42. Also see chapter four.
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Table 11:12: Industrial employment in Greater Buenos Aires.
1935-1984.
Year GBA Capital Provincial
Section
1935 307,818 244,231 63,587
1946 628,616 437,249 191,367
1954 700,414 406,922 293,492
1964 726,439 356,944 369,495
1973 748,607 304,476 444,131
1984 666,074 230,376 435,698
Sources: R.Walter "The socioeconomic growth of Buenos Aires in 
the twentieth century" in S.Ross and T.McGann, eds Buenos Aires: 
400 years. Austin (1982), p.95; Consejo Federal de Inversiones 
Las transformaciones socioeconomicas del area metropolitana. 
Reconversion industrial v empleo: 1960-1987. anexo estadistico, 
Buenos Aires (1987), p.14.
la Vivienda (CNV) in 1959 found that 76 per cent of adults were 
blue-collar workers and that the majority of these lived less 
than two kilometres from their workplaces.97 However, as Table 
11:12 shows, the rapid growth of industrial employment in GBA 
during the 1935 to 1954 period was followed by ten years of 
relative stagnation. Rather than the total amount, it was the 
changing distribution of industry within the city which prompted 
the foundation of these villas. Growth was greatest in the 
provincial section of GBA; indeed, industrial employment in the 
Capital had gone into decline by the late 1940s. Even within 
this district there was a pronounced shift of industrial
97CNV Plan de emercrencia. p.47.
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employment to more peripheral areas.98 Thus, whilst the dockers 
and factory hands of the inner city had been forced to find 
accommodation in conventillos, the relative abundance of open 
spaces in out-lying areas allowed more dispersed, informal 
settlement to take place.
Not all villas can be explained by the relocation of industrial 
employment: a number were established under unique
circumstances. Likewise, not all were peopled by rural migrants 
working in factories. One important exception was Barrio Retiro, 
in the heart of the Federal Capital, which initially functioned 
as a reception centre for both overseas and native migrants and 
continued to expand due to employment opportunities in the 
central business district.99 Another shanty, Villa Carton, was 
the direct, if unintentiona?., result of a government initiative 
to provide temporary accomodation.100
According to official surveys, villas also varied in terms of 
their "progressiveness". The CNV took pains to distinguish 
between those located alongside factories where "a handful of 
morally healthy individuals are striving to improve their 
present conditions"101 and other villas which were considered 
"permanent foci of disease and moral degradation, whose
98R.Walter "The socioeconomic growth...", p.96.
"E.Pastrana "Historia de una villa..", pp.126-9.
100A. Ro j o Las villas. . . . p. 44. The CMV Censo de villas. . (no 
page numbers) refers to a number of similar examples. Despite 
government involvement conditions were generally no better than 
in other villas.
101CNV Plan de emeraencia. p.40.
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inhabitants urgently require social readaptation".102 The CNV 
identified Villa Carton as one of the worst slums of despair, 
concluding that it was "a graphic example of how not to go about 
removing unhealthy slums".103
Table II; 13 Gross product of the Argentine public and private 
construction sectors, 1900-1969 (millions of 1960 pesos).
Private sector Public sector
1900-1909 572.89 291.02
1910-1919 558.66 308.96
1920-1929 810 .29 379.72
1930-1939 704.73 641.57
1940-1949 1,320.20 731.47
1950-1959 2,039.28 1,218.72
1960-1969 2,277.25 1,862.57
Sources: calculated from O.Yuinovskv Claves politicas. . . pp.390- 
91; Argentine Republic, Secretaria de Estado de Vivienda
Inversion en vivienda: oarticipacion del sector publico. Buenos 
Aires (1969), p.20.
To what extent was the appearance of villas the result of market 
failure? In its 1959 report, the CNV echoed Bunge's earlier 
critisisms of the private construction sector, identifying a
shortage of skilled masons and general technical
backwardness.104 Although data for the output of private
construction in GBA are not available, Table 11:13 shows that, 
for the country as a whole, output for the 194 0s onwards far
102ibid. p. 39. The strong, moralistic language of the report 
reflected the origins of the CNV, which was established during 
a period military rule a year after the unseating of Peron in 
1955.
103ibid. p.41.
104ibid. p.44.
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exceeded that of previous decades. As such, the post-war 
expansion of villas was not the result of a struggling private 
sector. However, the proportion of total construction for 
residential usage experienced a substantial decline. As a 
result, the share of GDP spent on housing fell from an annual 
average of 5.3 per cent, 1950 to 1958 to an average of 3.4 per 
cent, 1959 to 19 6 8.105 Whether newly-built housing was 
affordable for low income families is another matter. Between 
1940 and 1970 house prices in the Federal Capital more than 
doubled in real terms106, whilst real wages only rose by 67 per 
cent.107
Despite increasing rhetoric and the creation of several 
agencies, the state did little to alter the priorities of the 
private construction sector or to increase the stock of cheap 
public housing. Between 1915 and 1943 the government agency 
charged with providing such housing was only able to construct 
977 units.108 Whilst public housing programmes were expanded in 
subsequent decades, the private sector still accounted for over 
8 0 per cent of house building in the 1960s.109 The CNV report
105Argentine Republic, Secretaria de Estado de Vivienda 
Inversion en vivienda: participacion del sector publico. Buenos 
Aires (1969), p.8.
106O . Yujnovsky Claves uoliticas. . . . p. 311.
107S.Torrado Estructura social..., pp. 265-6.
108O .Yujnovsky Claves politicas del problema habitacional 
argentino, 1955/1981, Buenos Aires, 1984, p.74.
109Argentine Republic Inversion en vivienda. . . p. 20. Also 
see C.Tobar "The Argentine national plan for erradicating villas 
de emergencia" in G.Geisse and J.Trueblood, eds Latin American 
urban research. Volume 2. Regional and urban development 
policies: a Latin American perspective. London (1972), pp.221- 
23 .
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noted that government agencies did little to facilitate the 
access of poor families to housing credits or to reduce 
bureaucratic red tape. It also blamed inadequate regional and 
local planning controls for encouraging disorderly patterns of 
settlement.110
Thus, increases in the size and number of villas resulted from 
a combination of factors. These included changing patterns of 
migration and industrial employment, the piorities of the 
private sector and ineffectual government action. As mentioned 
earlier, by the 1960s migration from Europe had been superseded 
by flows from neighbouring countries, whose high fertility 
partly accounted for a subsequent acceleration in villa growth 
(see Table 11:10).
As the "progressive" villas became more established, their 
inhabitants became increasingly well-organised. A wide variety 
of local associations developed, including sports clubs, 
neighbourhood councils (junta vecinales), political groups and 
religious activities.111 These often sought to up-grade local 
services or to obtain government guarantees that residents would 
not be evicted. In 1958 the first body representing the 
interests of villas in the city as a whole, La Federacion de 
Villas y Barrios de Emergencia, was established.112 However,
110CNV Plan de emergencia..., pp.44-5.
1:L1P.Davolos, M.Jabbaz, and E.Molina Movimiento villero v 
estado (1966-1976). Buenos Aires 1987, pp.21-22 and O.Grillo and 
M.Lacarrieu "Actores sociales de la decentralizacion politica 
administrativa. Estudio de la red vecinalista de Barracas" Medio 
Ambiente v Urbanizacion. Buenos Aires (1989), p. 41..
112P.Davalos et al Movimiento villero. . . p. 21.
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there are indications that these community organisations were 
often ephemeral and poorly coordinated, reflecting the political 
or religious agendae of outside actors rather than the interests 
of the villas. Ethnic divisions may also have led to the 
fragmentation of these initiatives. As such, their impact on 
conditions within the villas was generally limited.113
As Table 11:10 indicates, the distribution of villa residents 
(known as villeros) within GBA changed dramatically during the 
1970s. The villa population of the Capital virtually 
disappeared, whilst that of the Province continued to expand. To 
a certain extent, this reflected changing economic conditions. 
However, as will be seen, new policies directed towards villas 
in the Capital had a dramatic impact.
By the 1950s it was becoming clear that shanty towns were no 
longer a short-term response to economic cycles or sudden surges 
in population growth. Thus, it became necessary for the state to 
develop a more considered policy towards them. Alternatives 
ranged from outright eradication to the provision of full 
services and granting villeros property rights. Both these 
extremes would have entailed considerable expenditure; either to 
provide new accommodation for those displaced or to install 
infrastructure. In addition, both carried the political risk of 
alienating either villeros or those parts of the city where they
113For example, P.Davolos et al Movimiento villero. . . . p. 24 
note that resistance to state eradication projects in the late 
1960s was generally ineffective.
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were to be relocated.114 As will be seen, these dilemmas, along 
with frequent regime changes, explain why, through the 1950s and 
1960s, there was so much inconsistency in state policy towards 
villas.
The first formal eradication plan was put forward by the newly- 
formed CNV in 1956 during a period of military rule.115 Strong 
opposition from villero organisations helped to persuade the 
subsequent civilian government of 1958 to 1962 that eradication 
would be a drastic and potentially unpopular measure and so the 
plans were shelved. An alternative proposal to build large 
numbers of temporary metal huts, known locally as medio canos 
(half pipes) was adopted. However, once it was realized that the 
"medio canos" were highly impractical and less preferable to 
living in villas, the plan was quickly abandoned.116 Following 
military intervention and another change of government, a fresh 
series of eradication plans were drawn up and, for the first 
time, implemented.
Between 1966 and 1970 the first eradications of villas in the 
Capital took place, with the destruction of 11 settlements, 
containing 15,176 people.117 A number of erradications also took
114This problem was echoed by widespread resistance to
eradication plans in the 1990s (for example, see "El traslado de
la villa quedo en la congeladora" Pagina 12. Buenos Aires,
16.2.94) .
115CNV Plan de emergencia. . . . pp.48-72.
1160 .Yujnovsky Claves politicas. . . , p. 118.
117CNV Censo de las villas... (no page numbers) . The
original justification for the plan was a severe flood which 
affected villas in the Province of Buenos Aires (see C.Tobar 
"The Argentine national plan..", p.223. However, the plan (which
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place in the Province but no data are available for the numbers 
affected.118 The eradications were coupled with a new programme 
to build large numbers of low cost housing units in peripheral 
districts and to provide mortgage subsidies. These were funded 
by the surpluses of social insurance funds and were supposed to 
meet the needs of those forced to leave the villas.119 However, 
funding for public housing only benefited a small proportion of 
displacees. Between 1968 and 1971 25,052 people were moved from 
villas in the Capital and Province to three temporary government 
camps known as nucleos de habitacion transitorio (NHTs), located 
on the fringes of the city.120 These camps were designed to 
provide temporary, basic accommodation until a more permanent 
solution could be afforded.121 There were, however, few signs 
that the authorities had learned from the mistakes of Villa 
Carton. Conditions in the NHTs were described as being little 
better than in the original villas and shanty town organisations 
strongly resisted relocation.122 Moreover, it is claimed that 
government agencies applied some form of negative discrimination 
when selecting families for the NHTs:
had already been in preparation) was implemented with greatest 
rigour inside the Federal Capital.
118J.Imaz Los hundidos. p. 90, mentions that some 
eradications also occurred in the Province, but there is no 
available data for the numbers involved.
119Ministerio de Bienestar Social Plan de erradicacion de 
las villas de emergencia de la Capital Federal v del Gran Buenos 
Aires, Buenos Aires (1968), pp.35-40.
120O. Yujnovsky Claves politicas. . . , p. 166. It is unclear 
whether the public funding went to other groups or simply failed 
to materialise.
121ibid. pp.24-28.
122P.Davolos et al, Movimiento villero. . . pp. 23-24 ; 
O.Yujnovsky Claves politicas.... p.167.
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The relocations took no account of preserving existing communities: rather
they sought to break groups up, particularly local leaders. And those
placed in the NHTs were people considered to be inferior: single women, 
Alcoholics, the most socially marginalised.123
The eradications prompted both an increase in the number of 
villa organisations and their politicisation. This also 
reflected a general upsurge in political tensions in the country 
at large from 1969 .124 Conflicts within villas between different 
political factions became more pronounced in the run-up to the 
presidential elections of 1973.125 As villero organisations 
gained strength they were able to resist further attempts at 
eradication.126
In 1976 a new military regime was installed and set in motion 
what it termed "The Process of National Reorganisation" (El 
Proceso). The new government advocated harsh and repressive 
policies aimed at demobilising Argentine society.127 Villa 
organisations were brutally repressed and plans were drawn up 
for a new series of eradications. These differed from their 
predecessors in one crucial respect: they made virtually no
provisions for re-housing those made homeless. The plans were 
implemented between 1977 and 1980 and led to the eviction of
123M.Davalos Movimiento villero. . . , pp. 23-24.
124D.Rock Argentina, 1516 to 1982. From Spanish colonisation 
to the Falklands War, Berkeley (1985), pp.346-66.
125E . Pastrana "Historia de una villa..." describes the 
struggle for supremacy between communist and peronist 
organisations in Barrio Retiro.
126For example, E. Pastrana "Historia de una villa. . ." claims 
that in 1973 local organisations forced the postponement of 
plans to build a motorway through the neighbourhood.
127W. Smith "Reflections on the political...", pp. 48-50.
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27,846 families from villas in the Capital. Of these, the vast 
majority were left to provide their own alternative 
accommodation,128 and often simply moved to villas in the 
provincial section of the city.129
Economic factors might have been expected to alter the pattern 
of villas in Greater Buenos Aires from the 1970s. As has been 
shown, industrial contraction, informalisation and increasing 
poverty were features of both the 1970s and 1980s. As such, the 
continued expansion of villas in the Province and their 
reappearance in the Capital after 1983 cannot be explained by 
formal employment opportunities. Rather than genuine "pull" 
factors, villa growth resulted from high fertility and 
continuing arrivals from regions where conditions were even 
worse.130 A new, negative dynamic had taken over: to use the
terminology of the general literature, more villas were becoming 
"slums of despair". Even as rural migrants continued to arrive, 
opportunities to "make good" and move out of the villas were 
being reduced.
The changing economic climate led to a marked worsening of 
conditions within villas during the 1970s and 1980s. A growing
128M.Bellardi and A.De Paula Villas miseria. . . . p. 53.
129This led to complaints from one provincial minister that 
the Capital was simply off-loading its problems onto the 
surrounding districts (see M.Bellardi and A.De Paula Villas 
miseria.... p.44).
130Provincia de Buenos Aires Censo socioeconomico de villas 
en emergencia. La Plata (1981) provides data on fertility and 
place of birth of villa residents. C.Fernandez Pardo Economia v 
sociedad de la pobreza en las provincias araentinas. Buenos 
Aires (1984) shows that there were high provincial disparities 
in poverty levels in 1970.
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proportion of residents had to resort to employment in the 
informal sector.131 The local organisations which reemerged from 
the repression of the Proceso years increasingly prioritised 
issues such as emergency food aid, rather than legality of 
tenure or political mobilisation.132 There was also a shift in 
government policy away from eradication towards up-grading villa 
infra-structure and mitigating the impact of the economic 
decline.133
The nature of Argentina's urban expansion, notably the growth of 
the city of Buenos Aires, in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was clearly very different to that which 
subsequently took place in Latin America as a whole. Housing 
conditions in Buenos Aires were more comparable to those in 
rapidly-industrialising European and North American cities.134 
However, whilst the housing problems of European cities were 
gradually reduced over time, those in GBA worsened. The 
emergence of shanties occurred in response to the expansion of 
industry in peripheral parts of the city, yet similar changes in
131Argentine Republic, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad 
Social El empleo v condiciones de vida en las villas de 
emergencia del Gran Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires 1987, pp.18 to 
20; E.Grassi "Donde viven los trabajadores? Condiciones de 
trabajo, reproduccion y la cuestion de los prejuicios" in 
S.Hintze, E.Grassi and M.Grimberg Trabaios v condiciones de vida 
en sectores pppulares urbanos, Buenos Aires (1991), pp.60-68.
132L.Golbert "La asistencia alimentaria: un nuevo problema 
para los Argentinos" in L.Golbert et al, eds La mano izauierda 
del estado. La asistencia social seaun los beneficiarios. Buenos 
Aires (1992), pp.62-64.
133ibid. pp.43-46.
134See P.Lawless and F.Brown Urban growth and change in 
Britain. An introduction. London (1986), pp.21-33 and C.Glaab 
The American city. A documentary history. Illinois (1963), 
pp.266-85.
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industrial distribution occurred in European cities without the 
same results. It is difficult to pin down the underlying causes 
for these diverging experiences. Factors include sustained 
levels of population growth in GBA, low rates of economic 
expansion and weak responses to the need for cheap housing from 
both the public and private sectors.
The growth of villas inside the Federal Capital occurred whilst 
the total population remained almost static and industrial 
employment fell. However, the population of shanties in the 
Capital should not be characterised as the downwardly-mobile 
"drop-outs" of slums of despair. Early villeros included 
European immigrants, many of whom would not have required a 
period of acclimatisation to modern urban life-styles. There are 
indications that this group was able to move out of the villas 
relatively quickly.135 A 1965 survey of Barrio Retiro, by then 
without Europeans, found that the majority of residents were 
employed on a full time basis and aspired to obtaining improved 
accommodation.136 The large number of local organisations which 
emerged also testifies to the progressive spirit of Retiro's 
inhabitants.137
Whilst some surveys of villas in Greater Buenos Aires 
distinguish between "good" and "bad" shanties, none provide
135Most of the Italians who had originally founded Barrio de 
los Imigrantes, part of Barrio Retiro, in the 1940s had moved 
out by the late 1950s (E.Pastrana "Historia de una villa...",
p.132) .
136P.Davolos et al, Movimiento villero. . . . p. 19.
137E . Pastrana "Historia de una villa...", p. 132.
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anything more than anecdotal descriptions to support their 
claims. Inevitably there must have been differences, but these 
do not appear to have conformed to a discernable pattern. 
Opportunities for economic improvement were more a reflection of 
time than place. During the period of relative prosperity up to 
the 1960s many were able to accumulate savings and purchase land 
outside the villas. From the 1970s this became increasingly 
difficult and it could be argued that all the city's shanties 
were by then becoming "slums of despair". However, the only 
clear examples of shanties containing concentrations of "social 
undesirables" were those created by the state itself: Villa
Carton and the NHTs. Chapter four provides a detailed case study 
of one such NHT, assessing whether these characterisations were 
accurate.
6) Ageing in shantv towns.
The origin and nature of villas influenced both the number of 
elderly living there and their economic condition. As they were 
largely populated by non-European migrants from the interior or 
neighbouring countries, fertility levels in shanties "were 
generally higher than the national average.138 Large numbers of 
children would have reduced the proportion of aged villeros. 
Also, several reports stress poor levels of hygiene and 
healthcare facilities in the shanties, which would have reduced
138A 1981 survey in the Province found that 65 per cent of 
villeros were from the interior, Paraguay or Bolivia and that 
32.8 per cent were aged under 10 years old (Argentine Republic, 
Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social El empleo v las 
condiciones..., pp.7-11).
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life expectancy and hence the number of elderly.139 The desire 
of many villeros to move to a more secure location once they had 
sufficient savings was also significant. In "succesful" villas, 
newcomers would generally be younger than the upwardly-mobile 
villeros they replaced and only the least prosperous would 
remain until old age. The rapid increase in poverty in Greater 
Buenos Aires from the 1970s reduced the likelihood that 
residents could save enough to purchase a plot of land outside 
the villa and consequently promoted ageing. Thus, whilst the 
persistence of high fertility served to reduce the relative 
number of elderly villeros. reduced opportunities for escape had 
the opposite effect. Any overall change in the age structure of 
villas depended upon the relative importance of these two 
factors.
Table 11:14 The proportion of over 60 year-olds in villas in the 
Province of Buenos Aires (PBA). 1981.
District Total over 65 Over 65 as % of 
total
Total PBA 901,829 8.3
Villas in PBA 8,420 2.9
Villas in Lanus 
municipality
1, 618 3.6
Villas in Lomas de 
Zamora municipality
765 2.7
Sources: Provincia de Buenos Aires Censo socioeconomico en
villas de emergencia. La Plata (1981) (no page numbers); INDEC 
Censo nacional de poblacion v vivienda. 1980. Buenos Aires 
(1981).
139Argentine Republic El empleo v las condiciones. . . . pp.93-
99 and 114-18.
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Very little data exists for the age structures of shanty town 
populations in GBA, particularly for before the 1980s. The only 
general survey of villas which includes data on residents' ages 
was the 1981 census conducted in the provincial section of the 
city.140 This found that villas in the Province contained a much 
lower proportion of elderly than did the Province as a whole 
(see Table 11:14). Villas in the municipalities of Lanus and 
Lomas de Zamora contained respectively the highest and lowest 
proportions of elderly. Even in the case of Lanus the proportion 
was less than half that for the Province as a whole.
Table 11:15 Housing and the elderly in selected school districts 
in the Federal Capital 1980 and 1991.
Districts with 
most precarious 
housing (numbers)
% housing 
precarious*
% aged over 
65
1991 District 5 9.17 14 .22
District 19 7 . 63 12.51
District 21 12.12 9 .34
1980 District 5 6.63 14 . 67
District 19** 5.09 9.37
District 20 5 . 72 13 .56
* In the 1980 Census, these are termed "precarious", but in the 
1991 Census this changes to "ranchitos o casillas" (cabins or 
huts) .
@ This also includes district 21, as defined in the 1991 Census.
Sources: INDEC Censo nacional 1980. . : INDEC Censo '91: censo 
nacional de poblacion v vivienda 1991, Buenos Aires (1993) .
Unfortunately, no comparable surveys have been conducted for 
shanties in the Federal Capital. As was shown earlier, this part
140Provincia de Buenos Aires Censo socioeconomico. . .
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of the city contains a higher proportion of elderly than more 
peripheral areas. Demographic data is, however, available at the 
level of individual school districts, of which there are twenty 
two in this area. Table 11:15 shows that in those districts 
which contained the most precarious housing in 1980 and 1991 the 
proportion of elderly was much higher than for villas in the 
Province. However, these data are far from conclusive, since 
precarious housing never accounted for more than 12.12 per cent 
of accommodation in any district.
No data exists for changes in the age structure of villas over 
time. Consequently, it is impossible to say whether the changes 
in the principal dynamics of shanty town growth mentioned 
earlier had an impact on their age structure. Subsequent case 
study chapters will return to this issue, presenting data on 
individual villas.
7) Conclusion.
This chapter focuses on two separate problems: that of
population ageing and that of shanty town development. It shows 
that, in both cases, the experiences of Greater Buenos are 
atypical for other Latin American cities. Population ageing came 
sooner than in other parts of the region and shanty towns did 
not begin to appear on a large scale until the city had already 
experienced several decades of rapid expansion. Both of these 
phenomena were linked to the arrival of large numbers of 
migrants from overseas, from other parts of the country and from 
neighbouring regions. These, in turn, reflected the general
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course of economic development from the late nineteenth century: 
the "boom" of 1870 to 1930, gradual decline up to the late 1960s 
and more severe economic crises since.
Both ageing and the growth of shanties prompted a number of 
public policy responses. The chapter shows how attempts to clear 
away the shanty towns simply led to their relocating in other 
parts of the city and subsequent reappearance. Attempts to up­
grade the shanties' services were equally unsuccessful. Public 
policy responses to the needs of an ageing population are 
considered separately in the next chapter.
A lack of data on population ageing in shanty towns prevents the 
chapter from looking at the two problems together. There are 
indications that shanty towns contained a smaller proportion of 
elderly than did other neighbourhoods, but no information about 
their relative socio-economic conditions is available. By using 
data gathered for individual villas, subsequent case studies are 
able to take a more integrated approach.
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CHAPTER 3: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF ELDERLY INCOME
MAINTENANCE IN GREATER BUENOS AIRES.
1) Introduction.
This chapter examines the responses of state and non-state 
institutions to the income needs of the elderly in Greater Buenos 
Aires. It begins by outlining general models and philosophies of 
state welfare intervention in Latin America. Following this, it 
traces the evolution of relevant state welfare programmes in 
Argentina since the late nineteenth century, focusing on their 
administrative organisation and the coverage they afford. This 
leads on to a detailed review of elderly welfare provision for 
GBA in the early 1990s. The chapter then turns to consider the 
evolution of non-state initiatives for the elderly. These include 
large-scale institutions -mutual aid societies, NGOs, overseas 
aid and private pension funds- as well as micro-level forms of 
informal institutional action -community, kinship and household 
strategies. The chapter concludes with an overview of the various 
forms of state and non-state activity, examining areas of over­
lap and complementarity and the protection they afford both 
insured and uninsured elderly.
2 ) State action.
This section begins by reviewing models of economic and social 
development which have been influential in Latin America during 
the twentieth century. Particular attention is paid to the role 
they prescribe for the state vis a vis the private and voluntary
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sectors in the mitigation of poverty and the provision of social 
security. It then examines the state policy options applicable 
to this end and the extent to which these have been implemented 
in Greater Buenos Aires.
2a) Models of state intervention.
As mentioned in chapter one, the state may intervene to meet the 
welfare needs of .groups such as the elderly either through 
insurance or assistance programmes. However, the degree to which 
these programmes are implemented and their institutional 
structures may vary considerably. In large part this reflects the 
influence of different development models which advocate varying 
levels of state intervention in the economy and welfare 
provision. Socialism represents one extreme in this debate. 
Whilst the only clear example of a Latin American country 
organised along these principles is that of Cuba since 1959, 
socialist ideas have had some influence throughout the continent 
at different periods.141 Socialists advocate that the private 
sector should be given no role in any part of the economy, 
including welfare provision. Socialists argue for universal 
public sector welfare coverage for all major contingencies, 
including old age.142 By 1980 Cuba had achieved complete
141For example, P.Drake Socialism and populism in Chile. 
1932-52, London (1978), pp.214-67; E.Sader "Cuba no Brasil: 
influencias da revolugao cubana na esquerda brasileira" in
D.Filho et al, eds Historia do marxismo no Brasil. 1. O impacto 
das revolucoes. Sao Paolo (1991), pp.157-84.
142C.Mesa-Lago The economy of socialist Cuba. Albuquerque 
(1981), pp.194-5.
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healthcare coverage and 93 per cent of the economically active 
population were included in pension programmes. However, 
critiques of Cuban development point out that advances made in 
welfare provision had been paralleled by failures to generate 
sustained economic growth.143 This both increased the need for 
welfare expenditure and reduced the resources available for such 
programmes.
In most Latin American countries progress in social provision 
occurred under the aegis of non-socialist regimes. The most 
important early example of this was Uruguay, which, by the end 
of the First World War, had developed an extensive welfare state. 
This had been implemented by a progressive liberal regime as a 
practical means to establish social and political consensus and 
was not ideologicaUy-mot ivated.144 Nevertheless, the public 
sector was given the monopoly of pension administration, through 
the creation of the Banco de Seguros del Estado in 1911.145
During the middle decades of the twentieth century other Latin 
American countries began to adopt similar welfare policies. These 
formed an integral part of new, non-liberal development 
strategies variously termed as "structuralist",
143C.Mesa-Lago The economy. . . pp. 175-76.
144J.Oddone "The formation of modern Uruguay, c. 1870-1930" 
in L.Bethel, ed The Cambridge history of Latin America, volume 
V, Cambridge (1986), pp. 464-70 and H. Finch Historia economica del 
Uruguay contemporaneo. Montevideo (1980), pp.16-21.
145C.Mesa-Lago Social security in Latin America; pressure... 
pp.7 2 -4.
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"developmentalist" and "populist".146 These strategies advocated 
that the state play the dominant role in the economy but also 
permitted the private sector to participate within the confines 
of strict government controls. The relative importance of the 
private and public sectors varied considerably but the state was 
always theoretically assigned the leading role.147 Welfare 
policies bore much resemblance to those advocated by socialists, 
such as universal public pensions. However, no structralist 
regime was able to achieve these welfare goals.148 Failure may 
have reflected resistance from the private sector, the 
mismanagement of funds or a lack of genuine political will, as 
the specific case of Argentina, examined below, will 
indicate.149
By contrast, liberal and neo-liberal models for development 
stress that the public sector is intrinsically less efficient 
than the free market and so state participation in all areas of 
the economy should be kept to a minimum. This includes the field
146M.Conniff "Introduction: towards a comparative definition 
of populism" in M.Conniff, ed Latin American populism in 
comparative perspective. Albuquerque (1982), pp.3-30 and 
K.Sikkink Ideas and institutions. Developmentalism in Brazil and 
Argentina. New York (1991), pp.31-41 provide detailed analysis 
of these concepts.
147C.Veliz The centrist tradition in Latin America, Princeton 
1980, pp.156-60, 186-90; R.Sikkink Ideas and institutions...
pp.31-2 and 3 7.
148C. Mesa-Lago "Comparative study of the development of 
social security in Latin America" International Social Security 
Review. (1986) .
149S.Draibe "An overview of social development in Brazil" 
CEPAL Review. December 1989, pp.47-60; J.Arellano Politicas 
sociales v desarrollo en Chile: 1924-84. Santiago (1985), pp.71- 
97.
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of welfare, where provision should be limited to those in extreme 
need, leaving the rest to the "trickle-down" of wealth resulting 
from economic growth.150 At the same time, liberals advocate 
direct intervention by the private and voluntary sectors in the 
provision of welfare. Neo-liberals, in particular, emphasise the 
benefits of private initiatives in welfare, both for the 
individual and the economy at large.
The frequent failure of (neo-)liberal policies to generate 
sustained economic growth or recovery in the 1970s and 1980s and 
their detrimental effect on welfare in many countries prompted 
a search for a less radical development model: the neo­
structuralist approach.151 This comprises a synthesis of statist 
and liberal views, arguing that the state's role should neither 
be minimised nor held above the private sector.152 Most neo­
structuralists identify welfare provision as one of the key areas 
for state intervention, although this should be combined with the 
efforts of the private and, in particular, voluntary sectors.153
150S.Bitar "Neo-liberalism versus neo-structuralism in Latin 
America", CEPAL Review (1988), pp.45-62.
151C.Anglade and C. Fortin "Accumulation, adjustment and 
autonomy of the state in Latin America." in C.Anglade and 
C.Fortin, eds The state and capital accumulation in Latin 
America, volume 2. London (1990) pp.264-70 contains a detailed 
analysis of such policies and J. Roddick The dance of the 
millions: Latin America and the debt crisis. Birmingham (1988), 
p.98 examines their impact on welfare programmes.
152D. Felix "Privatising and rolling back the Latin American 
state" CEPAL Review. (1992), pp.31-46 is a good example of this 
argument.
153See O.Rosales "An assessment of the structuralist paradigm 
for Latin American development and the prospects for its 
renovation" CEPAL Review (1988), pp.19-36.
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According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC):
. .greater equity can be promoted through the development of a broad range 
of participatory organisations and movements which are controlled by their 
members and directed towards fostering mutual aid and reciprocity and
helping the most underprivileged groups to make their needs known to the
administrative agencies of the state in a more effective manner.154
The dividing line between neo-liberalism and neo-structuralism 
is much less clear than it was between their respective 
predecessors. / often reflecting differences in emphasis rather 
than basic content.155 Thus, It iS not easy to label the welfare 
policies of many Latin American countries during the 1980s and 
1990s as either one or the other. This is considered in greater 
detail below with reference to Argentina.
2b) The evolution of social security in Argentina.
Argentine social and economic policy in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries is generally considered to have been 
predominantly liberal. Nevertheless, this period saw the 
appearance of several occupation-specific social insurance 
programmes (among the first in the world) and increasing state 
involvement in assistance projects. By 1915 all public employees, 
including state railway and bank workers had been enrolled in 
public pension schemes. These were obligatory and replaced pre-
154ECLAC Changing production patterns with social equity. 
Santiago (1990), p.81.
155S. Bitar "Neo-liberalism versus..", pp. 45-62.
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existing private funds.156 The apparent paradox between liberal 
policies and the expansion of pension funds has been explained 
in a number of ways. Ross claims that the most powerful labour 
unions were able to impose their demands on the state.157 
Conversely, Isuani argues that the state itself took the 
initiative and sought to co-opt sections of the labour
movement.158
Social assistance funding was provided primarily by the 
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Culto (MAEC). Aid was
channelled through a number of organisations which, whilst 
originating in the voluntary sector, developed increasingly close 
ties with the national government. According to Ross:
The Sociedad de Beneficencia, despite its appearance as the major private 
charity organisation, was a semi-state body which received somewhere
between 81 and 92 per cent of its funding between 1894 and 1903 from
government grants.159
In 1908 this state of affairs was recognised by law, which placed 
the Sociedad formally within the jurisdiction of the MAEC.160 
Lacking adequate financing from non-government sources, voluntary
156C.Lewis "Social insurance..", pp. 177-78.
157P . R o s s  Policy formation and implementation of social 
welfare in Peronist Argentina, PHD thesis, University of New 
South Wales (1989), p.19.
158E. Isuani "Los origenes" in J. Feldman, L.Golbert and 
E.Isuani' eds Maduracion v crisis del sistema orevisional 
argentino, Buenos Aires (1988), p.29.
159P.Ross Policy formation. . . p. 134.
160Decree law 3,727 (P.Ross Policy formation. . , p.233).
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organisations had little alternative but to accept their loss of 
autonomy. As seen in Table 111:1, the level of government funding 
for such organisations increased substantially in real terms 
through the early twentieth century. However, given that only 2.3 
per cent of the population were aged over 65 in 1914 and that the 
proportion for low income groups was probably much lower, it is 
unlikely that the elderly received a significant proportion of 
assistance financing.161
Table 111:1 Social assistance funding bv the Ministerio de 
Asuntos Exteriores v Culto, 1905-42.
Year MAEC funding MN$
1905 567,336
1910 4,055,212
1938 41,916,808
1942 64,911,763
Source: Calculated from P.Ross Policy formation... pp.231 and
237.
Thus, the extension of state involvement in social insurance and 
assistance programmes was a gradual process, which was already 
well underway before regimes more generally considered to be
welfarist had taken office. This process continued, albeit
erratically, through the 1920s and 1930s.162 Again, the
expansion of social insurance appears to have had little to do 
with the broader economic and social role allotted to the public
161E.Tenti Fanfani Estado v pobreza: estrategias de
intervencion, Buenos Aires (1989) examines in detail the
activities of state-subsidised charities in Buenos Aires but 
makes no reference to programmes potentially of economic benefit 
to the elderly.
162C.Lewis "Social insurance...", pp. 177-85.
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sector, which varied from proto-statism in the 1920s to renewed 
liberalism in the mid 1930s. In 1922 coverage was extended to 
banking workers, but efforts by the same regime to set up funds 
for other white collar workers were thwarted by determined 
political opposition.163 Nevertheless, by 193 9 additional 
occupation-specific funds had been established for financial 
workers, journalists and the merchant marine.
Less information is available about social assistance funding in 
the inter-war period. Accounts of the social hardships resulting 
from a number of sharp economic recessions make little reference 
to the activities of such programmes.164 In 1932 the state set 
up the Fondo de Asistencia Social to coordinate the payment of 
subsidies to, and activities of, a number of private charities. 
In 1933 the first national conference for social assistance was 
convened and proposed the establishment of a national programme 
of direct assistance. The conference made specific reference to 
a number of vulnerable social groups including mothers, young 
children, invalids and even ex-prisoners, but made no direct 
mention of the elderly.165 This constituted a failure to 
recognise that the elderly were, by that time, accounting for a 
rapidly growing proportion of the populace. In any case, most of
163C.Lewis "Social insurance..", pp. 178-79.
164For example, P.Lewis The crisis of Argentine capitalism. 
London (1989), pp.104-6 and 123-5 and D.Rock "From the First 
World War to 1930" in L.Bethel, ed Argentina since independence. 
Cambridge (1993), pp.142-3.
165Argentine Republic Primera Conferencia Nacional de 
Asistencia Social. Buenos Aires (1934), Volume 1 pp.7-8, Volume 
2 pp.160-65.
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the conference's proposals were shortly afterwards rejected, as 
attempts were made to channel public expenditure to the 
struggling rural economy.166
Many historical accounts of state welfare policy in Argentina 
portray the first Peronist regimes of 1945 to 1955 as a crucial 
turning-point. Indeed, it is often claimed that this period saw 
the transformation of a number of disparate, limited social 
measures into a universal, beveridgian welfare state.167 
However, whilst few dispute that the broader development policies 
of the regime were strongly statist, recent revisionist writings 
have questioned whether this was reflected in significant 
increases in public welfare expenditure, particularly within 
social insurance.168
The early Peronist period saw a dramatic expansion of the social 
insurance system. Public pension funds were set up for commercial 
and industrial workers in 1944 and 1946 respectively and in 1954 
protection was extended to all remaining sections of the 
labOurforce, including domestic service, the self-employed and 
rural workers. Ross claims that the total number of insurance
166E.Tenti Fanfani Estado v pobreza. pp. 72-76 and C.Diaz- 
Alejandro Essays on the economic.., p.97.
167For example, M.Passanante Pobreza v accion social en la 
historia argentina: de la beneficencia a la sequridad social. 
Buenos Aires (1987), pp.125-33 and P.Waldmann El Peronismo. 
Buenos Aires (1981), p.155.
168P. Lloyd-Sherlock The Instituto Nacional de Prevision 
Social and social insurance reform in Argentina, 1944 to 1953. 
Economic History Working Paper, London School of Economics 
(1992), pp.12-18 and C.Lewis "Social insurance...", pp.187-90.
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FIGURE 2: Estimates of social insurance affiliation. 1947-55.
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Source: P.Ross Policy formation and implementation of social
welfare in Peronist Argentina, PHD thesis, University of New South 
Wales, p.65a; S.Lischinsky La afiliacion al sistema previsonal 
(1944-1955) . Locrros v dificultades en su expansion, (mimeo) Rosario 
(1989), pp.5 and 11; ILO Economically active population estimates: 
1950-1980. Projections: 1985-2000. Volume 3, Latin America. Geneva
(1986), p.79.
affiliates rose from 2,771,446 to 4,681,411 between 1947 and 
1954. However, as shown in Figure 111:1, a different study 
concludes that evasion may have reduced real levels of 
affiliation to only 2,129,000 in 1954. This compared to a total 
economically active population of 7,106,000 in 1950. Moreover, 
the ratio of pensioners to affiliates in pension funds remained 
very low.169 Consequently, whilst the creation of new pension 
funds would ultimately lead to a large increase in the number of 
benefits granted, this did not occur during the lifetime of early 
Peronist governments. Rather, accelerating inflation reduced the 
overall effect of social insurance on the welfare of the 
elderly.170
Peronist social assistance policies represented a more dramatic 
break with the past. The increased priority afforded the welfare 
needs of the elderly was reflected in a number of guarantees 
enshrined in the new Constitution of 1949:
All the elderly have the right to full economic protection, which should 
be provided by their families. Where this does not occur, the State will 
provide such protection either directly or through institutions and 
foundations created to this end. The State or the above-mentioned bodies 
retain the right to demand that any relatives who are able to provide 
financial support do so.171
169Review of the River Plate. Buenos Aires, 3 0th December
1952 .
170A 1954 survey found that retirement pension values in 
every fund had fallen since 1947, sometimes by as much as 52 per 
cent. In only one fund did average pensions exceed the minimum 
industrial wage of the day (Review of the River Plate. Buenos 
Aires 20th April 1954).
171Article 31 of the 1949 constitution cited in Ministerio 
de Finanzas de la Nacion, Caja Nacional de Ahorro Postal Ahorro 
obrero: manual para el diricrente. Buenos Aires (1950), p.21.
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Thus, although it placed the emphasis on family support, the 
regime took on the responsibility of providing a universal safety 
net for all those elderly without insurance pensions or 
sufficiently prosperous relatives.
The government soon made plain its unwillingness to operate 
through private charities. The state cut funding to organisations 
such as the Sociedad de Beneficiencia, prohibited their use of 
voluntary staff and imposed unrealistic minumum wages.172 In 
1948 a new welfare organisation was set up under the control of 
the President's wife. To many Argentines the Fundacidn Eva Peron 
(FEP) embodied Peronism's genuine concern for the welfare of the 
most disadvantaged. However, the FEP's high-profile activities 
did not lead to higher levels of social assistance expenditure 
by the state. The bulk of its revenue came from a national 
lottery, a new tax on labour and donations which employers were 
"encouraged" to make.173 Thus, social assistance still combined 
the efforts of the private and public sectors, but their roles 
as executive and funder had been reversed.
Peronist assistance policies influenced the economic welfare of 
the elderly in several respects. Most importantly, they included 
the first large-scale non-contributory pension programmes. From 
1950 the FEP began to grant basic benefits to unprotected 60 
year-olds who could no longer work and lacked immediate family
172P.Ross Policy formation. . . . p.246.
173See P. Ross "Policy formation...", p. 288.
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members in employment. By 1953, official sources claim that 
32,000 such pensions had been granted in Greater Buenos Aires 
alone.174 This represented 5.5 per cent of over 60 year-olds in 
the city.175 However, pensions were devalued by inflation, so 
that by 1953 they were worth only one sixth of the minimum 
industrial wage.176
As with many of the activities of the FEP, this programme was 
implemented with the maximum publicity and self-congratulation. 
According to P.Ross:
Many of the recipients received the pensions in public ceremonies, 
orchestrated in such a way as to be emotional and sentimental events 
widely reported in the media.177
As such, the pension programme and other FEP activities provided 
an important precedent for the implementation of high profile, 
populist assistance programmes by future regimes, some of which 
would be of direct benefit to the elderly.
The 1950s and 1960s did not see significant changes in the basic
174P . R o s s  Policy formation. . . , p.345.
175Calculated from INDEC Cuadros ineditos. IV censo general 
1947. Caracteristicas de familia v convivencia, estado civil v 
fecundidad. Buenos Aires (1948), pp.108-10.
176Calculated from P. Ross Policy formation... p. 345 and 
Review of the River Plate. Buenos Aires, 20th April 1954.
177P.Ross Policy formation... p. 276. For an account of a 
similar presentation ceremony, though not specifically involving 
the elderly, see "The first lady participates in the distribution 
of grants" Cronica Mensual de la Secretaria de Trabaio v 
Prevision, November 194 6, pp.106-7.
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administrative and legal framework of social insurance. On one 
hand this reflected political considerations: the power of the 
unions and the desire of non-democratic regimes to co-opt the 
support of a range of interest groups. On the other it 
complemented broader development policy which remained largely 
statist and considered public welfare as necessary to provide a 
cooperative, efficient workforce.178
Whilst social insurance policy did not change dramatically, its 
financial position and impact on welfare did. As a growing
proportion of affiliates reached retirement age, the number of
insurance pensions (known as iubilaciones) began to increase. 
This was paralleled by a shift from surplus to deficit in pension 
fund finances (see Table 111:2.
Pension fund deficits are not an inevitable consequence of 
increasing numbers of benefit payments. As long as pensions are 
fully capitalised, fund finances should reach an equilibrium 
after the initial start-up period. However, Argentina's social 
insurance schemes rarely struck a balance between expenditure and 
interest accrued by contributions. Even before 1944 a number of 
individual funds were in debt.179 From the late 194 0s, these
were
178C.Lewis "Social insurance..", pp. 191-5.
179Review of the River Plate, 9th October 1953 gives an 
account of the financial problems of the railway and urban
transport funds. Similar accounts are given in J.Gonzalez Gale 
Jubilaciones v seguro social. Buenos Aires (1929), p.5 and 
Argentine Republic, Caja Nacional de Jubilaciones y Pensiones La 
situacion de los funcionarios de la administracion nacional en 
la actividad v la pasividad. Buenos Aires (1914), pp.51-63.
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Table 111:2 Social insurance coverage, 1950-1990.
Year Number over 
retirement 
age (000s)*
Pensions
granted
(000s)
Coverage 
(%) **
Fund surplus 
(deficit)
* * *
1950 1,495 188 12.59 28,880
1955 1, 836 473 25.76 21,735
1960 2, 236 749 33.51 5, 628
1965 2, 674 1, 086 40.62 3,350
1970 3,123 1,390 44.52 (4,492)
1975 3,575 1, 695 47.41 145
1980 4, 039 2,342 58.00 (136)
1985 4, 528 2, 759 60.93 na
1990 4, 977 3, 031 60.90 (2,367,870)
*Until 1967 this was 60 years for men, 55 for women; 
subsequently, it became 65 and 60 years respectively.
**This figure is the total population above the retirement age 
divided by the total number of benefits granted. Since a 
proportion of pensions were granted to individuals below the 
retirement age and some individuals held more than one, this 
figure over-estimates the true percentage of elderly with an 
insurance benefit. Unfortunately, there is insufficient data to 
provide a more accurate estimate.
***Data excludes provincial and municipal funds. Financial data 
as follows: 1950-1970, 1960 pesos (000s); 1975-1985, 1985
australes (000s); 1990, 1990 australes (000,000s).
Sources: E.Isuani and J.San Martino La reforma previsional
argentina. Qpciones v riesgos., Buenos Aires (1993), pp.19 and 
29; H.Dieguez and H.Petrecolla "Estudio estadistico del sistema 
previsional argentino en el periodo, 1950-1972", Economica 
(1977); J. Feldman et al Maduracion v crisis.... p.103.
being baled out by transfers from more recently-established funds 
and in 1954 the scheme as a whole shifted to a pay-as-you-go 
system of financing, which sought to balance annual contributions 
with expenditure.180 This merely postponed the effect of the
180J. Feldman et al Maduracion v crisis. . . . pp. 33-37.
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rising ratio of pensioners to contributors.
Various factors explain why the Argentine social insurance system 
was not developed on a sound financial basis. These include an 
absence of actuarial forecasting and the dominance of short-term 
political agendae over longer-term economic rationalism. 
Sometimes this was reflected in promises of unfeasibly large 
benefit hikes or low retirement ages.181 At other times it 
entailed the accumulation of substantial public debts to the 
system.182 Moreover, the administrative structure was highly
Ay
fragmented with separate funds and separate benefits for 
different occupation groups. This increased administrative costs 
and facilitated evasion and fraud.183 Fragmentation led to the 
development of priviledged funds for groups such as the military, 
the police and high-ranking functionaries. Between 1950 amd 1972 
average military pensions were roughly double those paid by other 
funds.184 This was a drain on resources and reduced the
181A clear example was the pledge made by the Frondizi 
administration in 1958 that average pension values would be at 
least 82 per cent of the recipient's previous earnings (see The 
Review of the River Plate. 21st August 1958, 19th September 1958 
and 21st September 1959) . A 1966 survey found that 26 per cent 
of pensioners had retired under 50 (J.Feldman et al Maduracion
v crisis. . . , p.44).
182In 1963 it was estimated that the state owed the funds a 
sum equivalent to half Argentina's GNP (The Review of the River 
Plate, 11th November 1963).
183In Argentine Republic, Consejo Federal de Seguridad Social 
de la Republica Argentina Informe acerca de la factibilidad 
financiera del plan arcrentino de seguridad social. Buenos Aires 
(1967), p. 112 it is estimated that evasion rose from 31.3 to 55.0 
per cent of total contributions between 1950 and 1958.
184H.Dieguez and H.Petrecolla "Estudio estadistico del 
sistema previsional argentino en el periodo 1950-1972" Economica 
(1977), pp.185-6.
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credibility of the social insurance system in the eyes of the 
general public.
In 1966 a military junta committed to moderately liberal policies 
siezed power and began to plan a complete overhaul of the pension 
system. These reforms, implemented in 1967, gave rise to the 
administrative structure still in place in the early 1990s. Non­
military occupation-specific funds were grouped into three 
divisions: public employees, private waged labour and self-
employed workers. The range of available benefits was 
rationalised and the retirement age was pushed on to 65 for men 
and 60 for women. However, these measures were unable to prevent 
the system from generating large deficits in the 1970s (see Table 
111:2) .
No major innovations in social assistance took place during the 
1950s and 1960s. Whilst some of the FEP's activities were 
continued under the aegis of a new state agency, the Instituto 
Nacional de Accion Social185, there are no indications that 
significant numbers of assistance pensions were granted. 
Expenditure in this area remained very small, compared to 
insurance programmes. Meanwhile,
there was a gradual shift in emphasis away from large-scale 
projects to initiatives in individual neighbourhoods and by 1971 
a national network of "community development programmes" had been 
established. These aimed to combine the efforts of state agencies
185N.Ferioli La Fundacion Eva Peron/2, Buenos Aires (1990), 
p . 158.
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with grassroots actors186 and, as such, marked the beginings of 
a gradual shift away from the state welfare monopoly. The impact 
of these programmes is examined in detail in the following
chapter.
Despite the system's financial problems, in 1970 a new dimension 
was added to state social insurance programmes, with the creation 
of the Instituto Nacional de Servicios Sociales para Jubilados 
y Pensionados (INSSJP) . This was to offer a broad range of
services for the elderly from the late 1980s, but most of its 
activities were originally restricted to healthcare 
provision,187 including discounts for a large range of drugs and
treatments.188 Uninsured elderly aged over 70 and those in
receipt of national assistance pensions were eligible for a small 
number of these services. The Institute was financially 
autonomous from the other components of the social insurance 
system, receiving funds from a separate scheme of workers' 
contributions.
The extension of social insurance coverage in the immediate post­
war decades was impressive but financially unsustainable. From 
the mid-1970s this expansion began to slow and its positive
186E.Tenti Fanfani Estado v pobreza. . . . pp. 83-90.
187See L.Golbert "El envejecimiento de la poblacion y la 
seguridad social" Boletin Informativo Techint. (1988) , for a 
detailed study of the Institute and its healthcare project: el 
Programa de Asistencia Medica Integral (PAMI).
188In 1993 these discounts ranged from 3 0 per cent for drugs 
dealing with mild problems to 100 per cent for those treating 
serious illness.
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impact on the economic welfare of the elderly declined. The 
Proceso de reorganisacion nacional of 1976 to 1982 sought, for 
the first time since the 1930s/ a dramatic shift away from 
developmentalist to neo-liberal economic and social policies. The 
new military government rejected the notion of the state as a 
guarantor of welfare for the whole population, with brutal 
repression replacing cooptive, if occasionally violent, populism. 
All areas of social policy suffered sharp spending cuts, with the 
full burden of social insurance contributions passed onto the 
workers.189 Whilst the number of beneficiaries continued to 
rise,’ this largely reflected official encouragement of early 
retirement as a means of reducing open unemployment levels190 
and as such would not have influenced the economic welfare of the 
elderly. Despite the political orientation of the Proceso regime, 
the level of state involvement in welfare remained far higher 
than during earlier periods of liberal rule. This reflected the 
enormous socio-economic changes which had occurred, the 
durability of pre-existing welfare structures and the need to 
maintain a modicum of political support.
Whilst there is some disagreement over whether average pension 
values rose or fell during the 1950s and 1960s,191 it is
189A. Marshall Politicas sociales: el modelo neoliberal.
Buenos Aires (1988) contains a detailed account of social policy 
during the Proceso.
190R. Cortes "El empleo urbano argentino de los 7 80. 
Tendencias recientes y perspectivas" in E.Bustelo and E.Isuani, 
eds Mucho. poauito o nada  p.223.
191J. Feldman et al Maduracion v crisis. . . pp. 41 to 42, note 
that there were occasionally dramatic hikes in benefit values. 
However, H.Dieguez and H.Petrecolla "La distribucion funcional
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Table 111:3: Value of social insurance benefits, 1971-1990.
Year Average 
pension as 
% of 
average 
wage
% benef­
iciaries 
with 
minimum 
pension
Minimum 
pension 
value (A)
Minimum 
pension 
value (B)
1971* na 22.1 70.6 na
1972 na 40.6 76.6 na
1973 na 50 .2 86.9 na
1974 na 50.9 117. 9 na
1975 46.6 84 .4 115.1 1, 061
1976 56.2 58 .3 68.1 700
1977 67.4 68 .1 74 .8 700
1978 95.8 48.2 92.1 840
1979 73 .2 50 . 0 82.3 819
1980 65.0 50.1 82.3 962
1981 64 . 0 66.1 86.6 843
1982 61.6 73 .7 73 .8 713
1983 58 . 0 74 .3 80.3 663
1984 45 . 8 76 . 9 93 .9 651
1985 51 79 . 7 76 .4 733
1986 43 na na 753
1987 45 na na 546
1988 55 82 .3 na na
1989 42 na na na
1990 55 na na na
*Unlike other figures which are taken from the year's end, this 
is a January figure.
A=198 5 australes 
B=June 1988 australes
Sources: J.Feldman et al Maduracion v crisis.... pp.119-22, 124;
E.Isuani La reforma..., p.30; R.Frediani La seguridad social. . . . 
pp.3 9 and 4 7.
del ingreso y el sistema previsional en la Argentina, 1950-1972" 
Desarrollo Economico (1974), claim that over the long-run average 
payments fell. This was due to a failure to index pensions to 
inflation.
Ill
generally agreed that there were significant reductions from the 
1970s. As Table 111:3 indicates, between January 1971 and 
November 1976, the proportion of insurance pensions paid at the 
minimum value rose from 22.1 to 58.3 per cent. Although pensions 
values were able to keep pace with average wages, it should be 
noted that the latter fell by over half between 1975 and 
1992 .192
Table 111:2 shows that, although the number of benefits granted 
continued to rise during the 1980s, levels of coverage remained 
largely the same. Meanwhile, the ratio of contributors to 
beneficiaries continued to fall193, indicating that a "hard­
core" of evasors or unemployed remained beyond the systems 
scope both as affiliates and pensioners. A survey of workers 
lacking insurance cover in 1988 found that 46 per cent were rural 
labourers, 3 6 per cent were employed in the urban informal sector 
and 11 per cent worked in domestic service.194 Thus, even when 
the extreme liberalism of the Proceso was replaced by moderately 
progressive social policies, the worsening financial position of 
the pension funds prevented any improvement in either qualitative 
or quantitative coverage.
In one respect, however, the Argentine social insurance system
192Data from the Subsecretaria de Seguridad Social presented 
in "Why a social plan?" Clarin. Buenos Aires, 18th January 1993.
193The ratio of contributors to pensionsers in the system was 
projected to fall from 2.54 to 1.81 between 1980 and 1990 (see 
R.Frediani La seguridad social en Latinoamerica: un estudio
comparativo en Argentina v Colombia. Buenos Aires (1989), p.40.
194R. Frediani La seguridad social. . . . p. 80.
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was in a relatively healthy condition, especially compared to 
those of other Latin American countries. Reductions in public 
sector real wages since the late 1970s had led to a substantial 
fall in staffing costs. Between 1983 and 1986 these only 
represented 3.4 per cent of total expenditure, compared to 6.8 
per cent in Brazil and 8.2 per cent in the newly-privatised 
Chilean system.195 However, the overall deficit of the Argentine 
system had reached such proportions that these economies had a 
minimal impact.
Social insurance funding reached crisis point in 1986 when the 
Supreme Court ruled that minumum pension values should be in line 
with the 82 per cent figure promised in the past. Contributions 
were increased, new taxes on food and telephone use were 
introduced and a number of direct transfers were made from the 
treasury.196 The crisis also prompted a new debates about 
thorough reforms, which continued into the early 1990s.197 Since 
the first occupation-specific funds had been established, 
affiliation had been, at least in theory, obligatory. By banning 
private pension schemes, the state had effectively granted itself 
a monopoly of pension fund management. The reform proposals of 
the 1980s began to challenge this policy. In 1989 provision was
195C . Mesa-Lago "Social security: ripe..", Table 5, p. 2 02. The 
high costs in Chile were largely the result of an intense sales 
and marketing drive (P.Lloyd-Sherlock Social insurance reform...
p.18) .
196Latin American Weekly Reports. 20th November 1986.
197E.Isuani and J.San Martino La reforma previsional. . . , 
pp.41-77, provide detailed descriptions of the various reform 
proposals put forward.
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made for the establishment of complementary private pension 
funds198 and in 1993 the National Congress voted to allow the 
private sector a major role in the main system.199
As shown in Figure 11:7 in the previous chapter, a failure to 
restore long-term economic growth had led to a marked increase 
in poverty levels from the late 1960s. This process was 
accelerated by the policies of the Proceso and a series of acute 
economic crises which afflicted subsequent governments. By the 
1980s Argentina was no longer a country which enjoyed "European" 
living standards. This both reflected the failure of the state 
welfare monopoly and the mounting need for emergency social 
assistance initiatives.
During the Proceso no new social assistance initiatives were 
implemented and funding for existing community-level projects was 
reduced. 200 There is no evidence of projects providing non­
contributory pensions or other measures of direct benefit to the 
elderly. Indeed, many of the community-level programmes 
implemented during the 1960s were actively discouraged at this
198These are dealt with separately below.
199Ambito Financiero. Buenos Aires 24th September 1993 gives 
details about the reform bill. The partial privatisation of the 
system was encouraged by a number of high-profile failures to 
resolve the problems of the insurance system from within the 
public sector. These included the creation in 1990 of a new state 
agency to bolster efficiency levels which in fact led to the 
doubling of administrative costs (Fundacion de Investigaciones 
Economicas Latinoamericanas (FIEL) Argentina: La reforma 
economica 1989-1991. Balance v perspectivas. Buenos Aires (1991), 
pp.302-3.
200E.Tenti Fanfani Estado v pobreza. . . , p. 183.
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time.201 This contrasted with subsequent democratic governments 
which responded to growing poverty levels with a series of food 
aid projects on a scale which had not occurred since the days of 
the FEP. These included the Programa de Alimentacion Nacional 
(PAN, 1984 to 1989) and the Bono Nacional Solidario de Emergencia 
(BNSE, 1990 to 1991), which provided food aid to several million 
households. As with the FEP, no provisions were made to include 
private or voluntary organisations in the distribution of the 
aid. 202 Some studies claim that these programmes were 
inefficient and clientelistic and that only a small proportion 
of their budgets went to those households in greatest need.203 
Despite such claims and the fact that they did not specifically 
target the elderly, the very scale of the projects suggests that 
they must have been of some benefit to the aged.
National assistance projects were complemented by an increasing 
array of initiatives implemented by provincial and municipal 
governments. This partly reflected the increased autonomy granted 
these tiers of government after the years of military rule. It
201This is considered in detail in chapter four.
202The PAN programme led to the creation of a a complicated 
hierarchy of state distribution agencies ranging from 
municipalities to the national headquarters. The BNSE was 
distributed through central trade union offices (G.Midre "Bread 
or solidarity...", pp.350-55).
203G.Midre "Bread or solidarity?.." gives a general critique 
of both programmes. Whilst, L.Golbert "La asistencia
alimentaria: un nuevo problema para los argentinos" in S.Lumi et 
al, eds La mano izauierda... p.46, shows that high proportions 
of shanty town families participated in the two schemes, 
P.Aguirre Impacto de la hiperinflacion en la alimentacion de los 
sectores populares. FUCADE documento no.2, Buenos Aires (1990), 
claims that their impact on poor households was insignificant.
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also stemmed from a policy of social assistance 
decentralisation204 . A number of new agencies were set up 
offering the elderly means-tested, non-contributory pensions and 
subsidies. The impact of these changes is assessed in greater 
detail in the next section.
The evolution of social insurance in Argentina followed a pattern 
similar to that of several other developed and developing 
countries. 205 The system drifted from an initial phase of large
surpluses to increasing deficits and ultimate crisis. This was
not an inevitable consequence of demographic ageing. Rather, it 
resulted from a failure to establish a direct relationship 
between contributions, interest accrued and benefit payments. 
This problem was compounded by a disorganised administration and 
the plundering of early surpluses for investment in areas which 
generated low, if any, rates of return. As a result, a large
amount of fund resources were effectively transferred to other
areas of public spending and from later generations to earlier 
ones. This could not be adequately compensated for by raising 
contributions, nor could the number of benefits granted be 
reduced. Thus, the final result was the devaluation of pension 
payments.
204E.Villanueva La decentralizacion de las politicas sociales 
en la Provincia de Buenos Aires, mimeo Buenos Aires (1990) and 
FIEL El crasto publico en la Argentina. 1960-1985 Buenos Aires
(1987), pp.189-93.
205M.Gordon Social security policies in industrial countries. 
Berkley (1988) and J.Arellano Politicas sociales v desarrollo en 
Chile: 1924-1984. Santiago (1985).
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Government commitment to social assistance programmes was 
markedly inconsistent. As such, they did not provide an effective 
safety-net for those denied insurance pensions. Two distinct 
approaches can be identified. The former was low-key, small- 
scale, with both private and public agencies playing an active 
role. The latter was on a grander scale, was often politicised 
and made little or no provision for the participation of non­
state agencies. The relative merits of these approaches are 
examined in greater detail below.
Figure III;2 Periodisation of development and welfare policy,
State welfare role
19th Century 
to 1930s
1940s to 
1955
1955 to 
1976
General development 
philisophv/rhetoric
Traditional liberal
Strongly statist
Moderately statist
Gradual rise in state 
intervention and 
growing voluntary 
sector.
State monopoly of 
i n s u r a n c e  
assistance. No 
actors allowed.
a n d
other
State remains dominant 
Small but gradually 
increasing role for 
voluntary sector.
1976 to 
1982
Neo-liberal Reduction in state 
involvement but it 
remains the dominant 
actor.
1983 to Moderately statist/ Large-scale state
1990 neo-structuralist assistance programmes.
I n c r e a s i n g  
participation of 
voluntary sector. First 
involvement of private 
sector.
Figure 111:2 shows that the welfare role allotted the public
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sector did not always reflect the general development policy (nor 
rhetoric) of the government of the day. From the late nineteenth 
century until the mid-1970s, state involvement in insurance and 
assistance programmes continued to increase and scope for 
participation by the private and voluntary sectors was very 
limited. The public sector monopoly of welfare provision which 
emerged should not be equated with a fully-fledged beveridgian 
welfare state, since the protection it afforded was by no means 
universal nor sufficient. Subsequent attempts to cut back state 
involvement both in welfare and the economy at large were in the 
main unsuccessful. This reflected the size and resiliance of the 
public sector and the lack of politically viable alternatives. 
Despite this, the real impact of state pension schemes was 
undermined by the system's financial collapse. This, coupled with 
a surge in poverty levels, increased the need for participation 
by the private and voluntary sectors: their response to this
challenge is. examined in detail in a subsequent section.
3) Social security in Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) in the early 
1990s.
This section examines the administrative structure of and the 
quantitative and qualitative coverage afforded by various state 
initiatives for the elderly in GBA. These include social 
insurance, services offered by the ISSJP and assistance schemes. 
These initiatives are analysed at the level of the city as a 
whole and for individual municipalities.
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In 1989 the Peronist party returned to power, with the election 
of Carlos Saul Menem to the presidency. As has been shown, the 
Peronist regime of 1945 to 1955 had been strongly statist in its 
policies, promoting a public sector monopoly of welfare 
provision. The distribution of the BNSE food parcels through the 
trade unions (considered the traditional base of Peronist 
support) was reminiscent of earlier Peronist welfareifttfclatives. 
However, this programme was discontinued in 1990 amidst 
allegations of corruption and mismanagement. 206 Moreover, the 
general economic policies of the Menem government represented a 
sharp break with Peronist tradition, advocating privatisation, 
fiscal reform and tighter controls on public expenditure. 207 As 
mentioned earlier, these included plans to privatise, in whole 
or in part, the national social insurance system and to 
decentralise the administration of social assistance. Thus, there 
emerged a contradiction between the traditional orientation and 
support base of the ruling party and its conversion to neo­
liberal policy. This section will examine the effect of this 
paradox on patterns of state protection for the elderly.
To understand the impact of social security in GBA it is 
necessary to draw comparisons with other parts of Argentina. 
Table 111:4 shows that large differences in insurance coverage 
existed amongst provinces, although these had been slightly
206G.Midre "Bread or solidarity..", p. 370.
207P. Waldmann "The Peronism of Peron and Menem: from
Justicialism to Liberalism?" in C.Lewis and N.Torrents, eds 
Argentina in the crisis years (1983-1990). London (1993), pp.90- 
102 effectively contrasts these two approaches.
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Table 111:4: Geographical social insurance coverage in selected
areas, 1970-1990*.
1970 1975 1980 1983 1990
Argentina 42.7 45.2 53 .3 54.6 9.30
Federal
Capital***
65.3 66.9 72.8 73 .1 21.42
Province of 
Buenos Aires
44 .4 47.9 56.9 58.1 10.41
Formosa** 6.5 8.3 13 .7 15.7 1.49
*The 1970-83 figures for national coverage are smaller than those 
cited in Table III:^. Both are taken from the Secretaria de 
Seguridad Social, but the former defines the eligible population 
as all those aged over 60 years old. This should, in fact, lead 
to a higher coverage. The reasons why it does not are not 
apparent. The 1990 figure does not take eligibility into account, 
simply dividing the total benefits granted by the total 
population.
**The province with lowest coverage in 1970.
***The province with the highest coverage in 1970.
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social Sistema nacional 
de prevision social: su evaluacion v situacion a fines de la
decada del ' 80. Buenos Aires (1990), p.38; E.Isuani and J.San 
Martino La reforma previsional.... p. 31.
reduced since the 1970s. This reduction may have reflected an 
expansion of public sector employment in the poorer provinces, 
which continued until the late 198 0s. 208 Throughout this period 
coverage was higher in GBA than in Argentina as a whole. However, 
disparities between the Capital and the Province of Buenos Aires 
(PBA) became more pronounced. These differences cannot be 
explained by variations in relative proportions of elderly since 
the figures up to 1983 are themselves based on age. Some studies
208Between 1983 and 1993, public sector employment in 
provincial governments rose by 40 per cent (World Bank Argentina: 
from insolvency to growth, Washington (1993), p.129).
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have sought to explain geographical variations of insurance 
coverage in terms of urbanisation, 209 yet 94.5 per cent of PBA' s 
population was defined as urban in 1990 .210 An alternative 
explanation is that the Province contained larger concentrations 
of types of employment with high evasion propensities than in the 
Capital. However, the 1980 National Census revealed few 
significant differences in the areas' respective employment 
structures.211 High insurance coverage in the Capital may also 
have reflected ease of access to centrally-located social 
security offices and higher levels of political mobilisation. 
These influences are not easy to quantify but are referred to in 
later chapters.
Data for the value of insurance benefits are not available for 
individual provinces. As mentioned above, pensions and real wages 
suffered significant reductions from the 1970s. A number of 
developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s served to 
accelerate this process. The state was unable provide benefits 
at the level stipulated in the 1986 Supreme Court ruling and from 
late 1991 began to transfer its accumulated debt into public
209For example, see C.Mesa-Lago Social security in Latin 
America.... p.186.
210INDEC Censo nacional de poblacion v vivienda. 1991 (total 
del pais), Buenos Aires (1993), p.47.
211For example, in 1980 the proportion of total employment 
in the Capital and PBA accounted for by the public sector was 
19.4 and 17.3 per cent respectively, whilst domestic service 
accounted for 6.0 and 7.3 per cent (Consejo Federal de 
Inversiones Estructura social de la Argentina. Volumen 2: Capital 
Federal, Buenos Aires (1989), p.45 and Volumen 4; Buenos Aires, 
p.45) .
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bonds.212 These were held by pensioners but were only cashable 
in exceptional circumstances.213 The broader economic climate 
reduced the real buying power of benefits, particularly during 
the hyperinflationary crises of 1989 and 1990, since they were 
not effectively indexed. From early 1991 a policy of tying the 
Argentine peso to the US dollar was able to reduce inflation but 
both salaries and pensions continued to lag behind the cost of 
living as the gap that opened during the early phase of the 
stabilisation programme was not corrected.214 As a result, in 
September 1992 minimum insurance pensions were equivalent to only 
12 per cent of the cost of a basic monthly basket of household 
goods.215
Table 111:5 shows that there were substantial differences in 
pension values in 1991. Whilst the majority of beneficiaries 
received the minimum payment of 120 pesos, the proportion varied 
from almost 98 per cent of the self-employed to under 17 per cent 
of public sector workers. Thus, previous occupation had an
212FIEL Argentina: la reforma. . . . p.304.
213In 1993 the Supreme Court ruled that a 93 year-old woman 
was too old to be made to wait to cash her bonds ("The Court 
ruled that a iubilado be payed in cash instead of bonds" Clarin, 
30th April 1993).
214A survey conducted by the Universidad Argentina de La 
Empresa calculated that between September 1991 and September 1992 
the real value of the minimum insurance pension fell by 15.8 per 
cent. See "A downturn in salaries" Clarin. Buenos Aires 29th 
September 1992.
215Clarln, Buenos Aires 29th September, 1992. The monthly 
basket was defined by the Instituto Nacional de Estadlstica y 
Censo. Whilst the needs of an elderly individual do not 
correspond to those of an entire household, it should be noted 
that possesion of such a pension usually renders a spouse 
ineligible for assistance benefits (see below).
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Table 111:5; Variations in pension payments bv fund. June 1991.
Monthly value 
(pesos*)
Total Public Self-
employed
Industry/
commerce
under 120 64.6 16.7 97.7 59.8
120-160 16.0 22 .7 1.9 24.1
160-200 8.3 28.0 0.3 6.0
over 200 11.1 32.6 0.0 10 .1
*A 1991 peso is worth exactly one US dollar.
Source: Prevision Social. No. 3 Buenos Aires April (1991), pp.115- 
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important effect on benefit values. Since provinces in the 
interior generally contained larger numbers of self-employed and 
fewer public sector workers, it is probable that average values 
here were lower than those in GBA. Thus, there were differences 
in both qualitative and quantitative coverage between GBA and 
elsewhere.
Table 111:5 only provides data for the three most important 
national funds. It should be noted that a significant proportion 
of public sector workers were provided for by separate agencies. 
As mentioned above, the military, police, politicians and high- 
ranking functionaries had individual funds which received large 
state subsidies and paid benefits far in excess of those provided 
by the main system.216 Provincial and municipal government 
workers were also covered by separate schemes. In 1992 these
216J.Sabato "Jubilados con coronita" Humor October 1988, 
Buenos Aires; H.Dieguez and H.Petrecolla "Estudio 
estadistico..",pp.181-92 provide detailed accounts of the 
development of privileged pension funds.
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accounted for 9 per cent of total affiliations and paid average 
benefits of over 500 pesos.217 Although the rapid increase in 
provincial public sector employment had sustained the ratio of 
contributors to beneficiaries, by the 1990s the majority of funds 
were in financial difficulties comparable to those of the 
national system. In 1993 the Federal Capital and PBA pension 
funds generated deficits of roughly 200 million pesos218 and it 
was projected that provincial fund deficits would treble by the 
end of the century.219
From the mid-1980s the INSSJP began to broaden its range of 
activities within the Programa de Atencion Medica Integral (PAMI) 
to include economic support as well as healthcare discounts. In 
1984 a number of special subsidies to cover basic needs and the 
costs of family care were proposed but there is no evidence that 
these were implemented on a large scale. 220 In 1992 PAMI 
launched the "Programa Social Integral" which included a less
217E.Isuani and J.San Martin La reforma previsional. . . . pp. 23 
and 34 and M.Vargas de Flood and M.Harriague (Ministerio de 
Economia) El gasto publico consolidado. November 1992, p.3.
218"Deficit millionario de las cajas" El Cronista. Buenos 
Aires, 20th September 1993. H.Dieguez and H.Petrecolla "Estudio 
estadistico...", pp.183-4 give a brief account of the historical 
evolution of these funds.
219World Bank Argentina: from insolvency. . . pp. 132-3.
220See R.Blanco "Social welfare programmes for the elderly 
in Argentina" in Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) Mid-life 
and older women in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington
(1989) for outlines of these proposals. However, these subsidies 
do not figure in data on PAMI's expenditure presented in 
L.Golbert "El envejecimiento...", p.58. PREALC El desafio de la 
seauridad social: el caso Argentino. Santiago de Chile (1989), 
pp.64-5 refers to PAMI's general financial difficulties in the 
late 1980s.
124
ambitious package of financial assistance, including a means- 
tested supplement to those in receipt of the minimum pension.221 
By April 1993 it was claimed that 16,312 such supplementsjWorth 
between 50 and 100 pesos a month, were being paid to members in 
"extreme need". 222 The source of funding for these supplements 
was unclear.223
From the 1970s PAMI encouraged the formation of pensioners' day 
centres (Centros de iubilados) and from the 1980s provided them 
with financial support. By the early 1990s several hundred of 
these day centres had been established within GBA. 224 These 
provided a range of services including recreation and legal 
advice for obtaining benefits. Day centre members benefited from 
heavily-subsidised day trips and holidays. However, over 60 year- 
olds without contributory pensions were denied effective 
participation in the centres and were excluded from most of their 
activities. 225 In 1992 PAMI launched the "Programa Pro- 
Bienestar" which sought to provide members with emergency food 
aid. This was to be distributed through communal kitchens 
operating out of recognised day centres. By April 1993 it was
221PAMI Programa social integral. May 1992, pp.8-9, proposes 
that subsidies should be provided in cases of "urgent social 
emergency". Rather than providing for the costs of family care, 
it simply states that household unity should be encouraged.
222,,An annoucement from PAMI" Pagina 12. Buenos Aires 3 0th 
April 1993.
223 "The pending allowance" Pagina 12, 28th October 1992.
224Interview with N. Redondo of PAMI, 27th May 1993.
225See PAMI El centro de -iubilados. Buenos Aires 1992, for 
PAMI guidelines for the establishment and structure of day 
centres.
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claimed that 32 0 kitchens had been set up and it was planned that 
112,000 elderly would be benefiting from the scheme by the end 
of the year.226
Thus, 1992 saw two large-scale initiatives that were designed to 
provide economic benefit to PAMI members. Their timing may have 
partly reflected political factors. Discussions of pension fund 
privatisation, weekly pensioner protest marches and a series of 
economically-motivated pensioner suicides had been attracting a 
considerable amount of public attention. 227 The PAMI measures 
were subsequently incorporated into a broader government 
initiative, the "Plan Social", which sought to reduce general 
levels of social discontent and reassert the national 
government's Peronist pedigree.228 The initiatives may have also 
reflected the INSSJP's president's apparent success in 
restructuring the organisation and putting its finances in 
order. 229 However, it should be stressed that the programmes 
only included a fraction of pensioners with the minimum benefit 
and excluded most of those without insurance cover. As such they 
may have served to increase the marginalisation of the poorest
226 "An announcement from PAMI", Clarin, 30th April 1993.
227For example, see "A drawn-out march" Pagina 12. 12th 
November 1992; "The PJ [Peronist party] resigns itself to 
postponing the pension reform until February" El Cronista, Buenos 
Aires 3 0th December 1992; "Another three iubilados commit 
suicide" Clarin. Buenos Aires, 15th October 1992.
228 "Why a social plan?" Clarin. 18th January 1993.
229"Immediate benefits for 750,000 iubilados" La seauridad 
social en la Argentina. Buenos Aires, January 1993. This apparent 
financial success was later discovered to be illusory ("PAMI: 148 
million dollars missing" Microsemanario. Buenos Aires, 28.6.94) .
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elderly. Whilst the new PAMI programmes entailed a broadening in 
the range of services offered to insured elderly, the low values 
of basic insurance pensions meant that the overall level of 
protection afforded this group remained very low.
What state protection existed for elderly living in GBA who did 
not have insurance pensions and were thus excluded from the 
majority of services offered by PAMI? Argentine national law 
stipulated the provision of monthly means-tested assistance 
pensions for all over 65 year-olds and people with serious 
physical disabilities.230 At the national level, two agencies 
were charged with providing such benefits: the Administracion
Nacional de Seguridad Social (ANSES) and the Direccion Nacional 
de Ancianidad (DNA).
ANSES, part of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 
provided means-tested pensions for over 65 year-olds, invalids 
and a number of other, unspecified contingencies. Applicants were 
initially dealt with by social workers operating at the level of 
individual municipalities who would interview them at home. This 
information would then be vetted by the central ANSES office in 
the Federal Capital. Eligibility criteria were rigorous, 
including proof that no immediate family members had sufficient 
income to offer economic support.231 Nevertheless, Table 111:6
230Article 9 of Law 13,478 and subsequent revisions 
(A.Vasquez Vialard Derecho del trabaio v de la seguridad social, 
tomo 2, Buenos Aires (1954), p.433.).
231,,Proof" usually required photocopies of family member's 
past pay slips.
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shows that the total number of benefits granted by ANSES rose 
steadily between 1985 and 1992 .232 In 1992 average ANSES monthly 
pension values were 124 pesos, slightly lower than the minimum 
contributory benefit at that time.
Table III; 6 Non-contributory pensions granted bv ANSES and the 
National Congress. 1985 to 1992.
ANSES* Honorary 
Congressional 
Pensions (HCPs)
HCPs funded 
from general 
revenues@
1985 60,583 72,505 5, 961
1986 69,787 96,377 13,295
1987 73.058 124,242 25,455
1988 76,428 142,601 31,942
1989 81,941 188,901 51,767
1990 84,Oil 219,114 65,814
1991" 86,446 222,220 66,157
1992 94,484 na 98,026
♦Pensions paid by the Administracion Nacional de Seguridad 
Social, covering old age, invalidity and general assistance.
@Funded from general revenues. It is unclear how the remaining 
honorary pensions were financed.
"Data for first quarter only.
Source: INPS Prevision social. Buenos Aires, April 1991, p. 125; 
Secretaria de Seguridad Social Acciones significativas 
desarrolladas en el ano 1992. Buenos Aires 1993 (unpaginated).
The DNA, part of the Ministry of Health and Social Action (MHSA) , 
was established in 194 9 to provide sheltered housing for poor 
elderly in Greater Buenos Aires. Over the following 40 years it 
implemented a number of small scale, low budget projects for the
232Data concerning the proportion of these pensions granted 
to the elderly was unavailable. However, it is probable that they 
counted for the majority.
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elderly, including day centres. In 1989 the DNA began to grant 
small grants for elderly in Argentina as a whole. A pilot scheme 
involving 15 pensioners had grown to 6,000 by 1992. The grants 
were considered a cheaper alternative to putting the elderly into 
sheltered homes and differed from the ANSES pensions in a number 
of respects. First, they were not an acquired right: the DNA was 
under no legal obligation to make regular payments of a given 
value. The aim of the subsidy was to provide short-term relief 
for over 60 year-olds suffering acute hardship. Applications 
would have to be filed by the claimant or a relative at the DNA 
office in the Federal Capital. Following this a social worker 
would interview the claimant at home. The director of the DNA 
suggested that successful applications would typically be elderly 
whose contributory pension claims had been delayed. 233 In late 
1992 average DNA subsidies were worth 100 pesos and were paid 
approximately two months out of every three. However, following 
the creation of the Secretaria de la Tercera Edad (see below) the 
DNA's future became uncertain and subsidy funding was terminated.
Argentine national law also makes provision for the granting of 
"honorary" pensions by the National Congress, in accordance with 
the prescriptions of the national budget. 234 Table 111:6 shows 
that the number of congressional pensions awarded in the early 
1990s was far in excess of the combined efforts of ANSES and the 
DNA. However, it is unlikely that a large proportion of these
233Interview with Cecilia Oetel, director of the DNA, 26th 
March 1993.
234FIEL Argentina: La re forma. . . . p. 299.
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were awarded to the elderly. Honorary pensions were financed by 
fixed sums allotted to individual politicians who made awards 
according to "merit" rather than general eligibility 
criteria. 235 Whilst there were no restrictions on the value of 
benefits, in 1992 the average monthly payment was 146 pesos: 
almost the same as the minimum insurance pension at that time.
The combined actions of ANSES and the DNA amounted to a total of 
roughly 100,000 assistance benefits in 1992, some of which may 
not have been for the elderly. This compares to a total 
population of 1,946,000 above the retirement age in 1990 who were 
not in receipt of an insurance benefit. 236 Although ANSES and 
DNA benefits were both means-tested, there are indications that 
they did not systematically target those elderly in greatest 
need. Both organisations received fixed budgets from their 
respective ministries which could not be increased according to 
demand. This probably explained why both benefits were given 
little publicity: this would have taken a share of existing
funding and created demands which could not have been met.237 
Information about the benefits was largely spread by word of 
mouth and thus targeted the better-informed rather than the most 
needy. Budget restrictions may also explain why no efforts were 
made to facilitate the arduous application procedures for both 
benefits. This was particularly apparent with claims for the DNA
235In 1993 the annual sums awarded were: US$ 4,000 to
national deputies and US$ 9,000 to party leaders.
236Calculated from Table 111:2.
237This was admitted by the DNA's director in an interview, 
26th March 1993.
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subsidy which could only be initiated in a single location. 
Neither agency took an active role in seeking out the most 
deserving cases.
After the BNSE was discontinued in 1990, there were no national 
food aid programmes until PAMI initiated the Pro-Bienestar 
project in 1992. Thus, of the total number of uninsured elderly, 
only those who had obtained membership of PAMI were eligible for 
food aid from a national programme. This shift away from large- 
scale food aid was not due to a significant reduction in poverty 
levels. 238 Rather, it reflected the high cost of such 
initiatives and the criticisms of corruption and adminstrative 
inefficiency mentioned earlier. It may also have reflected a 
desire to decentralise food aid administration to provincial and 
municipal authorities.239 The local government response to this 
is outlined below.
In October 1992 the Secretaria de la Tercera Edad was created to 
provide assistance for uninsured elderly. It was proposed that 
the Secretaria be funded by the MHSA, the national lottery and 
the social insurance system. 240 However, there was no mention of 
specific initiatives and, by mid-1993, none were forthcoming.241
238Chapter two, p. 63.
239E.Villanueva La decentralizacion de las. . . . pp. 10-26.
240 "How to put out the fire" Pagina 12, 28th October 1992.
241For example, "The hour for social spending" La seguridad 
social en la Argentina. Buenos Aires April 1993, lists recent 
initiatives for the elderly but makes no mention of the 
Secretaria.
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Indeed, the principal effect of the new agency was to throw into 
doubt the roles played by existing ones, particularly PAMI and 
the DNA. 242 An investigation by government auditors into the 
expenditure of the MHSA found that 80 per cent of its 1993 budget 
for the elderly had not been used. 243 This testifies to the 
failure to develop effective assistance projects for the 
uninsured and to publicise the availability of services.
Thus, at the national level, the only significant source of 
social assistance for uninsured elderly were the benefits granted 
by the DNA and ANSES, but the former had been discontinued by 
1993 . These elderly were denied PAMI pension supplements and, for 
the most part, participation in PAMI soup kitchens. This may have 
reflected a lack of political mobilisation and media concern for 
this group, which was reflected in the tendency of newspaper 
reports to use the term "-jubilado" (person in receipt of an 
insurance pension) when referring to the elderly in general244 
and an apparent lack of participation of the uninsured in the 
pensioner demonstrations mentioned earlier.
Figure 111:3 shows that whilst municipal spending on social
242"Protected by law" Pagina 12, 28th October 1992 speculates 
that PAMI will be integrated into the Secretaria. "An evening of 
dogs" Pagina 12. 3 0th October 1992 describes hurried meetings
between National President Menem and the PAMI director who agree 
that the two agencies will remain separate.
243See "Chaos uncovered at Argentine ministry." Financial 
Times. London, 13th January 1994.
244For example, in "The secret Argentina" Pagina 12. 25th 
November 1992, it is claimed that half of those with basic needs 
dissatisfied were iubilados but makes no mention of other 
elderly.
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FIGURE 111:3 Social assistance expenditure bv provincial and 
municipal governments as a percentage of gross national product.
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Source: M.Vargas de Flood and M.Harraigue El Gasto Publico
Consolidado, Buenos Aires (November 1992), p.6
assistance only fluctuated between 0.1 and 0.2 per cent of GDP, 
provincial spending rose almost tenfold from 1980 to 1993. This 
suggests that some elements of social assistance may have been 
decentralised. Following 1990 both the Province of Buenos Aires 
and the Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (MCBA)245 
established food aid programmes: the Programa Alimentario
Integral y Solidario (PAIS) and the Programa Alimentario de la 
Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (PAMBA). By 1992 it 
was claimed that PAIS was supporting 770,000 people in PBA. 
However, the programme targeted mothers, the unemployed and young 
children rather than the elderly. 246 The PAMBA scheme made more 
provision for the elderly, distributing food parcels through day 
centres.247
Provincial governments also granted a number of non-contributory 
pensions. The PBA established such a programme in 1986 and was 
granting 4,000 new benefits a year by 1993. These were targeted 
at uninsured over 65 year-olds and were fixed at 70 per cent of 
the value of the minimum insurance pension. Claimants were means- 
tested and cross-checked with registers of national and municipal 
pensions. As with ANSES and the DNA, the programme's annual 
budget was fixed and could only provide for a fraction of
245Despite its name, the MCBA is part of the provincial tier 
of government and is included in provincial financial statistics.
246L.Golbert "La asistencia alimentaria. . . ", pp.45-7 and 59-
60 .
247For example, A. Thompson Sequndo informe de monitoreo. 
Buenos Aires 1991 (mimeo) , notes that 500 PAMBA food parcels were 
distributed to elderly residents of the slum district of La Boca 
through a day centre in September 1990.
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potentially eligible claims. Again little effort was made to 
publicise the service or to facilitate applications. Claimants 
were initially required to visit the central office in the city 
of La Plata, 40 miles south of central Buenos Aires. Despite 
this, by May 1993, 35,000 successful applicants were on a waiting 
lists for benefits for which there was no funding. 248 This 
suggests that the sharp rise in provincial assistance expenditure 
had little direct benefit for uninsured elderly.
Figure 111:3 shows that at the level of municipal government 
there were no increases in assistance expenditure. Individual 
municipalities were free to develop their own range of assistance 
programmes, prioritising different social groups. Rather than 
briefly outline the activities of each of the 21 municipalities 
in GBA, it is useful to focus on an individual case. Figure 111:4 
is a matrix of social assistance and insurance agencies operating 
within the municipality of Lanus. Those operating at the national 
and provincial levels have already been discussed. These were 
complemented by the activities of the Direccion Municipal de la 
Tercera Edad (DMTA) which was providing 3 00 assistance pensions 
a year in the early 1990s. These were of a similar value to the 
ANSES pensions. 249 In addition, the DMTA offered a small number 
of grants for elderly with outstanding needs.
Figure 111:4 indicates that coordination between the various
248Interview with Sra Vazquez of the Direccion Provincial de 
la Tercera Edad, La Plata, 18th May 1993.
249Interview with Dr R.Masobrio, 070-078.
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Figure 111:4 Social provision for the elderly in the municipality of Lanus.
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assistance programmes was scant. The DNA preferred to deal 
directly with local organisations or needy individuals rather 
than work through local government. Likewise, the local social 
workers employed by ANSES had little contact with the municipal 
authorities.250 Despite sharing funding from the PBA, there was 
no evidence of communication between the provincial and municipal 
Direcciones. The strongest external ties of the DMTA were with 
PAMI, with whom it jointly organised meetings at local Centros 
de Jubilados.251 This is paradoxical given that the former was 
primarily concerned with assistance and the latter with those 
already in receipt of insurance pensions.
Thus, uninsured elderly living in Lanus could seek financial 
assistance from a variety of state agencies operating largely 
independently of each other. Rather than facilitate access to 
benefits, these multiple channels served to create confusion and 
increase bureaucracy. The assistance agencies operating at all 
three levels of government shared a number of weaknesses. First, 
all were constrained by small, fixed annual budgets, which did 
not reflect real levels of need. 252 According to the head of the 
DMTA:
Yes, there is a tendency to decentralise social policy decisions... but
250For example, the head of the DMTA had never heard of the 
Subgerencia de Prevision Social, the organisation responsible for 
local ANSES workers (interview with Dr R. Masobrio, Lanus, 22 
April 1993, 276).
251Interview with Dr R Masobrio, 150-160.
252This was as true for the DMTA as it was for national and 
provincial agencies.
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this a long-term, drawn-out process...I believe that everybody's budgets 
are being "rationalised"253 a little...Today you have to watch every penny 
you spend.254
As a result, no agencies took a pro-active role, seeking out 
those elderly in greatest need. Instead, they relied on 
individuals or local associations to bring deserving cases to 
their attention. 255 Furthermore, unlike PAMI, no assistance 
agencies made efforts to publicise their services. This led to 
a highly fragmented, under-funded and inaccessible system of 
social assistance, which might have been avoided if funding had 
been concentrated in a single agency. The failure to do so 
reflected the piecemeal creation of agencies, which was more 
frequently motivated by political considerations -a need to be 
seen to be doing something- than a desire to improve the welfare 
of the uninsured. Similar matrices could be drawn for the other 
municipalities of GBA, most of which undertook some form of 
assistance aimed at the elderly and lacked coordination with 
other levels of action.256
253The Argentine word ensanarse has no direct equivalent in 
English. It means both to reduce and to make more efficient.
254Interview with Dr R. Masobrio, 360-390.
255For example, the head of the DMTA refers to beneficiaries 
as "those who come here to ask for a pension. . . " (interview with 
Dr R. Masobrio 080-085) .
256For example, the municipality of Lomas de Zamora ran a 
food aid programme for needy elderly instead of a pension scheme. 
However, by July 1992 this was only being distributed to 2,700 
households. There was no coordination between this initiative and 
PAMI's Pro-Bienestar programme (untaped interview with A. de 
Micheli, Subsecretary of Social Assistance, municipality of Lomas 
de Zamora, 5th November 1992).
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In summary, the pattern of social insurance and assistance 
coverage in GBA in the early 1990s was extremely complex. Whilst 
social insurance programmes included a large part, but by no 
means all, of the elderly population, the benefits they provided 
usually fell far short of subsistence needs. This was only partly 
compensated for by PAMI iniatives such as the pension supplements 
and Pro-Bienestar programme. Despite having far smaller budgets 
than social insurance funds, assistance agencies suffered from, 
if anything, an even higher degree of fragmentation and 
bureaucratic confusion. Assistance programmes did not provide an 
effective safety net for the uninsured elderly, with national 
schemes only providing pensions for roughly five per cent of this 
group. Local initiatives were fragmented, poorly coordinated and 
under-financed. In every case assistance pensions were worth less 
than the minimum insurance benefit and thus fell even further 
short of providing for subsistence needs.
It is not easy to locate state initiatives for the elderly in GBA 
within the general policy typology outlined in the first section 
of the chapter. On the one hand, the complex array of public 
assistance agencies and their lack of contact with private 
organisations suggests a statist orientation. On the other, the 
lack of funding and the limited economic impact of their 
initiatives is more typical of the neo-liberal approach. This 
apparent contradiction reflected an incomplete shift towards neo­
liberalism. Funding was reduced whilst pre-existing agencies were 
allowed to continue their operations and new "ghost" 
organisations such as the STE were created. The maintenance of
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at least the facade of a complicated welfare structure served to 
obfuscate the real failure of the system to meet the economic 
needs of the majority of the elderly. Plans to privatise 
insurance and to further decentralise assistance will have 
accelerated this shift towards liberal welfare policies.
4) Non-state action.
Non-state income maintenance strategies are very diverse, ranging 
from the actions of international organisations to decisions 
taken by individuals. For the sake of clarity, this section 
groups these phenomena into two loose categories: large-scale and 
micro-institutional strategies. Particular attention is paid to 
the level of cover these activities afford poor urban elderly and 
the degree of coordination with state agencies.
4a) Macro-institutional strategies.
As shown in Figure 111:2, private and voluntary sector actors 
were afforded very little significance in welfare provision in 
Argentina for most of the twentieth century. Consequently, the 
following analysis of large-scale organisations focuses on two 
specific periods: (1) the years before the statist welfare
monopoly and (2) the gradual reversion to a more pluralistic 
approach.
i) Mutual aid societies.
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As mentioned above, the early expansion of social insurance 
schemes in GBA was a very gradual process which only catered for 
a minority of the urban workforce until the mid-twentieth 
century. This was by no means compensated for by comprehensive 
assistance programmes. Thus, the majority of the population had 
to provide for its own welfare needs. One means by which this was 
accomplished was through the expansion of mutual aid
societies. These organisations were usually established along 
ethnic lines, reflecting the immigrant origins of urban 
workers. 257 In some cases, however, they were established by 
occupational grouping as part of the expanding union movement258 
or by the catholic church as "workers' circles".259
Although the first mutual aid society did not appear until the 
1850s, they numbered 214 in the Federal Capital alone by 
1914 . 260 Such organisations provided a broad range of social and 
welfare functions, including hospitals, insurance against
257S.Baily "Las sociedades de ayuda mutua y el desarrollo de 
una comunidad italiana en Buenos Aires, 1858-1918." Desarrollo 
Economico (1982), pp.485-514 and F.Devoto and A.Fernandez 
"Mutualismo etnico, liderazgo y participacion politica. Algunas 
hipotesis de trabajo" in D.Armus, ed Mundo urbano v cultura 
popular. Estudios de historia social arcrentina. Buenos Aires
(1990), pp.136-41.
258S.Badoza "Typographical workers and their mutualist 
experience: the case of the Sociedad Tipografica Bonaerense,
1857-80" in J.Adelman, ed Essays in Argentine labour history. 
1870-1930. London (1992), pp.72-90.
259H.Recalde Benef icencia. asistencialismo estatal v 
prevision social/1. Buenos Aires (1991), pp.32-8.
260Argentine Republic Censo Nacional 1914. Tomo X: valores 
mobiliarios v estadisticas diversas. Buenos Aires (1917), p. 92.
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accidents and sickness and burial expenses.261 Three mutual aid 
societies specialised in providing pensions. The most important 
of these was the Caja Internacional Mutua de Pensiones. This was 
established in the Federal Capital in 1901 and contained 72,835 
members by 1916.262
Table III;7 Membership of welfare organisations in the Federal 
Capital, 1914.
Contributory pension funds..............76,056
Union funds.............................13,420 *
Catholic organisations..................23,920
Military funds..........................368
Mutual aid societies....................300,000 @
* This was dominated by the railway workers' fund, which 
contained 8,378 members.
@ This is a rough calculation made by A.Bunge.
Source: A.Bunge El seauro nacional. Buenos Aires (1917), pp.128- 
33 .
Table 111:7 shows that on the eve of the First World War, mutual 
aid societies dominated welfare insurance in Buenos Aires, 
containing roughly 300,000 affiliates. This represented 29 per 
cent of the total population of working age263 and, when taking
261M. Passanante Pobreza v accion social en la historia 
argentina: de la beneficencia a la seguridad social. Buenos Aires 
(1987), pp.75-80 and J. Fogarty "Social experiments in regions 
of settlement" in D. Platt, ed Social welfare 1850 to 1950: 
Australia. Argentina and Canada compared. London (1989) .
262Republica Argentina Censo Nacional 1914. Tomo X. . . pp.100-
103 .
263Argentine Republic Censo Nacional 1914. Tomo III: 
poblacion, Buenos Aires (1916), p.20. "Working age", used in lieu 
of data for the economically active population, is defined here
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into account that the coverage of individuals usually extended 
to their immediate family members, demonstrates that a subtantial 
proportion of the population participated in collective welfare 
organisations.
There are indications that mutual aid societies began to suffer 
increasing financial difficulties following the First World War. 
This resulted from rising demands for benefits from their ageing 
memberships, falling contributions due to the recession of 1914 
to 1919 and administrative fragmentation. 264 These problems 
might have served as a warning to future social security policy­
makers. Despite these set-backs, mutual aid societies' 
memberships continued to expand, with some estimates gauging 
their national affiliation to be around two million in 1943 
(roughly a fifth of the total population of working age) .265 
This reflected the rapid increase in urban, industrial employment 
and the expansion of trade unions. 266 Table 111:8 shows that the 
bulk of the societies' expenditure was concentrated on 
healthcare. Nevertheless, services largely targeting the elderly, 
such as pensions and funerals, accounted for over a fifth of
as between 15 and 64 years old.
264S.Baily "La sociedades de ayuda mutua...", p.492.
265J.Juarez Los trabaiadores en funcion social. Buenos Aires 
(1947), p.127. No figure for the economically active population 
is available for this period, although the 1947 National Census 
records a population of 10,215,3 02 aged between 14 and 59 (INDEC 
Cuadros ineditos... p.104).
266Between 1936 to 1945 union membership grew from 369,969 
to 528,523 (R.Munck Argentina. From anarchism to Peronism. 
Workers, unions and politics. 1855-1985. London (1987), pp.115 
and 132).
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outgoings.
Table 111:8 Mutual aid society expenditure in 1943.
Per cent of 
total spend
Total spend (1943 
pesos)
Healthcare 70 18,988,266,40
Subsidies and 
pensions
5 1,384,676,59
Funerals 17 4,698,702,40
Other services 8 2,215,482,50
Source: J.Juarez Los trabaiadores. . . . p.128.
By the 194 0s, mutual aid societies were developing stronger ties 
with several state agencies. These included the labour ministry's 
Direccion de Mutualidades which was responsible for regulating 
and coordinating their activities. 267 According to the 
Direccion:
Mutualism should move without delay from being simply the loaning of 
services offering protection and assistance; it must become integrated 
with the various elements of social provision..closer to a system of 
social insurance;..268
In 1946 all mutual aid societies were absorbed into the 
Direccion, which set minimum levels of services and membership
267J.Mensa "Algunas consideraciones sobre legislacion mutual" 
Cronica mensual de la Secretaria de Trabaio v Prevision. January 
1946; J.Juarez Los trabaiadores.... p.128 and 132-3.
268J.Mensa "Algunas consideraciones..", p.83.
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levies. 269 Within a short period the societies lost their 
individual welfare functions; their pension schemes were 
incorporated into the new social insurance funds, whilst their 
healthcare functions formed the basis of the semi-public medical 
system.270
Thus, during the 1940s mutual aid societies met the same fate as 
state funded charities (see above) . This gave the state the 
monopoly of large-scale institutional initiatives for the 
elderly, although, as has already been shown, this did not mean 
that all GBA's elderly received adequate protection. The rapid 
expansion of social insurance affiliation which brought with it 
prospects of early retirement and relatively generous pension 
payments reduced the perceived need for large-scale private 
institutional action. This was also discouraged by the mood of 
statism which predominated from the 1940s to 1960s.
ii) Non-governmental organisations.
In the 1960s a new form of private institution began to appear 
in Latin America and other developing regions: the non­
governmental organisation (NGO) .271 These were extremely
269 "Deberan contribuir con diez centavos mensuales los 
asociados de sociedades mutuales" Cronica mensual de la 
Secretaria de Trabaio v Prevision. January 1946, p.90.
270See C.Escude Aspectos ocultos de la salud en la Argentina. 
Buenos Aires (1976) , pp.38-44 for a description of the obra 
social healthcare system.
271For example, see A.Fernandez "NGOs in South Asia: peoples' 
participation and partnership" and L.Landim "Non-governmental 
organisations in Latin America" World development. (1987) pp.39-
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heterogeneous in both form and function and can only be loosely 
defined as:
..private, non-profit organisations that are publicly registered (i.e., 
have legal status), whose principal function is to implement development 
projects favouring the popular sectors, and which receive financial 
support.272
The emergence of NGOs in Argentina partly reflected the gradual 
deterioration of state welfare programmes from the late 1950s. 
This coincided with a shift in the emphasis of welfare planning 
throughout Latin America. The new thinking stressed the role of 
"community development programmes", which aimed to encourage the 
poor to participate more actively in their own welfare through 
mutual support, cooperatives and a combination of grassroots and 
top-down planning. 273 However, a series of repressive regimes 
tended to stifle rather than encourage popular participation. 
Thus, church organisations and political militants from the 
traditional left became aware of the need and opportunities for 
non-state actors to play a significant role in small-scale, 
grassroots development projects. 274 Much of this activity was 
conducted informally by small groups of individuals in shanty
4 9 and 31-35.
272M . Padron Los centros de promocion v la cooperacion 
internacional al desarrollo en America Latina (mimeo), Buenos 
Aires (1986).
273E.Tenti Fanfani Estado v pobreza. . . . pp. 83-90.
274L.Landim "Non-governmental organisations in Latin 
America." World Development (1987) and A.Hall "Non-governmental 
organisations and development in Brazil under dictatorship and 
democracy" in C.Abel and C.Lewis, eds Welfare, poverty and 
development in Latin America. London (1993), pp.422-3.
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towns and poor rural neighbourhoods. 275 However, in some cases 
formal institutions emerged, some of which were still operating 
in the 1990s.276
Table 111:9 Period of foundation of NGOs still operational bv 
June 1992.
1960 : 6 1975: 33 1990 : 162
1965: 13 1980: 56 1992 : 168
1970 : 17 1985 : 104
Source: Grupo de Analisis y Desarrollo Institucional y Social 
(GADIS) Directorio de organizaciones no cubernmentales de 
promocion v desarrollo de Argentina. Buenos Aires (1992) p.209.
Table 111:9 indicates that the number of NGOs in Argentina grew 
steadily during the 1960s and 1970s and at a faster rate during 
the 1980s.277 This reflected worsening poverty, the diffusion of 
the NGO concept and, from the 1980s, increased opportunities due 
to redemocratisation. NGOs varied in size from a handful of
275Most histories of shanty towns in GBA make reference to 
the activities of religious and left-wing individuals during the 
1960s and early 1970s. For example, see E. Pastrana "Historia de 
una villa..11, pp. 135-40.
276Grupo de analisis y desarrollo institucional y social 
(GADIS) Directorio de organizaciones no gubernmentales de 
promocion v desarrollo de Argentina. June 1992. Buenos Aires 
(1992), pp.21 and 27, shows that Caritas Argentina (a catholic 
organisation) and La Asociacion Emaus de Rosario (a left-wing 
organisation) were founded in 1956 and 1959, respectively and 
still existed in 1992.
277It should be noted that the data does not include NGOs no 
longer operating in 1992 and that the register is by no means 
complete. Nevertheless, the trend it demonstrates is generally 
supported by academics (see A.Thompson "El tercer sector y el 
desarrollo social" in E.Bustelo and E.Isuani, eds Mucho, poauito 
o nada.... pp.63-4 and B.Cuenya, A.Rofman, M.Di Loreto and 
C.Fidel "Proyectos alternatives de habitat popular y ONGs en la 
Argentina" Medio Ambiente v Urbanizacion (1990), p.56.).
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individuals to large, international associations and performed 
a diverse range of functions. Thus, it is not easy to assess 
their impact on the welfare of particular social groups such as 
the elderly. Of the 172 listed in the GADIS register, 15 claimed 
to run programmes specifically directed at the needs of the 
elderly, of which 13 were located in GBA. 278 Two of these 
provided direct financial support, nine provided advice and 
training, two promoted healthcare and two were concerned with 
academic investigation. Seven of these NGOs provided data on 
their annual budgets, which amounted to a total of US$ 1,167,000 
for 1992. Thus, the information provided by GADIS suggests that 
NGOs concerned with the economic needs of the elderly were too 
few in number and too restricted in their budgets to play a 
significant role in filling gaps in state social insurance and 
assistance.
Nevertheless, it is probable that NGOs had a more important
effect on elderly welfare than the GADIS register suggests. The 
survey was far from complete, excluding several of the NGOs 
referred to below and in subsequent chapters. 279 Moreover, a 
number of the NGOs listed in the register as not providing
services specifically for the elderly did in fact offer a number 
of direct and indirect benefits to this group. The most notable 
example of this was CARITAS, described in detail below. Finally, 
it should be noted that the aim of most NGOs was not to
278See GADIS Directorio de organizaciones.... p. 220.
279These include the Fundacion para la Atencion Integral del 
Anciano y la Familia and the Fundacion para Estudio e
Investigacion de la Mujer (see below).
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distribute direct welfare benefits, but to provide advice and 
training to grassroots initiatives among deprived social 
groups.280 Consequently, the relationship between the size of 
their budgets and their impact on elderly welfare was less clear- 
cut .
The limited number of studies of NGOs in Argentina identify 
various problems common to these organisations. One area of 
general difficulty is the expansion of NGOs from individual 
small-scale projects to larger regional or national 
organisations. This poses several challenges, including the need 
to develop effective administrative structures while maintaining 
flexibility and the organisation's original ethos.281 The 
process may be hindered by erratic flows of funds, particularly 
when these are derived from overseas. However, the most serious 
challenge to growth is the nature of the relationships between 
NGOs and the state. As shown above, earlier voluntary sector 
organisations had suffered from a high level of reliance on 
government funding and, as a result, lost their independence. By 
contrast, through the 1970s and 1980s voluntary organisations 
received little if any funding from the state. Indeed, given that 
the early NGOs were established during authoritarian regimes, it 
is probable that relations between them and the state must at 
best have been mutually suspicious. Subsequent redemocratisation
280L.Landim "Non-governmental organisations..", pp.33-5.
281S.Anis "Can small-scale development be a large-scale 
policy? The case of Latin America." World Development (1987) and 
R.Martinez Nogueira "Lifecycle and learning in grassroots 
development organisations." World Development (1987).
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and the devolution of some social welfare functions to local 
governments presented NGOs with both opportunities and dilemmas. 
By 1989 a small number of government loans and subsidies were 
being made available to NGOs and several public agencies had 
expressed interest in joint projects. By the late 1980s, most 
NGOs had obtained official registration as non-profit making 
entities. 282 This exempted them from paying taxes and, in some 
cases, may have facilitated access to state resources. A 1988 
conference on relations between the Argentine state and NGOs 
identified the following problems:
1. The heterogeneity of state agencies, each with their own 
agendae, can lead to conflicting and contradictory alliances.
2. The risk of compromising the NGO's political autonomy.
3. Differences between NGOs and state agencies in the scale of 
projects and attitudes towards participation.283
The way in which NGOs confronted these challenges is considered 
below in the descriptions of individual agencies.
1) HELP AGE INTERNATIONAL (HAI).
HAI was established in London in the early 1980s as a network of 
age-care NGOs based in both developed and the developing 
countries. By 1993 40 such organisations participated in the
282A survey of 58 NGOs carried out in the 1980s found that 
92 per cent were formally registered (B.Cuenya et al "Proyectos 
alternatives .. 11, p. 53).
283A .Thompson The voluntary sector in transition. The case 
of Argentina. Serie Estudios GADIS, no.4, Buenos Aires (1989), 
pp.2 7-8 .
150
network, either as full or associate members. The former had 
direct involvement in HAI's strategic decisions, whilst the 
latter were allowed to participate in regional fora and 
conferences. 284 The network contained several Latin American 
NGOs, including three full members285 and five associates.286 
This both attested to HAI's interest in the region and the degree 
of participation afforded to organisations from developing 
countries.
Nevertheless, the activities of HAI in Argentina were restricted 
by a number of factors. The first of these Was the low priority 
afforded Latin America as a whole. HAI funded a large number of 
projects across the developing world. Some of these consisted of 
"operational programmes", which involved the direct participation 
of HAI workers in the field. However, the preferred modus 
operandi for Latin America was the indirect funding of projects 
initiated by local organisations. It was argued that this 
reflected a higher degree of social organisation and voluntary 
activity in the continent. 287 Indirect funding may also have 
been due to the smaller budget allocated to Latin America as
284Interview with Susanna Connor, project officer Latin 
America and the Caribbean, HAI, London 18th January 1994, 50-85 
and 33 6-355.
285Pro Vida (Colombia) , Pro Vida (Bolivia) and AGECO (Costa 
Rica): HAI Horizontes 32. London, November 1993.
286CARITAS (Chile) , Pro Vida (Peru) , Pro Vida (Ecuador) , 
ANAYA (Dominican Republic) and FAIF (Argentina) ; see HAI 
Horizontes 32.
287Interview with S. Connor, 14 0-180.
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compared to Asia or Africa. 288 This reflected HAI's particular 
concern for elderly refugees and victims of large-scale natural 
hazards (both relatively uncommon in Latin America) and the 
preference of major external funding agencies, such as the 
European Community (EC) and Overseas Development Association 
(ODA) , for relief work in regions generally considered as more 
impoverished.289
Argentina was afforded a low priority relative to other Latin 
American countries. Both the EC and ODA refused to fund projects 
in what they considered to be a "middle income country". 290 For 
similar reasons, the financial committee of HAI did not consider 
Argentina a priority. According to the regional project officer:
The Help the Aged trustees who are on the international operations 
committee. . .which is administered under the name of HAI. . .some of them do 
have objections to funding in Argentina and I can't say that we would now 
be able to increase our work there again... It's to do with making 
comparisons with poorer countries... If we really felt we had real reason 
to expand the programme again, we would have to have a debate in that 
forum and find out what the real objections were...If we do, they might 
cut funding altogether.291
HAI activities in Argentina were also restricted by the low 
priority afforded to the elderly in development funding as a
288Interview with S. Connor, 140-145.
289Interview with S. Connor, 164-195.
290Interview with S. Connor, 283-306. Interestingly, both 
agencies were prepared to fund projects in Chile, which enjoyed 
a higher per capita income. The project officer suggested that
this probably reflected attempts to mitigate the social costs of
Chile's long period of military dictatorship.
291Interview with S. Connor, 574-597.
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whole. The organisation had encountered greater difficulty in 
obtaining external funding than had other development NGOs. This 
reduced the overall scope of its activities. According to the 
regional project officer:
It has taken a while to get on board the issues that elderly people face 
and why they are important in the development process. . .There are definite 
trends in the development world and ageing and older people certainly 
wasn't one of them...It is begining to change but it's still difficult to 
get..money or support for the kind of programmes that we have.292
These restrictions explain why HAI involvement in Argentina was 
reduced from five to just two projects between 1992 and 1993. 
Detailed descriptions of a project which maintained funding and 
one which lost it are given below in separate sections.293 
According to HAI, the process of selection favoured local 
organisations with a specialist interest in the elderly, rather 
than ones with broader development objectives. 294 The scaling- 
down of operations reduced what was already a marginal role in 
promoting the economic welfare of needy elderly in GBA as a whole 
and is indicative of the problems facing other international NGOs 
operating in this field.
292Interview with S.Connor, 211-225.
293These are, respectively, CEPEV and FOC. The other project 
to maintain funding, La Fundacion para la Atencion Integral del 
Anciano y la Familia (FAIF), was based outside GBA and is thus 
not of direct interest. However, descriptions of its activities 
can be obtained from C.Ball "The experience of FAIF in Argentina" 
Community development journal. Vol.27, No.2, London 1992 or FAIF 
Talleres para la tercera edad: testimonios de sus protagonistas. 
Cordoba, 1990.
294Interview with S. Connor 385-398.
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2) El Centro de promo cion y estudios de la vejez (CEPEV) :295 
CEPEV was founded in 1987 by a number of PAMI social workers and 
academics. One of these, having conducted a detailed study of old 
age and poverty in the poor urban neighbourhood of La Boca,296 
proposed the implementation of a pilot project there. Through 
contacts with internationally-recognised academics, CEPEV was 
able to obtain funding from the Inter-American Foundation (IAF), 
an organisation based in the USA. The La Boca project aimed to
. . .form an association of elderly people in an area of poverty, given that 
these groupings do not develop spontaneously in pockets of poverty, and 
facilitate the access of these poor elderly people to private and public 
benefits or resources which other groups are able to obtain thanks to 
their better relative positions, their better experiences of life, their 
greater capacity to exploit such resources.297
This objective contains the implicit assumption that the PAMI 
Centros de Jubilados programme was less-easily established in 
poor neighbourhoods whose residents often lacked organisational 
expererience. Furthermore, CEPEV considered such day centres less 
appropriate to the needs of poor elderly, many of whom lacked 
insurance pensions and were therefore denied PAMI membership. 
These issues are considered further in the following chapter.
The project in La Boca proved a success and by 1991 the resultant 
elderly organisation contained 250 members. CEPEV played a purely 
consultative role in La Boca and, by 1990, most of the day-to-day
295The Centre of the Promotion and Study of the Elderly.
296N . Redondo Ancianidad v pobreza: una investigacion en
sectores oopulares urbanos, Buenos Aires (1990).
297Interview with S.Simone of CEPEV, Buenos Aires 1.6.93, 
1/065 to 1/073.
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decisions were being taken and executed by elderly locals. By 
grouping together, the elderly of La Boca were able to obtain a 
number of PAMI benefits, including medical aid and subsidised 
day-trips. The organisation distributed food parcels obtained 
through the PAMBA programme and provided general advice about 
applications for contributory and assistance pensions.298 As a 
result, it was decided to set up a second project in a shanty 
town outside the Federal Capital, Villa Jardin. This is examined 
in detail in the next chapter.
Whilst CEPEV took pains to preserve its autonomy, it had a large 
number of contacts with state agencies. Indeed, its executive 
director remained a senior official in PAMI. As is shown in 
chapter four, CEPEV often used these personal contacts to great 
effect in obtaining welfare benefits for elderly in the two 
projects. However, it did not favour participation in joint 
projects with state agencies and received no government funding. 
Indeed agencies such as PAMI and the STE may have been more 
inclined to regard CEPEV as a rival organisation, given its 
commitment to establish elderly organisations with no formal ties 
to the state.
CEPEV achieved a number of successes in the first years of its 
life, but ambitions to expand activities beyond two urban 
neighbourhoods were thwarted. This failure was due to changes in 
funding largely beyond CEPEV7s control. By 1991 it was receiving
298A.Thompson Segundo informe de monitoreo: el Centro de
Estudios v Promocion de la Veiez. (mimeo) Buenos Aires (1991).
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funds from Help Age International (HAI) and CONICET (an Argentine 
research institute), in addition to support from IAF, giving a 
total of US$60,000 per annum. 299 However, during the following 
two years the IAF funding was discontinued and HAI's aid was 
frozen. This forced CEPEV to reduce its staff from three full and 
two part-time workers to just one part-time and to give up its 
small rented office. Thus, by 1992 it activities were reduced to 
just maintaining occasional contact with the Villa Jardin 
project. Attempts to develop contacts with other local NGOs 
concerned with the elderly, such as FOC (see below), were not 
reciprocated. By early 1993 the prospects of obtaining additional 
funding appeared slim and so CEPEV's activities seemed destined 
to remain pilot projects with very localised impacts.
The experiences of CEPEV illustrate the problems that NGOs face 
if they are not prepared to develop close relations with state 
agencies. Despite the evident success of its two pilot 
programmes, CEPEV remained dependent on a small number of funding 
agencies which proved to be unreliable, threatening its eventual 
collapse.
3) La Fundacion de Organizacion Comunitaria (FOC) : 300 Whilst 
FOC's activities did not extend to any of the neighbourhoods 
studied in this thesis, it provides a useful comparison with the 
experiences of CEPEV. FOC was established in 1981, at the end of 
the Proceso period, by a group of women living in shanty towns
299GADIS Directorio de orcranizaciones. . . . p. 55.
300The Foundation for Community Organisation.
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around Lomas de Zamora in PBA, rather than by social workers and 
academics. They sought to improve healthcare and hygiene by 
establishing womens' groups and providing basic medical 
training.301 FOC's slow initial growth and informal origins were 
reflected in the fact that it did not obtain legal recognition 
until 1989 .302
By 1992 FOC had been transformed into one of the largest 
development NGOs in GBA. Its activities had been broadened to 
include communal kitchens, kindergartens, micro-enterprises, 
housing improvements and a number of services for the elderly. 
FOC was receiving funding from a wide range of sources, including 
UNICEF Argentina, La Fundacion Antorchas (a local trust), the 
Dutch Embassy and Help Age International. In early 1993 FOC moved 
to larger well-equipped premises in the centre of Lomas de 
Zamora. Thus, at first sight, FOC would appear to provide a clear 
example of successful NGO expansion.
The rapid transformation of FOC from a number of informal 
projects to a large organisation reflected the close relationship 
it was able to develop with the municipality of Lomas de Zamora. 
Its legal recognition and rapid expansion were linked to the 
election of a new mayor in 1989. This was followed by the 
appointment of a founder member of FOC as municipal minister of
301FOC Las educadoras sanitarias comunales de Lomas de 
Zamora; slntesis v exoeriencia de los programas. (mimeo) Lomas 
de Zamora, 1981.
302GADIS Directorio de orcranizaciones. . . . p. 95. Legal 
recognition or "personeria iuridica" is a necessary prerequisite 
for formalising relations with state agencies.
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social assistance and by 1992 several other members of FOC were 
employed by the ministry. 303 These officials proposed to extend 
the successful experiences of FOC to other parts of the 
municipality as part of a state programme for the establishment 
of "Centres of Community Organisation". 304 Thus, rather than 
simply establishing joint projects, municipal and FOC activities 
and personnel were being integrated to the extent that it was 
difficult to separate the two organisations. This contrasts 
sharply with the relation between CEPEV and state agencies. 
Whilst there was no clear evidence that FOC received direct 
subsidies from the municipality, their close ties made this quite 
likely.
It is not clear whether FOC's expansion was the cause or result 
of its strong municipal ties. Given that FOC personnel were 
appointed to the municipality rather than vice versa, it would 
appear that the relation was more NGO penetration of a state 
agency than the reverse. Nevertheless, the relation carried the 
risk of comprising FOC's development objectives with political 
ones and posed serious administrative challenges. Moreover, the 
relation was extremely sensitive to any future change in 
municipal office-holders.
There are indications that the expansion of FOC's activities
303Interview with A. de Micheli, sub-secretary of social 
assistance, Lomas de Zamora, 5th November 1992.
304Subsecretaria de Accion Social Comunicacion de la 
subsecretaria de accion social. Informacion para los C.O.C. 
(mimeo), Lomas de Zamora, 1992.
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occurred more in breadth than in depth. Its services for the 
elderly stressed the importance of forming local day centres and 
workshops. By November 1991 two of these had been established, 
with a total membership of 45 elderly women. A third centre was 
set up in conjunction with a PAMI Centro de Jubilados and 
contained 50 active members. 305 These groups had a wide range of 
objectives including providing advice for pension applications, 
gymnasia classes for the elderly and healthcare education. 
However, by early 1993 there was little evidence that these had 
evolved beyond informal discussion groups and funding from Help 
Age International was discontinued. Several factors may account 
for this failure. The shanty towns around Lomas de Zamora 
contained far smaller numbers of elderly than the neighbourhoods 
in which CEPEV worked and thus the creation of large groups was 
more difficult. 306 Moreover, FOC admitted that its central 
concern was the plight of mothers and young children, rather than 
the elderly. 307 Consequently, most had more experience of 
working with mothers' groups and childcare than of the special 
needs of the elderly. None were aware of the range of potentially 
available pensions or subsidies and few efforts were made to
305FOC Informe de avance del provecto de tercera edad. iulio- 
noviembre 1991. (mimeo) Lomas de Zamora (1991) and FOC Provecto 
de integracion de la tercera edad como educadores sanitarios 
comunales (mimeo) Lomas de Zamora (1990).
3061980 Census data shows that in most of the enumeration 
districts in which FOC operated (F.23, F.24, F.26, F.27 and F.30) 
over 65 year-olds accounted for less than 1.5 per cent of the 
total population (INDEC La pobreza.... p.125.).
307A publicity leaflet issued by FOC in 1992 gives the 
organisation's principal aim as: "To improve the quality of life 
in marginal communities, providing technical support and 
prioritising as the focus of its activities the mother-child 
binomial."
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directly involve the elderly in group decision-making.308
The experiences of FOC illustrate some of the potential 
difficulties faced by NGOs as they seek to expand their 
activities beyond a small number of pilot projects. Growth can 
lead to the development of new activities beyond the range of 
experience of existing members. FOC was far less successful in 
its dealings with the elderly than it was in areas closer to its 
original remit. As was seen in the elderly day centres, NGO 
expansion may reduce the scope for grassroots participation. It 
also increases the temptation to develop strong ties with 
organisations, be they funding agencies or government organs, 
whose objectives may not coincide with those of the NGO. Whilst 
they pose new challenges, none of these developments are 
necessarily detrimental to the success of NGOs. Indeed, FOC's 
links with the municipality could be a valuable source of 
experience and training for members, enabling them to develop 
more effective programmes for the elderly in the future.
4) CARITAS Argentina: The catholic church played a central role 
in the provision of social assistance in Argentina in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, through charitable 
organisations similar to the Sociedad de Beneficencia (see 
above). Whilst these generally focussed on the needs of mothers 
and young children as opposed to the elderly, the encouragement 
of "workers circles" contributed to general expansion of mutual 
aid societies' pension coverage (see above). As mentioned
308Direct observations by the investigator.
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earlier, these assistance and insurance initiatives came into 
conflict with the welfare monopoly imposed during Peronist rule 
and largely disappeared. The overthrow of Peron gave the church 
more scope for action and in 1956, a year after the dissolution 
of the Fundacion Eva Peron, CARITAS Argentina was formally 
established.309
CARITAS Argentina stated its central objective as:
To encourage and coordinate the official charitable activities of the 
catholic church, as part of its broader pastoral mission, through 
practices reflecting circumstances and experiences, in order to attain a 
more integrated development for all men, especially the most marginalised 
people and communities.310
CARITAS is part of an international hierarchy, paralleling the 
organisation of the catholic church. This ranges from the global 
headquarters in Rome, to the Latin American secretariat in 
Bogota, to the national centre, to individual bishoprics and 
dioceses. These tiers of organisation are presided over by the 
corresponding priests, bishops and archbishops. Thus, CARITAS 
activities are closely connected to the broader structure of the 
catholic church. As will be seen, the individual components of 
this hierarchy enjoy considerable autonomy, although they may be 
called upon to fund other areas of CARITAS at times of crisis.
CARITAS activities expanded steadily through the 1960s and 1970s, 
reflecting the growth of the NGO sector as a whole. This
309See GADIS Registro de organizaciones. . . . p. 27.
310Comision Nacional de Caritas Argentina Memoria v balance, 
periodo 1987-1990 (mimeo) Buenos Aires (1991).
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expansion occurred despite the conservative orientation of the 
Argentine church.311 CARITAS was of particular significance 
during the Proceso period, since it was largely exempt from 
government repression and interference.312 Indeed, several 
CARITAS branches in Buenos Aires formed the focus of popular 
opposition to the eradication of shanty towns in the late 
1970s.313 The economic crises of the 1980s saw a dramatic 
expansion in the scope of CARITAS activities, including emergency 
food aid programmes.314 At the same time, there was a shift in 
policy away from pure assistance to employment training workshops 
and micro-enterprises.315
A full evaluation of the impact CARITAS activities on the welfare 
of the elderly in GBA is not easy, since each individual parish 
establishes its own priorities and runs its own assistance 
programmes. The cases of three individual parishes are examined 
in detail in the next chapter. Nationally, CARITAS activities
311According to I.Valler in Catholicism, social control and 
modernisation in Latin America Santa Cruz, California (1970), 
p.126: "Most pastors and bishops are orientated to the values of 
the social elites rather than to the workers, the agricultural 
labourers or the urban poor."
312E.Mignone "The catholic church, human rights and the 
"dirty war" in Argentina." in D.Keogh, ed Church and politics in 
Latin America. London (1990) pp.3 52-72, for an account of 
relations between senior church figures and the military 
authorities.
313M.Bellardi and A.de Paula Villas miseria. . . . pp. 63-77.
314Comision Nacional de Caritas Argentina Memoria v 
balance.... pp.10-13.
315For example, see "Promocion, asistencia y 
asistencialismo." Informe Caritas. Buenos Aires, September 1992, 
p. 17.
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tended to prioritise the needs of poor northern provinces rather 
than those of GBA.316 This might have reflected the particular 
lack of social insurance and state assistance in these regions 
(see Table 111:3). Publications at the national and bishopric 
level, made more reference to groups such as children, flood 
victims and unemployed men than the elderly.317 The only 
programme run at the national level directly targeting the 
elderly was the establishment of a small number of rest homes. 
These benefited a maximum number of 2,363 households across the 
country.318 It is difficult to estimate the proportion of 
elderly who benefited from more general assistance programmes, 
such as emergency food aid. However, it is possible that the 
shift in emphasis away from assistance to productive ventures 
could have favoured social groups who are more capable of work.
CARITAS did not suffer from many of the limitations common to 
NGOs. Through the catholic church, it had a secure base of 
funding which could be increased at times of crisis by support 
from overseas branches. In the early 1990s, CARITAS Argentina was 
receiving significant levels of financial assistance from its
316Aid targeted at northern provinces included the "Mas por 
menos" programme of the 1970s and the "Regreso con esperanza" in
the early 1990s (M.Passanante Pobreza v accion..., p.156 and
Comision Nacional de Caritas Argentina Memoria v balance.... 
p.14) .
317Comision Nacional la Caritas Argentina Memoria v
balance.... p.18.
318Comision Nacional de Caritas Argentina Memoria v
balance. . . . pp.19-20. The figure for households benefitted by
rest homes also included the activities of other community
organisation projects.
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German, Spanish and Italian counterparts.319 Its large size and 
prestige also enabled it to attract funding from a range of 
private businesses and run joint projects with organisations such 
as UNICEF. 320 Financing was also facilitated by flexible 
arrangements between national bishoprics. For example, during the 
inflationary crisis of 1989 the Federal Capital district provided 
funding for food aid in more peripheral parts of the city.321
Relations between CARITAS and state agencies differed from the 
case of most NGOs in as much as Caritas Argentina was often the 
larger member of the partnership. Thus, there was less danger 
that its objectives would be hijacked or modified. Nevertheless, 
CARITAS Argentina was wary of involvement in projects which might 
be of party political inspiration. 322 Cooperation with state 
agencies increased through the 1980s and early 1990s. By late 
1992, CARITAS was developing links with PAMI and the STE to 
develop a new assistance programme aimed at the elderly, although 
no details of the project had been agreed.323
CARITAS Argentina was successful in implementing a wide range of
319Comision Nacional de Caritas Argentina Memoria Y
balance.... d d .17, 28 and 31.
320Comision Nacional de Caritas Argentina Memoria Y
balance.... d d .13 and 24.
321Comision Nacional de Caritas Argentina Memoria Y
balance. . . . p.11.
322Interview with Director of CARITAS Argentina, Buenos Aires 
24th November 1992.
323Interview with Director of CARITAS Argentina 24th November
1992 .
164
assistance projects of benefit to disadvantaged groups, including 
the elderly. However, it should not be considered an adequate 
safety-net for the shortcomings of state action. In 1992 the 
national headquarters only contained 13 full-time staff and just 
one computer. 324 Moreover, its dual objectives of social 
assistance and furthering the catholic faith might not 
necessarily be compatible. 325 This raised the question of 
whether assistance should be dependent upon religious and moral 
compliance to Catholicism. 326 These issues are examined in more 
detail in the next chapter.
As has been seen, it is more meaningful to stress the great 
diversity of NGO activities in GBA rather generalise about their 
significance and performance. This diversity encompasses all 
aspects of NGOs, including their origins, objectives, structure, 
scale and relations with other organisations. However, it is 
likely that their impact on the economic welfare of poor elderly 
was very limited, compared to the actions of large state 
programmes. It is possible that development NGOs evolved more 
slowly in Argentina than in other parts of Latin America due to 
the country's relatively high living standards and the large
324GADIS Directorio de orcranizaciones. . . . p. 27.
325Most CARITAS publications devote considerable space to 
religious and moral discussions. For example, see "Consecuencias 
laterales del divorcio" in CARITAS es compartir. Buenos Aires 
September 1992.
326Church assistance earlier in the 2 0 th century had 
sometimes reflected these criteria (E.Tenti Fanfani Estado v 
pobreza. . . , pp.24-34).
165
welfare role played by the public sector. 327 Clearly, they were 
not able to provide an alternative to nor a safety net for public 
sector failure. Most NGOs and external sources of funding did not 
afford the elderly the same priority as other social groups. 
Small, unreliable budgets reduced the scale of their operations 
and tempted them to submit their particular objectives to those 
of more powerful organisations.
The role of NGOs was also limited by a lack of close cooperation 
amongst them. In the early 1990s a number of general conferences 
were held and a register of NGO activities was published.328 
However, the continued absence of communication between the 
various GBA NGOs funded by HAI indicated that the impact of these 
initiatives must have been minimal. Whilst cooperation between 
NGOs was hindered by their very diversity, it would have enabled 
them to redress the imbalance of power with state agencies and 
to exert more influence over general welfare policy. Financial 
cooperation may have also enabled NGOs to overcome some of their 
budgetary limitations.
iii) Direct overseas assistance.
As well as providing funds for local NGOs, some European 
governments sought to provide more direct forms of social
327A. Thompson The voluntary sector. . . , p. 30.
328A. Thompson The voluntary sector. . . . p. 27 and GAD IS 
Directorio de organizaciones.. . .
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security for citizens residing in Argentina. Given the timing of 
European immigrations (see previous chapter), it was probable 
that a high proportion of second generation or post-war 
immigrants had reached old age by the 1990s. The intervention of 
European governments reflected international recognition of the 
failings of the Argentine welfare system and fears that large 
numbers of impoverished pensioners would return to their 
countries of origin in order to obtain assistance. No comparable 
services were offered by Latin American governments, despite high 
levels of emigration to Argentina. This was probably because 
Argentine welfare programmes were generally considered superior 
to those elsewhere in the continent.
The most important form of overseas welfare intervention was the 
provision of retirement pensions. A 1991 Labour Ministry report 
estimated that overseas pensions accounted for 2 per cent of 
total affiliation to social security. 329 These included 65, 000 
Titulari di beneficio previdenziale. which had been awarded by 
the Italian government since the signing of an international 
treaty in 1961. Titulari consisted of regular monthly pension 
payments, worth 400 pesos in early 1993. Until the early 1990s, 
eligibility for these benefits required proof of Italian 
citizenship, one year's work and military service in Italy and 
at least 15 years of pension contributions within the Argentine 
system. Following this, eligility criteria were tightened, 
stipulating at least 5 years' work in Italy. This change
329J. Scipione et al Situacion de los benef iciarios del 
sistema nacional de prevision social. Informe de GALLUP (mimeo), 
Buenos Aires (1992), p.36.
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reflected the mounting financial difficulties of the social 
security system back in Italy.330
The Italian government offered its citizens a number of other 
benefits in addition to the titulari. These included 5,000 non­
contributory military veterans' pensions worth 200 pesos a month 
in 1993. During the economic crisis of 1989 and 1990 large 
amounts of emergency food aid and medical drugs were made 
available.331 Emergency financial assistance remained important 
after the crisis: 2,500 such grants, worth up to 400 pesos, were 
being distributed in the Federal Capital and PBA in 19 9 3 . 332 
These employed similar means tests to state assistance pensions 
and information about them was spread by word of mouth rather 
than by formal publicity. 333 Finally, some Italian government 
assistance was channeled through local Italian clubs, several of 
which had their roots in the old mutual aid societies. 334 These 
clubs sometimes liased with the consulates over individual claims 
for social assistance and provided members information about both
330Interview with Sr Giovannini, pensions officer, Italian 
Embassy, Buenos Aires 29th March 1993.
331In 1989 US$ 150 million of such assistance was provided 
(A.Schneider "Italian immigrants in contemporary Buenos Aires: 
their responses to changing political, economic and social 
circumstances", PHD Thesis, London (1992) pp.276-79).
332By then, these were being mainly distributed by regional 
consulates. Two such consulates operated in GBA: one in the
Federal Capital and the other in La Plata (the capital of the 
Province of Buenos Aires).
333Interview with Sra Tussini, Asistenzi Soziali, Italian 
Consulate, La Plata, 18th May 1993.
334A. Schneider "Italian immigrants..", pp. 278-84.
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Italian and Argentine benefits.335
In contrast with the Italian government, direct Spanish 
assistance was up-graded in 1993. Beforehand, the principal form 
of assistance had consisted of 10,000 quarterly grants based on 
similar elgibility criteria to the titulari. 336 In 1993 a new 
assistance package was developed, consisting of monthly grants 
for any Spanish citizens aged over 65 with incomes below 2 02 
pesos a month (the equivalent minimum payment in Spain) . 
According to Spain's labour attache, these subsidies sought to 
target those elderly who received minimum pensions from the self- 
employed workers' fund. The Spanish consulate predicted that 
around 15,000 grants would be granted by the end of 19 9 3 . 337
The activities of the Italian and Spanish governments reflected 
growing international recognition of the shortcomings of 
Argentina's public welfare system. Whilst the new criteria for 
titulari would have reduced the number of contributory benefits 
granted, both governments maintained or even increased 
expenditure on means-tested support. This means that the impact 
of direct overseas intervention on the poorest elderly was of 
growing significance..
335Interview with Sr Giovannini. See local publications such 
as La Comunita and L'Italiano, for accounts of Italian clubs.
336J. Scipione et al Situacion de los beneficarios . . . . p. 36.
337 "Espana equipara pensiones minimas para los residentes" 
Ambito Financiero, 15th October 1993.
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iv) Private pension funds.
The 1914 national census alludes to the existence of a number of 
private pension funds but does not undertake a full survey of 
them. Instead, it provides an account of one typical example, La 
Union Popular, which contained 37,000 members by this date.338 
No further information is available about these funds or their 
evolution up to the 194 0s, although it is highly probable that 
they subsequently met a similar fate to that of the mutual aid 
societies. Indeed, through much of the second half of the 
twentieth century private companies were expressly forbidden from 
offering any form of retirement pension scheme. This attitude 
reflected the belief that private pensions were superfluous to 
and would interfere with the operations of the state system. 
However, as the social insurance system plunged deeper into 
crisis in the 1980s, some provision was made to afford the 
private sector a limited role in this area of welfare.339
In 1987 the first private pension funds were established. These 
were to provide optional schemes, which would complement rather 
than substitute the public programme. 340 As such, no provision 
was made for opting out of the state system. Table 111:10 shows 
that after a slow begining, affiliation to private insurance rose 
rapidly in the early 1990s, accounting for approximately three
338Argentine Republic Censo nacional 1914. Tomo X. . . p. 93.
339Latin American Weekly Report. London, 20th November 1986.
340D.Peluffo "El desarrollo del seguro de retiro en la 
Argentina" Mercado Asegurador, Buenos Aires, September 1991.
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per cent of the total economically active population by mid-1992. 
However, the impact of private insurance on those who had already 
reached old age was very limited, since virtually no affiliates 
had as yet retired.
Table III;10: affiliation to private insurance schemes. 1980- 
1992 .
Year Trimester Individual Collective Total
1988 4 5, 252 569 5, 821
1989 1 8,795 714 9,509
2 15,584 1,331 16,915
3 38,269 2, 956 41,225
4 67,534 41,048 108,582
1990 1 79,801 28,412 108,213
2 82,698 28,818 111,516
3 96,020 30,941 126,961
4 99,180 37,932 137,112
1991 1 96,952 37,867 134,819
2 75,273 40,510 115,783
3 74,546 41,417 115,963
4 83,199 204,326* 287,525
1992 1 83,484 223,191 306,675
2 84,420 259,531 343,951
3 85,067 286,877 371,944
*This sudden rise was due to the affiliation of all members of 
the commercial workers' union.
Source: Secretaria de Economia, Superintendencia de Seguros de 
la Nacion Informacion estadistica. Seauro de retiro.. Buenos 
Aires, from 12th November 1991 to 26th February 1993.
The role afforded the private sector in social insurance was 
dramatically increased with the passing of a far-ranging reform
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bill in September 19 9 3 . 341 This enabled private insurance 
companies to participate directly in a mixed, obligatory 
insurance system, albeit with a large number of state controls 
and guarantees. By the end of 1993 a large number of local and 
overseas firms were preparing to take advantage of the 
reform. 342 However, its effect on those already retired had yet 
to be felt.
4b) Micro-level strategies.
The preceding sections have explained the failure of large-scale 
institutions, be they state or non-state, to meet all the income 
needs of the elderly. As a result many elderly remained dependent 
on a number of other income sources, such as employment, family 
support and savings. These strategies have generally received 
less official and academic attention than the operations of large 
organisations and thus the available data are often incomplete 
and highly fragmented.
i) The household, family and friends.
This section looks at the structure of urban households, families 
and friendship networks, the role the elderly play in them and 
the degree of economic support they obtain. Before proceeding,
341See Ambito Financiero, Buenos Aires, 24th September 1993 
for the full text of the reform bill and E.Isuani and J.San 
Martino La reforma previsional... for a detailed account of the 
reform process itself.
342For example, see "AFJP: preparadas, listas, ya." El
Cronista, Buenos Aires, 13th September 1993.
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it should be emphasised that "family" and "household" are not 
synomynous terms, especially in Latin American societies.343 The 
former are based on kinship, whilst the latter involve an element 
of shared residence and may include non-kin. As will be seen 
below and in chapter five, distinctions between immediate kin, 
household members and more distant relatives are often blurred.
The Argentine national constitution puts the responsibility of 
providing for the economic needs of the elderly squarely on the 
shoulders of their immediate family members (see above). This is 
reflected in the criteria applied by the various means-tested 
benefits for the aged. The capacity of families and households 
to provide economic support for the elderly is influenced to some 
degree by changes in their size or composition. The only sources 
of data for such changes are the national censuses and occasional 
surveys. Both of these suffer from a number of weaknesses. 
National censuses do not always include data on households and 
do not always present it in a standard format, thus hindering 
comparison. Surveys are often based on samples too small to be 
statistically significant and are restricted to particular cities 
or neighbourhoods.
Tables 111:11 to 13 summarise census information about household 
structures. They show that only a small minority of the total 
population lived alone, but that this had increased substantially
343E.Jelin "Family and household: outside world and private 
life" in E.Jelin, ed Family, household strategies and gender 
relations in Latin America. London (1991), pp.173-6, provides a 
good categorisation of different household and family structures.
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Table 111:11: Proportion of total and elderly population living 
alone, 1947-91.
Year Number 
living alone 
(a)
(a) as % 
of total 
pop.
65 + s 
living 
alone (b)
(b) as % 
of total 
65+s
1947 648,829 4.1 na na
1960 302,539* 1.5 na na
1970 615,900 2.6 na na
1980 749,600 2.7 268,977 12.0
1991 1,206,541 3.7 491,267 17.5
* This figure is most probably a miscalculation by the census 
authorities.
Source; INDEC Censo general de la nacion. 1947. Cuadros ineditos. 
Caracteristicas de familia v convivencia. estado civil v 
fecundidad. Buenos Aires (1970), p.2; INDEC Censo nacional de 
poblacion. 1960. Tomo 1; total del pais. Buenos Aires (1961), 
p.105; INDEC Censo nacional de poblacion. familias v viviendas - 
1970. Resultados obtenidos por muestra (total del pais). Buenos 
Aires (1973) p.48; INDEC Censo nacional de poblacion v vivienda. 
1980 (total del pais). Buenos Aires (1983), p.119; INDEC Censo 
nacional de poblacion v vivienda, 1991 (total del pais). Buenos 
Aires (1993), p.130.
Table 111:12-: Chances in the structure of Argentine households. 
1970-91 (% of total households) ,344
Year Unipersonal Nuclear Extended Composite
1970 10.2 58 .5 24 .7 6.7
1980 10 .4 58 .2 24.0 7.4
1991 13 .3 64 .1 19.3 2.2
Source: as Table 111:11.
344 INDEC defined the different household structures as 
follows: (1) Nuclear: father and/or mother with/without single
children (2) Extended: nuclear containing other relatives (3) 
Composite: nuclear or extended also containing non-relatives
(INDEC Censo...1970.., p.7).
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Table 111:13; Comparison of household structure between Federal 
Capital and Argentina as a whole and between over 65 vear-olds 
and the total population.
Uniperson Nuclear Extend Composite
1980 Argen. 2.7 56.0 31.5 9.9
Arg 65 + 12.0 35.7 43.1 9.3
Capital 5.6 59.0 28.5 6.9
Cap 65+ na na na na
1990 Argen. 3.7 66.4 25.7 4.1
Arg 65+ 17.5 44 .0 34.4 4.2
Capital 8.2 66.5 21.4 3.9
Cap 65+ 22.7 44 .2 29.6 3.4
Source: as Table 111:11.
between 1980 and 1991. As seen in Table 111:12, the growth of 
unipersonal households was part of a broader shift away from 
larger, extended units to smaller, nuclear ones. This trend has 
been observed in many urbanised, western societies and has been 
ascribed to a number of factors including falling fertility, 
improved access to housing and rising divorce rates.345
Table 111:13 shows that the proportion of elderly living alone 
was substantially higher than that for the total population, 
accounting for almost a quarter of over 65 year-olds in the 
Federal Capital. This reflected the relatively low probablity of 
an elderly individual having young children or a living partner.
345United Kingdom, Central Statistical Office Social trends 
24., London (1994), pp.33-42; S.Cotts Watkins "Conclusions" in 
A.Coales and S.Cotts Watkins The decline of fertility in Europe. 
Princeton (1986), pp.420-49.
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The latter was especially important for elderly women, who, due 
to their longer life expectancy, were much more likely to out­
live their partners than the reverse. Consequently, elderly women 
were more likely to be living alone (29.3 per cent in the Federal 
Capital) than were elderly men (11.4 per cent).346
Whilst the great majority of elderly lived in multi-person 
households, this had experienced a significant fall during the 
1980s. Unfortunately, it is not possible to disaggregate the 
census data to examine whether elderly with different socio- 
economic characteristics (such as iubilados or uninsured 
villeros) were more or less likely to live in a certain type of 
household. Nor is it possible to establish whether nuclear 
households containing over 65s just comprised an elderly couple 
or whether they also contained adult children. This could affect 
the capacity of the household to provide economic support. These 
issues are returned to in chapter five.
Some light is shed on these issues by surveys of the elderly" s 
living conditions, two of which are summarised in Table 111:14. 
The GALLUP data is based on a sample of 2, 000 people in receipt 
of a retirement or widow's pension living in the Federal Capital 
and a number of provincial capitals, whilst the La Boca survey 
comprises of 223 elderly individuals living in a low income 
neighbourhood in the Federal Capital. Both surveys indicate that 
approximately a third of the elderly were living just with their 
spouses. As a result, less than half were parts of households
346INDEC Censo 7 91... (Capital Federal), p. 85.
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containing non-elderly members.
111:14 Individual survey data cerca 1990: the structure of
households containing elderly in provincial capitals and La Boca 
(per cent).
Capitals La Boca
Alone 20.7* 27.8
With spouse 35 .4 33 .2
With spouse and 
children 12.5 10.3
With children 22 .2 13.9
With other 
relatives 7.1 14 . 8@
With others 2.2 -
*The corresponding figure for the Federal Capital was 28.1 per 
cent (unfortunately, no other geographically des aggregated data 
was presented).
@This also includes the "with others" category.
Source: J.Scipione et al Situacion de los beneficiarios del
sistema nacional de prevision social -analisis del informe 
GALLUP. Buenos Aires (1992), p.72; N.Redondo Ancianidad v 
pobreza: una investicracion en sectores populares urbanos. Buenos 
Aires (1990), p.201.
It is interesting to compare the results of the two surveys since 
the former was designed to represent the total urban elderly 
population, whilst the latter relates specifically to a low 
income neighbourhood. The proportions of elderly living alone or 
in a couple are similar, but a higher proportion of elderly in 
La Boca live with people other than their children. This 
indicates that nuclear household structures are less frequent in 
poor districts than elsewhere in large cities.
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The structure of elderly families and households reflects a large 
number of factors/ including demographic change, individual and 
cultural preferences, the availability of housing and the 
economic positions of their members. 347 These effects are often 
contradictory or difficult to disentangle. Consequently, it is 
not easy to bolster the census and survey data with intuitive 
deductions. For example, the greater frequency of households 
containing non-kin in La Boca may have been because larger homes 
afford greater security, especially when individual incomes are 
erratic. However, Redondo concludes that the majority of elderly 
surveyed in La Boca expressed a preference for living alone or 
in couples. According to Redondo, it was their increasing frailty 
and a generalised housing shortage in GBA which forced many 
elderly into other arrangements.348
It should not be assumed that there is a direct link between the 
composition of households containing elderly and the pattern of 
economic interaction between aged individuals and other household 
or family members. An elderly person may live alone but still
347E.Jelin "Family and household: outside world and private 
life." and L.Lomnitz and M.Perez-Lizaur "Dynastic growth and 
survival strategies: the solidarity of the Mexican grand
families." in E.Jelin, ed Family, household strategies and gender 
relations in Latin America. Paris (1991) provide good accounts 
of this process.
348R.Kaplan and N.Redondo "Family care of the elderly in 
Argentina" in J.Kosberg, ed Family care for the elderly; social 
and cultural changes. London (1992), p.116 and E.Pantelides 
Servicios sociales para la tercera edad en el Gran Buenos Aires 
(mimeo) Buenos Aires (1988).
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receive substantial support from nearby relatives.349 Likewise, 
it should not be assumed that economic relations between elderly 
and other household members can be reduced to the degree of 
economic assistance which the former receive from the latter. The 
reality may be more complex, especially in extended households 
and the elderly may themselves make a number of direct economic 
contributions. The CELADE survey found that 72.3 per cent of over 
60 year-olds were owner-occupiers and another 16.2 per cent had 
handed over the ownership of their residence to other family 
members. 350 During the early 1990s the proportion of household 
expenditure taken up by Accommodation costs rose sharply.351 
Consequently, free lodging was an important economic benefit to 
other people sharing the residence (assuming there was no rental 
agreement). 352 Likewise, Table 111:15 indicates that the daily 
domestic activities of elderly men and women should not be 
reduced to the passive receipt of economic support. Housework and 
childcare (for which, unfortunately, CELADE provide no data) may 
enable other household members to participate more fully in waged
349L.Ramos "Family support for elderly people in Sao Paolo, 
Brazil" in H.Kendig, A.Hashimoto and L.Coppard, eds Family 
support for the elderly, Oxford (1991), found that this was 
considered the ideal option by most of the elderly individuals 
she studied, who felt that it combined independence with 
security.
350Centro Latinoamericano de Demografia (CELADE) Argentina: 
situacion v necesidades de la tercera edad. Algunas ciudades 
seleccionadas. Santiago de Chile (1989), p.110.
351"Casi 15 millones de pobres" Clarin. Buenos Aires 22.9.92.
352M .Oddonne Ancianidad. contextos regionales v redes de 
intercambio. (mimeo) Buenos Aires (1991) pp.13-14, includes a 
personal testimony of such a case.
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employment. 353 Finally, the elderly may contribute through the 
sharing of their salaries and benefits with the household as a 
whole. The latter, whilst small, may provide a guaranteed, 
monthly source of income which may reduce the impact of 
variations in earnings characteristic of the informal sector.354
Table 111:15 Daily activities of over 60 year-olds. 1989.
Men Women Total
Go shopping 81.4 80.8 81.0
Sew, knit, darn 5.0 69.4 42.9
Housework 91.1 87.5 89.0
Source: CELADE Argentina: situacion.... p.179 and p.184.
Unfortunately, most surveys which examine economic relations 
between the elderly and the household characterise this process 
as passive and unidirectional. Moreover, as shown in Table 
111:16, there are large discrepancies between the findings of 
such studies. These may partly be explained by the specific 
wording of the questionnaires: the GALLUP one was concerned with 
levels of satisfaction with family support, whereas the others 
stressed its economic significance. 355 Taken together, the
353See the testimonies of "Bernarda" and "Celina" cited in 
M. Oddonne Ancianidad, contextos.... p. 12.
354A.Portes and M.Castells "World underneath: the origins, 
dynamics and effects of the informal economy" in A.Portes, 
M.Castells and L.Benton, eds The informal economy, Washington 
(1989), pp.26-7.
355GALLUP qualifies its findings by stressing that those in 
receipt of family support were vulnerable to variations in the 
amounts received over time (J.Scipione Situacion de los 
beneficiarios..., p.36).
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surveys imply that, although the elderly were not generally 
dissatisfied with family support, it was only of direct economic 
benefit to a small minority, even in low income urban 
districts. 356 These findings contrast with studies of other 
countries which emphasise the importance of family support.357
Table 111:16 Degree of economic support/autonomy from other 
household or family members, cerca 1989.
Support Autonomy Capitals
(GALLUP)
CELADE La Boca
Much 62.3
None 1.5 NA
Enough 24 .1
Some 8.7 NA
Little 8.0
Complete 89.7 87.6
None 4.3
NA 1.3
Source: N.Redondo Ancianidad v  do breza.... p 203; CELADE
Argentina: situacion.... p.189; J.Scipione Situacion de los
beneficiarios..., p.75.
The survey results may under-estimate the true importance of the 
household, due to the non-quantifiable nature of some forms of 
assistance and the difficulty of "capturing" them in a short 
questionnaire. Also, respondents may have been reluctant to admit 
the true extent of their economic dependence on relatives. 
Nevertheless, the limited available data suggest that direct
356This agrees with the findings of R.Kaplan and N.Redondo 
in "Family care...", p.115.
357For example, E.Contreras de Lehr "Aging and family support 
in Mexico" in H.Kendig et al, eds Family support... pp.215-23.
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economic support is generally insignificant and does not 
compensate for the gaps in the protection offered by larger 
institutions. This may partly be attributable to the failure of 
state agencies, such as PAMI, to develop large-scale programmes 
encouraging family support (see above). It may also reflect the 
general impact of increasing poverty in the 1980s on the ability 
of family members to help out. Chapter five ascertains whether 
the survey results were reflected in patterns of economic 
relations in villas.
As is shown by the census data, it is difficult to blame the 
limited role of the family on a preponderance of nuclear 
households and the residential isolation of the elderly. Whilst 
over half of the elderly live with other family members, only one 
out of ten obtains significant support from them. This may 
reflect two scenarios: (1) an absence of income pooling between
household members or (2) economic relations between members which 
do not entail a large "net gain" for the elderly. Although 
available survey data shed no light on the relative importance 
of these potential scenarios, general studies of poor urban 
households in Latin America stress the importance of income 
pooling, suggesting that the second explanation carries more 
weight.358
Less information is available about economic support received by 
the elderly from family members and friends beyond the household.
358For example, S.Ramos Las relaciones de oarentesco v de 
avuda mutua, Buenos Aires (1981), pp.51-7 and L.Lomnitz Networks 
and marainalitv.... pp.117-22.
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The small number of personal testimonies collected by M.Oddonne 
suggest that shared residence is not necessarily an important 
factor. 359 However, this contradicts the generally held view 
that the intensity of economic relations between kin is reduced 
by geographical distance.360 Given that direct financial support 
from household members is scant, it is unlikely that friends or 
other family members make an important contribution. 
Nevertheless, this relationship should be tested empirically, not 
just accepted intuitively.
As has been demonstrated, existing data about relations between 
the elderly and other household members are ambivalent and leave 
many questions unanswered. It is important to understand why an 
increasing proportion of elderly, especially women, were living 
alone and to assess what economic consequences this may produce. 
Similarly, it is important to follow up inconclusive indications 
that the majority of elderly in multi-person households did not 
obtain economic support from kin. This must involve a more 
sophisticated approach, taking into account the complexity of the 
micro-economic dynamics of households and families. The weakness 
of the data here contrasts with the wealth of material concerning 
the structure and impact of public sector agencies. A subsequent 
chapter of this thesis attempts to correct this imbalance by 
giving detailed accounts of inter-household relations in three
359M .Oddonne Ancianidad. contextos...; compare the testimony 
of Celina (p.12) to that of Antonio (p.14).
3 6 °A.MacEwan "Differentiation among the urban poor: an
Argentine study" in E.De Kadt and G.Williams, eds Sociology and 
development. London (1974) pp.197-226 and L.Lomnitz Networks and 
marginalitv.... pp.133-4.
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shanty town districts.
ii) Employment.
To understand the continued employment of elderly beyond 
officially-designated retirement ages, it is necessary to examine 
changes in the labour market as a whole. Chapter two has already 
provided some general background about the evolution of the 
Argentine economy and employment trends. This showed that the 
absolute size of the workforce expanded rapidly during the 
period. However, this did not occur at the same rate as the total 
population growth. As a result, the economically active 
proportion of the total population fell continuously between 1950 
and 1990 (Table 111:17) . Several factors account for this 
decline, including a shift from labour to capital intensive 
industrial and agricultural processes and the country's poor 
overall economic performance.361 Social factors, such as an 
increased tendency to pursue further education and opt for early 
retirement, were also significant.362
Official data for economic activity may fail to register the full 
extent of employment in the informal sector as well as part-time
361See chapter two, pp. 57-65.
362Between 1970 and 1980 the proportion of the total 
population attending tertiary education rose from 14.9 to 21.6 
per cent (ECLAC Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean 1992. Santiago (1993), p.57).
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Table III;17 Rates of economic activity in Argentina. 1950-1990.
Age/sex 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990*
Total
population 41.45 39.35 38.95 36.50 35.10
Total 60-64 45.70 38.70 33 .40 29.65 27.55
Total 65+ 30.85 21.60 16.10 9.70 7.20
Men 60-64 78 .40 66.40 57.20 52.00 49.40
Men 65+ 56.20 38.60 29.10 18 . 00 14.10
Women 60-64 8.10 9.00 10.50 9.70 8.20
Women 65+ 6.60 5 .20 4.70 3.20 2.10
* projected figures.
Source: International Labour Organisation (ILO) Economically
active population estimates: 1950-1980. Projections: 1985-2025. 
Volume 3. Latin America. Geneva (1986), pp.79-81.
and occasional labour. 363 These emerging forms of employment 
generally received less complete insurance protection than did 
formal occupations and often paid lower or less reliable 
wages. 364 Thus, there was a reduction in both the proportion of 
the total population in employment and in the quality of jobs 
which were available to them.
Table 111:17 shows that the decline in economic activity of the 
elderly population between 1950 and 1990 was considerably more
363See Table 11:8 and A.Marshall "Contrataciones flexibles 
o trabajo precario? El empleo temporario y a tiempo parcial" in 
G. Gal in and M.Novick, eds La precarizacion del empleo en la 
Argentina, Buenos Aires (1991), pp.18-46.
364E.Isuani and J.San Martin in La reforma previsional. . . 
p. 25, claim that no under-employed workers participated in social 
insurance programmes. See J.Carpio et al, "Precariedad laboral 
en el conurbano bonaerense. Resultados de un estudio sobre 
pobreza" in P.Galin and M.Novick, eds La precarizacion del 
empleo... pp.196-218, for data on income security.
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rapid than that for the total population. The decline was 
particularly pronounced among over 65 year-olds, for whom 
activity rates fell from 3 0.85 to 7.2 per cent. These differences 
between age groups reflected the large increase in the number of 
elderly receiving pensions, which continued up to the 198 0s. 
Likewise, gender differences may partly be explained by the lower 
retirement age for women. However, it should not be assumed that 
there is a direct correlation between the expansion of pension 
coverage and declining employment. The GALLUP survey of 
pensioners found that 11.4 per cent admitted to remaining in 
gainful employment in order to supplement their benefits.365 
Conversely, the number of economically active elderly was lower 
than the number excluded from insurance provision (see Table 
111:3), indicating that some elderly without benefits remained 
out of formal employment.
CELADE provides information about the types of economic activity 
the elderly were most likely to be engaged in. This shows that 
larger proportions were self-employed commercial or construction 
workers: activities generally recognised as highly informal.366 
CELADE also identifies a tendency for industrial workers to 
switch to self-employment or informal activities as they reach 
old age. 367 Similarly, the GALLUP pensioner survey found that 
58.3 per cent of those in employment worked less than six hours
365J .Scipione, et al Situacion de los beneficiarios. . . . p.35.
366See J.Charmes "Introduction." in D.Turnham, B.Salome and 
A.Schwartz, eds The informal sector revisited. Paris (1989), 
pp.10 -4 8 .
367CELADE Argentina: situacion.... pp. 164-167.
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a day. 368 Neither the CELADE or GALLUP surveys provide 
information about wage levels. However, a census of elderly 
villeros in the Province of Buenos Aires in 1981 found that 
elderly heads of household who remained in employment earned on 
average less than other age groups.369
The high level of informality among the elderly resulted from a 
number of causes. It is useful to divide the working elderly into 
those with and those without insurance benefits. The former 
sought to supplement the value of their benefits but no longer 
continued in full-time employment or in their original
occupations. This was partly because they were no longer capable 
Cor were not considered so by employers) to hold on to permanent, 
regular occupations. Also, legal restrictions, though frequently 
ignored, may have discouraged both insured elderly from seeking 
such work and employers from taking them on. As such, the
elderly would be the first to feel the effects of reduced
opportunities in the formal sector as a whole. Consequently, 
insured elderly were often left with little option but to pursue 
part-time, informal employment in activities which did not entail 
entry high barriers (capital, skills, etc).
Given the low coverage rates of assistance benefits, it was
unlikely that non-insured elderly would have a state pension. As 
such, they were not legally prevented from working. They would
368J . Scipione et al Situacion de los benef iciarios. . . . p. 109.
369Provincia de Buenos Aires El empleo v condiciones. . . .
p.70.
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have been less affected by the contraction of the formal labour 
market and would be more likely to remain in the same occupation. 
Without pensions, the need for this group to continue working 
full-time would be higher than was the case for insured 
elderly. 370 Indeed, their working practices would only change as 
a result of physical and mental frailty.
Little evidence exists to either corroborate or disprove the two 
scenarios outlined in the preceding paragraphs. Chapter five will 
return to these issues and assess whether the above 
characterisations held for elderly villeros.
The fall in elderly economic activity rates can be interpreted 
as evidence of the success of insurance and assistance schemes 
in providing for their economic needs. However, it could also 
have resulted from a reduction of access and opportunities for 
gainful employment. As mentioned above, a number of elderly had 
access to neither insurance benefits nor employment. CELADE found 
that 40.1 per cent of over 60 year-olds felt an economic need to 
continue working, but only 16.5 per cent were able to do so.371 
The high proportion of elderly working in informal activities, 
where incomes were generally lower and less reliable than in the 
formal sector, also reflects their difficulties in obtaining work
370This is reflected in the results of a 1988 survey of self- 
employed workers in GBA which found that the great majority (84.9 
per cent) of over 65 year-olds working in this sector had been 
doing so for more than seven years. This indicates that self- 
employment was not primarily a refuge for the recently-retired 
(calculated from INDEC Trabaiadores por cuenta prooia. Encuesta 
del Gran Buenos Aires 1988. Buenos Aires (1989), p.47.).
371CELADE Argentina: situacion..., pp. 154 and 161.
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elsewhere. Finally, the general fall in real wages will have 
reduced the importance of continued employment.372
iii) Other sources of income.
Savings comprise an important source of income for the elderly 
in many countries373 , but their importance in Argentina has been 
limited by a number of factors. Economic instability, high 
inflation and government manipulation of private deposits served 
as strong disincentives for savings in domestic banks.374 
Indeed, Figure 111:5 shows that monthly interest rates 
consistently failed to keep pace with inflation during much of 
the 1980s. At the same time, significant falls in real wages 
reduced the capacity for individual savings.375
The CELADE survey provides no information about elderly savings, 
implying that these are not a significant source of income. This 
is reflected in Table 111:18 which shows that only a very small 
proportion of pensioners received income from savings and
372See UN Economic survey of Latin America and the Caribbean.
1990. volume 2. Santiago (1992), p.32.
373P. Johnson and J.Falkingham Ageing and economic. . . . pp.59-
60 .
374G.Escude and S.Guerberoff "Ajuste macroeconomico, deuda 
externa y ahorro en la Argentina" in C.Massad and N.Eyzaguirre, 
eds Ahorro v formacion de capital: experiencias latinoamericanas. 
Buenos Aires (1990), pp.25-73 and R.Bouzas "Mas alia de la 
estabilizacion y la reforma? Un ensayo sobre la economia 
argentina a los comienzos de los '90" Desarrollo Economico (April 
1993) pp.9-13.
375During the 198 0s real wages suffered a sharp downward 
trend, falling by 27.9 per cent in 1989 alone (ECLAC Statistical 
yearbook.... p.32).
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FIGURE 111:5 Monthly real interest rates on fixed-term deposits. 
1984-1991 (per cent).
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Source: ECLAC Economic survey of Latin America and the Carribean.
1991. Santiago (1993), p.34; ECLAC Economic survey for Latin 
America and the Carribean, 1988, Santiago (1989), p.150.
corresponds with the finding of Redondo's La Boca survey that the 
majority of elderly complained that their savings had been 
significantly devalued by inflation.376
Table 111:18 also includes information about income from other, 
non-specified sources. These provide support for a slightly 
larger number of cases than do savings. Given that a high 
proportion of elderly were property-owners, it is probable that 
a large part of this category was accounted for by rents. 
However, a number of other potential sources of income exist, 
including subsistence production, scavenging and begging. The 
opportunities for the former were limited in urban areas such as 
Greater Buenos Aires. A survey of household incomes in three low- 
income neighbourhoods located in the outskirts of the city (where 
there was more available land for plots and small-holdings) found 
that subsistence accounted for less than three per cent of total 
income. 377 Scavenging and begging were clearly strategies of 
last resort, not to be pursued unless income from any other 
source was insufficient to meet the elderly individual's basic 
needs. No reference is made to such activities either in academic 
investigations, official surveys, NGO reports or the local press. 
A subsequent chapter providing detailed survey data for specific 
shanty towns considers whether any elderly residents were forced 
into such desparate straits.
376R.Kaplan and N.Redondo "Family care...", p. 115.
377P.Aguirre Impacto de la hiperinflacion. . . (unpaginated) .
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Table III;18 Additional sources of income (other than benefits, 
family or employment) for pensioners.
Total Retirement
pension
Widow's 
pension
Dollar savings 0.9 1.3 1.2
Short-term
deposits 1.2 1.4 0.8
Interest on 
savings 3.5 4.5 1.8
Other 4.2 4.9 2.9
Source: J.Scipione et al, Situacion de los beneficiarios....
p.35.
5) Conclusions.
The confused, fragmented structure of institutional economic 
support for the elderly living in GBA in the early 1990s can only 
be understood in the light of its complex historical evolution. 
This can be"divided into three approximate phases. The first, 
occurring from the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century 
involved considerable pluralism with the expansion of public 
programmes and organisations such as mutual aid societies. 
Throughout this period, there was a general labour shortage, 
enabling a large proportion of elderly to support themselves by 
remaining in employment. This was followed by the imposition of 
a state welfare monopoly and extended, though far from universal, 
protection which coincided with a sudden increase in the size of 
the elderly population. As a result, the elderly became 
increasingly dependent on state initiatives. This, along with an 
emerging labour surplus, led to a sharp falls in activity rates
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for the elderly. By the 1980s, the reduced capacity of the public 
sector to meet the welfare needs of the majority of the elderly 
and an ideological shift away from statism led to the gradual 
reemergence of a more pluralistic structure. Rather than 
encourage the simplification of the state welfare apparatus, 
however, this process was accompanied by further public sector 
fragmentation. This partly reflected the resiliance of such 
agencies and partly resulted from the state's failure to match 
the readiness with which it set up new programmes with adequate 
funding. Opportunities in the labour market remained limited, 
with many elderly resorting to informal employment.
It is not possible to obtain historical information about all 
aspects of elderly income maintenance. The most important missing 
link in the above schema is the role played by households and 
family members. These have been shown to provide the elderly its 
most significant source of income in many countries. "Golden age" 
arguments that the elderly received more respect from society in 
the past (perhaps because they were a rarer commodity) and were 
therefore more likely to obtain support from family members have 
been largely debunked by recent empirical research.378 
Nevertheless, the expansion of state provision may have reduced 
the role of family members in providing support to the elderly. 
The corollary of this would be that family support increased as 
the quality of state provision fell, yet the limited available 
evidence indicates that the elderly received scant assistance 
from household members. This may have been because, as was shown
378P. Johnson and J.Falkingham Acreincr and economic. . . p. 12.
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in chapter two, the elderly were often financially better-off 
than other groups such as young children.
Even with these historical insights, the general pattern of 
income maintenance strategies in the early 1990s does not, at 
first sight, make complete sense. First, it shows that the 
dominant role of the state in elderly welfare provision masked 
large gaps in the population's insurance coverage and the 
inadequacy of benefits. These failings had only been partly 
compensated for by the expansion of PAMI's activities and the 
establishment of numerous assistance agencies. Secondly, it shows 
that large non-state institutions provided economic support for 
only a very small number of elderly, due to the small budgets of 
NGOs and the recent establishment of private pension programmes. 
Following this, it shows that direct economic support from 
household members and opportunities for well-remunerated 
employment were very limited. Finally, other income strategies, 
ranging from saving to scavenging are shown to have been largely 
insignificant.
As such, it could be concluded that neither macro nor micro-scale 
strategies were enough to compensate for the shortcomings of 
state protection. Were this the case it would be expected that 
a large proportion of elderly would be left in a condition of 
poverty. Yet, as is shown in chapter two, levels of poverty among 
the elderly, whilst not being negligible, were low compared to 
other age groups. 379 Rather than indicating that income levels
379See Table 11:9.
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for the elderly were satisfactory, this showed that the incomes 
of other groups fell even further short of their requirements. 
This had been a consequence of falling real wages and the 
contraction of formal labour markets. Moreover, social insurance 
and assistance programmes made little provision for groups such 
as the unemployed and single-parent families.380
As has been shown above, in most cases no single source of income 
was enough to satisfy the basic economic needs of an elderly 
individual. Consequently, many elderly had to resort to combining 
income from a number of different sources in order to survive. 
This is illustrated by GALLUP'S finding that 61 per cent of 
pensioners received income from other sources.381
Unfortunately, there are no other available data which cross- 
refer income sources. Figure 111:6 provides a tentative schema 
of the ways in which the various types of income at the disposal 
of the elderly might be combined. It divides the elderly into two 
groups: those who had previously made insurance contributions and 
those who had not. This did more than influence their subsequent 
access to contributory pensions. Insured elderly had full 
membership of PAMI but were theoretically excluded from 
assistance pensions and formal employment. It was unlikely that 
insured elderly needed to resort to scavenging for economic 
survival. Conversely, it was probable that NGOs focussed their
380In 1983 contributory pension schemes accounted for 85.7 
per cent of total social security expenditure in Argentina (ILO 
The cost of social security. 1984-86. Geneva (1992), p.112.
381J . Scipione et al Situacion de los benef iciarios. . . . p. 35.
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efforts on the uninsured. Finally, the schema posits that those 
elderly who made pension contributions in the past were also more 
likely to have accumulated savings and acquired properties. This 
may have resulted from both higher levels of disposable income 
and a tendency to defer consumption. Unfortunately, there are no 
available data to corroborate this assumption.
Figure 111:6 Combined income sources for the elderly.
Insured Increasing probability Uninsured
-------------------------------------
Contributory Assistance
pension benefit
Full PAMI Employment
Family,
friends
Savings, NGOs
rents
Scavenging
If the pattern of income strategies displayed in Figure 111:6 is 
correct it could be concluded that a strong economic dualism 
existed between the insured and more marginalised elderly. It 
would be interesting to consider whether this dualism coincided 
with the distinction between those elderly suffering structural 
poverty and those facing the risk of impoverishment. The latter 
might be characterised as retired formal sector workers whose 
insurance benefits fell short of previous earnings. Available 
official data do not shed any light on these issues, but a 
subsequent chapter draws on detailed data for individual 
neighbourhoods to ascertain the existence and degree of economic 
dualism among their elderly residents.
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CHAPTER FOUR. THE CASE STUDIES: GENERAL FEATURES AND LOCAL
INITIATIVES FOR THE ELDERLY.
1) Introduction.
This and the following chapter move the emphasis away from the 
macro or national level to patterns of elderly income maintenance 
in specific neighbourhoods. Rather than treating these 
neighbourhoods in isolation, reference is made to the 
institutional structures outlined above. Whilst studies of macro 
structures are clearly incomplete unless consideration is given 
to their effects at the local level, little sense can be made of 
micro surveys if they are not placed within a broader context.
The chapter has two main goals. First, it provides the general 
background of the neighbourhoods surveyed. Secondly, it explores 
the effect of local welfare initiatives. Throughout, particular 
attention is paid to the conditions of, and opportunities 
afforded to, elderly residents. The chapter begins by introducing 
a number of general themes and issues which run through the 
remaining sections. Brief descriptions are given of the physical 
fabric and socio-economic conditions in each neighbourhood. These 
are followed by accounts of how patterns of organisation and 
participation in each location changed over time, paying special 
attention to initiatives targeting the needs of local elderly 
residents. The final section returns to the general themes 
discussed at the start of the chapter and compares the 
experiences of the neighbourhoods surveyed.
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Before looking at the case studies themselves, some explanation 
should be given for the choice of neighbourhoods. Since the 
thesis is concerned with the plight of poor urban elderly, case 
studies were only conducted in districts with high overall levels 
of poverty, namely villas de emeraencia.382 Whilst it was 
desirable to select villas which were typical of those in Greater 
Buenos Aires as a whole, it was necessary to study areas 
containing a large enough number of elderly to provide a 
representative sample. Many villas in the city did not meet this 
criterion and were consequently excluded. Preference was given 
to villas with distinct patterns of local organisation and socio­
economic characteristics, to reflect the diversity occurring in 
the city as a whole and so that the effect of these variables 
might be examined. Finally, and most importantly, consideration 
was given to the level of safety which could be guaranteed to the 
investigator: in many shanty towns the likelihood of robbery and 
assault restricted the ability of the researcher to gather 
material.
Some data about levels of poverty and numbers of elderly in 
different parts of Greater Buenos Aires were available from the 
1980 survey carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 
v Censos (INDEC) , 383 However, establishing contacts and gaining
382Villas de emeraencia are defined in chapter two. Whilst 
it would be dangerous to assume that they have the monopoly of 
poverty in Greater Buenos Aires, it is generally recognised that 
the vast majority of their populations are lacking in basic 
needs. Thus, shanties provide more convenient locations for case 
studies than neighbourhoods where poverty is more diffuse.
383INDEC La pobreza en la Argentina. Buenos Aires (1984) .
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acceptance in shanty towns is often a very drawn-out and 
complicated business. Inevitably then, the selection of shanty 
towns involved a degree of chance. Several neighbourhoods 
selected for a preliminary survey were subsequently found to be 
inappropriate, according to the above criteria, and were 
therefore discarded.384
2) Local initiatives for the elderly: general considerations.
This section introduces a number of themes which recur throughout 
the remainder of the chapter. It builds on the discussion of 
local initiatives in the previous chapter, examining factors 
which may contribute to the success or failure of such activities 
and considers how they may be able to improve the economic 
position of elderly villeros.
Formidable obstacles confront the successful organisation of 
elderly shanty town residents. Many of these result from what is 
described here as this group's "doubly marginal" status. Whilst 
theories referring to cultures of marginality or deviancy have 
been largely refuted since the 1970s, 385 it is important to 
consider other aspects of marginality, such as exclusion from 
political processes and the denial of access to public goods. As
384These included (1) Villa Albertina in Lomas de Zamora. 
Contacts were made with a local NGO working there, but the total 
elderly population was small. (2) Isla Maciel in Avellaneda. This 
contained a high concentration of both elderly residents and 
poverty, but was too dangerous to permit effective research. (3) 
Las Cavas in San Isidro. This was very difficult to reach by 
public transport from central Buenos Aires.
385J. Perlman The mvth of marginality. Berkeley (1976) .
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was shown in Chapter two, shanty towns were marginalised within 
Greater Buenos Aires as a whole, in terms of their physical 
infrastructures, access to services and so forth. The marginality 
of villeros was also evident in levels of literacy, which were 
much lower than elsewhere in the city. A survey of villas in the 
provincial section of GBA in 1981 found that 13.8 per cent of 
those aged over fourteen years old could neither read nor write, 
compared to a national‘(literacy rate of 6.1 per cent (see Table 
IV: 1) ,386
Table IV:1 Levels of illiteracy in villas and Argentina as a 
whole, 1980.
Villas in provincial 
GBA (aged 14+)
National average 
(aged 15+)
Total 13.8 6.1
Total men 11.8 5.7
Total women 15.7 6.4
Sources: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social El empleo v 
condiciones.., pp.5-11; UNESCO Statistical yearbook 1991. Paris 
(1991), p.1-23.
There are also signs that the elderly residents of villas were 
marginalised vis a vis these neighbourhoods as a whole. First, 
although the relative and absolute numbers of elderly villeros 
may have increased in recent years, they still formed a smaller
386Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social El empleo v 
condiciones de.., p.11. The report does not provide literacy 
rates for elderly villeros. but notes that men aged 50 and over 
accounted for 9.7 per cent of all male illiterates and that for 
women this was 16.7 per cent. Since over 50 year-olds only 
accounted for 9.2 per cent of over fives in the total population, 
it is evident that a disproportionate number of them were 
illiterate.
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proportion of the population of shanties than in other 
districts. 387 The fact that old age was a very recent phenomenon 
in most shanty towns meant that, as a group, the elderly had a 
lower profile in such neighbourhoods than in other parts of the 
city. According to Silvia Simone of CEPEV:
Old age is a modern phenomenon for which these groups of people were 
unprepared -they almost don't notice it themselves. Old age surprises 
them. They didn't see their parents grow old...The old person remains 
hidden inside the home. They scarcely consider themselves as old. One may 
ask "Are there many old people around here?" and they tell you "No, not 
very many."...the problems of mothers, children, youths, out of work 
adults come first. And really these are the groups who have suffered most 
in the crisis. But old people have their problems too and their ability to 
occupy a social position so that people recognise their needs...doesn't 
occur spontaneously in any of these neighbourhoods.388
Table IV: 2 Attendance of villeros at educational establishments.
Age Currently
attending
Attended in 
past
Never
attended
15-24 12.64 83.56 8 .43
25-49 4 .25 87.51 7.71
50 + 3.1 75.69 20.18
Source: calculated from Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social 
El empleo v condiciones... p.15.
Secondly, as shown by the data in Table IV:2, educational levels 
were particularly poor among elderly villeros. In the Province 
of Buenos Aires in 1980 it was roughly three times as likely that 
villa residents aged over 50 had not attended schools than was 
the case for those aged between 25 and 4 9 years old.
387See pp. 86-89.
388Tape VJ1 1/120-140.
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Hence it is feasible that elderly villeros suffered from two 
distinct forms of marginality: that of the slum and that of old 
age. A central concern of this chapter is to examine the extent 
to which these occurred in the neighbourhoods studied. This is 
done primarily by assessing the capacity of elderly villeros to 
organise themselves spontaneously. The chapter also considers the 
impact of local initiatives in reducing this group's marginal 
status.
Much of the existing literature on shanty town initiatives 
stresses the importance of outside actors.389 Consequently, this 
chapter looks at the particular objectives of such agents and the 
extent to which they facilitate autonomous action by elderly 
villeros themselves. It asks whether the role of outside agencies 
reflects the marginal status of elderly villeros and whether they 
serve to reduce or even promote it. Outside actors can perform 
two separate functions. On one hand they may provide the initial 
impetus and organisational know-how for villeros to form an 
association. On the other they may control the material resources 
for which villeros group together to obtain. In some cases, such 
as when the state is involved, the same external agent may 
perform both roles.
Some controversy exists regarding the desirability of external 
actors participating in the establishment of local organisations. 
It has been argued that this usually constitutes external
389For example, see A.Gilbert and P.Ward Housing, the state 
and the poor. Policy practice in three Latin American cities 
Cambridge 1985 pp.174-240.
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political control, which subverts the real interests of villeros 
to the dominant outside order. 390 Conversely, it has been 
claimed that the passivity and lack of associative experience of 
those suffering extreme poverty renders them incapably of 
organising without external support.391 Clearly, this was the 
view taken by non-state organisations such as CEPEV.392
While examining the prospects of developing successful local 
initiatives for elderly villeros. the chapter also considers the 
potential economic impact of these organisations. It is useful 
to distinguish between the different activities which may be 
undertaken to these ends. The first of these, direct economic 
assistance, includes monetary hand-outs as well as a wide variety 
of other goods, such as food aid (parcels, vouchers and feeding 
centres), the provision of medicines, accommodation or clothing. 
Goods may be provided free, subsidised or on loan.
Some organisations provide advice on obtaining benefits. As has 
been shown, in Greater Buenos Aires a complicated array of 
contributory and non-contributory benefits were available for the 
elderly. Legal entitlements, eligibility criteria and modes of 
application for these services were equally complex. Thus, it is
390M.Castells The citv and the grassroots. Berkeley (1983), 
pp.190-4; A.Gilbert and P.Ward Housing, the state and the poor. 
Policy and practice in three Latin American cities. Cambridge 
(1985), pp.175-7 and 237-9.
391E.Tenti "Representacion, delegacion y accion colectiva en 
comunidades urbanas pobres" in L.Golbert et al, eds La mano 
izauierda del estado. La asistencia segun los beneficiarios. 
Buenos Aires (1992), pp.142-6.
392See chapter 3 p. 154.
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important to provide clear information on which benefits may be 
available and how to obtain them. When the state agencies 
involved fail to do this, other organisations may take on the 
task.
Organisations may also assist members by providing "strength 
through numbers". This does not simply refer to direct lobbying, 
through demonstrations, petitions and so forth. For practical 
and/or political reasons some state services for groups such as 
the elderly are not granted directly to individuals but are 
instead managed through officially-recognised local associations. 
Consequently, the absence of such organisations in a
neighbourhood automatically excludes its residents from these 
state services. Again, according to Silvia Simone of CEPEV:
There is no other way systematically to obtain public resources without 
being included in official registers [of local organisations]. Its through 
these lists that official organs distribute their resources.393
Finally, local initiatives may offer a range of social
activities, such as subsidised holidays or literacy classes. 
Their contribution to the economic well-being of the elderly is 
less obvious than that of the activities mentioned above.
However, reducing an individual's sense of isolation and 
increasing their confidence may empower them to seek solutions 
to their own economic problems. It may also raise their 
collective awareness and thus increase their political
significance.
393Tape VJ1 1/355-60.
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Attention must be paid to the depth as well as to the range of 
services provided by local associations in villas. On one hand, 
identifying a single objective may allow the concentration of 
resources and prevent unrealistic expectations. On the other, it 
may result in a narrow base of participation, leading to the 
collapse of the organisation once this objective is wholly or 
partially realised. Indeed several scholars argue that local 
organisations generally experience cyclical phases of activity 
and decline, as they attain their initial objectives. 394 This 
argument may not necessarily apply to organisations concerned 
with the needs of elderly villeros. since their problematic is 
an on-going one, which is not usually resolved by the acquisition 
of a single good or service. However, elderly organisations are 
likely to suffer more frequent changes of personnel due to 
infirmity or death. The mobilisation and subsequent loss of key 
participants may, for different reasons, lead to similar cycles 
of activity and decline.
Throughout the following sections references will be made to 
these general themes, including the types of assistance offered 
by local initiatives and their impact on the status of the 
elderly both within and outside the villas. This will be placed 
within the broader hierarchy of income maintenance opportunities 
for the elderly.
394See E.Tenti "Representacion, delegacion. . " , pp.132-36.
205
3) Villa Jardin.
3a. The setting.
Villa Jardin (VJ) is located just beyond the administrative 
boundary of the Federal Capital, in the municipality of Lanus 
(see Map IV: 1) . On one side it is bounded by the highly-polluted 
Riachuelo River; another is lined with factories, most of which 
are now abandoned and crumbling (see Map IV:2).
At first sight much of the villa bears more resemblance to a run­
down working class neighbourhood than a shanty town. Houses are 
typically of brick, with corrugated roofs and reasonably well- 
maintained. Indeed, some large, detached homes suggest a number 
of middle class households live in the district. Many of the 
principal roads are surfaced. The most important thoroughfare, 
Calle Warnes, is dotted with a variety of shops and businesses, 
ranging from grocers to video rentals. Villa Jardin is well- 
served by a number of bus services running to various parts of 
the city, including the Federal Capital.
An important difference between Villa Jardin and typical working 
class barrios is that the vast majority of homes do not front 
onto streets. Each block of housing contains mazes of narrow 
passages, lined with open drainage ditches and housing at varying 
stages of dilapidation and precariousness. Most typically houses 
are small, two or three room structures with tin roofs and cement 
floors. An important feature of these passageways are the 
"guioscos": residents selling convenience goods through windows
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MAP IV:1 Lanus municipality.
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in their own front rooms. Neighbours would often visit these 
informal stores as much to catch up on local gossip as to make 
purchases.
There are indications that the southern end of the villa and 
areas alongside the Riacheulo are significantly poorer than the 
rest of the district. Here most streets are unsurfaced and are 
often subject to flooding from the river or drainage ditches.395 
Street-front houses are smaller and less well-maintained. Some 
are built of wood and scrap metal. There is more litter and a 
number of burnt-out cars. The streets are patrolled by scrawny 
dogs and gangs of scruffily-dressed children.
The mix of housing in Villa Jardin may reflect the fact that it 
did not began life as a shanty town. In the early 1930s European 
immigrants bought land and established a small village there.396 
It was not until the late 1940s that illegal land occupations 
began and clusters of precarious housing started to appear in the 
surrounding swampland. 397 Most of the newcomers were internal 
migrants, drawn by the prospects of industrial employment in the 
locality. 398 Villa Jardin expanded in a rapid, haphazard fashion
395Tape VJ1 1/417-24.
396C. Lezcano, La historia de la consolidacion de Villa 
Jardin. Buenos Aires (1982), p.19.
397C. Lezcano La historia de la consolidacion. . . p. 25.
398As mentioned in chapter two, this sector of Buenos Aires 
attracted a particularly large concentration of industry between 
the 1930s and 1950s. These included a military steel works as 
well as several metallurgical and meat-packing plants (CNV Plan 
de emeraencia. . . p.225) . These factories, along with the nearby 
docks, accounted for the vast majority of male employment until
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until the late 1950s, when all the available land had been 
occupied. By 1956 its population had grown to 24,000, making it 
by far the largest shanty town in Greater Buenos Aires.399 
Although the land was very marshy, the villa was centrally 
located and had fairly good transport links into the Federal 
Capital. Nevertheless, improvements to infrastructure tended to 
lag behind the villa's growth: the first water pipes were only 
installed in the late 1950s and land drainage was not completed 
until the 1970s. As is shown below, these developments reflected 
the degree of solidarity and level of organisation among local 
residents, as well as the external economic and political 
environment.
A 1980 survey of villas in Greater Buenos Aires (the most recent 
city-wide report available) recorded that the population of Villa 
Jardin had fallen to 14 , 554.400 This is very surprising, given 
that the total number of villeros in provincial Buenos Aires had 
more than trebled since the mid-1950s.401 None of the other 
surveys or historical accounts of the villa make reference to a 
sharp fall in population. Rather than resulting from a reduction 
of the physical extent of the villa or the abandonment of 
housing, this reduction reflected falling population densities. 
In the 1950s Villa Jardin had been one of the most densely-
the deindustrialisation of the 1970s.
399CNV Plan de emergencia. . , p. 76.
400See Provincia de Buenos Aires Censo socioeconomico de 
villas de emergencia (1981).
401See Table 11:10 in chapter two.
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populated parts of Buenos Aires, with roughly a thousand people 
to a block. 402 Whilst some sections of the villa were still very 
crowded in the early 1990s, they contained fewer residents than 
previously. In those parts of the villa containing better 
housing, accommodation had been considerably up-graded over time, 
causing both an increase in the size of homes and a reduction in 
the average number of people per room. This fall in population 
density meant that conditions in the villa had improved 
significantly over time and that many residents had been able to 
move away, suggesting that Villa Jardin conformed to the model 
of a "slum of hope", as described in chapter two.
Given the low population growth rate for Greater Buenos Aires 
during the past decade and the lack of open spaces in the villa, 
it is unlikely that VJ had increased significantly in size since 
19 8 0 . 403 According to the survey, Villa Jardin contained 694 
people aged over 59 years, or 4.8 per cent of the total 
population. This compares with 3.6 per cent for villas in Lanus 
as a whole and 2.9 per cent for the Province of Buenos Aires.
The relatively high proportion of elderly in Villa Jardin 
reflected its early foundation. Migrants drawn to the villa 
during the 1950s were largely in their twenties and would
402A.Rojo Las villas de emergencia. Buenos Aires (1976) ,
p.48 .
403Between 1980 and 1991 the population of Lanus fell 
slightly (see INDEC Censo nacional de poblacion v vivienda. 
Buenos Aires (1991)).
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therefore have been reaching retirement age by the 1980s. 404 In 
more recently-formed villas. there had not been sufficient time 
for this ageing process to occur. As has been shown, although VJ 
experienced a substantial outflux of population following the 
1950s, this was not compensated by new arrivals. Thus, the high 
proportion of elderly in the villa reflected the ageing of the 
residual population and a failure to replenish it with more 
youthful newcomers.
The 1980 survey shows that the vast majority (88 per cent) of the 
villa7 s population were Argentine nationals and that 48 per cent 
were born in Greater Buenos Aires. This is not surprising, since 
most settlers after the 1930s were themselves Argentine. It 
should also be noted that legal entitlement to social security 
benefits would be higher in a villa with a large proportion of 
long-established Argentine citizens than in one containing mainly 
foreigners. "
Table IV:3 Poverty indicators for Villa Jardin and Argentina.
% households 
lacking basic needs
% sub-standard 
housing
Argentina 22.3 8.7
Villa Jardin 68.8 60.6
Over 59s in VJ 59.2 no data
Under 2s in VJ 80 . 6 no data
Source: INDEC La pobreza en la Argentina. Buenos Aires (1984), 
pp.66 and 125.
404Z. Recchini de Lattes "Urbanizacion..", pp.109-10 shows 
that between 1869 and 1947 internal migrants were most frequently 
male and aged between 2 0 and 24 years.
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Further information about the villa is available from the 1980 
Census conducted by INDEC. 405 This provides data for individual 
enumeration districts, one of which closely conforms to Villa 
Jardin (see Map IV: 2) .406 Table IV:3 shows that the district 
contained a strikingly high concentration of poverty, compared 
to Argentina as a whole. 407 Even so, the fact that 3 9.4 per cent 
of housing was deemed up to standard and 31.2 per cent of 
households had their basic needs satisfied again indicates a 
degree of socio-economic heterogeneity. The position of those 
aged over 60 was marginally less severe, especially compared with 
that of young children. This corresponds with the results of a 
number of other surveys conducted in Buenos Aires during the 
1980s.408 However, the rapid deterioration in the real values of 
pensions since 1989409 may have worsened the relative position 
of the elderly in Villa Jardin.
3b. Local initiatives in Villa Jardin.
The challenge of settling inhospitable swamplands and a common 
threat of eviction helped to forge strong bonds of solidarity 
between the villa7 s early inhabitants.410 Many residents were
405INDEC, La pobreza. . . . p. 125.
406The enumeration district, number F16, is slightly larger 
than Villa Jardin, containing a population of 17,576 in 1980.
407Chapter two p. 65 explains the different types of poverty 
indicators.
408See Figure 11:7.
409See chapter three, Table 111:3.
410C.Lezcano, La historia de la consolidacion. . . p.30.
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active in unions and other Peronist organisations during the 
1950s.411 However, as will be seen, there were also elements of 
conflict and fragmentation: between property owners
(propietarios) and illegal squatters (intrusos), and between 
those who lived down passageways and those along the streets.
VJ's first local organisation ("El Sociedad de Fomento") was 
formed by propietarios of European origin in 1952 and excluded 
the recent arrivals. Whilst their initial concerns were largely 
related to improving the physical fabric of the villa. the 
overthrow of Peron by the military in 1955 prompted some members 
of the Sociedad to participate in violent anti-government 
demonstrations.412 1955 also saw intrusos make their first 
attempt to band together through the formation of a neighbourhood 
council (Junta Vecinal)413. There are indications that the 
authorities encouraged the development of the Junta at the 
expense of the more politically-active Sociedad. A report made 
by the Comision Nacional de la Vivienda in 1956 claims that:
the activities of this junta should be taken seriously, since it alone is
an indicator of the high moral calibre of the population.414
but makes no reference to the presence of the Sociedad de
411Chapter two provides a general account of political 
movements within the shanty towns.
412C.Lezcano Historia de la consolidacion. . . pp.43-6.
413This led to the formation of the first "Union Vecinal de 
Villa Jardin", usually referred to as the "Junta Vecinal", see 
C.Lezcano, Historia de la consolidacion... p.48.
414CNV Plan de emergencia. p. 225.
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Fomento. The good relations between the Junta and the authorities 
bore fruit in 1962, when, thanks to the passage of a national law 
forbidding evictions, the intrusos succeeded in securing their 
tenure. This encouraged intrusos to consider the settlement as 
a permanent residence and to take more interest in 
infrastructural improvements.
During the 1960s both the Junta and the Sociedad were active in 
improving the local infrastructure and continued to represent the 
respective interests of intrusos and propietarios. At the same 
time, several new organisations emerged, including church 
initiatives and grassroots political associations. However, 
despite their efforts, the district remained vulnerable to 
flooding. Indeed a particularly severe flood in 1967 led to the 
formation of the "Junta Coordinadora de Entidades de Bien 
Publico" which coordinated the activities of ten local 
associations and municipal agencies, including the Junta and the 
Sociedad.415 The Junta Coordinadora remained the most important 
organisation in VJ until the early 1970s and, for a period, went 
some way to reducing factionalism within the villa.
The heightened national conflicts of the 1970s were echoed in VJ 
and led to a break-down in cooperation amongst local groups. In 
1973 the Sociedad's committee was taken over by radical elements 
of a Peronist youth movement and became largely a political 
organisation. Following the military takeover of 1976, the 
Sociedad's committee was purged and it was forced to become a
415C.Lezcano, La historia de la consolidacion. . . p. 86.
215
virtual appendage of the authorities. The Junta Vecinal was 
disbanded shortly afterwards and several prominent members of the 
community were either killed or forced to flee.416 In May 1978 
the army occupied Villa Jardin, terrorising local residents. 
According to one villero:
They used to shoot people on the rubbish tip every night, unless it was 
raining, between 1.3 0 am and 3.3 0 am. The rubbish scavengers used to find 
two or three corpses a day, young people, in nylon sacks. Someone who 
worked in the military steel plant told me that they used to take 200 
litre drums full of corpses and throw them into the blast furnace. They 
took them away in trucks in the early morning. Along the streets the smell 
made you want to vomit.417
Only the Catholic church was allowed to continue working in the 
villa.418 As a result/ the church was able to expand 
substantially its role in the community and took initiatives 
specifically directed at socio-economic issues, rather than 
infrastructural problems. Military oppression had a long-lasting 
effect on the villa and local activity only regained its earlier 
diversity and depth by the late 1980s. This partly explains why 
many of the initiatives for the elderly operating in 1992 were 
of recent origin (see below). Nevertheless, the repressive 
actions of the Proceso do not appear to have reduced factionalism 
within VJ. A survey conducted in 1990 found considerable 
fragmentation both among community associations and grassroots 
political groups,419 although it did not specify whether these
416C.Lezcano Historia de la consolidacion... pp. 102-5 and
122.
417Cited in C.Lezcano Historia de consolidacion... p.120.
418This freedom was not extended to protestant organisations, 
as will be seen in the account of the CUNP (see below).
419CEPEV Evaluacion de la situacion. . . p. 14.
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divisions occurred along traditional lines (intrusos versus 
propietarios) or new ones. This issue is discussed further later 
in the chapter.
Despite changes in the political and economic environment, Villa 
Jardin contained a variety of local associations for most of its 
history. Whilst the majority of these were primarily concerned 
with the area's physical infrastructure, this thesis is more 
directly concerned with organisations that promote the economic 
well-being of residents, especially elderly ones. These are now 
examined in more detail.
3c) Caritas.420
The local Catholic parish church was consecrated in 1953 but the 
parish did not assume an important welfare role until the early 
1970s. This development was largely attributed to the arrival of 
Padre Luis Tokler, a German priest, who was able to obtain 
substantial funds from his home country for local projects. These 
included the construction of a new church, a large community 
centre (the "Ateneo") and a football ground, all of which were 
located in the heart of the villa (see Map IV: 2) . During his ten 
years in the villa. Padre Luis became an almost mythical figure 
and his photograph was often prominently displayed in villeros' 
homes.421 According to one elderly resident:
420See Chapter two for a description of the organisational
structure of Caritas in Argentina and its general objectives.
421Tape VJ6 489-92.
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You used to be able to go and tell him: "Look here, Padre, this person's 
died, or one thing or another" and he'd come straight away, straight away. 
No car, none of that. Rain or shine, you used to be able to go and he'd 
lend a hand. He was a very important man and did very good things here.422
The local Caritas branch was formally established in 1978 
although the church was already involved in a variety of 
assistance projects. Recognising the need to address socio­
economic issues as well as infrastructural problems, the church 
began to provide employment incentives, run workshops and 
distribute food and money to the most needy families. Caritas was 
particularly concerned with the unemployment of household heads, 
although it also provided services for the welfare of local 
elderly. According to the director at this period:
Caritas began [to pursue claims for] assistance pensions when I became 
involved in 1978. It was me who started them, but there was nobody [in the 
authorities] to provide this type of assistance. "Come back tomorrow!" So 
I'd come back tomorrow. "Return the day after!" So I'd return the next 
day. "Come back at such a time!" So I'd come back then. They couldn't get 
rid of me until I'd got what I wanted. ..There weren't many pensions at 
first, but then they were all I could manage. We also used to send people 
to the municipality and others to Bienestar Social in the Federal 
Capital.1..Afterwards we began to help people who were living alone find 
places in rest homes.423
Whilst the numbers involved were small424 , these measures 
represented an unprecedented series of initiatives for the local 
elderly, involving both direct assistance and bureaucratic 
advice. The local Caritas had recognised the need to obtain 
information about benefits from state agencies and to pass this 
on to needy locals. Caritas had also become aware of the
422Tape VJ6 514-18.
423Tape VJ2 145-150, 180-185.
424The number of assistance pensions granted never exceeded 
10 and only three people were placed in homes.
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formidable bureaucratic obstacles which lay in the path of those 
seeking assistance. According to the ex-director:
People don't insist. They're afraid of authority, [she enacts a dialogue] :
-"Good morning". They enter the office, "I'm from such-and-such a place 
and need such-and-such a thing.".
-"Come back tomorrow."
-"Alright, then. Bye."
I don't handle it that way. I go straight up to them and tell them:
-"I'm Estefania from such-and-such a parish and such-and-such a group and 
I've come to ask this, this, this and that: altogether so I don't have to 
make separate visits."
-"But the person you require isn't here", they tell me.
-"Isn't anyone taking their place?", I ask.
-"Yes, I am."
-"In which case, can't you help me with these things?".
-"Yes, but its not supposed to be my job."
-"Come on, you're only twenty. I'm three or four times as old as you. 
You're not going to send me away again."
-"I could get you a reply" she ponders "but the boss isn't here." 
-"Where's the boss?"
-"In a meeting."
"That's alright. I brought my rosario. I'll sit down and pray that the 
meeting ends soon." And I stay put. They know I'm not going to go and so 
they have to do something.425
The ex-director's story graphically demonstrates the difficulties 
of obtaining aid from state assistance agencies. It also shows 
that the administrative problems of social security systems 
referred to in the introductory chapter went beyond budgetary 
inefficiency. The incompetence and lack of motivation of 
personnel in many state agencies had engendered a culture of 
kafkaesque stone-walling, which usually proved insurmountable for 
individuals less confident or well-informed than the Caritas
425Tape VJ2 260-290.
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director. This issue will be explored further in the next 
chapter.
As mentioned in chapter two, food aid was often the most 
important activity of local Caritas branches. In Villa Jardin, 
the distribution of monthly food parcels grew slowly, beginning 
with a single household in 1976 and had reached five by 19 7 8 . 426 
With the formal inauguration of the local Caritas, parcels became 
increasingly important and were being distributed to around 180 
homes by 1992. It was claimed that these aimed to provide short­
term relief to households in extreme need, regardless of their 
religious persuasion.427 Households were identified by 17 part- 
time voluntary workers, mainly women, each of whom was 
responsible for monitoring the economic conditions of families 
living in a cluster of blocks. The monthly parcels would 
generally contain basic food items such as pasta and rice along 
with soap and, in some cases, medicine.
There were no formal eligibility criteria for Caritas help. This 
was left to the judgement of individual volunteers, who put in 
a claim to the director of the local centre. Thus, the director 
only exerted a negative control, vetoing cases she deemed 
inappropriate, rather than a positive, proactive one, identifying 
claims ignored by less conscientious volunteers. Given the uneven 
distribution of poverty in the villa, it would not be surprising
426Tape VJ2 .
427For example, at the end of 1992 Caritas was helping five 
families of evangelical Christians.
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if the geographical spread of beneficiaries was patchy. However, 
in an informal conversation, the director admitted that this may 
also have been because some volunteers made more of an effort to 
keep up to date with local requirements than others.428 
Volunteers were expected to combine their Caritas duties with a 
degree of catechism429 , which might have discouraged less than 
devout catholics from seeking their assistance.
Food parcels were partly financed by a small contribution of 
between 50 centavos and 2 pesos430 from beneficiaries (compared 
to a market value of around 60 pesos for the products they 
contained) .431 The local Caritas also received monthly donations 
of food and money from church collections. In addition, 
surrounding, relatively wealthy parishes permitted volunteers 
from Villa Jardin to collect second-hand clothes in their own 
districts. The best quality clothes were sold, raising up to 900 
pesos a month. The rest were distributed free among needy 
families.
428In tape VJ3 the interviewee complained that she had not 
received any visits from a Caritas volunteer, despite her bad 
economic position. The respondent in tape VJ5 mentioned going to 
the church in person to get Caritas aid, suggesting that the 
network of volunteers was not always effective.
429CEPEV Evaluacion de la situacion. . , p. 11.
430One Argentine peso was worth exactly one US dollar between 
1991 and 1993.
431These token payments were not well received by many 
beneficiaries. For example, in tape VJ6, the interviewee 
complains that if she had any cash she would buy the food for 
herself. Another claimed that she was exempt from making payments 
(see tape VJ7).
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Whilst these food parcels and used clothing were not specifically- 
targeted at the elderly, volunteer workers claimed that this 
group received a disproportionately large share. However, they 
were unable to show the investigator their records or give 
precise figures,432 providing some grounds for concern both with 
regard to their efficiency and their openness. In theory, the 
food parcels were intended to target households going through 
short periods of extreme need, as opposed to those experiencing 
more permanent difficulties. This might have excluded poor 
elderly who had little chance of improving their position. In 
cases where elderly were in great economic need but received no 
support from nearby family members, Caritas sometimes arranged 
for one of the two local padres to visit and talk over the 
situation with relatives. 433 The local branch was also planning 
to provide legal advice for elderly and other groups. This was 
to be given by a local lawyer who would provide his services free 
of charge.434
In 1993 a number of modifications were made to the food parcel 
programme, resulting in a halving of the number of beneficiaries. 
At the same time, the number of items in the food parcels was 
increased. It was hoped that this would enable the targeting of 
aid towards households with no potential bread-winners, such as
432Unfortunately, local Caritas archives going back to its 
foundation were destroyed in 1991 to make more space.
433Untaped interview with Caritas director 3rd March 1993.
434Untaped interview with local priest, 3rd March 1993.
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single mothers with large families and elderly living alone.435 
Rather than reflecting altered economic conditions within the 
villa. this new approach was the consequence of changes in 
personnel. The preceding year had seen the arrival of a new 
parish priest and the retirement of Caritas' long-serving 
director. Insufficient time had elapsed between these changes and 
the completion of the investigation for their impact to be fully 
assessed. However, a number of elderly interviewed in VJ 
complained that they had lost out under the new system:
Yes, I used to get them [food parcels] . And now they've cut me off..last 
month they cut me off. So now I have to go to see Jose Martinez [the new 
padre] so that he can give me a new form. And for this they want twenty 
pesos! What if I don't have it? If I had twenty pesos I'd go out and buy 
the stuff myself.436
Conversely, none of the elderly residents interviewed claimed to 
have obtained new Caritas benefits through the targeting 
strategy. Indeed by the early 1990s most local Caritas 
initiatives specifically for the elderly had been 
discontinued.437 No references were made to volunteers directly 
pursuing benefits at state agencies or obtaining places in rest 
homes. This both reflected the formation of a separate old 
people's association (see below) and the change in personnel.
Caritas had a number of contacts with the "Centro de los Jovenes 
del 90" (see below) . For example, it provided a hall for the
435Untaped interview with director of local Caritas, 3rd 
March 1993.
436Tape VJ6 16 8-75.
437CEPEV Evaluacion de la situacion. . . p. 11 describes Caritas 
activities but makes no reference to any specifically targeting 
the elderly.
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Centro's monthly birthday parties. The retired Caritas director 
was an active member of the Centro's committee and provided a 
vital bridge between the two organisations. 438 Several of the 
Caritas volunteers discussed the Centro's activities with the 
elderly in their respective neighbourhoods. Caritas had no links 
with other local initiatives, although it was considering the 
possibility of operating with the CUNP (El Centro Urbano Nuevo 
Parroquia -see later) in a local house renovation project. It 
maintained a distance from organisations such as the Junta 
Vecinal, the Sociedad de Fomento and local Peronist offices 
(unidades basicas). which, according to Padre Jorge (who 
succeeded Padre Luis as head of the parish church) "never get 
things done" and were too closely tied to party politics. 439 The 
local Caritas had good links with higher levels in the Caritas 
hierarchy, through monthly meetings with the bishopric of Lanus.
The local - Caritas provided few opportunities for the 
participation of elderly villeros and did not aspire to do so. 
Its director was appointed by the chief parish priest and most 
policy decisions were made between the two of them. None of the 
voluntary workers at the time of the survey were themselves 
elderly. Thus, the local Caritas constituted an initiative for 
(at least in part) the elderly rather than an initiative by the 
elderly.
As has been shown, the local Caritas branch went through several
438Tape VJ2 .
439Untaped interview, February 1993.
224
stages of development, which were largely a reflection of changes 
in key personnel. The initial impetus had been provided by Padre 
Luis and Estefania, the formidable ex-director. With their 
departure, the fundamental nature of the organisation began to 
shift. This supports Caritas Argentina's claim that local 
branches were afforded a high degree of autonomy and flexibility. 
By 1993 the local Caritas was concentrating resources in a 
smaller number of services and targeting these on a narrower 
section of the local population. This led to the discontinuation 
of some services directly catering for the elderly. Given that 
the majority of households in VJ had basic needs unsatisfied, 
this targeting could have caused the exclusion of many needy 
cases, including needy elderly. It was also an implicit 
recognition that the local branch could not aspire to fill all 
the gaps in state welfare protection. Since elderly villeros did 
not participate in decision-making, they were less able to resist 
changes in policy which prioritised other groups.
3d) El Centro "Los Jovenes del Noventa" (The Centro).
The Centro had been operating for three years in the villa. 
providing legal advice, serving as a pressure group and also a 
social forum for all elderly, whether iubilados or not. In this 
respect, it differed from the model for Centros de Jubilados 
developed by PAMI440 and reflected the Centro's philosophy of 
promoting solidarity among the elderly, whatever their economic 
circumstances.
440See Chapter three, p. 125.
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Whilst it was entirely independent of any other organisation, the 
Centro owed its creation to initiatives taken by a Buenos Aires- 
based NGO: El Centro de Promocion y Estudios de la Vejez
(CEPEV)441. CEPEV sought to extend its successful experiences in 
the slum district of La Boca442 to another poor urban 
neighbourhood outside the Federal Capital. It conducted pilot 
studies in Villa Jardin, developed contacts among elderly 
residents and arranged a number of social events and group 
discussions. 443 As a result of these iniatives, the Centro was 
founded. Although it still maintained very close links with CEPEV 
and received much technical assistance, decisions were made and 
activities executed by the Centro's membership. It had a 
democratically-elected president and steering committee, which 
comprised both elderly with pensions and those without. By the 
end of 1992 the Centro had 265 members, the great majority of 
whom (187) were women.
The Centro held two meetings a week: one for all members and one 
for its steering committee. These combined social activities with 
the provision of advice about how to obtain contributory and non­
contributory benefits. Largely because of the personal contacts 
of some CEPEV workers with government organisations, 444 the 
Centro was immediately successful in obtaining the subsidy
441See GADIS, Directorio de oraanizaciones. . . for more 
information about the origins, aims and methods of CEPEV. Some 
information is also given in the previous chapter.
442N.Redondo, Ancianidad v pobreza. . .
443Tape VJ1.
444Tape VJ1.
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offered by the Direccion Nacional de Ancianidad (DNA) 445 . Whilst 
not all applications were successful, by November 1991 it had 
secured DNA benefits for 84 members; out of a total of roughly 
5,000 granted in Argentina as a whole. Indeed, CEPEV became 
concerned that the Centro might just be seen as a means of 
obtaining these benefits. 446 In December 1992 the DNA ceased to 
pay subsidies and there were no indications that these would be 
resumed.
The cessation of the DNA subsidies caused a degree of 
disillusionment among members447 and might have threatened the 
continued success of the Centro, had it not been able to 
diversify its activities. The Centro had a small pool of funds, 
which came from a number of sources, including membership dues 
(1 peso a month), raffles, jumble sales and dances. Rather than 
provide direct economic assistance, these funds were used to pay 
for social activities, including barbecues, monthly dances and 
theatrical productions staged for local schools. It also ran 
daily classes in the Catholic church. The weekly general meetings 
were treated both as a source of information and as a social 
occasion. The Centro also organised tours and day trips, offered 
to members at greatly reduced prices thanks to subsidies from 
PAMI and the municipality. These social activities partly served 
to break down the isolation experienced by many elderly, enabling
445See chapter three, pp. 128-29.
446Tape VJ1.
447Tapes VJ3 and VJ6.
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them to share experiences and pool information. 448 This helped 
to boost members' confidence to participate and pursue claims for 
benefits.
The Pro-Bienestar programme, administered by PAMI and initiated 
in late 1992, provided a new source of finance for the Centro. 
This programme aimed to set up feeding centres for those elderly 
on the minimum pension. 449 The Centro objected to establishing 
such a centre in Villa Jardin, arguing that it would be both 
inefficient and degrading to pensioners and that it would exclude 
poor elderly without iubilaciones .45° It succeeded in replacing 
this proposal with food parcels to the value of 60 pesos a month 
(the same as those distributed by the local Caritas) . It also 
agreed with PAMI to put forward a joint proposal to the 
municipality to fund the provision of identical food parcels to 
non-jubilados. By July 1993, the Centro had obtained 35 food 
parcels from PAMI but had not yet had any success with its 
approach to the municipality.
By early 1993 the Centro was also pursuing claims for assistance 
pensions with the municipal office of the Administracion Nacional 
de Seguridad Social (ANSES)451. Eligibility criteria for these 
benefits were more complex and the Centro organised visits by
448Tapes VJ3 and VJ7.
449See chapter three, pp. 125-26.
450As explained above, PAMI was exclusively for iubilados and 
was constitutionally prevented from providing for elderly without 
pensions.
451See chapter three, pp. 127-28.
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representatives of ANSES to claimants' homes. Members of the 
Centro pursuing ANSES benefits claims encountered similar 
difficulties to those described above by the ex-Caritas director:
Its a very arduous job. To get hold of their attention is, in the first 
place, an exceptional achievement. It isn't something that I can rely on 
automatically on other occasions... Our experience with municipal social 
assistance is really bad...People [in the villa! point out that those 
responsible for social services in the municipality have a very unpleasant 
manner..If you do manage to get an interview with a social assistant its 
so complicated -all the paperwork you have to get because you have to 
prove what the exact situation of the whole family is. The family are 
obliged by the "Ley Argentina" to provide for the elderly. This 
[interpretation of the family] is very broad: not just the children, but 
siblings, older grandchildren and so on.452
These bureaucratic obstacles were well illustrated in the case 
of one member, described as: "..a blind lady, poor as a rat,
abandoned in a little house."453 This lady had the misfortune to 
possess the singularly common name of "Maria Martinez". She was 
obliged to make a legal declaration (by fingerprint since she was 
illiterate) that none of the several hundred other "Maria 
Martinezes" listed in the provincial register of property owners 
were any relative of hers. This delayed her claim by several 
months. 454 Despite such problems, the Centro had secured ANSES 
pensions for three members by July 1993.
Through contacts with a national deputy, CEPEV had been promised 
a number of gratuitous political pensions for members of the 
Centro. 455 It was hoped that these would be granted at a rate of
452Tape VJ1 1/466-78.
453Tape VJ1 1/490-500.
454Tape VJ1 provides a full account of this.
455VJ1 and chapter three, pp. 129-3 0 provide descriptions of 
these benefits.
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ten per month. If this were done, it would more than replace the 
role played by the DNA subsidies when the Centro first began. 
CEPEV accepted that this arrangement was:
..a political favour, which will be hard to repeat [elsewhere]...Even if 
the destination is justified, in its origin this is just as illegitimate 
as any other political favour.456
but felt that "legitimate" channels provided no valid 
alternatives.
Despite its numerous successes, the Centro still did not have its 
own premises by 1993. Weekly meetings were held in the buildings 
of the local Sociedad de Fomento and parties were usually thrown 
at the Ateneo. This partly reflected the absence of unused spaces 
in the villa and very high land values due to its proximity to 
the Federal Capital. 457 At the same time, sharing pointed to a 
degree of cooperation with other local groups and might in fact 
have been a more efficient use of the limited resources in the 
villa. Nevertheless, members stressed the importance of obtaining 
funds from PAMI or the municipality for a building which would 
ensure their organisation's continued survival and to enable it 
to develop new services such as a feeding centre and health 
clinic, which were seen as:
..concrete elements, through which and around which people can construct 
some type of organisation which deals with other needs such as literacy, 
artistic expression or recreation...which are also very important.458
456Tape VJ1 2/67-70.
457Tape VJ1.
458Tape VJ1 2/111-7.
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As can be seen, the Centro had a considerable amount of contact 
with a wide range of outside actors. Indeed, its main raison 
d'etre was to channel the benefits and services offered by such 
actors, be they NGOs, PAMI, the DNA or the municipality, to their 
members459 . At the same time the Centro was cautious about 
compromising its independence and apolitical status by ceding 
control to other organisations. It shunned contacts with some 
local associations which it regarded as controlled by political 
forces460 . It had some links with Caritas, CUNP and the local 
Sociedad de Fomento. but these were more the result of over­
lapping personnel than formal ties. Even the role of CEPEV was 
restricted to the provision of technical advice and this was 
gradually being reduced. There were no signs that the Centro's 
collaboration with the Sociedad de Fomento and its wariness of 
the Junta Vecinal reflected a predilection towards villeros who 
considered themselves propietarios. This would have contradicted 
its policy of putting jubilados on an even footing with 
unprotected elderly.
The Centro had achieved considerable success in the first three 
years of its existence, both in terms of improving the economic 
condition of local elderly and in reducing the social isolation 
often resulting from old age. The establishment of an 
organisation both for and by the elderly in the villa had no
459It should be noted that, because it lacked the requisite 
number of jubilados, the Centro was not fully recognised by PAMI. 
This meant that it was unable to obtain much of the assistance 
automatically granted to conventional Centros de Jubilados (see 
chapter three).
460See the Junta Vecinal. mentioned below.
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counterpart among younger generations living there. This may have 
partly reflected the greater necessity of cooperation during the 
early, difficult years of settlement which inculcated a strong 
sense of solidarity among the older generations. It may also have 
resulted from the greater amount of free time available to some 
(but not all) elderly who were often retired from the labourforce 
and free from commitments to other family members.
By developing new social programmes the Centro had been able to 
maintain the high level of interest generated by its early 
success with the DNA. In many respects, the Centro could be 
considered an ideal model for local initiatives by elderly 
villeros. against which others can be compared. Its success 
reflected a large number of factors, of which the most important 
were the progressive spirit of the villeros and the expertise and 
professional contacts of CEPEV. These factors are best 
demonstrated by comparing the experience of the Centro with 
elderly associations in other villas (see below).
Had the Centro transcended Tenti's "rise and fall" model of villa 
organisation mentioned above? Silvia Simone of CEPEV felt that 
it was still too soon to know:
All groups have their own life-cycles, don't they...I feel that, after two 
year's work, we [the Centro] are still at a stage of expansion, but I 
wouldn't like to say whether this will be permanent. I hope that the 
Centro is able to consolidate itself.461
Until the Centro had secured its own premises and had proved
461Tape VJ1 2/88-110.
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itself to be independent of outside actors, CEPEV included, its 
long-term prospects would remain uncertain.
3e) El Centro Urbano Nueva Parroauia (CUNP).
This organisation coordinated the activities of several non­
catholic churches462 . However, as will be seen, it did not just 
constitute a protestant version of the local Caritas. CUNP first 
became active as part of the general expansion of externally- 
initiated organisation in the villa during the 1960s. 463 Its 
activities combined a degree of evangelising with improvements 
to the local infrastructure. During the Proceso relations with 
the military government were not as good as was the case with the 
catholic church. Accordingly, CUNP did not enjoy the freedoms 
granted to Caritas: several members were arrested and its
activities discontinued.464
When it recommenced in the 1980s, CUNP developed a broad range 
of programmes that dealt with social as well as infrastructural 
problems. Rather than distribute food parcels, CUNP sought to 
provide local employment opportunities through training 
programmes and small workshops. These included a fresh pasta 
factory and a number of sewing groups. By their nature, such 
activities were more directed at the needs of local youths and
462These were: La Iglesia Evangelica Metodista, La Iglesia 
Evangelica Valdense, La Iglesia Discipulos de Cristo and El 
Instituto Superior Evangelico de Estudios Teologicos.
463C.Lezcano, La historia de la consolidacion... pp.72-5.
464In an informal conversation, one of the CUNP's directors 
hinted that this was partly because some members had had Peronist 
ties.
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women than those of aged villeros. Only two CUNP programmes were 
of clear benefit to the elderly. One, the provision of free legal 
advice from a local lawyer, over-lapped with similar programmes 
run by several other organisations. The other, the creation of 
a feeding centre inside the villa. had been attempted 
unsuccessfully on several previous occasions. These centres 
provided for both children and elderly and it was claimed that 
between 10 and 15 of the latter would come to eat on a regular 
basis. 465 They were run by elderly villeros. who would be given 
a small wage. One of CUNP's directors explained that the latest 
initiative had failed due to a lack of financial support from the 
municipality.466 However, local residents mentioned that people 
working there had been assaulted by local youths, who may have 
been angered by CUNP's heavy-handed evangelising amongst those 
who attended. 467 This reflected an inevitable tension between 
CUNP's religious and social functions, which it was admitted 
often led to disagreement within its coordinating committee.468
CUNP had a variety of links with other organisations both inside 
and outside the villa. Indeed, although it owned premises inside 
(the Centro Comunitario, see Map IV:2), its main offices were 
located just outside Villa Jardin. Unlike the local Caritas, CUNP
465Informal conversation with one of CUNP's directors, 30th 
March 1993. Also see tape VJ3.
466Untaped interview with Enrique Lavique assistant director, 
CUNP, 30th March 1993.
467Tapes VJ3 2/434-40, VJ5 335-42 and informal conversations 
with members of the Centro.
468Untaped interview with Enrique Lavique assistant director, 
CUNP, 30th March 1993.
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received part of its funding from a national body: La Federacion 
Argentina de Iglesias Evangelicas. Unfortunately, the exact 
nature of its relationship with this organisation was not made 
clear by those CUNP members interviewed.
CUNP collaborated with Caritas and other local organisations, 
including the Junta Vecinal (see below) in the distribution of 
emergency food aid during the hyperinflationary crisis of 1989. 
When this programme was discontinued in 1991 ties with Caritas 
became much weaker. CUNP members claimed that this was largely 
due to the arrival of Padre Jorge, the new catholic priest, but 
refused to say why this was the case. The most probable cause of 
the rift was tension arising from CUNP's predilection to combine 
assistance with evangelising. Whatever the reason, it indicates 
the importance of good personal relations between respective 
members for maintaining collaboration between local 
organisations. There were also indications that collaboration 
with the Junta Vecinal had created a number of problems. The 
assistant director of CUNP complained that the Junta had been 
suffering much internal conflict and had been too compromised by 
personalism to operate effectively.
These bad experiences partly explained why CUNP was wary of 
establishing links with other local associations. Thus, although 
CUNP provided CEPEV support and advice for establishing the 
Centro, these close ties weakened over time. When the Centro 
first succeeded in obtaining DNA subsidies it invited CUNP to 
send along any eligible elderly. This was done but CUNP refused
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a subsequent offer to send a representative along with the 
Centro's delegations to various social security agencies. Since 
then, there had been no contact between them. The breakdown in 
collaboration may have partly resulted from a gradual increase 
in ties between the Centro and Caritas, as detailed above.
CUNP's general impact on the economic welfare of the elderly in 
Villa Jardin was very small. This partly reflected its particular 
concerns and priorities. However, the failure of the feeding 
centre and the duplication of legal advice might have been 
avoided if links with Caritas and the Centro had been kept up. 
These, in turn, might have been facilitated if CUNP had been able 
to separate its evangelising mission from its other activities. 
Unfortunately, there were no indications of this being done.
3f) La Junta Vecinal (the Junta).
This was re-established in 1988 and carried forward its 
predescesor's tradition of improving the local infrastructure, 
such as drainage and power supply. Whether it also carried 
forward the tradition of representing the interests of intrusos 
within the villa is less apparent. Although Junta members made 
no reference to this matter, they admitted that it only worked 
within a handful of blocks surrounding their meeting room (see 
Map IV: 2) . This comprised one of the poorest parts of the villa, 
the vast majority of whose residents were probably intrusos.
From 1992 the Junta began to diversify its activities, providing 
various forms of social assistance. Like the CUNP, it prioritised
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the needs of local women and children. Nevertheless, some of 
these programmes were also of benefit to local elderly. As 
elsewhere, the Junta used the services of lawyers to provide free 
legal advice for elderly attempting to claim contributory and 
assistance pensions. By May 1993 30 elderly had taken advantage 
of this service but only one had so far been successful in 
obtaining a benefit. 469 This is yet another indication of both 
the formidable bureaucratic obstacles facing benefit claimants 
and the reiative success of the Centro. Indeed, members of the 
committee were unaware of the full range of non-contributory 
pensions potentially available to members470 nor did they have 
privileged personal contacts with the staff of state welfare 
organs, as had been the case with CEPEV.
At times, the Junta provided direct economic assistance to poor 
elderly. In 1992, the Junta received an undisclosed number of
food parcels from the provincial government in La Plata, to be
distributed among those it considered most needy. However, this 
service was no longer occurring by early 1993. The Junta also 
obtained food aid from the municipality, but this was only to be
given to mothers of young children. Occasionally the Junta
distributed food donated by political parties, some of which may 
have gone to elderly. None of the 100 elderly individuals 
interviewed in VJ made any reference to these programmes,
469This was a 60 year-old single working mother of three, who 
succeeded in obtaining a municipal assistance pension.
470Whilst they were aware of the municipal assistance 
pensions, they had never heard of the DNA subsidy.
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indicating that their scope must have been extremely limited.
The Junta had plans to develop new activities during 1993, some 
of which might have been of benefit to the elderly. It was hoping 
to cooperate with the municipality in the distribution of a new 
set of food parcels targeting the most needy families. This would 
appear to be a separate scheme to that proposed to the 
municipality by the Centro (see above) , since it would not be 
exclusively for the elderly.
In the past, the Junta had largely relied upon the cooperation 
of the local residents for the financing of its activities; for 
example, families in a block pooling the cost of a road 
improvement. In addition, registered members of the Junta, of 
which there are around 3 00, were required to pay a due of 2 pesos 
a month. However, as is indicated by the above activities, the 
Junta was beginning to develop relations with local government. 
Its formal registration by the municipality of Lanus in 1992 
coincided with its receipt of the first food parcels471 and the 
Junta continued to have meetings with the municipal Secretary of 
Social Assistance about once a month. Although the Junta 
maintained that these links did not compromise its non-political 
status, several elderly respondents disagreed, equating the 
activities of the Junta with local Unidades Basicas (see below) 
and complaining of false promises and political manipulation. 
According to one elderly woman:
471The municipality only recognised its right to operate in 
six blocks. The Junta was hoping to get the authorisation to 
extend this.
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..some of them get things done when there's a political [campaign]. They 
start to mobilise everyone, helping this person, helping someone opposite. 
And then they just forget about it all...Because its just for politics, 
for politics more than anything else.472
The Junta also received a small amount of funding from a national 
NGO, La Fundacion de Vivienda y la Comunidad, which channelled 
aid from the Italian, French and German governments. The Junta 
wanted to develop closer links with other organisations working 
in the barrio, but had no contacts with the Centro, due to the 
latter's reservations about its competence and political status. 
Other than recognising their mutually agreed spheres of 
influences or "territories", it had few links with other Juntas 
Vecinales in the surrounding barrios.
As with the CUNP, the impact of the Junta on the welfare of local 
elderly was limited by its own priorities. Moreover, both 
organisations encountered similar problems of credibility within 
the villa, resulting from tensions between the desire for social 
improvements and to win over new converts to their respective 
causes. In the case of CUNP, their cause, evangelism, conflicted 
with the catholic beliefs of the majority of villeros. Hence 
mixing religion with assistance caused more problems than it did 
for Caritas. By contrast, the alleged Peronist leanings of the 
Junta coincided with the political ascriptions of most residents. 
Its lack of credibility was partly due to false promises and an 
absence of professionalism in the past. However, this may also 
have been accompanied by a general disenchantment towards 
clientilistic modes of organisation in the villa. This issue will
472Tape VJ3 2/245-50.
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be developed below.
3g) Unidades Basicas and other grassroots political associations. 
As seen above, Villa Jardin had a tradition of political activity 
going back to the days of the first Peronist government.473 
Whilst political organisations were ruthlessly put down during 
the last period of military rule, they quickly recovered
following redemocratisation. By early 1993 the villa boasted at 
least three local Peronist offices (Unidades Basicas. UBs) and 
one belonging to the Radical party. Several more UBs appeared 
during the Peronist internal election campaign of May 1993. Many 
of these distributed food on an ad hoc basis.
As with the Junta, overtly political associations did not enjoy 
a high degree of credibility as unbiased purveyors of social
assistance amongst those elderly interviewed. Frequent 
accusations were made of corruption and incompetence.474 
According to Ana Gorostiaga:
Well, when its election time, they come looking for you. They come looking 
for you to join up so they'll give you bread, so they'll give you 
groceries. They do the rounds for this short time. Then they don't give 
you anything anymore, nothing at all. Just during the elections and all 
that stuff and then they don't give you anything.475
Ramon Maldonado adds:
They're always making lots of promises but never come up with the
goods...Its the politicians who are responsible for sucking the blood of
people living here, because politicians never work....They're pure lies,
473C.Lezcano La historia de la consolidacion. . . . pp.37-46.
474Tapes VJ3, VJ5 and VJ6.
475Tape VJ3 2/500-10.
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friend, pure lies.476
Generally negative attitudes towards local political militancy 
partly explain the strong loathing of overt party political 
compromise held by most other groups in the villa. They also 
suggest that the roles of unidades basicas and similar 
organisations in promoting welfare within the villa would remain 
slight.
By 1993, Villa Jardin contained a large range of local 
initiatives which addressed the needs of elderly residents, 
either directly or indirectly. This was helped by a rich 
tradition of local organisation and participation and a general 
shift in priorities away from improving the physical infra­
structure towards socio-economic problems. As such, the villa 
conformed most closely to the "slum of hope" characterisation put 
forward in chapter two. However, as has been shown, the 
contribution made by the Centro far out-weighed those of all the 
remaining groups put together. It is not easy to establish 
whether the latter's tendency to prioritise other issues was due 
to the emergence of the Centro or reflected the continued 
marginality of the elderly within the community. Thus, were the 
Centro to run into difficulties the general profile of the 
elderly within VJ might be substantially reduced.
There were few indications that the old factionalism between
476Tape VJ6 600-610.
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propietarios and intrusos was still present. The oppression of 
the Proceso and the economic hardships of the late 198 0s may have 
served to forge common interests between the villeros. A 
developing property market within the villa477 may have blurred 
the distinction between legal and illegal tenure. However, this 
had not led to increased collaboration amongst local 
organisations, whose political and/or religious conflicts, as 
well as personal differences, led to continued fragmentation.
4) Villa Azul.
4a) The setting.
Villa Azul (VA) straddles the municipalities of Avellaneda and 
Quilmes, approximately 3 0 kilometres from the Federal Capital. 
This distance is partly compensated by VA's location alongside 
the principal road and main railway line into the city from the 
south east (see Map IV:3). One side of the villa is flanked by 
an area of pleasant middle class housing, one by factories and 
the remaining two by major roads. Just across the Acceso Sudeste 
lies a larger villa, Villa Itati.478
Villa Azul had a very different appearance from the other two 
neighbourhoods studied. There was less evidence of socio-economic
477This was mentioned by several villeros and CEPEV worker 
Silvia Simone in informal conversations.
478Villa Itati was used as a case study by L.Golbert et al, 
eds La mano izcruierda. . . See pp. 33-6 for a general description.
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MAP IV:3 Villa Azul.
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variety than in Villa Jardin: virtually all its housing consisted 
of small brick or wood structures with corrugated iron roofs. In 
some cases the walls were also of corrugated iron or odd pieces 
of waste material. None of the roads were surfaced and the open 
sewers were often blocked, causing flooding. A small proportion 
of homes still lacked running water and there were frequent 
interruptions in the electricity supply. There was more open 
space and greenery than in villas closer to the Capital, which 
gave VA the appearance of a run-down village, rather than an 
urban slum. Whilst the settlement did not have an obvious centre, 
it was more compact than the narrow rows of Zavaleta (see later) 
and contained a variety of community buildings. Unlike Villa 
Jardin, VA did not contain a range of shops and businesses. Along 
Calle Azul a few residents sold fruit, vegetables and beverages 
from the land in front of their homes. In other parts of the 
villa a small number of cruioscos could be found.
There were indications that some parts of the neighbourhood were 
slightly more affluent than others. Housing on the Avellaneda 
side of the villa was more frequently built of brick and the 
passageways were better maintained. Towards the motorway, which 
was flanked by a steep embankment, a greater proportion of homes 
were built of wood and metal and there were fewer cruioscos. The 
investigator found this section of the villa more threatening and 
its residents less cooperative than elsewhere.
The contrast between the alleys and tumbledown housing of the 
villa and the large, modern detached homes of neighbouring
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districts could not be greater. There were no signs of social 
mixing between the two neighbourhoods; rather, there were 
indications of mutual distrust. Virtually all of the housing in 
the latter area had barred windows behind which guard-dogs could 
be heard .
There are no studies specifically referring to VA's early 
history. A report published by the Province of Buenos Aires in 
1985 mentions that the villa began with illegal occupations of 
privately-owned land in the late 1940s. 479 The report states 
that early settlers were drawn by the prospect of employment in 
a neighbouring factory, after which the villa was initially 
named.480 However, information obtained by the researcher, 
through taped interviews and conversations with local residents, 
puts this version of events into doubt. None of the 55 elderly 
interviewed claimed to have lived in Azul for more than 35 years. 
Those who arrived in the early 1960s regarded themselves as 
pioneers in the neighbourhood, claiming that only a handful of 
homes had been erected at that stage. Early residents also 
claimed that the villa was completely without basic infra­
structure throughout the 1960s.481 This contrasts abruptly with 
the rapid growth and development of Villa Jardin, suggesting that
479Province of Buenos Aires, Mision de aproximacion rapida. 
Asentamiento Villa Azul, La Plata (1985).
480According to the Province of Buenos Aires Mision de 
aproximacion.... the settlement was first known as "Villa Fa- 
mac", before taking the name "Azul" from a local dance hall. See
chapter two, for background information on the general expansion 
of industries in the provincial part of the city.
481Tapes VA2, VA3 and VA6.
245
VA was founded somewhat later and that its early expansion was 
somehow restricted. One resident mentioned that during the 1960s 
most of the Quilmes side of the villa had been taken up by a 
large pit and motorway construction works.482
Following the 1960s the villa began to grow steadily, initially 
occupying land alongside Calle Azul. According to one resident, 
the villa was only a quarter of its present size in 1973 .483 
With the completion of the motorway, neighbouring land became 
available and the villa began to spread south into Quilmes. At 
the same time, the land was bought from its private owners by the 
Ministry of Transport. This was followed by an acceleration in
growth until all the available land was occupied in the mid-
1980s. This pattern of growth away from Calle Azul may have
caused there to be a greater concentration of elderly and more
established community associations on the Avellaneda side of VA. 
This is examined later in the chapter.
Thus, Villa Azul was a much less mature neighbourhood than Villa 
Jardin, a fact reflected in the origins of its early settlers, 
the majority of whom came from poor northern provinces and, 
subsequently, neighbouring countries. Unlike Villa Jardin there 
was no indication that European immigrants played any part in its 
early history.
As in the other villas studied, VA experienced a rapid turnover
482Tape VA2 2 0-22.
483Tape VA1.
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of population. One early arrival claimed that during the 1960s 
and early 1970s the bulk of its residents were able to buy plots 
of land elsewhere and move out. She added that this had become 
much rarer in recent years due to sharp increases in land 
values. 484 This suggests that, as with VJ, population ageing was 
more due to reduced opportunities for escape than to the time 
which had elapsed since the foundation of the settlement.
Roughly one quarter of Villa Azul lay within Avellaneda 
municipality, with the rest in Quilmes. This makes it impossible 
to extract information from the INDEC analysis of the 1980 
national census. Likewise, the 1981 survey of villas conducted 
by the Province of Buenos Aires485 is of little use since it 
only refers to those within a single municipality. Consequently, 
none of the villas it covered corresponds with Azul.486
Fortunately, it is possible to obtain some information from other 
studies specifically relating to VA. These include a preliminary 
survey conducted in 1985 by the provincial government487 and a
484Tape VA6 45-61.
485Provincia de Buenos Aires Censo socioeconomico...
486Despite there being no mention of Villa Azul in the 
published version of the census, a separate survey (Province of 
Buenos Aires Mision de aproximacion...) claims the census found 
it had a population of 1,039. As will be seen, this figure 
sharply contradicts the findings of other surveys and should be 
discounted. It is possible that this figure only referred to the 
part of the villa lying in Avellaneda, whilst the rest was 
included with neighbouring Villa Itati in Quilmes. However, it 
was impossible to confirm this with those responsible for the 
census.
487Provincia de Buenos Aires Mision de aproximacion. . . .
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1990 report published by UNICEF488 . Also, the local Sociedad de 
Fomento has conducted various surveys of the villa's residents, 
although these do not include data for the section which lies in 
Avellaneda.
The government and UNICEF reports gives various estimates for the 
total population:
Table IV:4 Population estimates for Villa Azul.
Year Estimate Source
1981 1, 039 Province of Buenos Aires
1985 4,800 Programa Nacional de 
Alimentacion
1985 3,174 Province of Buenos Aires
1990 3,113 UNICEF
Sources: Provincia de Buenos Aires Censo socioeconomico... La
Plata (1981), unpaginated; Provincia de Buenos Aires Mision de 
aproximacion.... La Plata (1985), no page numbers; UNICEF Informe 
preliminar sobre Villa Azul. Buenos Aires (1990), unpaginated.
According to its residents, the villa did not experience a period 
of rapid growth between 1981 and 1985, nor did its population 
noticeably drop between 1985 and 1987 .489 Consequently, the
488UNICEF Informe preliminar sobre Villa Azul. Buenos Aires
(1990), unpaginated.
489Tape VA1.
first two figures can be discounted490 . The final two figures 
are deemed to be more reliable since they correspond with each 
other and with the general opinion that the villa/s population 
has been stable in the past decade.
Table IV:5 Age and sex structure of Villa Azul. 1990.
Age Men % Women % Total %
Below 60 1, 539 96.6 1,436 96.2 3, 002 96.4
60-64 22 1.4 21 1.4 43 1.4
65-69 10 0.6 14 0.9 24 0.8
70-74 12 0.8 11 0.7 23 0.7
Over 75 9 0.6 12 0.8 21 0.7
Total 
over 65
53 3.4 58 3.8 111 3.6
Total 1,592 100 1,521 100 3,113 100
Source: UNICEF Informe preliminar..., (unpaginated).
The UNICEF survey provides a full break-down of the age and sex 
of Villa Azul's occupants (see Table IV: 5) . It shows that 68 (2.2 
per cent) were aged over 65 in 1990. Meanwhile, the 1985 survey 
finds 53 (1.7) per cent within the same age category.491 This
490The inaccuracy of the 1981 figure is explained in footnote 
73. Various studies (eg Midre "Bread and solidarity..") have 
drawn attention to the tendency of PAN workers to over-estimate 
beneficiary populations in order to acquire additional food 
parcels.
491A further survey conducted by the Sociedad de Fomento in 
1992 recorded a total of 42 over-65's living in the Quilmes 
section alone. Given that roughly three-quarters of the villa's 
land is on this side of the municipal divide, this figure might 
be interpreted as signifying a reduction in the number of elderly 
in VA since the UNICEF survey. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
earlier settlement of the Avellaneda side may have led to greater 
concentrations of elderly in this section. This view was 
supported by the researcher's own direct observations of the
249
indicates that the villa had experienced a sudden rise in the 
proportion of elderly residents in recent years.492 
Nevertheless, the proportion of elderly was still much lower than 
in either Villa Jardin or Villa Zavaleta. The low proportion of 
elderly in the villa may have increased their marginal status by 
limiting their opportunities to organise and the interest taken 
by outside actors in their condition.
The 1985 survey contains various indicators which give an 
impression of the degree of poverty in Villa Azul. It shows that 
62 per cent of houses were built precariously and 42 per cent 
vulnerable to flooding. These both correspond with basic needs 
criteria used by INDEC in its 1984 report. 493 The survey finds 
that 63 per cent of the economically active population were 
labourers, domestic servants or odd-jobbers and that 24 per cent 
of families declared a total income below the minimum monthly 
wage. The high level of informality partly reflected the reduced 
opportunities for employment in neighbouring factories following 
the closure of a large sheet metal plant in the late 1970s.494 
Unfortunately, the survey provides no information specifically 
relating to the villa"s elderly.
villa.
492The Sociedad's survey of the Quilmes sector indicates that 
there is a much larger number of people aged between 50 and 59 
(102) than those aged over 60. This suggests that the ageing of 
VA's population will continue apace through the next decade.
493See chapter two, p. 65.
494Tape VA2 60-65.
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4b) Local initiatives in Villa Azul.
During the 1960s, with the exception of a football club, there 
were few attempts at forming local associations in Villa Azul, 
nor did interviewees have any recollection of grassroots party 
political activity. 495 Nevertheless, in 1969 a small group of 
residents formed a Junta Vecinal. which achieved some success in 
improving the local water supply and passageway surfaces. 
According to one ex-member:
the first priority was water. We'd got a plan to put pumps in every 
block...we asked for money from our neighbours -as a loan- we bought 
second-hand pipes and we built a system of running water.496
This desire to improve local conditions accords with the 
characterisations of shanty town residents found much of the 
literature. 497 The Junta continued to make improvements to the 
villa until the mid-1970s and received a donation of more water 
pipes from the newly-installed Peronist provincial
government. 498 However, these successes came to an abrupt halt
in 1974, when:
a group of bad people took it [the Junta] over and everything came to an
end. They took everything that was there -silly little things..wooden
benches..the cooker...They were from the villa but had arrived from 
outside..a family formed by four or five couples. Just one family..And 
afterwards they just didn't want to know and there were lots of 
problems.499
495Tape VA2 .
496Tape VA2 125-30.
497For example R.Skinner "Self-help, community organization 
and politics: Villa El Salvador, Lima" in P.Ward, ed Self-help 
housing. A critique, London (1982), pp.209-27 and chapter two.
498Tape VA2 134-8.
499Tape VA2 225-45.
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The arrival of new waves of migrants had led to a profound change 
in the internal organisations of the villa, as the fledgling 
Junta Vecinal gave way to a new structure of local authority 
based around the personal followings of a number of "strong men" 
(caciques) 500 and the rivalry of large extended families. As 
various cacicrues sought to establish themselves and the political 
situation in the country as a whole became more chaotic, the 
villa suffered increasing violence and internal strife. This 
culminated with the murder and "disappearances" of several 
important community figures.501
Had the state authorities so desired they could have intervened 
to prevent the emergence of caciauismo in VA. They may, however, 
have felt that this was not in their interests. There are 
indications that members of the Junta Vecinal had been 
sympathetic to, if not directly involved in, left-wing Peronist 
factions, including the "Montonero" guerrillas. 502 The 
increasingly right-wing national government was prepared to turn
500This is the term used by the villeros themselves. 
P.Friedrich "The legitimacy of the cacique" in M.Swartz, ed Local 
level politics: social and cultural perspectives. London (1978) 
defines cacicrues as "a strong and autocratic leader in local 
and/or regional politics whose characteristically informal, 
personalistic, and often arbitrary role is butressed by a core 
of relatives, "fighters", and dependents, and is marked by the 
diagnostic threat and practice of violence.". W.Cornelius Jr. in 
R.Kern, ed The caciques. Oligarchical politics and the system of 
caciauismo in the Luso-hispanic world. Albuquerque (1973), 
pp.119-34, gives an excellent account of such practices.
501Tape VA1 1/140-45.
502R.Gillespie Soldiers of Peron: Argentina's montoneros.
Oxford (1982), pp.89-159 provides a detailed examination of this 
and similar guerrilla groups.
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a blind eye to caciques. some of whom, it was claimed, were 
nominally aligned to a rival, right-wing Peronist faction. 
According to one resident:
Other people weren't in agreement with him [the president of the Junta] 
for political reasons... [he had] political links with the Peronists, a 
certain faction of Peronists...and had problems with this other group who 
were also Peronists..but the conservative, right-wing faction of 
Peronism.503
This was a similar strategy to the encouragement of the Junta 
Vecinal at the expense of the Sociedad de Fomento in Villa Jardin 
in the mid-1950s (see above).
The bitter experience of this period was frequently referred to 
by present-day residents and community leaders, suggesting that 
it had an important effect on subsequent attitudes towards local 
activity. 504 Unlike Villa Jardin, there is no indication that 
churches took on a more important role in VA during the period 
of military rule, nor were they exempt from the general 
repression. A radical catholic priest was kidnapped and killed 
in neighbouring Villa Itati.505
As elsewhere, redemocratisation led to a slow reemergence of 
local activities, especially Peronist unidades basicas and the 
communists, who had an office in the villa. These facilitated the 
up-grading of basic infrastructure, such as the electricity
503Tape VA1 1/158-65.
504Tape VA1 1/178-190.
505Tape VA1.
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supply.127 However, neighbourhood initiatives did not go beyond 
local party offices and, to a very limited extent, social 
assistance from a nearby evangelical church. The distribution of 
food parcels under the Programa de Alimentacion Nacional (PAN) 
from 1984 relied on trusted individuals in VA rather than local 
organisations.128 The villa remained in the grip of its 
traditional families and caciques. who learned to broker with 
outside actors, particularly the provincial and municipal 
governments.129 Low levels of participation may also have 
reflected fears about the return to repressive policies. Although 
a 1985 government survey refers to the formation of a "comisidn 
vecinal" (neighbourhood committee) the previous year, it goes on 
to identify:
A continued lack of representation among the various organisations which
operate in the community, displayed in the general ignorance of the
activities which they pursue..130
In 1987 local initiatives in VA entered a new phase of evolution, 
with the creation of a Sociedad de Fomento (the Sociedad). This 
was located within Quilmes, representing the first neighbourhood 
association on that side of the villa and is examined in more 
detail below. More importantly, its establishment coincided with
127Tape VA1 1/230-60.
128See tapes VA1 and VA3.
129According to the ex-president of the Grupo de Tercera 
Edad, it was impossible for local people to obtain any support 
from local government without dealing through these caciques 
(tape VA2).
130Provincia de Buenos Aires Mision de aproximacion. . 
(unpaginated).
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a large grant from the Province of Buenos Aires and UNICEF for 
the construction of a nursery school and health clinic and the 
improvement of the sewerage system. At the same time the Gruoo 
de la Tercera Edad (the Grupo) was established (see below) . This 
marked a broadening in local concerns away from simply up-grading 
the physical infrastructure to the social problems of vulnerable 
groups such as young children and the elderly. The nursery school 
building became an important community centre and was used by the 
Grupo for its weekly meetings. Despite these changes, local 
caciaues were able to maintain their positions of control by 
obtaining posts on the committee of the Sociedad and preserving 
links with the outside authorities, including the police and 
municipalities. This may have been largely achieved by 
intimidation: gunfights between rival groups were not an
infrequent occurrence during this period.131
198 9 proved to be another important watershed for local 
activities in VA. This reflected a combination of circumstances, 
including economic crisis, the change of national and provincial 
government, the death of the most influential cacique and the 
imprisonment of several others. The economic hardship resulting 
from hyperinflation prompted residents and Quilmes municipality 
to organise a soup kitchen, known as the "olla", which provided 
daily meals for over 3 00 children and around 10 elderly
131Reference was made to these during informal conversations 
with several villeros. The same interviewees became much more 
reticent about this issue When a tape recorder was switched on, 
indicating that they had still not conquered the fears engendered 
in earlier periods.
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people.132 The Peronist victories saw the emergence of new 
policies and encouraged greater local participation among its 
followers. These political discontinuities also reduced the 
external influence held by the caciques. whose status in the eyes 
of the authorities moved from power brokers to opponents and 
criminals. Recognising the change in circumstances a number of 
the most powerful caciques chose to leave the villa.133
By the 1990s a new group of local activists, many of them linked 
to left-wing Peronism were able to challenge the position of 
traditional leaders. Following allegations of corruption, two 
caciques were excluded from the Sociedad. This new group also 
dominated the two housing cooperatives which had been established 
in each municipality, as part of a national plan to sell off land 
to the villeros.134 Despite its purported commitment to open, 
democratic, non-partisan participation, the new movement revolved 
around a handful of key figures.135
Although Villa Azul had had a shorter and less rich history of 
local organisation than Villa Jardin, there were number of 
similarities between their experiences. Both had suffered 
internal conflicts between traditional Peronist and less
132Tape VA1.
133Tape VA2 478-88.
134This was known as the "Plan Arraigo" (tape VA1 and 
Presidencia de la Nacion, Comision de Tierras Fiscales Nacionales 
Programa Arraigo. Un pais para siempre. Buenos Aires (1993)) .
135For example, one family contained the treasurer of the 
Sociedad, the president of the Quilmes cooperative and a senior 
member of the Unidad Basica.
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politically modern factions. Government agencies had at times 
sought to encourage these rivalries and, during the Proceso, to 
clamp down on local organisations in general. Democratisation and 
the worsening poverty of the 1980s had seen a shift towards less 
fractious and more welfare-oriented modes of organisation, 
including the first instances of initiatives specifically 
concerned with elderly residents. The effects of these recent 
initiatives are now examined.
4c) El grupo de la tercera edad "Union v esperanza" (the Gruoo) . 
This organisation was founded in 1987, experienced a period of 
rapid growth and intense activity up to 1989 and then went into 
steep decline. After a two year hiatus, some old committee 
members began to attempt to renew the organisation, but met with 
little initial success. As such, the Grupo provides an 
interesting case study of a local initiative for the elderly 
which fell apart and, possibly, of the organisational life-cycles 
mentioned earlier in the chapter.
As with VJ's Centro, outside actors played an important role in 
the foundation of the Grupo. Three social workers from the 
provincial Ministry of Social Action, all of them women, began 
to advise elderly on hygiene and preventative healthcare. They 
organised informal discussions, held in one resident's house, and 
day trips for the elderly. They subsequently suggested starting 
a group and provided advice on how this could be done.136 These 
social workers continued to support the Grupo for the first year
136Tapes VA2 and VA5.
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of its existence, but then broke off contact.137 This may have 
been due to changes in their job responsibilities, a wish to give 
the Grupo more autonomy or the switch in power within the 
provincial government (from Radicals to Peronists) ,138 None of 
the surviving members of the Grupo's committee can remember the 
full names of any of these social workers, nor precisely which 
section of the provincial government they represented,139 
indicating that local participation was extremely limited.
The Grupo developed quickly in the months following its 
establishment and by the end of 1988 had attracted over sixty 
members. A committee had been elected and meetings were held 
roughly every month. Several committee members already had much 
experience of local action and had established contacts with both 
municipalities,140 enabling the Grupo to obtain formal 
recognition from both provincial and municipal tiers of local 
government.141 Whilst the gender balance of the total membership
137In the minutes book (Libro de Actas) , no mention is made 
of these social workers after December 1988.
138For a good account of the respective histories and 
policies of these two parties see Centro Interdisciplinario de 
Estudios Sobre el Desarrollo Latinoamericano Los partidos 
politicos en America Latina. Desarrollo, estructura v fundamentos 
proaramaticos. El caso argentino. Buenos Aires (1990).
139Tapes VA2 and VA5. This confusion meant that the 
investigator was unable to trace these social workers in order 
to obtain interviews.
140The Director of the Grupo had been working alone for 
several years to obtain food parcels and blankets from both 
municipalities (Tape VA2 280-90).
141The Departamento de Entidades de Bien Publico of Quilmes 
municipality formally registered the Grupo in February 1987, 
whilst the Province granted it legal status in March 1988.
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roughly matched that of elderly in the villa as a whole,142 
women filled twelve of the thirteen positions in the original 
committee. This indicates that, as with VJ's Centro, women 
participated to a much greater extent than men. Reasons for this 
are explored in detail below.
The official statute of the Grupo set out a series of objectives. 
However, these were couched in such general terms as to give 
little idea of the activities its members would be expected to 
undertake.143 The range of services offered by the Grupo, as 
mentioned either in the minute books or by ex-committee members, 
was impressive. It included all the four categories mentioned at 
the start of the chapter:
1) Direct assistance. Funds raised from parties, raffles and 
donations, were in part used to establish an emergency kitty.144 
This covered the costs of funerals, accommodation and food for 
those members deemed to be in extreme need by the committee.
2) Legal advice. The Grupo helped around 50 members put their 
identity papers in order. The possession of such papers is a pre­
requisite for access to almost all forms of state assistance. The 
Grupo also assisted around 100 members, almost all of them 
elderly, to obtain non-contributory pensions from the provincial
1420f the original 2 8 members, 15 were women.
143For example, the first goal was simply to: "Give an
organisational structure for the aspirations of progress in the 
neighbourhood and for improvements in material levels".
144Libro de Actas. 29.7.88.
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government.
3) Social forum. The Grupo organised a number of social events 
as well as conducting classes in literacy145, knitting and 
embroidery. Whilst the statute stipulated that it was not to 
engage in religious activities, the Grupo at times provided 
catechism for its members.
4) Strength through numbers. Whilst the statute expressly forbade 
the Grupo from conducting overtly political activities, it was 
able to send frequent delegations to local government to ask for 
financial aid, food parcels and more holidays for its members. 
These were sometimes provided.146
This range of activities was far broader than those conducted by 
the elderly group in Villa Jardin. However, there are indications 
that many of them were very limited in their effects. Only one 
of the elderly interviewed made any reference to literacy 
classes.147 Cases of direct economic aid to needy individuals 
were usually one-off events.148 No mention is made in the 
minutes about negotiations for assistance pensions nor identity 
documents for members. The impression given is that these 
services were only partially realized, that they were mainly
145These were part of a national campaign (tape VA1 and Libro 
de Actas. 29.11.89).
146For example, Libro de Actas. 15.2.88.
147Tape VA6.
148For example, see the Libro de Actas. 14.12.87 and 15.2.88.
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performed by social workers and that the committee had little 
direct input.
Following 1988, the Grupo went into decline. This is reflected 
in the number of formal meetings recorded in the minute books:-
Table IV: 5 Annual number of meetings held bv the Gruoo de la 
tercera edad "Union v esperanza".
1988 : 15 1991: 1
1989: 6 1992 : 1
1990 : 5
Source: El Grupo de la Tercera Edad "Union y Esperanza" Libro de 
Actas. Villa Azul, 18.1.88 to 16.11.92.
More frequently, the minutes refer to the failure of committee 
members to attend. There was also a general reduction in 
participation.149 By 1991 the Grupo had effectively ceased to 
function.
When asked why the Grupo failed, interviewees provided a variety 
of explanations. Often, reference was made to the death and 
illness of key members, including the president, vice-president, 
treasurer and secretary. These, combined with the withdrawal of 
support by the social workers from La Plata, led to considerable 
disruption. Remaining activists lacked experience and links with 
the authorities. In 1990 an attempt was made to reestablish the 
committee with new elections, but these were never held.150
149For example, the Libro de Actas refers to attendances of
52 members on 22.7.88 and only 6 on 2.3.90.
150Libro de Actas. 10.8.90.
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Following 1988, the Grupo was unable to obtain further assistance 
benefits for its members. It would appear that its early success 
stemmed from specific political considerations which subsequently 
changed. The granting of pensions by the provincial government 
may have been prompted by elections for national deputies in 
1988.151 One recipient referred to a large presentation ceremony 
in Villa Itati, in which 24 elderly people were awarded pensions, 
having been chosen by some form of lottery. A large number of 
senior politicians, including the provincial governor, were 
present as well as an impressive press entourage.152 Another 
mentioned a similar ceremony held in a local school.153 These 
circumstances changed once the election campaign had ended. The 
subsequent switch in provincial office-holders from Radicals to 
Peronists may also have disrupted the links which had been 
established by the Grupo and may also have heralded a new 
attitude towards social assistance. The loss of contact with the 
social workers may have simply reflected the Province's lack of 
interest in providing further assistance benefits. Whatever the 
reasons, the failure to obtain fresh benefits was a major set­
back for the Grupo, as this had been an important attraction for 
members. This indicates that, as was the case with VJ's Centro, 
the primary function of the organisation (at least in the eyes
151M. Cavarozzi and M.Grossi "Argentine parties under 
Alfonsin: from democratic reinvention to political decline and 
hyperinflation" in E.Epstein, ed The new Argentine democracy. The 
search for a successful formula. London (1992), pp.178-86 
provides a good analysis of political developments in during this 
period.
152See chapter five.
153Tape VA7.
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of its rank and file membership) was to obtain and distribute 
resources from state agencies.
Throughout its history, the Grupo was never able to obtain its 
own premises, despite the efforts of the committee who recognised 
both the concrete utility and symbolic value of this. Their 
failure partly reflected poor communications between the Grupo 
and other organisations in the villa. The president was invited 
to be a committee member of the Sociedad de Fomento (which owned 
a building with several spacious rooms) but only attended twice. 
She claimed that this was partly because she did not want to 
become too involved with the caciques then running the 
Sociedad.154 In 1989, the two organisations came into conflict 
over the allocation of funds for new office by Quilmes 
municipality. According to members of the Grupo, these funds were 
allocated to the organisations jointly but they could not agree 
whether the building should be divided into one room each or a 
a single large unit. The final result was that the Grupo was 
denied the use of the premises. One ex-committee member regarded 
the subsequent rupture of relations with the Sociedad as the 
principal cause for the collapse of the Grupo.155
The Grupo maintained better relations with the nursery school, 
which was where it most frequently met. It also had a number of 
contacts with church organisations. At one point a local priest 
offered the use of a chapel on Calle Azul for two years. However,
154Tape VA2 .
155Tape VA5.
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this promise was subsequently broken and relations with the 
catholic church were consequently soured.156 This may have 
resulted from the hostility towards villeros apparent in the 
surrounding district and even voiced by some Caritas volunteers 
(see below) . As has been seen in Villa Jardin, guaranteed access 
to a suitable meeting room was considered extremely important by 
local organisations. The failure to achieve this certainly 
contributed to the Grupo"s demise.
The Grupo"s relations with government organs were both erratic 
and problematic. Meeting the bureaucratic requirements to 
maintain formal recognition took up a significant share of the 
committee's limited resources.157 This shows that the problems 
posed by bureaucratic red tape were as serious for local 
organisations as for individual benefit claimants. In addition, 
promises made by the municipalities were, more often than not, 
broken. The minutes show that Quilmes promised a regular monthly 
subsidy for the Grupo in September 198 8 and monthly food parcels 
in April 1990. However, there is no mention of these being 
received after the first month in each case. This suggests that 
subsidies may have been granted to serve the municipal 
government's short-term political ends. Relations with Avellaneda 
were less developed, although this may have been less due to 
municipal disinterest than a failure of the Grupo to develop
156Libro de Actas. 14.9.90. No reason was given for the 
church's actions.
157For example, see the Libro de Actas. 5.5.89.
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contacts158. The failure of committee members to establish 
firmer relations with, and follow up the promises made by the 
municipalities is another indication of their high dependence on 
the original social workers, who were themselves representatives 
of local government.
Finally, the Grupo missed opportunities to establish contacts 
with organisations in surrounding neighbourhoods. The minute 
books notes that by early 1988 the Grupo's activities were being 
talked about in Villa Itati and beyond.159 Some attempts were 
made to hold joint meetings with a group of elderly people from 
Villa Itati. This proposal foundered because many members of both 
groups found the walk across the motorway too arduous. Contacts 
with such organisations might have increased the Grupo's 
bargaining powers vis a vis the authorities and might also have 
helped it through the difficulties it subsequently faced. The 
organisation in Itati was still holding regular meetings and 
organising outings in March 1993.
The collapse of the Grupo did not result from the achievement of 
its original objectives nor the disappearance of its main raison 
d'etre. Thus, it did not conform to Tenti's organisational life­
cycle. Instead, the Grupo's demise resulted from a combination 
of problems, including the loss of personnel, the failure to
158The Libro de Actas, 19.2.90, mentions the visit of two 
social workers from Avellaneda to the president's wife, offering 
help. It would appear that the Grupo failed to take advantage of 
this offer, as no further mention is made of it. This was 
probably because the Grupo had already gone into decline.
159Libro de Actas ,26.2.88.
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acquire proper premises and poor contacts with actors inside and 
outside the villa. Villa Jardin's Centro had been much more 
successful in meeting at least two of these challenges. In 1993, 
partly prompted by the greater interest being taken in VA's 
elderly by the Sociedad, some of the Grupo's old committee 
members organised new assemblies, reopened communication with 
Quilmes and elected a new committee160. However, by July 1993 
they had yet to translate their words and plans into concrete 
activities of benefit to elderly residents.
4d) Caritas.161
The nearest catholic church was located just three blocks from 
VA, in an area of modern middle class housing in Avellaneda. It 
was permitted by the local ecclesiatical authorities to include 
those parts of VA located in Quilmes within its activities. 
However, interviews with residents of the villa indicate that, 
whilst assistance from the church had occurred over a long 
period, this was both limited and sporadic.162 Unlike, Villa 
Jardin, the local branch of Caritas was only established in 1990.
By 1993 Caritas had developed a number of programmes of potential 
benefit to the elderly. Free food parcels containing similar 
goods to those provided in Villa Jardin were distributed weekly 
to needy families. However, of a total of 34 beneficiaries aged
160The investigator was directly involved in this new 
initiative.
161See chapter two for general information on Caritas
Argentina.
162Tape VA1.
over 55 years, only 9 came from the villa itself. The majority 
lived in the middle class district and had minimum contributory 
benefits. Most of these had begun to receive help after Caritas 
carried out a door to door survey in 1990. Despite containing far 
higher concentrations of poverty than other parts of the parish, 
Villa Azul had not been included in this survey. As in Villa 
Jardin, the local Caritas collected used clothing, although the 
bulk of this was resold with only left-over items being 
distributed free.163
In early 1993 the local Caritas began to provide legal 
counselling, using the free services of a local lawyer. By April 
one elderly man, from the barrio not the villa, was using this 
facility to apply for a contributory invalidity pension. At this 
time, none of the elderly interviewed in the villa were aware 
that Caritas offered this service, again indicating a lack of 
contact.
As in the other villas studied, the local Caritas received 
funding from a wide variety of sources. These included the sale 
of clothes, church collections, fund-raising by local schools and 
donations of food and medicines. Unlike Villa Jardin, there were 
no special arrangement with surrounding parishes enabling them 
to collect used clothing there. The director stressed that funds 
sometimes dried up and so the provision of food parcels was not
163Untaped interview with the local Caritas director, 29th 
April 1993.
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always reliable.164
As mentioned above, the bulk of the local Caritas activities were 
directed at needy families living in the middle class district 
rather than in VA. Unlike Villa Jardin, no attempts had been made 
to develop a network of voluntary assistants within the villa. 
This may partly have been because the local branch was 
established at a time when the middle classes were suffering from 
a sharper fall in living standards than poorer sectors.165 
However, there are also indications that the attitudes of 
individual Caritas workers precluded initiatives in the villa. 
Coming from surrounding middle class districts, many of Caritas 
workers considered the proximity of shanty towns as a "threat" 
to the neighbourhood and were in favour of eradication. During 
an untaped interview in April 1993 the director gave a very 
negative view of the villa and its inhabitants, who were 
portrayed as lazy, untrustworthy scroungers.166
Until 1993 the local Caritas had developed no links with 
organisations in VA, arguing that most of them made false
164Untaped interview with local Caritas director, 29th April
1993 .
165A.Minujim, "En la rodada" in A.Minujim ed, Cuesta abaio. 
Los nuevos pobres: efectos de la crisis en la sociedad arcrentina. 
Buenos Aires pp.33-8.
166The director complained that used clothing was rarely 
passed onto villeros since they would "send it to relatives back 
in Paraguay." He went on to claim: "They ask out of habit. . . They 
haven't learnt anything except how to beg. . . .They have a lot of 
time. What do they do with it all?". Untaped interview, 29th 
April 1993.
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promises and were corrupt.167 The dominant position of local 
cacicrues in villero politics up to the late 1980s was no doubt 
a serious barrier to greater church participation. However, these 
links were improved during the period of the investigation and 
several joint meetings were held with the Sociedad and the Grupo. 
Plans were made to coordinate future projects, including a 
poverty census and workshops for youths and elderly. Several 
members of the Grupo registered to receive food parcels and to 
take advantage of free legal advice.168
That the local Caritas played a very different role in VA than 
in VJ appeared to be largely due to its location inside a middle 
class neighbourhood many of whose residents felt hostile towards 
the villeros. The contrasting priorities of different branches 
of Caritas indicates that the organisation as a whole did not 
play a consistent part in providing economic support for elderly 
villeros across the city. Indeed, individual parish priests often 
had more influence over local initiatives than did national 
guidelines.
4e) El Sociedad de Fomento.
The general context of institutional change surrounding the 
foundation and early history of the Sociedad have been dealt with 
above. As explained, the Sociedad received its initial stimulus 
from the construction of a nursery school in 1987 and later, in
167Untaped conversation with Juan Carlos Gomez, the local 
Caritas director, 29th April 1993.
168Direct observations of the investigator, who was himself 
involved in developing these new contacts and proposals.
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1989, from emergency government policies designed to reduce the 
impact of hyperinflation. According to the ex-President:
[the hyperinflation] was the key moment because...Maglana became the 
president [of the Sociedad], the vice-president was Nino (who isn't in the 
Sociedad any more but is still actively working for social issues) and 
this other guy called Martin who used to be an active member of the 
Communist Party back then and after they stopped he began to work with us 
in the Sociedad de Fomento. He was the president of the last committee 
but, well, for personal problems he couldn't carry out his duties and he 
had to resign a few months ago.169
Thus, by 1992 the Sociedad had passed from the hands of local 
cacicrues such as Nino and Maglana, and from non-Peronists to a 
tightly-knit group of Peronist activists who were also dominant 
in the two housing cooperatives.
Until recently, the Sociedad had primarily been concerned with 
the physical fabric of the villa and conducted no activities 
specifically targeting the elderly. Its only contact with the 
Grupo resulted from the conflict over premises in 1989. However, 
by 1993, the Sociedad was taking increased interest in the 
elderly. This change may have been prompted by several 
considerations, including the demise of the Grupo, the
acquisition of substantial funds and political opportunism.
In 1991 the Sociedad obtained a substantial grant via the 
provincial "Plan de Justicia Social"170, which was used to
169Tape VA1 1/330-48.
170This programme was funded through a 10 per cent profit tax 
imposed by the national government. Its objective is to up-grade 
the "social infra-structure" of greater Buenos Aires, including 
health clinics and the improvement of basic utilities (see 
Movimiento: revista de la agrupacion "11 de Marzo". April 1993) .
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construct a sports centre and community buildings alongside the 
nursery school (see Map IV:3). These were nearing completion in 
July 1993 and it was planned that they would be used to provide 
a daily feeding centre for the villa/s elderly. According to the 
vice-president, the committee were confident that they would 
receive funding from the PAMI Pro-Bienestar programme.171 They 
were also confident that all elderly residents aged over 60 
included in their 1992 census would be entitled to use the 
feeding centre. This clearly contradicts the line taken by PAMI 
that the programme would only benefit those with contributory 
pensions.
It is clear that the Sociedad had been very successful in 
obtaining funding and executing projects. As such it had become 
the focus for local participation in Villa Azul. It is also 
apparent that much of its success stemmed from personal contacts 
which originated in the party political activities of some 
committee members. During the internal Peronist elections of May 
1993, several were openly campaigning for Eduardo Schiavo, a 
local councillor who had previously been secretary for social 
assistance in Quilmes and was presently working for the "Plan de 
Justicia Social". It was also disclosed that Schiavo's sister 
worked for PAMI in Quilmes and had been their original contact 
with the Pro-Bienestar programme. The vice-president of the 
Sociedad was himself working in Quilmes municipality, as part of 
the Direccion de Cooperativas, set up by the Plan Arraigo. In
171See chapter three and tape VA1 for descriptions of this 
programme.
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this respect the attitude of the Sociedad was a marked contrast 
to that of organisation in Villa Jardin. According to the vice- 
president:
There are people in the Comission, the Sociedad de Fomento. the 
Cooperative, who are politically active...Our success. with the sports 
centre was partly because we had realized that what we need more than 
anything is an organisation in the barrio. But if this organisation 
doesn't have political contacts, then , unfortunately it won't be 
successful: it has to be done the other way.172
The Sociedad's attitude to the reactivation of the Grupo was at 
best ambivalent. The vice-president argued that the Grupo's 
committee members were too old to be able to take on major 
responsibilities and hinted that they might be about to lose 
formal recognition from Quilmes. He felt that, since the Sociedad 
had itself obtained funding for the feeding centre, they would 
be unable to delegate the full responsibility for its management 
to another organisation. He argued that either the Sociedad 
should have a strong supervisory role in the affairs of the Grupo 
or that they should take it over completely.173
The attitude of the Sociedad's new leadership towards the "old 
guard" of the Grupo was in part a continuation of the struggle 
against individualistic modes of organisation which had 
previously been dominant. It could also be interpreted more 
cynically, as an attempt by one group of activists to extend 
their political influence within VA at the expense of another. 
Interestingly, one of the caciques who had lost his post in the
172Tape VA1 2/490-500.
173Tape VA1.
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Sociedad began to take a much more active, behind-the-scenes, 
role in the renewal of the Grupo. These potential conflicts were 
resolved, at least superficially, by the election of a Sociedad
member onto the Grupo's committee in May 1993.174 Yet the
Sociedad did little to encourage the participation of elderly. 
Indeed, its attitude towards the Grupo suggested it believed that 
the elderly were not capable of running an organisation.
The Sociedad had obtained several tangible benefits for the
villa. although none had been of direct nor exclusive benefit to 
the elderly. Its success had stemmed from a very different
approach to that taken by organisations such as VJ's Centro. 
Alignment with dominant elements in local government had clearly 
paid short-term dividends and won the Sociedad the backing of 
most villeros. However, this must also have left it vulnerable 
to the sort of external political changes which had previously 
undermined the Grupo. The crucial difference between the two was 
that the Sociedad's committee had considerable organisational and 
political experience and therefore were not dependent on the 
decisions and expertise of outside actors. This left it in a much 
stronger position. The large sports hall, which dominated one end 
of the villa was concrete proof that the Sociedad was able to 
obtain material benefits for residents and had had a galvanising 
impact on local support. This contrasted with the Grupo's failure 
to even acquire its own office.
174Direct observation.
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4f) The Evangelical church.
The general lack of interest and even hostility of the local 
catholic church to the villeros. appeared to provide evangelical 
protestants an opportunity to attract new converts. There was, 
however, little indication that they had been able to do so. One 
evangelical organisation still maintained premises in the villa. 
on Calle Azul, but none of the local residents interviewed had 
seen any signs of activity in recent times. One interviewee who 
received economic assistance from them in the early 1980s 
mentioned that these programmes had since been discontinued. 
Another received occasional help through a contact at a church 
in the neighbouring district of Bernal.175 Neither was able to 
throw any light on why the evangelists had stopped coming to 
Villa Azul. According to the vice-president of the Sociedad:
There have always been evangelicals around here but, as far as I can see, 
they were never really accepted..I don't just mean large-scale 
support. .Yes, they have a few followers, but they're not at all important 
for most people.176
This suggested that the evangelists may have lost heart due to 
the failure to realise large-scale religious conversions.
Villa Azul had failed to establish an organisation comparable to 
VJ's Centro and its local initiatives provided far less economic 
support for the elderly. This could largely be attributed to the
175Tapes VA6 and VA7.
176Tape VA1 1/298-304.
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decision of CEPEV to become involved in one area and not the 
other and the different priorities of the local catholic priests. 
By contrast, local government had taken more interest in the 
plight of VA's elderly than it had in VJ, sending social workers 
and providing assistance benefits. A change in local government 
undermined the Grupo, cutting off an important source of outside 
assistance for the elderly. By 1993 these needs were being 
rearticulated by an organisation which had better links with the 
new power structure. In both of these initiatives, participation 
by elderly villeros was much lower than it had been in the Centro 
and there was little indication that it had reduced their 
marginal status either within or outside the villa.
Villa Azul's experiences illustrate the close relationship 
between internal organisation and supralocal political change. 
This was apparent in general developments, such as the struggles 
between Peronist factions, the emergence of the caciques and, 
from 1989, the re-establishment of traditional Peronists. It was 
also apparent in the histories of individual initiatives such as 
the Sociedad and Grupo. Whilst most residents welcomed the 
disappearance of the caciques. there were signs that this had led 
to a weakening of structures of local authority, as gunfights 
were replaced by drug abuse and delinquency:
What's terrible now are those yobs who're all on amphetamines..This didn't
used to happen...it's just been the past year, never before.177
177Tape VA2 433-36.
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Other elderly residents complained of a sudden increase in 
muggings and burglaries. These developments were of particular 
concern to vulnerable groups such as the elderly and, if were to 
escalate, would have had a serious effect on their economic and 
general welfare. They showed that the villa was at a critical 
juncture as new organisations sought to obtain through welfare 
the level of legitimacy the caciques had won through 
intimidation.
5) Villa Zavaleta 
5a) The setting.
Villa Zavaleta (VZ) is located just inside the Federal Capital, 5 
kilometres down the Riachuelo from Villa Jardin. It is an ugly 
place, wedged between two dual carriageways, a large waste 
collection plant and an area of warehouses and workshops (see Map 
IV:4) . Zavaleta was founded in 1969 as a temporary camp (nucleo de 
habitacion transitorio or NHT), for people displaced from villas 
eradicated elsewhere in the Federal Capital178. The origins and 
main elements of this programme have already been examined in 
chapter two. The Comision Municipal de Vivienda (CMV) was charged 
with the general administration of the camp. As such, Villa 
Zavaleta was the direct outcome of a government initiative, rather 
than the result of ad hoc, illegal land occupations. As will be
178G.Barmak and V.Mazzeo Warnes: 3 0 anos en la historia de un 
pueblo (work in progress).
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seen, this distinction had an important effect on the subsequent 
development of the villa.
The outline proposals of the NHT programme stressed the temporary, 
spartan nature of the new settlements:
The project has attempted to take every consideration into account, including 
a minimum level of comfort, the camps' transitional and precarious nature and 
the use of materials which may be of most value when the homes are taken down 
again.179
and:
It is hoped that the strict regime and hard conditions will stimulate and 
sharpen the desire for something better.180
The original camp consisted of 30 rows (known locally as tiras) 
containing a total of 560 identical back-to-back units. These were 
built of brick, with corrugated iron roofs and consisted of three 
small rooms with an inside bathroom. Some basic services, such as 
running water and electricity, were provided, but the camp lacked 
an effective sewerage system and surfaced roads. Reflecting its 
supposedly transitional nature, no provision was made for shops nor 
communal buildings.181 Thus, on balance, it is hard to say whether 
the camp's general facilities represented an improvement on the
179Ministerio de Bienestar Social, Plan de erradicacion de las 
villas de emercencia de la Capital Federal v del Gran Buenos Aires. 
Buenos Aires (1968) p.11.
180Ministerio de Bienestar Plan de erradicacion. . . p. 24.
181This contradicts proposals made in the original plans (see 
ibid p.25).
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conditions in the villas which had been eradicated.
As mentioned in chapter two, the construction of NHTs coincided 
with a programme to provide low-interest loans for cheap 
accommodation.182 This may partly explain why, at least during its 
early years, the majority of VZ's inhabitants only remained for 
short periods before moving to improved accommodation. These were 
replaced by subsequent waves of displaced villeros. Housing loans 
were only to be made available to people included in social 
insurance programmes183, which may have caused the gradual 
accumulation of unprotected groups in the villa. The rapid turnover 
of population probably reduced residents7 incentives to maintain 
its facilities, causing the physical infrastructure of the camp to 
decay: electric meters were replaced by illegal connections and
some units no longer received running water. Gradually, VZ began to 
take on the appearance of any other villa de emergencia.
By early 1993, the camp still had the appearance of a temporary 
settlement, despite being over 2 0 years old. The passageways 
between the tiras remained unsurfaced and the surrounding wasteland 
had not been developed. There was less street life than in the
182Law 17.561, cited in ibid p. 35. Interestingly, these loans 
were to be financed by the Instituto Nacional de Seguridad Social 
and, consequently, may have exacerbated the financial positions of 
national pension funds (see chapter three, pp.107-108).
183Law 17.561 stipulated that since housing loans should be 
funded from the social insurance system they would only be 
available to affiliates.
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other two villas. Gangs of youths, some openly taking drugs or 
sniffing solvents, would intimidate passers-by. The only 
commonplace sign of improvements to the original houses was the 
addition of reinforced doors and window bars.
Interviews with residents suggest that the turnover of population 
in the camp began to slow during the 1980s, as opportunities for 
escape were reduced.184 This led to a problem of overcrowding and 
from 1990 small clusters of make-shift accommodation began to 
spring up in areas of surrounding wasteland (see Map IV:4). These 
largely consisted of overspill population from the camp and 
contained very few elderly. Consequently, they were not included in 
the survey.
The original plans for the camp made strict provisions for the 
maintenance of law and order. Indeed, the tenancy contracts which 
residents were obliged to sign went as far as to prohibit:
..noisy disturbance of any kind, especially in the hours of sleeping, which 
will be fixed according to the judgement of the Director.185
This reflected the broader authoritarian tendencies of the military 
government of that time (see chapter 2) . The outline proposals also
184This included a reduction both in general economic 
opportunities to "make good and get out" and in the relocation of 
villeros to better sites by the CMV. The latter had not occurred 
since 1984 (Tape VZ1 1/38-42).
185Ministerio de Bienestar Plan de erradicacion. . . p. 78.
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stressed the need to:
Instill security and confidence in oneself, motivate and direct the energy 
which every citizen should apply in obtaining a better level of living for 
those who aspire to improve themselves.186
These utopian ideals could not provide a sharper contrast with the 
grim realities of life in the camp. One local resident described 
her horror upon arrival to find the villa in the grip of violence 
and crime. She mentioned her attempts to obtain a night watchman 
from the CMV and added:
Villa Zavaleta was appalling. There were so many bad people who were always 
robbing and assaulting everyone else. It was a very ugly situation...I had 
the luck [ironically] to be placed alongside some particularly unpleasant 
people who nobody could get rid of..They terrorised us.187
Over the years, these problems of crime and delinquency became 
considerably worse. Commonplace illegal activities included the 
supply and use of various drugs, looting warehouses in the adjacent 
neighbourhood and holding up cars which passed along the two main 
avenues.
Unlike Villa Azul, the camp had no structure of local authority and 
few norms or values which residents could abide by. This made the 
guarantee of "safe passage" to an outsider virtually impossible, 
whatever their role or status may be, and partly accounted for a 
number of other features. First, as will be seen, there was a low
186ibid p . 28 .
187Tape VZ1 1/55-70.
level of local organisation in VZ. Secondly, there was a complete 
absence of state involvement in the camp. Interviewees maintained 
that the CMV had had few dealings with the villa in recent years 
and that visits made by a social assistant had been discontinued 
two years ago.188 Thirdly, the risks inherent in working in VZ had 
discouraged academic study. The researcher was unable to find any 
research specifically relating to the villa.
This element of danger partly restricted the scope of the
investigation. The researcher was only able to enter the camp when
accompanied by the local catholic priest, reducing the number of 
individual interviews which it was possible to conduct.
As will be seen, the daily lives of the elderly in VZ were greatly 
affected by these problems of security, with many afraid to leave 
their homes. Interviewees generally put the fear of robbery and 
violence before economic and housing problems. According to one 
elderly lady:
They [the elderly] are terrified because they think something will happen to 
them, people without any defence, like has happened before..There's a couple 
who've been broken into three times and had everything inside taken. They're 
two little old people who just can't defend themselves..and when the lady is 
left on her own in the house and they see she's there alone they [local
youths] take advantage, they're so brazen. This a very serious problem for
the elderly here.189
By further reducing the mobility of elderly people, this fear
188Tape VZ1 2/20.
189Tape VZ1 1/641-51.
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served as an additional obstacle to completing the paperwork 
(tramites) for social security benefits.
The reasons why VZ experienced such a social breakdown, whilst the 
other villas studied remained relatively safe and law-abiding are 
not entirely clear. From the outset, Zavaleta contained a 
concentration of "bad types" many of whom, it was claimed, came 
from the eradication of the notorious slum of Bajo Flores:
Lots of bad people were brought here or came from other places to live here. 
It was really very bad, very bad...Here there are more bad types [than other 
villas] . . .because they came from so many places, like when those people were
thrown out of Flores villa, Bajo Flores, and they all came here...that villa
was -how should I put it? That villa was real badlife...The CMV had chosen 
the people, done a census and seen what they were like, so they shouldn't 
have let them come here.190
As mentioned above, it is possible that a process of selection for 
those to be given more permanent accommodation existed, and that
this took into account the payment of rent and other factors. If
this were the case, it could have bequeathed a residual population 
of "social undesirables".
The reduced degree of state involvement in VZ may have been both a 
cause and an outcome of the rise in delinquency there. One resident 
argued that the villa was better-run during military governments 
when the authorities made more of an effort to maintain basic
190Tape VZ1 1/575-90.
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facilities and clamp down on crime.191 During the 1980s, 
government involvement in VZ became virtually non-existent. 
According to one community leader:
The CMV has had five projects to begin reconstructing the villa. These 
include a [community] centre. On their plan there's a free space where they 
could build a community centre. But there's not the political will to do 
anything other than talk about it. The plans can say what they want but..I 
suppose the [CMV] assistants will end up retiring without anything being 
built.192
This both impeded the development of local initiatives and 
heightened the sense of marginalisation and anomie felt by 
residents, including the elderly.
Table IV:6 INDEC data for Villa Zavaleta's census district.
Lacking basic needs
Total households 686
% of total households in 
district
18.5
Total population 2, 903
Total over 64 years 362
Source: INDEC La oobreza.... pp.46 and 54 (district V.l).
Since it was located in the Federal Capital, not the Province of
191Tape VZ1.
192Tape VZ2 1/265-75.
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Buenos Aires, the camp was not included in the 1980 survey of 
villas de emercencia referred to above. INDEC data from the 1980 
national census is available, but provides a less direct picture of 
conditions in the camp than it does for Villa Jardin. The census 
district which is used includes various other wealthier 
neighbourhoods. Thus, the overall figure of 18.5 per cent of 
households lacking in basic needs (LBN's) (see Table IV:6), is not 
representative of conditions in the camp alone. It is also feasible 
that the accuracy of the census data may have been affected by the 
reluctance of officials to run the risk of entering the villa. 
However, it is interesting that the total number of LBN households 
was 685, since this almost perfectly matches the number of housing 
units originally in the camp. This suggests both that VZ accounts 
for the vast majority of population lacking basic needs and that 
the total population of the camp consists of familes living in sub­
standard housing.
If these assumptions are valid, several more specific conclusions 
about the camp can be drawn. It can be concluded that in 1980 the 
villa had a total population of 2,903 (the total number of LBN's). 
Of these 365, or 12.5 per cent, were aged over 65 (Table IV: 6) . 
This is a slightly lower proportion than that for the district as 
a whole, but far higher than in the other villas studied. This 
reflects the greater concentration of elderly in the Federal 
Capital than in the Province of Buenos Aires193.
193See chapter two.
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There are no surveys specifically relating to VZ or its elderly 
population. On one hand, they possessed more opportunities to 
reduce their marginal status: they formed a relatively high
proportion of the total population and were, located within the 
Federal Capital, whose insurance coverage and assistance 
expenditure were far higher than in the Province of Buenos 
Aires.194 On the other hand, the high levels of disorder and 
delinquency may have left many elderly as virtual prisoners in 
their own homes. One social worker estimated that, in 1992, at 
least 15 per cent of over 60 year-olds in Zavaleta lacked any kind 
of benefit and that a significant proportion of these were 
seriously disabled.195 This will be considered in more detail in 
the next chapter.
5b) Local initiatives in Villa Zavaleta.
The original NHT proposals made much reference to the importance of 
local organisations. These were to include: "literacy classes,
medical check-ups, groups in each tira, sociedades de fomento and 
recreation for the elderly."196 Yet, despite its early foundation 
and location within the Federal Capital, by 1993 Villa Zavaleta had 
a lower degree of local organisation than any of the other 
neighbourhoods studied.
194See chapter three, Table 111:4.
195Tape VA1 1/341-61.
196See Ministerio de Bienestar, Plan de erradicacion. pp. 64-68.
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As has been shown, conditions in the villa were hardly propitious 
for local associations. As a government-run camp, initiative was 
stifled in the early years. Yujnovsky describes the relation 
between the authorities and residents as top-down "imposition- 
control."197 The rapid population turnover in the early years may 
also have discouraged local initiatives, although this had not been 
the case in the other two villas surveyed.198 However, the 
greatest barrier to progressive organisation was without doubt the 
high level of crime and violence in Zavaleta.199
The first known case of local organisation in VZ was the Consejo 
Deliberante set up in 1976. The Consejo provided a limited range of 
services for the villa"s needy (including some elderly residents), 
such as the distribution of free medicines. Sadly the Consejo 
ceased to function after just a few months. The reasons for this 
are not clear. It is claimed that, whilst it received no support 
from state organs, at least the Consejo did not suffer repression 
during the Proceso. 200 Most probably, the Consejo fell victim to 
the generally unfavourable conditions for organisation within the 
villa.
1970.Yujnovsky, Claves ooliticas... pp 165-66.
198For example, Maria Basan claimed that she was the only ex­
committee member of the Consejo Deliberante remaining in the villa 
(see tape VZ1).
199Many of the members registered by the "Virgen de Lujan" gave
false addresses, perhaps reflecting a fear of both the outside 
authorities and other villeros.
200Tape VZ1.
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Reference is made to other attempts at local initiatives, but these 
proved to be equally short-lived.201 The villa received some aid 
from the PAN programme, but this was said to have been handled 
corruptly. 202 It was not until 1988 that an organisation of any 
real significance was formed. The Comision Paz y Justicia (CPJ) 
functioned for two years, receiving donations from local residents 
and neighbouring businesses, which were passed on to needy 
residents. Sadly, the CPJ fell apart amid accusations of corruption 
within the committee.203
In 1989 some members of the CPJ went on to form a new comision 
vecinal (NCV) which survived, at least in name, until the time of 
this investigation. The NCV succeeded in obtaining funds from the 
municipality (MCBA204) for a feeding centre (which a small number 
of elderly regularly attended) and a health clinic. It also 
distributed monthly parcels as part of a municipal food aid 
programme. 205 Of the 10 0 or so beneficiaries of this programme in
201For example, Maria Basan refers to a group which assisted 
the CMV in its 1984 survey of VZ (tape VZ1 1/185-7).
202Tape VZ2 2/255-60.
203According to Maria Basan, several committee members were 
taking many of the donated goods for themselves (tape VZ1 1/290- 
98) .
204Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, which is 
responsible for the Federal Capital section of the city.
205E1 Programa Alimentario de la Municipalidad de la Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires (PAMBA), a similar programme to the PAN mentioned in 
chapter three pp.134.
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VZ, it was claimed that the majority were elderly villeros .206 In 
addition, the NCV president helped local residents, including 
several elderly, obtain identity papers as a first step to gaining 
a range of contributory and non-contributory benefits. 207 Indeed, 
the president would appear to have been the key figure within the 
organisation and was credited with most of its successes. 208 With 
his illness and death, the NCV7s committee split, with some members 
remaining in control of the feeding centre and others running the 
health clinic. By 1993 considerable animosity existed between the 
two sides, with claims that the feeding centre refused to cater for 
some sections of the villa. 209 Most of the NCV7 s activities had 
been discontinued by this time, although plans were being aired to 
hold fresh elections. Thus, as had been observed for a number of 
initiatives in other villas. the failure of the NCV was more a 
reflection of the personalities of key participants than the 
structure of the institution itself.
Grassroots political organisations were never able to establish a 
permanent presence in Villa Zavaleta. It was generally claimed that 
these organisations failed to carry out their promises and were,
206Tape VZ1.
207Unfortunately, the NCV7s minutes book was unavailable and so 
it was unable to obtain more precise information about its 
activities and the numbers who benefitted from them.
208Tapes VZ1 and VZ2.
209Tape VZ1.
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more often than not, managed corruptly.210 In 1992 an attempt to 
set up a unidad basica in VZ was abandoned when its premises were 
burnt down by local vandals. Likewise, church organisations never 
played a large role in the villa. As in Villa Azul, this was 
largely because no churches were located within the settlement. The 
NCV never established contacts with Caritas nor other religious 
bodies in the surrounding neighbourhoods. In the early 1990s, the 
arrival of a new priest prompted one local catholic church to begin 
to take a greater interest in the villa, leading to the formation 
of several new local initiatives. These are examined below.
Local initiatives in VZ were generally short-lived, usually failing 
to live up to their promises and often corrupt. This must have 
served to further reduce residents' willingness to participate in 
such activities. According to one community leader:
The elderly don't participate very much...1 used to see them with their arms 
folded. They don't have much hope...They don't get involved. They lack the 
confidence to.211
This contrasted with the active, participative attitude apparent in 
at least a proportion of elderly in VA and VJ and with the 
political mobilisation of iubilados elsewhere in the Capital.212 
Local residents also differed from VA and VJ in that they did not
210Tapes VZ1 and VZ2.
211Tape VZ1 1/100-110.
212See chapter three.
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distinguish between credible and non-credible initiatives. The 
failure of all earlier attempts to organise encouraged residents to 
view subsequent initiatives with suspicion and scepticism. This 
posed another serious obstacle for progressive organisation in the 
villa.
The history of organisation in VZ was also characterised by the 
inability of residents to work together against common problems. 
Active members of the community often preferred to work 
individually than in concert, indicating the general lack of 
solidarity and trust in the villa.213 Conflicts within and between 
organisations only served to worsen the "social chaos" of 
Zavaleta.214
Local organizations of particular relevance to the elderly were as 
follows:
5c) El Centro de la tercera edad "La Viraen de Luian" (CVL).
This was one of the initiatives which resulted from the heightened 
interest taken in the villa by a local catholic church "La Virgen 
de Lujan" (see Map IV:4). The CVL shared its premises with the 
local Caritas branch (see below) and many of its volunteers were 
active in both organisations. Most interestingly, it was the first
213Cecilia Bassia lists a number of initiatives run by 
individuals (tape VZ2 1/100-180).
214This term is used by Cecilia Bassia, a prominent community 
figure (tape VZ2 1/130).
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recorded instance of outside actors taking a proactive role in 
local organisation. These were the local priest and a part-time 
PAMI official who took catechism in the same church.215 
Unfortunately, as will become clear, these outside actors showed no 
more capacity for working together than the villeros themselves.
The establishment of the CVL in 1992 partly resulted from the 
arrival of a new priest who took a particular interest in the 
villa7 s social problems and, especially, the high concentration of 
elderly living there. It was also inspired by the initiation of 
PAMI7s Pro-Bienestar programme, which sought to encourage the 
organisation of elderly and the establishment of feeding centres 
for pensioners.216 Meetings were organised with elderly active in 
the local church, none of whom lived in the villa itself and all of 
whom had contributory benefits. It was hoped that these would 
provide an "example" to villeros and form the core of the new 
organisation.217 A door to door survey of elderly was then 
conducted inside the villa, noting ages, addresses and benefits 
held.218 Such a survey was possible without provoking a violent 
confrontation due to the volunteers7 links with the catholic
215The latter was Cecilia Bassia, interviewed in tape VZ2. Her 
work with the CVL was not part of her PAMI responsibilities and she 
did not represent the organisation in this capacity.
216See chapter two, pp. 125-26.
217Tape VZ2 1/305-10.
218Elderly inhabitants were initially identified by going 
through index cards from the local Caritas. Unfortunately, the 
survey was left incomplete as the CVL went into decline.
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church, the only institution which appeared to hold any authority 
in the villa.
By late 1992 fortnightly meetings with villeros were being held in
a church building and the principal objectives of the new
organisation had been agreed upon. Recognising the lack of 
community spirit in Zavaleta, a principal goal was to teach 
residents how to work together and to set a precedent for other 
local initiatives. The new group was to be structured according to 
PAMI's guidelines for a Centro de Jubilados and was to provide a 
channel for the food aid being offered by the Pro-Bienestar 
programme. However, in contradiction to the PAMI guidelines, the 
group was to have a strong religious role, seeing to the spiritual 
as well as the material needs of the elderly. Every meeting was 
preceded by a short religious service in the adjacent church. 
According to the social worker:
..I think its important that the elderly have a space for reflection about
the transcendental side of life..we changed the [PAMI's] normative model in
this respect. So far the Centros de Jubilados which deal with social issues 
only really meet to dance, play cards and go on trips. And the reputations of 
these Centros have really fallen.219
The CVL's meetings combined catechizing with the dissemination of 
information about PAMI programmes and other assistance benefits. By 
early 1993 the PAMI worker had helped three local elderly obtain 
non-contributory invalidity pensions. Largely through the efforts
219Tape VZ2 2/115-30.
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of the local priest, the group obtained a subsidy from the newly- 
formed Secretaria de la Tercera Edad (STE) 220 for healthcare and 
housing improvements for over 60 year-olds without a pension. The 
full sum payed to the CVL was never disclosed but some members 
suspected that 300 pesos of it had gone towards the purchase of a 
new statuette for the church.221 Other than a vaccination 
programme jointly funded by the STE and PAMI, no health or housing 
programmes were undertaken for elderly lacking insurance cover.
The initial meetings attracted upwards of 40 elderly from the villa 
and membership quickly rose to above 70. However, by mid-1993 
attendances had slumped to less than ten and it appeared that the 
CVL could be dismissed as just another initiative in Zavaleta that 
failed to take off.
As in the case of Villa Azul, it is instructive to examine why an 
organisation of the elderly which showed some initial promise then 
fell apart. The principal reason given by those involved was the 
conflict between the PAMI worker and the local priest. The former 
saw the priest's role as purely spiritual, whilst the latter sought 
to play a major, if not the dominant, part in all CVL activities. 
It was claimed that this often went to the extent of excluding the
220See chapter three, pp. 131-32.
221These allegations were made by Cecilia Bassia and a number 
of volunteers but they refused to be recorded.
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elderly villeros themselves from the decision-making process.222 
This conflicted with the PAMI worker's objective to encourage 
participation among the membership. Tensions between the two 
outside actors worsened over the months, until the PAMI worker 
withdrew her support or was prevented from participating.223 
Members, many of whom considered the PAMI worker to have been the 
initiator and key figure in the CVL, were left bewildered and 
disillusioned. According to the vice-president:
It all began when Cecilia began to go door to door to talk with people. . . .But 
she hasn't come by or been at a meeting for the past two months. I more or 
less agreed with what she used to say. But now she doesn't come to meetings, 
well... [shrugs shoulders and tails off].224
Whilst the rift between the two initiators of the CVL indubitably 
had a very negative effect on the group's fortunes, there are 
indications that this may have been a final blow to an organisation 
which had already lost its way. Attendances at meetings had already 
gone into steep decline225 and, other than helping a small number 
of members with tramites. the CVL had yet to put its plans into 
practice. This may have reflected the attitudes taken by the two
222Tape VZ2 .
223These opposing versions were given by each of the two 
involved (tape VZ2). Note: the investigator was unable to obtain a 
taped interview from the priest, but was able to engage him in 
several lengthy discussions about the CVL.
224Tape VZ1 1/600-615.
225For example, the meetings held on 17.3.93 and 31.3.93 only 
attracted 15 and 12 elderly respectively (direct observations).
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outside actors and their lack of specialised knowledge about the 
complex system of official programmes and assistance benefits. Both 
were opposed to forming a group which gave priority to organising 
outings and parties, feeling that this would be incongruous with 
their religious objectives. 226 As has been seen, such social 
activities were often a major attraction for elderly in other 
villas. The church service and a tendency to pepper discussions 
with religious references may also have discouraged some elderly 
from attending.227 Thus, whilst the behaviour of key individuals 
led to the final collapse of the CVL, many of its difficulties had 
arisen from institutional weaknesses.
Despite working for PAMI, the social worker's views often ran 
counter to those of more senior officials responsible for the Pro- 
Bienestar programme. She insisted that the feeding centre would 
provide for all over 60 year-olds in the villa, not just those with 
contributory pensions. 228 This misunderstanding may have been 
because she was employed in PAMI's Woman's Section rather than a 
department dealing specifically with food aid. Neither the PAMI 
worker nor the priest were aware of several types of assistance 
benefits potentially available to members229 , nor did they have
226Tape VZ2 .
227Direct observations by investigator.
228Tape VZ2 .
. 229For example, the ANSES assistance pension (see chapter 
three, pp.127-28).
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personal contacts with influential officials.
It is possible that many initial participants simply lost patience 
with the CVL. After nearly a year of operation none of its members 
had yet benefitted from PAMI food aid. Plans for a feeding centre 
were replaced by attempts to obtain individual food parcels. The 
process of obtaining these parcels, requiring the completion of a 
simple index card by members, was less complex than that for many 
other benefits,. However, in July 1993, after several months of the 
operation, only a handful of the cards had been completed and none 
had been handed over to PAMI. Few volunteers were provided to make 
further efforts or sacrifice their time for such activities. 
Similarly, the process of obtaining full recognition from the MCBA 
proved to be very protracted. 230 Thus, the CVL was able to offer 
very few material benefits to its members. According to its vice- 
president :
...because people here are always telling me, "Nothing has happened yet. I'm 
not going to go anymore." You see, the people here are like that. If they 
don't see an immediate benefit, they begin to drift away.231
By mid-1993 there were few signs that the CVL would be able to 
overcome these difficulties.
Some of the reasons why the CVL was unable to succeed were similar
230Direct observation by the investigator.
231Tape VZ2 1/630-640.
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to those which thwarted the Grupo in VA. In neither case did 
elderly villeros play a large role in day to day decision-making. 
In the case of the Grupo, local interest ebbed when its early 
successes were not followed-up. Likewise, the CVL's inability to 
obtain quick, tangible economic benefits for participants led to a 
rapid fall in support. Had this not occurred, the subsequent 
tensions between its initiators might not have arisen.
5d) CARITAS.
As elsewhere, the local branch's main activity was the distribution 
of food parcels, which were sold on to those identified as needy at 
a 20 to 30 per cent reduction of the usual price. This economy was 
largely achieved by buying the food in bulk at a local warehouse. 
Volunteers argued that it was possible to help a larger number of 
families by providing smaller discounts than in VA and VJ. The 
local Caritas kept index cards for the 2,000 or so families who had 
received aid. However, it had made no effort to establish a network 
of volunteers inside the villa. as had been done in VJ. This would 
have been hindered by the lack of solidarity and security in the 
villa but, for the same reason, would have been very beneficial. 
The Caritas also collected used clothing, all of which was 
distributed free. It had no activities specifically relating to the 
villa's elderly.
The local Caritas had some links with organisations inside Villa
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Zavaleta and provided funds for the NCV's feeding centre, enabling 
it to build an extension. 232 In general, however, the lack of 
effective local initiatives in VZ reduced the scope for 
collaboration. As in the CVL, the local priest played a large part 
in Caritas' day to day management. Indeed, it was often difficult 
to distinguish initiatives taken by Caritas from the CVL or the 
individual actions of the priest.
5e) Neighbouring Centros de Jubilados.
Two such centres existed along the perimeter of the villa: "El
Centro de Jubilados Pompeya Sud" and a centre run by a unidad 
basica (see Map IV:4). Neither of the two contained members from VZ 
nor had any contacts with the villa. and they expressed no desire 
to change this state of affairs. 233 This indicates that, as in 
Villa Azul, the surrounding neighbourhoods had very negative 
attitudes towards the villa and its residents, further increasing 
its marginal status.
Potentially, local initiatives could have been of more benefit to 
local elderly living in Villa Zavaleta than in the other villas 
studied. Their most important contribution would have been to
232Tape VZ1 1/505-10.
233Informal conversations and direct observation.
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reduce the sense of fear and isolation experienced by many of the 
elderly there. The relatively high number of elderly, the majority 
of whom it was claimed possessed contributory pensions, would have 
increased the bargaining power of organisations vis a vis official 
agencies such as PAMI. Sadly there were few signs that any of this 
could be achieved until a degree of order was established in the 
villa.
6) Local initiatives for the elderly: concluding comments.
This section compares the experiences of the three neighbourhoods 
studied and seeks to draw some general conclusions. It begins by 
examining factors which may have contributed to the success or 
failure of local initiatives in reducing the marginal status and 
improving the economic position of elderly villeros. It then 
considers how much successful initiatives were able to achieve.
(i) Requisites for success.
a) Outside actors:
For the purposes of analysis it is useful to distinguish between 
those actors that form an integral part of local initiatives and 
others that are less directly involved. These are referred to as 
"integral" and "non-integral" actors.
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Integral.
None of the three villas contained examples of elderly residents 
organising themselves spontaneously without outside help. This was 
largely a consequence of the problems of double marginality 
referred to at the beginning of the chapter. In every case, outside 
actors (be they social workers, the church or political parties) 
were integral both in initiating activities and, more often than 
not, in their day-to-day management. When this external support was 
interrupted many initiatives foundered (see VA's Grupo or VZ's 
CVL) . Similarly, the inability or reluctance of outside actors to 
work in a villa was a major obstacle to the organisation of elderly 
there. This partly accounted for the fact that VZ contained no 
successful initiatives, despite having by far the highest number of 
elderly.
Whilst outside actors were ubiquitous, their roles varied 
considerably. This partly reflected the type of actor involved 
(religious, political, state or NGO) and their reasons for becoming 
involved in the villa. On the one hand, CEPEV sought to make groups 
fully independent of outside help after a few years, so that its 
resources might be directed elsewhere. On the other, religious or 
political actors had an interest in maintaining permanent links 
with local initiatives (to put bums on pews or crosses on voting 
slips).
The presence of outside actors provided local initiatives with a
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series of opportunities and constraints. They provided villeros 
with basic organisational skills, information about available state 
or non-state resources and, in many cases, direct access to 
resources through personal or institutional contacts. Personal 
contacts were particularly important. The case studies indicate 
that access to resources was frequently a question of "who you 
know, rather than what you know". Examples of this included the VA 
Sociedad de Fomento's political patron's links with PAMI staff and 
CEPEV's contacts with the DNA.
However, permanent dependence on such actors tended to stifle 
initiative and participation within the groups234 making them more 
vulnerable to changes in external support. It could also lead to 
conflicts between social and other objectives. The failure of 
CUNP's feeding centres and the CVL partly reflected the dangers of 
mixing religion with assistance. Political links were often 
perceived negatively by villeros and generally proved to be 
unreliable. It should be stressed that divisions between state and 
party politics were often confused in Argentina. 235 Ruling 
factions generally filled government posts with their own party 
faithful. CEPEV identifies:
The predominance of a centralised, "strongman" pattern in the exercise of
234See VZ's CVL or VA's Grupo.
235These relationships are well portrayed in I.Izaguirre Los 
asalariados del aparato del estado: 1945-76. Buenos Aires (1984).
302
power and distribution of resources on the part of local government.236
Thus, close association with a specific state agency might bring 
with it the same drawbacks as links with a political party. If 
elections led to a change in the political party of office-holders, 
villa organisations' links with local government might be badly 
damaged.
Non-integral.
All the local initiatives studied also maintained non-integral 
relations with outside actors. These included a wider range of 
institutions, with local government particularly important. Again, 
such contacts offered local groups both advantages and 
disadvantages.
Local groups usually took the initiative in developing such ties, 
often motivated by a desire to obtain resources held by the outside 
actor. At times, substantial barriers had to be overcome in order 
to develop formal links. Again, such contacts could open doors to 
previously inaccessible resources. Likewise, they could also 
increase external dependence or foster political or religious 
compromise. However, since these relations were by definition less
236CEPEV Evaluacion de la situacion de los ancianos en Villa 
Jardln v diseno de una estrategia de abordaie. Trimestre Julio- 
Agosto 1990. Buenos Aires, 1990 (mimeo) p.14. It should be noted 
that, as the prime mover behind the establishment of the Centro, 
CEPEV's views would have a major effect on its relations with other 
organisations.
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intensive, both the risks and opportunities they conferred were 
usually less significant.
b) Incentives:
Local initiatives for the elderly were unable to maintain high 
levels of participation nor justify monthly dues unless they could 
provide concrete benefits for their members. The experiences of the 
neighbourhoods studied suggest that these must include a tangible 
economic benefit for a large proportion of members. This might be 
food aid or facilitating access to cash benefits. Whilst parties, 
vaccinations and day trips increased the solidarity and confidence 
of local elderly, they were not enough on their own to ensure 
participation.
One problem which confronted VZ7z CVL, VA7 s Grupo and VJ7s Centro 
was that it was sometimes impossible to obtain benefits without 
having already achieved a high level of participation, yet local 
elderly were unwilling to join until they saw clear evidence of 
economic aid. 237 Often it was not possible to break out of this 
unfortunate cycle. According to VA Grupo7s ex-president:
The people here are rather non-committal. I don't know if they're afraid or 
what... Its hard for me to talk with them, convince them and even, to be 
frank, lie to them in order to motivate them.238
237In the case of the Centro, this occurred because not enough
jubilados could be persuaded to join up for it to obtain formal 
support from PAMI.
238Tape VA2 1/350-60.
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c) Secure premises:
Access to suitable premises was another key requisite for the 
success of local initiatives. This reflected both the concrete 
utility and the symbolic value of the building. Premises could have 
been offered to or shared with other organisations, increasing 
cooperation between them. Space may also have been rented out, 
providing organisations an additional source of income. Ideally, 
the building should have been centrally located: the lack of
community buildings inside VZ severely restricted its development. 
The failure to secure a regular meeting room contributed to the 
demise of VA's Grupo and limited the activities of VJ's Centro.
d) Broad participation:
All of the organisations studied were dominated by a small number, 
sometimes just one, of key participants. In some cases these were 
outside actors, in others they also included local residents. 
Whilst this was probably inevitable, maximising the number of 
active members from the locality was important for the long-run 
success of initiatives. VZ's NCV and VA's Grupo both provide 
examples of organisations which foundered because key members 
became inactive. Clearly, the risk of death or illness was higher 
if initiatives were run by a small number of elderly people.
In most of the initiatives studied notions of democratic 
participation were somewhat limited. In both VZ CVL's and VA
Grupo's elections for committee members, only one person was 
nominated per post. Few votes were taken on day-to-day decisions, 
and, when this was done, they generally consisted of an informal 
show of hands. This lack of democracy can only have served as a 
disincentive to participation and to concentrate decision-making in 
fewer hands.
Generally speaking, women participated in local initiatives for the 
elderly to a much greater degree than did men. Other than parish 
priests, local Caritas volunteers were virtually all female. Women 
dominated both the general membership of the Centro and the 
committee of the Grupo. This gender imbalance was more pronounced 
than that for the total population of elderly villeros and requires 
explanation.
Levels of female participation may have reflected the importance of 
elderly women in the national human rights movements of the late 
1970s and early 1980s. 239 The military regime was unable to 
supress these activities with force, since it feared public 
reaction to the sight of elderly women being manhandled by police 
and soldiers. This experience increased the confidence and capacity 
of elderly women to organise themselves. However, its importance 
should not be over-estimated, since there are no indications that 
villeros were involved in these activities. Moreover, none of the
239See H.Leis El movimiento por los derechos humanos v la 
politica argentina, Buenos Aires (1989).
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elderly women interviewed in the three villas made any reference to 
the human rights movement.
Various neighbourhood studies draw attention to the importance of 
women in maintaining contacts with friends and neighbours through 
informal network's. 240 This may partly have been because, while for 
men the workplace represented the principle focus of social life 
and organisation (hence the predominantly male ethos of much of the 
trades union movement241) , for women these functions were more 
usually located in and around the home. Consequently, elderly men 
who were no longer working were less able to maintain social 
contacts than were women in the same situation.
Data for Argentina as a whole (see Table 111:17 in the previous 
chapter) indicate that elderly women were less likely to be in 
employment than were men. Whilst this does not take activities such 
as unpaid housework into account, it could have meant that elderly 
women had more free time to devote to local activities. However, it 
should not be assumed that national patterns of economic
240S. Ramos Las relaciones de parentesco. . . pp. 55-6; L.Lomnitz 
and M .Perez-Lizaur "Kinship structure and the role of women in 
upper class Mexico" Signs (1979), p.166; E.Jelin "The social 
relations of consumption: the urban popular household" in E.Jelin, 
ed Family, household strategies.., p.183.
241This is evidenced by a lack of reference to women in the 
literature on contemporary Argentine unionism. For example, 
H.Palomino "El movimiento de democratizacion sindical" in E.Jelin, 
ed Los nuevos movimientos sociales/2. Buenos Aires (1985), pp.36-60 
makes direct reference to 16 prominent union leaders in the 1980s, 
none of whom were women.
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participation were replicated in the villas. The disproportionate 
number of elderly women in local associations may also have 
reflected greater levels of material need or more formidable 
obstacles to state assistance. 242 These issues are returned to in 
chapter five, which provides detailed comparisons of the economic 
conditions between the sexes.
(ii) The impact of local initiatives.
The local initiatives described in this chapter sought to reduce 
elderly villeros' marginal status, both in terms of access to 
resources and by fostering a higher social profile. In other words, 
they aimed to compensate for some of the gaps and dualism inherent 
in the macro structures described in chapter three.
The impact of local initiatives varied substantially among the 
neighbourhoods studied. Nevertheless, some general comments can be 
made. The provision of direct economic aid and advice by local 
organisations were usually the principal functions of such 
organisations. Their capacity to do so was limited by a number of 
factors, including a lack of information about benefits and their 
unfamiliarity with complex bureaucratic procedures. Whilst a number 
of local organisations sometimes resorted to pressuring government
242A.Brumer "Mobilization and the quest for recognition: the 
struggle of rural women in southern Brazil for access to welfare 
benefits" in C.Abel and C.Lewis, eds Welfare, poverty.., pp.412-18 
notes that a failure to provide welfare benefits to women in 
particular prompted them to form pressure groups.
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agencies for additional resources, this was usually on an ad hoc 
basis rather than as a systematic strategy. Thus, they could not be 
considered to be pressure groups in the same sense as other 
pensioner protest organisations. 243 Rather than this, many local 
organisations actively strove to formalise and develop relations 
with government agencies along clientelistic or apolitical lines.
The reluctance of elderly villero organisations to protest against 
or confront the state could be interpreted in a number of ways. In 
one sense, it could be considered a rational strategy, averting the 
risk of alienating agencies which might be able to provide short­
term material relief. It is unlikely that overtly political 
organisations would have been afforded formal recognition by local 
government, thus excluding them from initiatives such as the PAMI 
Pro-Bienestar Programme. This might also be interpreted as a 
strategy of top-down social control, as put forward by Gilbert and 
Ward. 244 However, the political passivity of such organisations 
may also have been a reflection of the double marginality of their 
membership. Many elderly may simply not have been able to afford 
the bus fare to take them to demonstrations in the city centre or 
may have been too frail or unwell to make the journey. There were 
also psycological barriers to participation in such activities. As
243These organisations are mentioned in the previous chapter. 
The weakness of local initiatives as pressure groups fits with 
Gilbert and Ward's view that community organisations are never 
allowed to challenge the existing structure of power and resources 
(see footnote 390) .
244See footnote 390.
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has been shown, the repression and violence of the Proceso years 
had been particularly intense in the villas. This would have 
discouraged future political activity and increased fears of 
official violence. According to one elderly woman:
If you go to Plaza de Mayo or Plaza del Congreso [scene of demonstrations] 
you just go and shout and what do you get out of it? You just leave all 
battered and bruised. That's why we won't go to Plaza de Mayo. What does it 
solve?... They punch you, kick you, all sorts -I've seen what they do on the 
television. This is what the [mockingly] jubilados, the jubilados from the 
Capital get up to.245
Moreover, elderly villeros generally did not equate their plight 
with that of jubilados living elsewhere in the city. According to 
one resident of VA:
What do those -jubilados from the [Federal] Capital do for people in the 
Province [of Buenos Aires]?..Because maybe they'll give them things if they 
ask for this, then for that. But the Province just gets worse..The people 
living badly are in the Province.. The situation in the Province is very 
different.246
Local organisations were more successful in providing the elderly 
with a social forum, including parties, classes, outings and other 
activities. Although these were not of a political nature they may 
have served to increase the confidence and collective 
identification of members and thus lay the foundations for future 
mobilisation. There were, however, few signs that this had occurred
245Tape VA6 123-38.
246Tape VA6 135-49. This perceived distinction was borne out by 
official data for insurance coverage in the Federal Capital and 
Province (see Table 111:3).
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as yet in the villas studied.
Thus, whilst local initiatives often met with some success, they 
were never able to resolve all the shortcomings of the broader 
institutional structure of economic support for the elderly. 
Assuming that all the requisite factors mentioned in the previous 
section were in place, it is instructive to examine what "external" 
effects reduced the role of local initiatives.
As mentioned above, the elderly were generally given little 
attention by their fellow villeros. Partly because of this, many 
local initiatives emphasised the needs of other groups -young 
children, single mothers or unemployed men- rather than the aged. 
This bias was also reflected in local government social assistance 
programmes, so that often resources simply were unavailable for 
local organisations dealing with elderly.
The marginal status of the elderly within the villas was compounded 
by the negative attitudes of outsiders towards villeros in general 
(as voiced by the VA Caritas or the Centros de Jubilados in VZ). 
This discouraged some neighbouring organisations from getting 
involved in the villas and deprived elderly villeros of the 
opportunity of mixing with and learning from residents of other 
neighbourhoods.
Local organisations seldom had good information about the range of
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benefits available to their members. As was seen, there was much 
confusion about who would be the eventual beneficiaries of PAMI's 
Pro-Bienestar programme. No organisation other than VJ's Centro was 
even aware of the existence of the Direccion Nacional de 
Ancianidad. This mainly reflected the failing of the agencies
concerned to publicise their services, which, as was shown in 
chapter three, was largely due to budget constraints and the way 
funds were allocated.
Since the rising number of elderly in shanty towns, many of whom 
lacked insurance cover, had been a relatively recent phenomenon, 
many external agencies had yet to adapt to the changing
circumstances. This was well illustrated in PAMI's advocation of 
model Centros de Jubilados. which were geared to the needs of those 
who already had contributory pensions. These were clearly
inappropriate to the needs of the three neighbourhoods studied 
here.247
In some cases outside actors proved to be inconsistent. In the case 
of Caritas, assistance programmes varied very much by parish, often 
reflecting the preferences and concerns of the local priest.
Outside aid from political agencies was extremely erratic and this 
was sometimes also the case for benefits provided by the state.
247During the reelection of VA's Grupo's committee in May 1993, 
a proposal was made to model the organisation along PAMI lines. 
This was met with general derision when it pointed out that around 
80 per cent of its elderly lacked contributory pensions (direct 
observation).
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Local organisation in each of the three neighbourhoods often 
exhibited a lack of coordination and collaboration. This sometimes 
resulted in over-lapping service provision, as was clearly the case 
in Villa Jardin, where, by mid 1993, it might have been possible to 
receive food parcels from a number of sources: Caritas, CUNP, the 
Centro or the Junta Vecinal. Similarly, legal advice might have 
been obtained from either CUNP, the Centro or the Junta. This lack 
of coordination may even lead to rivalry when organisations are 
competing for the same resources from an outside agency. In Villa 
Jardin, both the Centro and the Junta made requests for food aid 
from Lanus municipality. In Villa Azul, the Grupo and Sociedad de 
Fomento fought over municipal funding for a meeting hall.248
Common services, common links with external agencies and, most 
importantly, a common aim to alleviate the poverty of elderly are 
all very strong reasons for organisations to develop close mutual 
ties. Several factors may explain why this often failed to occur. 
These included:
(i) The fear of compromising religious or political status. This 
was apparent in VJ's Centro's attitude to the Junta. Similarly, 
church organisations were often bound by hierarchical guidelines 
about collaboration with other agencies. 249 The local CARITAS in
248This rivalry and fragmentation is also observed by E.Tenti 
"Representacion, delegacion..." in L.Golbert et al, eds La mano 
izauierda... p.137.
249For an example of this, see the article "Close to poverty, 
far from power" in Clarin, 9 March 1993, written by Monsenor J. 
Casaretto, a senior church figure at the national level.
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Villa Azul had very little knowledge of initiatives inside the 
villa nor did they of it.
(ii) A lack of information. Ignorance of other organisations may 
lead to suspicions and false claims that they "never get things 
done".
(iii) Personal motives. As was seen in Villa Zavaleta, failure to 
cooperate may result from personal conflicts between key members of 
organisations. These individuals may shy away from links with other 
groups because they fear their own positions of authority could be 
usurped. This fear was apparent in the attitudes of the Grupo's old 
committee to the Sociedad de Fomento in Villa Azul.
A key theme throughout this chapter has been the "double 
marginality" faced by elderly shanty town residents: the
marginality of the slum and the marginality of old age. Local 
initiatives have sought to reduce this marginality but, in the case 
of VZ at least, were often unable to overcome the barriers it 
imposed. State agencies sometimes compounded this marginality 
through their own prejudices or their inability to adapt to 
changing circumstances. Whilst the experiences of the three villas 
were very mixed, all of them displayed less propensity for local 
organisation than more affluent neighbourhoods. Community-specific 
income maintenance was shown to be patchy and biased against the 
most vulnerable groups of elderly. This compounded the fragmentary 
and skewed pattern of coverage afforded by agencies outside the 
villas. At the same time, the exceptional success of VJ's Centro
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shows what could be achieved through enlightened outside actors and 
should be considered a model to be applied in other shanties.
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CHAPTER FIVE; INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES.
1) Introduction.
This chapter focuses on the economic experiences of individual 
elderly villeros. which complement the macro and community-level 
perspectives given in the two preceding chapters. Its findings 
are largely based on two sources of data, a household
questionnaire survey and a number of longer, semi-structured 
interviews. The chapter begins with an explanation of the 
methodology. The data is then presented and analysed. The final 
section examines a number of general themes which emerge from the 
survey results, including barriers to state protection and 
economic marginality.
2) Survey methodology.
The questionnaire survey was conducted in three villas between
November 1992 and June 1993. It did not aim to provide a
representative sample of all elderly villeros living in Greater
Buenos Aires and its findings should be not be interpreted as 
such. The number of returns for two neighbourhoods (Villa Jardin 
and Villa Azul) was large enough to be representative for all 
elderly living there. As such, they can be treated as two 
specific case studies, continuing the analysis of the preceding 
chapter. Unfortunately, the number of questionnaires completed 
in Villa Zavaleta (VZ) was much smaller due to the high risk of 
assault. In this case, the returns cannot be assumed to be
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representative for elderly in the villa as a whole. Because of 
this, data from VZ is only used when grouped with findings from 
the other two neighbourhoods.
The questionnaire survey includes 129 separate households, each 
with at least one member aged over 55, giving a total of 181 
"elderly" villeros. Whilst the survey sets out to provide a 
representative sample of the economic conditions of the elderly 
living in each villa. it does not make use of orthodox sampling 
techniques. Given the lack of a complete, single source of 
information on the addresses of households containing elderly, 
it was impossible to construct sampling frames embracing whole 
villas or even sections of them. Instead of selecting a random 
sample, the survey identified a number of streets whose housing 
and infra-structure appeared representative of the villa and 
interviewed all the available elderly living on them. Whilst this 
method does not yield data as robust as a properly-conducted 
random sample, its reliability is high since the size of the 
sample relative to the total universe is large.
The questionnaire is broken down into several sections.350 These 
concern:
1) Living conditions: composition of the household and quality 
of accommodation.
2) Individual data for elderly members, including labour 
histories, access to state benefits, economic relations with 
family and neighbours and other income sources.
350See Appendix for a copy of the questionnaire.
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3) The interviewee's appraisal of his or her own condition.
4) A recapitulation and summary of the income sources of the 
elderly individual.
The sequence of questions was designed with the respondents in 
mind. Thus, less sensitive topics, such as household structure 
and labour history, come before more sensitive issues such as 
monetary income. This chapter follows a different sequence from 
the questionnaire, making a more logical procession through the 
issues. For example, data on household structure is analysed in 
the section about economic relations with family members.
Other difficulties encountered in conducting the survey included: 
(1) obtaining the addresses of households with elderly; (2) 
gaining access to them and (3) ensuring the reliability of 
responses. The problem of addresses was resolved in several ways: 
first, by using membership registers of local organisations 
dealing with the elderly;351 secondly, by relying on the 
personal knowledge of local community leaders and thirdly, by 
asking interviewees for contacts with other elderly living 
nearby. This provided a good mix of members of various local 
organisations as well as people with no links to any group. 
Working with organisations which were generally well-respected 
in the villas. also ensured safety and helped gain entrance into
351VJ's "Centro Los Jovenes Del '90", VA's "Grupo De La 
Tercera Edad Union y Esperanza" and VZ's "Centro La Virgen De 
Lujan" (see chapter four).
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households and obtain the trust of their members.352
The problem of reliability was less easily resolved. In cases 
where the respondent was clearly confused, his or her answers 
contradictory or where the information given clearly contrasted 
with the evidence of the interviewer's own eyes (such as the man 
eating beef steak and reading that day's newspaper, whilst 
claiming to be living on an extremely low income), the lack of 
reliability was recorded in the questionnaire. Of the 129 
households surveyed, 11 were identified as potentially 
unreliable. Rather than excluding the data provided from these 
cases and thus imply that all this information is false and that 
all the remainder is correct, no such distinction is made. 
Instead, the proportion of apparently reliable results is used 
as a rough indicator of the degree of reliability of the survey 
as a whole.
Information about household income is probably the least reliable 
of the data sets obtained from the questionnaires and interviews 
and for this reason is not used as a major element in the 
elaboration of the research. Elderly residents were not always 
aware of the income of all household members. Figures given for 
earnings for similar occupations, such as domestic service, often 
varied to such a degree that they could not be assumed to be 
reliable. Also, some income sources, such as occasional gifts of
352The interviewer received eight refusals from prospective 
households. The reasons, when apparent, were varied, including 
the intervention of an intoxicated relative and a claim to be on 
the verge of moving away from the villa.
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food from neighbours, were difficult to quantify. Because of 
these limitations, the analysis of income values is restricted 
to identifying those sources which provide a substantial income 
and those which are less significant.
The questionnaire survey was followed up by 11 more detailed 
semi-structured interviews. The households interviewed were 
selected to represent the various types of income maintenance 
strategy encountered in the questionnaires: pensions, odd-jobs, 
reliance on family support and so forth. These interviews were 
recorded and serve, in part, to illustrate the findings of the 
household survey. However, they also provide a source of richer, 
qualitative insights, which complement the narrower focus of the 
questionnaire.
It should be stressed that neither the questionnaire nor the 
interviews seek to provide an objective, "correct" view of the 
income maintenance opportunities afforded elderly villeros. 
Rather, they give a subjective version of reality, which may at 
times be at odds with that held by better-informed actors and may 
even contradict itself. This is useful in two respects. First, 
the perceptions of elderly villeros of surrounding phenomena 
condition the way they respond to them. Secondly, disparities 
between the views held by such individuals and larger agencies 
reflect the incomplete diffusion of information both from above 
to below and vice versa. It is, however, important to avoid 
confusing the views held by respondents with those of the author. 
Attention is drawn to cases where there are clear discrepancies
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between the two and reasons are put forward to account for the 
particular views of the respondent.
3) Survey results.
3a) General characteristics and origins.
Table V:1 Age and sex structure of sample households. 1992/3.
55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80 +
Azul Men 1 6 9 6 0 3
Azul Women 1 7 11 5 4 2
Jardin Men 6 6 12 10 1 5
Jard Women 5 14 22 8 3 3
Zava Men 1 4 4 2 1 1
Zava Women 6 3 1 2 3 3
All Men 8 16 25 18 2 9
All Women 12 24 34 15 10 8
Total 20 40 57 33 12 17
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires, 1992-3 (Villa Azul, Villa 
Jardin and Villa Zavaleta).
Table V:1 shows the age and sex structure of the sample survey. 
The gender distribution roughly conforms to the pattern for 
Argentina as a whole, with higher numbers of elderly women than 
men. 353 However, the age distribution differs in a number of 
ways from the national pattern. The higher number of elderly in 
the 65-69 age group, compared to those in younger cohorts is not
353United Nations Social and economic aspects of population 
ageing in Argentina. New York (1990), p.21.
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easily explained. It may have occurred because larger numbers of 
younger age groups were in full-time employment and therefore 
unavailable for interview. Also, younger age groups may not have 
considered themselves to be elderly and therefore may not have 
joined local organisations. As shown in chapter three, the age 
of an individual can affect his or her potential entitlement to 
numerous state benefits. Thus, the lower proportion of elderly 
in younger age sets should lead to above average levels of access 
to state benefits. This is examined in a later section.
Table V:2 Place of birth.
Greater 
Buenos Aires
Other part of 
Argentina
Overseas
Azul 2 (1.1%) 46 (25.4%) 7 (3.9%)
Jardin 6 (3.3%) 81 (44.8%) 8 (4.4%)
Zavaleta 6 (3.3%) 23 (23.7%) 2 (1.1%)
Total 14 (7.7%) <50 (82.9%) V7 (9.4%)
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
Table V:2 shows elderly villeros' places of birth. In both VJ and 
VA the majority came from Argentine provinces lying beyond 
Greater Buenos Aires (GBA). Most of these were provinces in the 
far north east and north west of the country, rather than the 
surrounding Pampas region or relatively nearby cities such as 
Rosario or Cordoba. General surveys of internal migration between 
1947 and 1980 found that the latter areas accounted for the 
highest proportion of those coming to GBA. 354 There was,
354S.Torrado Estructura social. . . pp. 85-9.
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therefore, a heavy regional bias among those migrants who settled 
in the two villas. This was not surprising, since the relative 
poverty of northern Argentina meant that this group would have 
been unable to afford housing elsewhere in the city.
As such, the data in Table V:2 supports the general view that 
villas served, at least initially, as reception centres for 
opportunistic migration from impoverished rural districts. This 
is reflected in the experiences of Senora Eulalia of Villa 
Jardin:
When I was fourteen or so..in [the north eastern province of] 
Misiones..first, I worked in the Misiones regional hospital in my 
village..cleaning..and then I started work in the maternity ward...I was 
nineteen when I came here [VJ] from Misiones... to get my midwifery 
qualification...355
However, it would be dangerous to assume that movement to the 
villas always resulted from economic opportunism. The relatively 
recent origins of such settlements suggest that the small number 
of villeros who were native to GBA had mainly originated from 
less precarious neighbourhoods. For this group, arrival in the 
villa was more likely to have resulted from economic destitution 
rather than opportunism (ie "push" rather than "pull" factors). 
This was clearly illustrated by the circumstances of Haidee 
Filipetti, a resident of Villa Azul:
We left [La Boca in the Federal Capital] because my daddy had come to live 
in Bernal [in Quilmes municipality] . There we lived in a very big 
house. .Daddy kept animals and we were very comfortable. Then, you know how 
it is, one person got ill and then the next one did. Doctors and other
355Tape VJ7 23-88.
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blokes, loan sharks, had us over a barrel. They just came and took their 
money. What with all the expenses and one thing and another, they took 
away our house. When daddy died, we had to move somewhere else in Bernal 
with mummy...We rented a place until mummy died...Then my brother came and 
said "What are you going to do? Mummy's dead and you're living here all on 
your own. Come and with me to live in Cordoba... Then I got ill...because 
the air is so strong out there...So I came back to Bernal.. . a good friend 
of my mummy's lent me a plot of land... but the lady had to sell it. So we 
grabbed our things and came to live in the villa.356
Haidee Filipetti's demise partly reflected a failure of the
social security system to compensate for the cost of nursing and
the loss of the household's main breadwinner, her father. At the
time of his death, in the early 1930s, public healthcare and
insurance were still at an early stage of development. Her
difficulties were compounded by the failure of other family
for
members to providers vulnerable relative -her vague comment about 
the "strong air" of Cordoba may have been a means of avoiding 
reference to a family dispute. Similar references were made at 
other points in her interview. Whilst the experience of Haidee 
Filipetti was by no means typical, it shows that the course by 
which elderly individuals came to live in the villas was 
sometimes very complex and cannot always be reduced to a single 
set of circumstances.
Only 17 elderly were born overseas and all but four of these were 
from Paraguay. Interestingly, only four foreigners received any 
type of state insurance or assistance benefit. Comparisons of 
factors such as past employment and date of arrival show no 
significant difference to Argentine nationals. Whilst Argentine 
citizenship is not a requirement for obtaining most state 
benefits, possession of documents proving the right of residence
356Tape VA4 027-110.
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is. 357 However, since almost 90 per cent of elderly villeros 
were native Argentines, this problem should not have had a 
substantial influence on general patterns of access to benefits.
Table V:3 Date of arrival (Villa Azul and Villa Jardin).
Azul Jardin Total*
Before 1950 0 28 (29.8%) 28 (18.8%)
1951-1960 11 (20.0%) 34 (36.2%) 45 (30.2%)
1961-1970 20 (36.4%) 18 (19.1%) 38 (25.5%)
1971-1980 11 (20.0%) 6 (6.4%) 27 (18.1%)
1981-1990 9 (16.4%) 1 (1.1%) 10 (6.7%)
Since 1990 4 (7.3%) 2 (2.1%) 6 (4.0%)
Do not remember 0 5 (5.3%) 5 (3.4%)
*This excludes Villa Zavaleta, many of whose residents were 
simply relocated from villas elsewhere in GBA.
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA and VJ).
Table V:3 shows the date at which the elderly came to live in the 
respective villas. The higher proportion of elderly coming to VJ 
before 1970 reflects that settlement's relatively early 
foundation and the use of all available land by this time. The 
date elderly arrived in the villas is significant in a number of 
respects. First, those elderly who arrived in VJ and VA after 
1990 displayed various differences from the sample as a whole. 
In all but one case their children owned the house in which they 
lived and in every case family support was their principal source
357Chapter two, pp. 49-51 shows that historically many 
residents from neighbouring countries had not obtained formal 
registration.
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of income. This indicates that they came to the villas because 
they had no other source of economic support and were unable to 
maintain a separate household. Secondly, the proportion of 
elderly in VJ whose principal employment had been in the formal 
sector was roughly twice as high for those who arrived before 
1960 than for those who came subsequently. 358 Similarly, the 
proportion of those lacking a benefit was twice as high for post- 
1960 arrivals as for those who arrived before I960 .359 These 
relationships reflect the broader shifts of employment and the 
dynamics of villa growth outlined in chapter two. By using 1970 
as a cut-off point in VA no significant differences occur. This 
is probably because levels of formal sector employment were 
generally much lower there.
3b) Principle lifetime employment.
Table V:4 refers to the principal occupations held by respondents 
during their working lives. As was shown in chapter two,
Argentina's economic performance after the Second World War was 
highly erratic, with marked cycles of growth and decline.
Moreover, from the 1960s there was a steady increase in the 
relative importance of the urban informal sector (UIS). This 
increased the probability that elderly villeros had changed their
35823 of a total of 62 pre-1960 arrivals (37 per cent) worked 
in the formal sector, compared to 5 out of 27 (19 per cent) for
the other group. It was decided to exclude VA from the analysis,
since so few of its elderly came in the earlier period and so 
this could have introduced a locational effect.
359The respective numbers are 19 (31 per cent) and 16 (60 per 
cent) .
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occupations at least once, if not frequently, during their 
working lives. The necessity to keep the questionnaire short and 
simple prevented the collection of precise information about 
individual labour histories. Thus, rather than provide full 
accounts of each respondent's past experiences, the analysis is 
restricted to those occupations which respondents perceived as 
their principal job.
Table V:4 Principal employment during lifetime.360
Villa Sex Fact Formal Const Domes UIS Rural House
Azul M 7 4 10 0 1 3 0
F 1 0 0 21 2 2 4
Jard M 13 8 7 0 10 2 0
F 8 2 0 27 3 0 15
Total
*
M 23 15 23 0 12 5 0
F 10 4 0 54 7 3 25
Key: Fact
Formal
Const
Domes
UIS
Rural
House
Factory work.
Other formal sector work. 
Construction.
Domestic service.
Other urban informal sector work.361 
Rural work.
House work.
* Includes Villa Zavaleta.
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
360Note that two respondents failed to give satisfactory 
answers and are not included.
361In the villas this type of employment is often known as 
changas. It includes street hawking and a wide range of odd jobs, 
usually performed on a casual, part-time basis.
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Patterns of male employment in the two villas were fairly 
similar, although a slightly higher share of those in VJ (53 per 
cent) were engaged in factory work or other formal activities 
than was the case for VA (44 per cent) . This may have been 
because VJ was founded earlier and was located closer to 
erstwhile concentrations of heavy industry along the Riachuelo 
River. However, the small number of men surveyed prevents more 
concrete conclusions. In both villas. principal male employment 
was split roughly evenly into urban formal and urban informal 
activities, whilst only a very small number had been rural 
workers. This is in line with the finding that the vast majority 
of respondents had lived in the villas for more than 20 years.
Male employment was much more diverse than that of females, who 
were almost entirely engaged in domestic service or housework. 
However, even within female employment there were clear 
differences^between the two villas. In VJ a larger proportion 
were engaged in housework and a small but significant group found 
employment in factories. The increased likelihood of unpaid 
housework in VJ may have been related to higher overall levels 
of male formal employment there, which, if better remunerated, 
would have reduced the need for female waged labour. At least 
half of women who had been engaged in housework had husbands who 
participated in the formal sector. 362 Greater opportunities for 
formal employment around VJ would also explain the success of 
some women in obtaining factory work.
362The survey found that eight definitely did, two definitely 
did not and six did not provide a clear answer.
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Domestic service accounted for at least 52 per cent of female 
employment in all villas. rising to 70 per cent in VA. This 
compared to between 6 and 8 per cent for the national workforce 
(both sexes) between 1950 and 1992 .363 The extended interviews 
indicated that this concentration was due to a lack of 
alternatives rather than any genuine preference. Juanita Morales 
puts it bluntly:
I didn't have any education. I didn't have anything. So was I going to
walk along swinging my handbag in the air, go with men, become a whore? It
was the only alternative.364
Within domestic service there were differing degrees of 
formality, reflected in whether the worker was paid on an hourly 
or monthly basis. The latter was more stable and sometimes 
afforded the employee more rights. One interviewee noted that her 
daughter-in-law, who was paid by the hour, did not receive the 
aquinaldo365 . whereas she herself used to. 366 Another 
contrasted the unstable, casual nature of her hourly work with 
the security of her monthly paid job as a hotel cleaner. 367 Very 
few of those interviewed had lived in the houses where they had 
been employed. More typically, domestic service was a part-time 
occupation and was often combined with other jobs as well as
363See PREALC Mercado de trabaio en cifras. Santiago (1992) 
and PREALC Newsletter, No.32, Santiago (1993).
364Tape VJ6 472-476.
365This is a form of annual bonus which is ubiquitous in 
Argentina's formal sector.
366Tape VJ5 3 60-3 64.
367Tape VJ3 1/72-80.
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housework. 368 According to Senora Eulalia:
I used to work in lots of different houses in the Capital. Sometimes it 
was by the hour, sometimes by the month. Sometimes I worked in the morning 
by the hour and in the afternoon by the month..Do you know why? Because I 
had children and so that I could get more money, well, you understand?369
Thus, although factors such as date of arrival in GBA and 
location exerted some influence over principle lifetime 
employment, gender divisions had the strongest effect. Individual 
testimonies indicate that the higher proportion of men in the 
formal sector mainly reflected a lack of opportunities for women, 
rather than their desire to pursue informal employment.
3c) Contributions and benefits.
Table V:5 shows respondents' social security contributions, along 
with their sex and principal employment. It is probable that the 
figures for those who made some or all the required contributions 
are slightly exaggerated, since not all respondents produced 
documentation to verify their claims. A number of reasons were 
given for this, some of which were more credible than others. In 
one case, an elderly villero stubbornly claimed to have made 
contributions to the self-employed workers' fund for longer than 
it had been in existance. Several maintained that they had lost 
their papers in fires or floods. The physical conditions of
368Tapes VJ6 422-428 and VJ3 1/72-80.
369Tape VJ7 170-180.
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villas (wooden structures, accumulations of litter, lack of 
drainage) may have increased the likelihood of such events. 
Others claimed to have left their paperwork behind before 
migrating to Buenos Aires. Since it was impossible to assess 
which of these accounts were accurate, it may well have been that 
levels of social insurance evasion were higher than those 
indicated.
Table V:5 Principal lifetime employment and social security 
contributions.
Sufficient 
to qualify
Insufficient None
Women Domestic 5 8 41
House 0 1 24
UIS 0 1 6
Factory 8 2 0
Formal 2 2 0
Rural 0 0 3
Total 15 (15%) 14 (14%) 74 (72%)
Men Const 11 5 7
UIS 1 4 7
Factory 18 4 1
Formal 11 3 1
Rural 0 2 3
Total 41 (53%) 18 (23%) 19 (24%)
Total 56 (31%) 32 (18%) 93 (51%)
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
For the three main national funds, a minimum of 15 years7 
contributions was required to be eligible for a pension. There 
were pronounced differences between the sexes, with 53 per cent
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of men having made all the required contributions and only 15 per 
cent of women. The respective figures for no contributions were 
24 and 72 per cent. However, it was - difficult to establish 
whether the underlying cause for these differences was gender or 
occupation. In exclusively female activities, such as domestic 
service and housework, levels of contribution were extremely low. 
However, when women worked elsewhere, they were as likely to make 
contributions as were men. These relationships between occupation 
and contributions roughly coincide for information obtained for 
Argentina as a whole. 370 This issue is reconsidered later in the 
chapter.
Interviewees who made no contributions put forward a number of 
explanations. According to Juanita Morales, lack of spare cash 
was the main reason:
I was worried about the future but I needed a hundred of those little 
pesos, the type that don't exist any more. I needed them to be able to get 
a iubilacion. to make the contributions, to be able to go to a iubilacion 
fund. Well, us women are always worried about keeping up the house.371
In this case, exclusion from social insurance was a matter of 
constraint rather than choice. It suggests that policies which 
lead to a fall in real wage levels or redistribute income away 
from poorer groups will have an adverse effect on social
370R. Frediani La seauridad social en Latinoamerica: un
estudio comparativo del seauro social en Argentina v Colombia. 
Buenos Aires (1989) p.80.
371Tape VJ6 435-447.
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insurance coverage.372
However, Juanita Morales' husband, who also failed to make 
insurance contributions, put forward another set of reasons:
I always used to work in a firm called "Picasso" in Luna Park. And then 
the firm finished because the boss was already pretty old. So I began to 
work for myself, doing changas [odd jobs], always changas, nothing 
else...I made about three months' contributions, when I was working for 
one company. . . [I ask if he was ever worried about the future] . No, to tell 
you the truth I wasn't. Because once I left them I always worked in 
black...I had all my work papers but because you earned more working in 
black, well. Imagine it. At that time we earned 150, 120. That was talking 
money! ...So it paid me to work like that. And I did. I've been working 
like that ever since.373
Here, exclusion from social insurance involved elements of both 
choice and constraint. A lack of occupational stability, with 
frequent shifts from self-employment to working in semi-formal 
firms, discouraged continued contributions. In the case of Senor 
Morales, this might have required transferring from the general 
employees (or, before 1967, construction workers') fund to the 
self-employed one and back again. At the same time, Senor Morales 
showed a clear preference for "working in black". This reflected 
a number of considerations, which should not be dismissed as 
irresponsibility or an unwillingness to defer consumption. As was 
mentioned in chapter four, ageing was a fairly recent phenomenon 
in the villas and, as such, making provision for later life may 
not have been perceived to be economically rational. It is 
possible that villeros were aware, at least to some degree, of
372C.Mesa-Lago "Social security: ripe. .", p. 188 goes further, 
claiming that in Latin America none of those below the poverty
line are included in social security (by which he means 
insurance) programmes.
373Tape VJ6 446-4 69.
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the vagaries of insurance benefit values and the high levels of 
administrative wastage in such programmes. These, coupled with 
bureaucratic obstacles, may have meant that the perceived 
opportunity cost of pursuing contributions was higher than the 
future benefits. Working in relatively informal activities 
afforded some villeros an opportunity to opt out of insurance 
programmes which was denied to formal sector workers.
The very low levels of coverage for women working in domestic 
service may have partly been because they did not trust their 
employers to pay their own share of contributions. According to 
one elderly woman:
I could have paid. . .But you know that when you work by the hour the 
patrones [domestic employers] don't have anything to do with the domestic 
service fund, they don't pay them, they don't discount you or anything. So 
why would a person want to pay if she isn't going to keep her half of the 
deal? That's what happens.374
Other interviewees who expressed an opinion generally blamed 
themselves for not making contributions, admitting that they 
could have found the money if they had really wanted to.375 
However, in blaming themselves, it is possible that some 
respondents were taking an idealised view of their earlier 
circumstances which played down the hardships they had had to 
face at that time.376
374Tape VJ3 1/217-224.
375See Tapes VJ7 239-250 and VJ3 210-217.
376This confusion was apparent in one interviewee who stated: 
"Yes, of course I was irresponsible not to pay them 
[contributions] -I had to pay them. But I couldn't find the 
money.." (Tape VJ3 1/216-7).
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Taken together, these testimonies indicate that the reasons why 
a relatively high proportion of elderly villeros did not make 
contributions were complex and cannot simply be reduced to choice 
and constraint. Attention must be paid to the opportunity costs 
as perceived by the elderly villeros during their prime working 
years. What was the rationale of making contributions if, in the 
meantime, the individual would not have enough income to subsist, 
the individual was unlikely to reach old age or the benefits 
received did not match the resources (both financial and 
paperwork) paid in? Whilst it would be unrealistic to assume that 
respondents' past decisions had been entirely based on a 
considered appraisal of opportunity costs, the interviews 
indicate a general awareness of these issues.
Table V:5 also shows that 22 per cent of respondents had made 
some contributions but that these were insufficient to make them 
eligible for an insurance benefit. The only occupation where this 
did not occur was factory work. It should be noted that such 
individuals were unable to withdraw their partial payments and 
thus directly financed pensions which were denied to them. The 
average amount of contributions made by respondents in this 
category was 7 years.
The payment of some, but not all, insurance contributions cannot 
be explained in terms of past perceptions of opportunity costs. 
In some cases, respondents had planned to make the required 
number of payments but had lost their jobs. An extreme case was
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that of Ana Gorostiaga, who claimed (probably exaggerating) that 
she had lost her job only lacking one month's contributions:
I went to the fund..and they told me that I'd have to pay a thousand and 
something. And I couldn't..I didn't have enough money. I didn't have 
enough to make up the [out-standing] contributions. . .it was a lot of money 
to have to pay.377
Although no interviewees made reference to it, it is possible 
that some villeros were forced to discontinue contributions from 
the mid-1970s as real wage levels fell and income distribution 
worsened.
Tables V:6 and V:7 show the number of respondents who received 
the various types of state benefit. The proportion over the 
minimum retirement age (65 for men, 60 for women) who received 
no insurance benefits was 63 per cent: far higher than figures 
for GBA or Argentina as a whole. 378 However, the proportion who 
received no benefits whatsoever accounted for only 45 per cent 
of the total. This was because assistance benefits were almost 
as widespread as social insurance pensions (49 and 51 respondents 
respectively). Available data shows that assistance coverage for 
GBA as a whole was much lower than this, 379 indicating that the 
low level of insurance coverage in villas was partly off-set by 
a degree of targeting of assistance benefits. As is shown in
377Tape VJ3 1/200-210.
378In 1990 only 39.9 per cent of the national population aged 
over the minimum retirement age were without an insurance benefit 
(see Tables 111:1 and 111:3).
379National assistance coverage of the elderly was estimated 
to be roughly 5 per cent in 1992 (see chapter three).
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Table V:6 Type of social security benefits held.
Total Men Women Azul Jardin
None 82 (45%) 37 (47%) 45 (44%) 29(53) 39 (41)
Spouse D 7 6 1 0 7
Spouse A 2 2 0 0 0
Spouse I 12 1 11 3 6
Employee 31 23 8 7 21
Public 3 3 0 1 1
Self Emp. 3 1 2 1 1
Widow(er) 14 0 14 1 7
Total ins 51 (28%) 27 (35%) 24 (23%) 10 (18%) 30 (32%)
Old age 21 6 15 15 4
Invalid 8 3 5 1 2
DNA 20 5 15 0 20
Total ast 49 (27%) 14(18%) 35 (34%) 16 (29%) 26 (27%)
Key: None = Receive no benefit, but spouse may do so.
Spouse D = Spouse with DNA.
Spouse A = Spouse with assistance benefit.
Spouse I = Spouse with insurance benefit.
Employee = Private employees' insurance benefit. 
Public = Public employees' insurance benefit.
Self emp. = Self-employed insurance benefit.
Widow(er) = Widow(er) insurance benefit.
Total ins = Total insurance benefits.
Old age = Assistance benefit for elderly.
Invalid = Invalidity assistance benefit.
DNA = Direcion Nacional de Ancianidad subsidy.
Total ast = Total assistance benefits and subsidies.
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ)
Table V:7, average assistance benefits (113 pesos per month) were 
worth substantially less than insurance ones (185 pesos). Even 
so, the importance of assistance pensions in the villas studied 
was obvious. To date the general literature on Latin American
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Table V:7 Average benefit values (1993 pesos).
Average Maximum Minimum
Employee 185 310 140
Public* 320 500 210 .
Self emp.* 243 450 140
Widow(er) 170 245 140
Assist. 113 140 110
Invalid. 122 153 102
DNA 100 100 100
Men 143 500 100
Women 113 450 100
Total 125 500 100
*The low numbers of respondents with these benefits reduce the 
reliability of these figures.
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
social security has neglected this topic.380
As with principle employment, there were sharp divisions between 
men and women in the distribution of state benefits. Men (35 per 
cent) were more likely to receive an insurance benefit than were 
women (23 per cent). This largely reflected the greater 
likelihood that men had made contributions during their working 
lives. Conversely, a much higher proportion of women (34 per 
cent) received assistance benefits than did men (18 per cent). 
This meant that a slightly higher overall proportion of women 
received some form of benefit, although, as Table V:7 shows, the 
average value of their benefits was less than those received by
380For example, C.Mesa-Lago "Social security and extreme..", 
pp.83-110.
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men. Also, women were more likely to have a spouse with an 
insurance pension. However, whether this was of benefit to them 
depended on the degree of pooling of income. Pooling between 
couples could not be taken for granted: according to Juanita
Morales:
If I'm without I wouldn't even ask him [points to husband] for help. I 
know that he has money but I wouldn't ask him for any. I wouldn't ask for 
money even to buy bread, even to buy an aspirin.381
Comparisons between villas also reveal some important 
differences. At 53 per cent, the proportion of residents of VA 
without any benefit was clearly higher than in VJ (41 per cent) . 
This difference was largely accounted for by access to insurance 
pensions, which, in turn, reflected the levels of formal 
employment in the two villas. In VJ 32 per cent received 
insurance benefits, compared to only 18 per cent in VA. Levels 
of access to assistance were very similar in the two locations, 
but there were important differences in the type of benefit. 
Whilst DNA grants accounted for the vast majority of assistance 
benefits in VJ, nobody in VA received or had even heard of them. 
Conversely, VJ contained a far smaller proportion of elderly in 
receipt of better paid and more reliable assistance pensions. 
Thus, in VJ economic divisions between iubilados and other 
elderly respondents were more pronounced than in VA. These 
variations largely resulted from the particular contacts and 
information at the disposal of local organisations and testified
381Tape VJ6 1/140-55.
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to the impact of such activities.382
As Table V:7 shows, in every case average benefit values were 
only a small fraction of 1,250 pesos, the amount which the state 
statistics agency estimated was needed to provide for the basic 
requirements of a "typical" household in 1992 .383 All of those 
who expressed an opinion in the extended interviews claimed that 
the benefits fell a long way short of meeting their basic needs. 
According to one elderly man in VA:
It's impossible, impossible. Try to imagine it. How can we survive for a 
month on a million, one hundred [110] pesos? How much does bread cost us? 
How much does a kilo of sugar cost us?..Now bread's gone up [in price] to 
8 pesos to buy half a kilo.384
The same man estimated that his assistance pension was roughly 
a third of the money he required to eat and dress himself 
properly. 385 According to Eugenia Borda, whose husband had an 
insurance pension:
Because this money that the government gives you doesn't even last for 15 
days...Why should I have to wait in line three or four hours for a 
pathetic amount of money?... Because I can't just live like that, just 
bread and water...Some people tell us "Well you're alright because he's 
got his iubilacidn". [she laughs] They don't know what it's really 
like..the pathetic amount of money the government gives us.386
382See chapter four.
383See chapter three, p. 122. The size and structure of 
elderly villeros7 households is examined in a later section.
384Tape VA7 89-94.
385See tape VA7 125-3 0.
386Tape VA6 150-160 and 358-362. Tape VJ3 350-360 gives a 
similar account.
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Whilst a large number of residents of VJ had been in receipt of 
the DNA grant, most complained that the benefit had been paid 
irregularly and so could not be budgeted for. None had received 
payment for several months at the time of the interviews and few 
expected the benefit to be resumed. Most recognised that, unlike 
pensions, payment of grants was not obligatory:
Now they're not going to pay us any more...They owe us lots. Well no, no
they don't owe us because it isn't really our money.387
If the discontinuation of the DNA grant is taken into account, 
access to state benefits for women in VJ was far more limited 
than in VA. Indeed, insurance pensions become almost the only 
available source of state support in VJ. This underlines the 
importance of securing guaranteed payment for both insurance and 
assistance benefits.
The means-tested PAMI supplement for iubilaciones388 was 
introduced during the period of interviewing. Consequently, it 
was not possible to ascertain its overall distribution, although 
later interviews with iubilados in VA showed that a large 
proportion had not obtained the supplement.389 Occasionally, 
villeros would refer to other forms of state support, including 
food aid.390 However, no elderly villeros directly benefitted
387Tape VJ6 190-200. Also see tapes VJ3 1/260-266 and VJ5 99-
105.
388See chapter three, p. 125.
389For example, tape VJ3 1/359-370.
390See tape VJ6 685-700.
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from this type of assistance during the interview period.
Given the contributions requirement, it is logical that 
variations in access to insurance pensions were largely 
conditioned by previous employment. By contrast, the distribution 
of assistance was most strongly governed first by location and 
then by gender. The locational effect is easily explained by the 
irregular diffusion of information about different benefits and 
the haphazard nature of contacts between local organisations and 
the authorities. Reasons why uninsured women should be more 
likely to receive assistance than their male counterparts are 
less obvious. There was no evidence of conscious targeting by 
support agencies. As was mentioned in chapter four, a 
disproportionately large number of women actively participated 
in local organisations in the three neighbourhoods studied. This 
may have in part reflected a greater degree of female involvement 
in informal networks. As a result, women would have been better- 
informed about available support.
3d) Present employment.
Table V:8 shows that roughly a quarter of respondents were still 
employed at the time of interviewing. Whilst levels of economic 
activity for 60 to 64 year-olds were not much higher than those 
recorded for Argentina as a whole (27.55 per cent in 1990) 391, 
employment of over 64 year-old villeros was much higher than the 
national average (7.20 per cent). This indicates that elderly
391See chapter three, Table 111:17.
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villeros were more likely to remain in employment than were their 
counterparts in other neighbourhoods.
Table V:8 Present employment.
Under 65 
years
65 years and 
over
Total
UIS 10 11 21
Domest 6 2 8
Build 2 6 8
Wash 2 3 5
Fact 1 1 2
Formal 1 1 2
Total 23 (37%) 25 (21%) 48 (26%)
Key: Wash = Informal laundry worker.
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
A national survey of elderly attitudes found far more expressed 
a desire to continue working than were able to do so.392 
Consequently, the disproportionately large number of villeros who 
continued employment into old age could have resulted from 
privileged access to work. However, it may have also have been 
because elderly villeros. as a result of their greater necessity, 
performed tasks which other groups would have shunned. Also, 
casual forms of employment, such as clothes washing and odd-jobs, 
which accounted for a high share of villero employment, may not 
have been registered in larger, official surveys. As such, 
disparities between the villas and other areas may have been
392Chapter three, p. 188.
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smaller than the data indicate.
The survey results show that a large proportion of elderly 
villeros would have liked to have obtained employment had they 
had been capable of working. The incidence of severe health 
problems and frailty explain why levels of economic activity were 
far lower among over 65 year-olds than for younger respondents. 
Several respondents had been forced to abandon work because of 
accident or illness. Of those without either employment or a 
benefit, 31 (46 per cent) claimed to have serious health
problems. According to Juan Jugo:
I don't work because I can't, thanks to the business with this knee of 
mine which I can't rely on...Really, I need to go about the place, doing 
things since the money I have isn't enough. But I havn't been able to. .for 
a year now.393
Employment opportunities were also limited by rising levels of 
unemployment in GBA at this time. By 1993 this had reached 11.1 
per cent, the highest level ever recorded. 394 Some interviewees 
pointed out that even younger household members often had 
difficulty finding work.395
The data for present employment show far smaller proportions 
working in the formal sector than was the case for principle 
lifetime occupation. This is in keeping with findings for elderly
393Tape VA7 18-24 and 110-115. Tape VJ3 1/240-248 contains 
a similar testimony.
394 "Desocupados: hay 1,5 millones" Clarin Internacional.
Buenos Aires, 26.7.94.
395Tapes VA4 17-30 and VA5 75-80.
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in Argentina as a whole396 and was the result of two processes. 
First, it reflected the withdrawal of formal sector workers from 
the labourforce. Of the 50 respondents principally engaged in 
formal activities, only 12 were still working at the time of the 
interview. Employment patterns also reflected the transferral of 
formal labour into the informal sector. Seven of the 22 working 
in chancras had originally been formal sector workers.
As explained in chapter three, increased informality was part of 
a more general down-grading of employment between the 
respondents' main periods of economic activity and their old 
age. 397 The great majority (73 per cent) were working on a 
casual, part-time basis, which reflected the limited availability 
of employment rather than their desire to work fewer hours. 
According to Orlando Maldonado:
I do changas when there are any, but right now they're screwed...You see, 
when there are any chancras I'll go and do them. Every two or three months, 
every month, maybe every week there'll be some chancras that I can do and 
so I get on with them.
[Wife interrupts: Come on. You havn't done any work for the past five 
months.] You know, the other day there was this changa and they told me to 
come back the next day for the money. [Emphatically] 200,000 australes! 
[20 pesos]. But then they didn't have any money. Well, what do you expect 
me to do, what do you expect me to say?398
A similar process of down-grading occurred for women who had been 
working in domestic service. The physical rigours of this work 
meant that only a small minority (22 per cent) of these continued 
in employment. Of these only one, a 60 year-old, was engaged on
396See chapter three.
397Chapter three, p. 187-88.
398Tape VJ6 300-315.
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a full-time basis. Several moved into informal laundry work, an 
occupation which none had pursued during their prime working 
years. The low income and, possibly, the social stigma attached 
to this activity may explain why no younger residents covered in 
the survey worked as washerwomen. One interviewee with a crippled 
arm washed clothes, whilst her retarded son would wring them for 
her. She was aware of the resulting stigma:
I do it sometimes, sometimes Mondays and Tuesdays. When the weather's fine 
like today for example, then I can wash. Today I could wash. The clothes 
would dry and tomorrow I could iron everything. . .They pay by the dozen 
[items], 60 or 70 [6 or 7 pesos] for the dozen...I only do it because I
need to...1 mean, I could wash twice a week, every week...1 don't have any 
problems about it. When my neighbours come "Can you do this for me?" "Yes, 
I need the money". And I have to do it because I need the money.399
One female interviewee, Venite Tibursi, found an alternative form 
of employment to domestic service and clothes washing: assembling 
small metal components for a local factory. She was able to do 
this at home but had to work very long hours to obtain an 
adequate income:
The lady who lives behind me used to do it. I used to work with her 
because she's on their books. Well, these things are called "collectors". 
They say that they're used to make bobbins. That's what they say. I take 
them from the factory. .When I finish them off I take them back and if they 
have any more they give me those, I do them again, bring them back and 
that's the way it is... [interviewer asks if she is paid well] No. I get 
paid for the month.. sometimes I may get seven hundred and something [70 
pesos] and sometimes six hundred and something. Its never enough for me, 
never.400
Unlike her neighbour, Venite was not on the factory's "books" and 
therefore had no formal or legal status with her employer. The
399Tape VJ7 430-456. See tapes VA3 265-273 and VA6 205-210
for other accounts of informal laundry work.
400Tape VA8 13 5-160.
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fact that she went to the factory in person indicates that the 
company actively colluded with her illegal employment as a means 
of reducing labour costs.
It is unclear to what extent this down-grading of labour was 
related to life-cycle transitions and how much it resulted from 
the general contraction of formal employment in GBA since the 
1960s. Many villeros who had worked in factories, the docks or 
the railways were made redundant by closures. One interviewee 
explained how her deceased husband had lost his job as a 
stevedore during a bitter dock strike:
And then in this port there was some bother, I don't know what, and he 
didn't go there any more. I've no idea what happened. They closed down and 
then people started to go back to work. But he didn't go back there any 
more. He started up with his changas. Just changas and he never made any 
more [social insurance] contributions.401
Conversely, despite the rapid decline in middle class standards 
of living during the 1980s402 , domestic service was still the 
predominant form of female villero employment and elderly 
participation here was only limited by frailty.
Thus, the possibility of obtaining income through continued 
employment was restricted by the elderly's ability to compete 
with younger age groups in an environment of high unemployment. 
Those who found work were usually occupied on a highly informal,
401Tape VJ5 190-195. This was probably the month-long dock
strike of 1966, which was part of a general campaign of labour 
unrest known as the "Plan de lucha" [Plan of struggle] (see 
R.Munck Argentina: from anarchism... pp.161-2).
402See chapter two.
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part-time basis. Few distinctions could be drawn between insured 
and uninsured elderly, men and women or locations: all appeared 
equally willing to work.
3e) Economic relations with household and family members.
Tables V:9,V:10 and V:ll provide information about respondents' 
relations with other household members. Defining household units 
in villas was complicated by a tendency for several family 
members to occupy adjacent buildings on the same, jointly-owned 
plot of land. In cases where cooking and bathing facilities were 
also shared, the survey elected to define households as a single 
unit. Where this did not occur, they were treated as individual 
units.
Table V:9 Size of household.
Age Alone Partner 3-5 6 + 2*
Over 69 6 7 18 19 11
Under 70 14 23 47 24 121
Total 20 30 65 43 23
* Not including partner.
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
Table V:9 shows that the great majority of respondents of all 
ages (72 per cent) lived with relatives other than a spouse. 
Conversely, only 11 per cent lived completely alone. Of those 
respondents living with other relatives, over half were in 
households of three to five members, rather than large extended
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Table V:10 Degree of economic dependence on household members 
other than partner.
Age Complete Substantial Slight None
Over 69 3 7 14 37
Under 70 5 19 25 71
Total 8 26 39 108
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
Table V:ll Nature of economic ties within the household.
Age Win Lose Neutral None
Over 69 7 15 20 19
Under 70 23 17 35 45
Total 30 32 55 64
Key: Win = Clear net economic gain for respondent.
Lose = Clear net economic loss for respondent.
Neutral = No clear net gain or loss for respondent.
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
units. These figures are roughly compatible with findings for 
Argentina as a whole. 403 The survey found few significant
differences between elderly aged over or under 70 years, although
the proportion of the younger group still living with their 
partners was slightly higher, reflecting the greater likelihood 
that he/she was still living.
The degree of economic dependence on household members, as shown 
in Table V:10, is not a quantitative measurement and, in part, 
reflects an element of subjective judgement by the investigator.
403Chapter three, Table 111:13.
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This is based on both the frequency, type and value of support 
obtained from the household, as well as other sources of income 
at the disposal of the respondent. An absence of dependence on 
household members did not necessarily reflect an absence of 
economic relations, but rather that the respondent did not 
benefit directly from them.
Table V:10 shows that 19 per cent of elderly villeros were either 
completely or substantially dependent upon the economic support 
of other household members. However, levels of such assistance 
may have been greater than the results indicate. First, as 
mentioned in chapter three, it is probable that some respondents 
were embarrassed to admit their true levels of dependence on 
other household members. According to one villero:
I don't go to my children for anything because it makes me ashamed to ask
them.404
Also, respondents may have been unaware of a number of important 
indirect benefits of living with other family members. For 
example, scale economies such as bulk buying and the sharing of 
costs could have substantially reduced individual expenses 
without any internal transfer of income.
Another important reason why the elderly did not feel dependent 
on other household members was the reciprocal nature of 
assistance provided. As mentioned in chapter three, it is 
misleading to reduce relations between the elderly and other
404Tape VJ6 160-62.
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household members to a unidirectional flow of income to the 
former from the latter. Table V:ll identifies those cases where 
the flow of income was clearly in favour of the respondent and 
those where it clearly went the other way. It shows that roughly 
a quarter of respondents who had economic relations made a net 
gain, with a similar proportion making a loss. This suggests that 
other household members were just as likely to be economically 
dependent on the elderly as vice versa.
Nevertheless, the claim by the majority of respondents to be 
independent of household assistance, although probably 
exaggerated, cannot be dismissed and requires further 
explanation. The pattern of relations with other household 
members reflected a number of factors, including their relative 
economic positions and the priorities of individual members. In 
20 of the 32 cases where the elderly made a net loss, they were 
the only source of household income. Of these, 13 were living 
with grandchildren, 8 with ill relatives and 7 with unemployed 
family members. One interviewee suggested that other household 
members would have supported her had they been able to:
They can't help at all because they're just as poor as I am. They have to 
work to be able to eat too... I never think about going and troubling 
people, do I? What can I do?...When they started working then as soon as 
they got paid they would go and buy what we needed and that was that. But 
now they havn't got any work.405
This indicates that the rapid increase in urban unemployment had 
reduced the capacity of family members to provide for the
405Tape VJ4 199-206 and 255-270.
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elderly.
Individual willingness to provide support was reflected in the 
degree of income pooling between members. In the survey, 24 
respondents lived in households where some members held back a 
share of their personal incomes from the common pool and in 
another 7 cases there was no pooling whatsoever. However, in the 
vast majority of households members would pool all their 
individual incomes. 406 The pensions and benefits received by 
elderly members took on particular importance when the incomes 
of other family members were less reliable and were sometimes 
ear-marked for basic items.
The willingness of other family members to offer support and the 
willingness of the elderly to accept it was compromised when this 
reduced the resources available for young children in the 
household. According to Juanita Morales:
"La Morena" [her daughter] helps out when she can, when I tell her to. And 
I can't really ask her either. I'm not going to ask her for her childrens' 
bread. They're her children. She has to look after her children like I 
looked after mine...The children -one's just started going to secondary 
school, he's in his second year, and the others are practising to play 
football. You have to buy them their shoes, you have to buy them their 
vitamins, you have to buy them the food they're eating, pay their bus 
fares.407
The over-riding priority given to the needs of young children by 
both their parents and grandparents paralleled the main interests
406Tape VJ3 2/75-110.
407Tape VJ6 250-270. See tape VJ7 320-330 for very similar 
comments.
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of local organisations in the villas. 408 Both local community 
leaders and the elderly themselves tended to put children first.
Elderly respondents did not just contribute to the economic 
welfare of households through the pooling of income. Respondents 
were sometimes responsible for the care of grandchildren, freeing 
the child's mother for waged employment. 409 A more frequent and 
potentially more significant contribution was the provision of 
accommodation. Whilst virtually all the homes surveyed had no 
legal entitlement to the land they occupied, this did not mean 
that these houses were without value. Several interviewees made 
references to informal property markets in the villas and to the 
gradual improvements they had made to their houses over time. 
According to Ana Mitri:
We moved in paying 150 a month to an old lady who lives in that place
there, opposite. Now they work as scavengers there. .This boy came and told 
me "The lady, my granny told me that you're to stay here. You're doing it 
all up"...And we were doing it up, because before it was all made of bits 
of wood, just bits of wood., its still not finished, but we're still 
working on it. When there was money we used to buy cement or something and 
get on with it. That's how it was.410
Of those elderly surveyed, 140 (77 per cent) owned (either
individually or with their partners) their own home. Of these 90 
were living with other adults. Few respondents attached any 
importance to this form of economic support and none referred to
any form of rental arrangement. However, various surveys of
408See chapter four.
409Tape VJ5 261-271.
410Tape VJ5 280-295.
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household expenditure in the early 1990s found that accommodation 
accounted for a high and increasing share of costs.411
Table V:12 Degree of economic dependence on other family members.
Age Complete Substantial Slight None
Over 69 1 11 15 34
Under 70 2 28 35 55
Total 3 39 50 89
Source; Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ). 
Table V:13 Nature of economic ties with other family members.
Age Win Lose Mutual None
Over 69 24 1 4 32
Under 70 41 5 24 50
Total 65 6 28 82
Source; Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
Tables V:12 and V:13 provide information about family members who 
did not form part of respondents' households. They indicate that 
more elderly obtained economic support from relatives living 
outside their domestic units (23 per cent) than from those within 
(19 per cent) . This is reflected both in respondents' dependence 
on these ties and in the probability of them making a clear net 
gain from them.
Several explanations may account for this counter-intuitive
411For example, see "Casi 15 millones de pobres" Clarin. 
Buenos Aires, 22.9.92.
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finding. More economically-successful children would have been 
more likely to be living away from their parents, since they 
would have been able to meet the cost of their own accommodation. 
Two interviews provide extreme examples of this. In both cases 
all the children but one, who was mentally retarded, had moved 
away from their elderly parents.412 Another explanation may be 
that elderly respondents generally had more children and close 
relatives living outside the home than in it. This increased the 
probability that some would be willing and able to help out. In 
many cases where support came from outside the home it was only 
provided from one of several children or close relatives. 
According to one interviewee:
One [of my children] lives just opposite...He works as a street trader..He 
never sets foot in this house.. .Another [son] lives in Avellaneda. .he7 s a 
builder and he sometimes calls in..I've another son who's a street trader, 
selling clothes. That one would never give me a penny either. And he lives 
on his own! ...Another son lives near here in "Las Saladas"...They can't 
give us anything because they've got seven kids to fend for. I could never 
ask them for anything. [I ask about her two daughters] . They're both very 
near... [one gives us] lots of things. Every month they give me what they 
can: 50, 100, 200 [pesos]. That's my girl, the youngest one...She's very 
good to me. [I ask if other daughter helps] No...she's got three children 
and they're all men and all working. But I'm not going to go begging to my 
children for anything. No way...Only the youngest daughter, only her.413
Whilst support from relatives beyond the household was more 
significant than that from those within, it should be noted that, 
for the majority of elderly (77 per cent), it was of slight or 
no importance. Economic ties were restricted in a number of ways. 
As seen in the previous testimony, the primacy given to the needs 
of young children was again important. Geographical distance was
412See tapes VJ7 260-360 and VA3 260-285.
413Tape VJ7 280-355.
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another potential constraint. One respondent mentioned that she 
would occasionally go to relatives who lived outside the city for 
help but that sometimes she did not have enough money to make the 
trip.414 However, as shown by Juanita Morales7 testimony 
(above), proximity did not necessarily lead to economic ties. 
According to Ana Gorostiaga:
I've another daughter who's married and lives with her husband on the 
other side [of the street]...We're sometimes very friendly. Other times 
I'm ill and can't go over there. I can't walk very well... Sometimes they 
say to me "Are you going to stay here to eat, mum?" "No, I'm going", I 
tell them. They eat different types of food, strange food I don't 
like... Sometimes they come here. Very seldom...I can't help them out much 
either. We help each other in here [the house] and that's it. Inside here, 
but only here... Everyone has their own way of living, their own way of 
life. Everyone. Them in their house, me here.. .Everybody has their own 
house. They never come bothering me for anything and I don't go bothering 
them either.415
Rather than distance, the important factor here was residential 
separation. S.Ramos notes that informal reciprocal exchange 
contains a strong element of social symbolism, which has broad 
implications for the nature of the relationship between the two 
parties.416 As such, elderly individuals may have felt that to 
cross the threshold of another home to ask for assistance was a 
more considered, public gesture than to make ends meet within 
their own households.
Whilst respondents were more likely to profit from dealings with 
relatives living outside the household, economic support was not 
entirely one-way. Several respondents spent time caring for
414Tape VJ4 130-145.
415Tape VJ3 2/136-183.
416S. Ramos Las relaciones de. . . . pp. 16-17.
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grandchildren whose parents lived outside the home. According to 
Senora Eulalia:
At one time I helped her [younger daughter] out a lot because...he 
[grandson] lost his place in the school, because he was at nursery school 
and he lost his place because she couldn't go and pay them the fee. They 
couldn't give the boy a place, they couldn't take him. So I looked after 
the boy...she [daughter] leaves her house at five in the morning and gets 
back at four in the afternoon....1 looked after the baby between seven or 
eight in the morning until twelve...His father worked until twelve. When 
his father came back the boy would go over to him.417
The survey found that 3 8 per cent of respondents were completely 
or substantially dependent upon family support, be it from within 
or beyond the household. This figure is considerably higher than 
those recorded by studies of Argentina as a whole418 but still 
only represents a minority of respondents. These economic 
relations were diverse and affected by a range of factors. As has 
been shown, the economic welfare of the elderly was partly 
dependent on that of other groups. Low and unreliable wages and 
a lack of state benefits for unemployment or invalidity reduced 
the amount of support relatives were able to provide. However, 
often relations were as much the result of individual volition 
as economic capability. Intra-family support was generally 
inequitable, with one child bearing a disproportionate share of 
the burden of caring for the elderly. Conversely, elderly 
respondents were sometimes left by richer relatives to fend for 
sick or unemployed children.
417Tape VJ7 360-380.
418Chapter three, Table 111:16.
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3f) Economic relations with friends and neighbours.
Numerous studies have stressed the importance of mutual trust for 
exchange and assistance between non-kin.419 Some of these argue 
that a condition of common poverty and marginality promotes a 
stronger sense of solidarity within communities, enabling such 
assistance to occur with relative frequency.420
Table V:14 Degree of economic dependence on friends and 
neighbours.
Age Complete Substantial Slight None
Over 69 0 3 11 47
Under 70 1 4 37 78
Total 1 7 48 125
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
Table V:15 Nature of economic ties with friends and neighbours.
Age Win Lose Neutral None
Over 69 6 2 8 45
Under 70 12 5 31 72
Total 18 7 39 117
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
There was little evidence to corroborate this view in the villas
419For example, L.Lomnitz Networks and marginalitv. . . p.158.
420For example, S.Ramos stresses: "the importance of informal 
exchange and mutual aid between relatives and neighbours for the 
daily organisation of these [poor urban] households." Las 
relaciones de parentesco... p.5.
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studied here. Tables V:14 and V:15 show that respondents received 
and reciprocated far less economic support with friends and 
neighbours than they did with family members. Among those who 
received no such support, many claimed only to have loose 
acquaintances and not to trust the local people. The most 
frequent view was that:
Only acquaintances. "Good morning, good afternoon". No more than that.421
Some respondents went further, claiming to have been taken 
advantage of in the past. According to Eulalia Cristobal:
I don't like the people [here] because you [tend to] put a lot of trust in 
them and that's not a good idea... It happened to me lots of 
times... someone comes and makes themselves your friend, and that's when I 
lower my guard and then they rob me...I've never even asked anyone for a 
yerba mate [popular herbal infusion], never...and I've helped out lots of 
people here. . .1 don't want to have anything to do with any of them because 
they paid me back badly. Because I, I gave them oil, pasta. I gave things 
to all my neighbours. And afterwards nobody thought about doing the same 
for me. So when I go out of here I don't even say "Hello" to them.422
In nearly every case where substantial support was received the 
respondent was in extreme economic straits, often with no other 
source of income at his or her disposal. According to Juan Jugo 
some neighbours actively sought out those who might be in 
particular need:
I have to go about a lot to be able to get by. Because there are 
neighbours round here who sometimes lend me a peso, a useless peso...Every 
time I pay a visit they give me something...There are some who come here 
and ask me "Alright, do you need any money?" and I say "Alright" . .and 
just like that they give me ten pesos, if I don't have any money for the
421Tape VJ4 295-298.
422Tape VJ7 652-688.
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next week, if I'm short.423
This form of economic support was considered an option of last 
resort by takers and, sometimes, the givers. It provided a final 
safety net for those respondents who might even have faced the 
threat of starvation if they had been abandoned by the community. 
As with family assistance, the burden of support was not spread 
evenly between all residents, but was provided by a small 
minority.
By contrast, the bulk of cases involving slight dependence 
consisted of reciprocal support, with each party careful not to 
put their own pride at stake. Juanita Morales' attitude was 
typical of many villeros:
I tell you, my neighbours help me out lots of times. They give me plates 
of food, they bring me bread. . .You can't cook any type of food without 
oil, you know. If I want to eat lettuce, anything and I've not got a drop 
of oil, they ask me why I didn't ask. Look, if you don't have something, 
you don't want to show the other person that you don't. I don't like doing 
that. I have this pride...They have a plate of food and they bring it me 
without me asking first. I help them without asking them for anything in 
return and without them asking me first. I'm about to take a plate of food 
next door. I don't know if they need it and sometimes they needed it so 
much and they hadn't told me, they hadn't asked me.424
As has been shown, there were two separate forms of economic 
interaction between neighbours. The first responded to dire need 
and involved no expectation of repayment. In these cases, the 
pride of the recipient was not an important issue. The second was
423Tape VA7 067-080. See tape VJ6 015-075 for a similar
account.
424Tape VJ6 118-155.
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usually a mutually beneficial arrangement, where participants 
took pains to defend their pride and stress that they were not 
financially dependent on the favours of another family. However, 
the great majority of respondents preferred to have no economic 
dealings of any shape or form with their neighbours.
3g) Other sources of income.
None of the elderly individuals covered by the survey claimed to 
derive any income from savings or rent. One couple in VJ had 
lived off the proceeds of selling their home but claimed that 
this money had since run out. The absence of savings paralleled 
findings for GBA and Argentina as a whole and was explained in 
chapter three. 425 Likewise, little evidence was found of 
property renting in the villas. although one interviewee 
mentioned that she had previously rented her home from another 
elderly villero.426 In the few households which contained non­
related individuals, these were generally treated no differently 
to relatives and were expected to pool earnings rather than pay 
rent.
CARITAS provided economic assistance for 36 respondents.427 This 
generally consisted of monthly food parcels, although in some 
cases it was limited to the provision of basic medicines and used
425See chapter three, p. 189.
426See tape VJ5 280-290.
427See chapters three and four for descriptions of CARITAS 
and the services it provided.
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clothing. The proportion of respondents assisted by CARITAS 
varied sharply amongst the villas. rising from 9 per cent in VA, 
to 15 per cent in VJ, to 54 per cent in VZ. It should be noted 
that the number surveyed in Villa Zavaleta was not large enough 
to be representative for the area as a whole and was probably 
exaggerated since most of the interviews were obtained through 
volunteers at the local church. The variations between VJ and VA 
were the consequence of the different resources and priorities 
of the local CARITAS branches, as explained in chapter four.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, local CARITAS branches 
generally sought to channel their aid to those households in the 
greatest economic need. Whilst none of the respondents were 
entirely without other forms of income, the majority appeared to 
be in more difficult economic circumstances than the average 
elderly villero. However, there were cases both of respondents 
suffering extreme poverty without CARITAS help and those in 
relatively secure circumstances receiving it.428
No other local organisations, religious or otherwise, were 
mentioned as sources of income in the survey, with the exception 
of one villero who made daily visits to a soup kitchen run by the 
neighbourhood council. 429 In two of the extended interviews 
references were made to assistance from nearby evangelical 
churches. However, in neither of these cases did they provide a
428See pp.223 and 266-67.
429See chapter 4, p. 288.
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significant source of support at the time. 430 Thus, other than 
CARITAS, local organisations were largely insignificant as 
sources of direct economic assistance for elderly in the villas.
It is probable that a large number of elderly villeros received 
occasional economic support from past employers, particularly 
those who had engaged them in domestic service. This source of 
income was not included in the questionnaire, but its importance 
became apparent when frequent reference was made to it in the 
extended interviews. According to Eulalia Cristobal:
And when I go into the [Federal] Capital where I used to have my bosses; 
if I go to a boss' home they give me clothes, shoes, they give me all 
kinds of things... every year, once every year I go and visit them...they 
give me fruit, they give me meat to eat, they give me tuna fish, that's 
what they give me...1 go when I feel like it and all of them give me some 
help. . .They were all very nice, very nice, because I was a very good woman 
to them. ..Sometimes they give me five hundred, a thousand, two thousand 
[50, 100 or 200 pesos] . . . I went visiting just a while back, before
Christmas. I went to visit a lady, to spend a bit of time there, near to 
Chacarita...1 went there early and stayed until the afternoon...she filled 
my bag...and told me "Stay here and eat. You stay here and eat". 431
This form of assistance was ad hoc, varying in intensity and 
content. In some cases it extended to providing elderly 
respondents' relatives with employment. 432 However, not all 
those who had worked in domestic service received such support:
I had a boss. I was with her for three years...now she doesn't [help] 
because I don't go there any more. Sometimes I meet them by accident, 
sometimes. I often bump into her husband...I saw him about two months 
ago...We only said hello. No more than that...Besides, I stopped working 
there because when the wage for domestic servants started to go up, they
430Tapes VA6 430-440 and VJ5 320-330.
431Tape VJ7 690-730. Tapes VA4 335-345 and VA6 315-320
include similar testimonies.
432Tape VA4 325-335.
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didn't want to give me a raise.433
Another interviewee pointed out that her employer had herself 
been a iubilada and had not been capable of providing any 
economic assistance. 434 Similarly, it is likely that the 
worsening financial position of many middle class families 
reduced their capacity and willingness to provide assistance to 
ex-employees. Consequently, this form of support did not 
compensate women who had worked in domestic service for the lack 
of social security protection they had received. Moreover, rather 
than being sought out, it was necessary for villeros to visit 
employers' homes and assistance was considered a special favour 
rather than an obligation. At its most cynical, it represented 
a paternalistic salve for the consciences of past employers, an 
extension of a mistress and servant relationship.
Only one example was found of informal support from past 
employers when the respondent had not been in domestic service. 
This was the case of an elderly villero whose dead husband had 
worked as an assistant in a solicitors' office:
They're not obliged to give me anything. They give me stuff because, well 
I don't know, they're the people where my husband used to be. If they 
hadn't wanted to, they wouldn't have given me anything...The lawyer never 
paid our pension [contributions] or anything. . .when there are some clients 
who pay up. . .then they've got money and they give me some. . .sometimes two 
million [200 pesos] but when they give me two million I always owe more 
than two million. They havn't paid me now for about six months... I go 
looking for whatever money there is but there isn't anything. I've gone 
there so many times.435
433Tape VA6 2 93-304.
434Tape VJ5 380-390.
435Tape VJ4 155-195.
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Twelve respondents referred to use of an informal credit 
arrangement with local shopkeepers, known locally as a libreta. 
These involved bulk payments, usually made on a monthly basis, 
which enabled the customer to buy goods on account. This service 
was usually only offered to a select few customers deemed to be 
trustworthy and any failure to repay would lead to exclusion. It 
was unclear whether users were charged any kind of interest on 
the libreta and, therefore, whether it was essentially a 
mechanism which enabled respondents to budget more effectively 
or represented a drain on their resources. According to Eugenia 
Borda:
We make use of it [libreta] at the grocer's. Well, it works because you 
have to put money in at the end of every month. You have to put money in 
and sometimes you pay, for example now I paid exactly a million [100 
pesos]..
[Husband interjects] We have to pay up. If we don't pay then we won't have 
anything to eat.
EB: If you don't pay up then there's no more credit. You've got to.
[Interviewer asks if she pays interest]. Sure, because there are - 
sometimes there are no rises, no rises in food prices. They hear on a 
certain day a certain thing is going to go up...So when you go there to 
pay they really sting you. But there hasn't been a rise yet. With the 
money that we pay the grocer, she [grocer] goes and buys the food...to 
have it in for the month.436
A handful of respondents obtained income from a variety of other 
sources. As mentioned in chapter three, a general lack of open 
ground prevented most villeros from raising livestock or keeping 
hens. One interviewee kept a small number of fowl but did not
436Tape VA6 260-285. This is corroborated by E.Jelin "Social 
relations of consumption: the urban popular household" in
E.Jelin, ed Family, household strategies... pp.173-9 who notes 
that the use of libretas is most frequent among households with 
low but stable monthly incomes. See tapes VA4 360-380 and VA 3 
250-260 for other accounts of the libreta system.
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consider these a potentially significant source of support.437 
The same elderly couple were paid every month for minding a 
neighbour's child along with their own numerous 
grandchildren.438 Finally, three respondents were reduced to 
scavenging in rubbish tips (a practice known as haciendo ciruias 
and more commonly pursued by children) or begging in the streets 
of adjacent districts. This was a strategy of last resort pursued 
by those elderly villeros who had no alternative source of 
support. The stigma attached to this activity was reflected in 
Eugenia Borda's defiant pride:
At one time, I told you, we were very poor. He [husband] searched for 
whatever he could get. He went looking for things to eat in the 
rubbish...Yes, we used to eat out of bins. I used to go out early in the 
evening with my son when he was smaller and I used to do the rounds of all 
the food shops. All of them. No -why should I be ashamed to say it?...I'm 
proud to say that I ate from rubbish, that I ate out of bins. We ate and 
I fed my children out of the rubbish.439
Thus, the survey identified two significant sources of income 
other than benefits, continued employment or the support of 
family and friends: occasional hand-outs from past employers and 
CARITAS food parcels. The former was almost entirely restricted 
to respondents who had previously worked in domestic service, 
whilst the latter targeted, albeit imperfectly, those elderly in 
direst need. However, for neither group did this support fully 
compensate for their position of relative disadvantage.
437Tape VA6 325-340.
438Tape VA4 350-360.
439Tape VA6 418-427.
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3h) Summary of income sources.
This section examines the relative importance of the income 
sources described above by analysing how they were combined by 
individual respondents. These income sources are classified as 
follows:
Ins = receipt of an insurance benefit
Ass = receipt of an assistance benefit
Spo = substantial economic support from spouse
Emp = continued employment
Hou = substantial household support*
Fam = substantial family support*
Fri = substantial support from friends and neighbours*
Oth = other
* Excludes cases of slight support
Table V:16 Commonly occurring income combinations.
Sources No. Respondents
Insurance benefit and household 15
Assistance benefit and household 15
Employment alone 15
Insurance benefit alone 12
Household alone 11
Assistance benefit alone 10
Spouse alone 7
Family alone 6
Insurance and family 6
Assistance and other 6
Employment and family 5
Spouse and family 4
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
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Table V:17 Number of income sources.
Number of 
sources
Number of 
respondents
One 65
Two 83
Three 31
Four 2
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
Using this classification, the survey found a striking variety 
of income strategies: 55 different combinations for a sample of 
181. The complex pattern of income sources is also apparent from 
Table V:17 which shows that 64 per cent of respondents received 
more than one. However, some combinations were much more 
prevalent than others. As shown in Table V:16, the six most 
frequent accounted for 78 (43 per cent of the sample) and the top 
twelve accounted for 112 (62 per cent). Conversely, all of the 
remaining combinations were pursued by only three respondents or 
less.
It is worthy of note that of the 100 respondents in receipt of 
benefits, 79 combined these with some other form of income. The 
proportion who did so was the same for both insurance and 
assistance pensions. Sometimes these combinations included 
sources of last resort: CARITAS assisted 14 respondents who also 
received benefits, of which all but one were non-contributory. 
Five pensioners were forced to turn to neighbours for substantial 
amounts of economic support and one iubilado made regular
368
scavenging trips. This supports the earlier finding that the 
values of all forms of benefit were insufficient to meet the 
basic requirements of elderly villeros.
A number of studies of the Argentine social security system draw 
attention to the problem of multiple benefits. In 1990 it was 
estimated that 7.7 per cent of beneficiaries of the national 
insurance system received two or more contributory pensions.440 
Of those surveyed, only three respondents admitted to receiving 
multiple benefits and in two of these cases this involved an 
insurance and an assistance benefit. It is probable that a number 
of others chose not to disclose information about multiple 
pensions and so it is not possible to gauge the extent of this 
practice.
The existing literature on elderly income maintenance in Latin 
America makes few, if any, direct references to the effect of 
factors other than principle lifetime occupation, thus implying 
that they are insignificant.441 Rather than accept this 
assumption at face value, it important to verify that factors 
such as gender, age and location were negligible. This can be 
done by making comparisons between sub-sets of the sample 
population.
Gender comparisons show significant differences in a number of
440E.Isuani and J.San Martin La reforma previsional 
araentina: oociones v riescros. Buenos Aires (1993), p.21.
441For example, CEPAL El desarrollo de la seguridad social 
en America Latina. Santiago (1985).
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areas. First, as indicated, elderly women (15 per cent) were much 
less likely to have made social insurance contributions than were 
men (53 per cent). Gender differences for access to contributory 
benefits (35 per cent men, 23 per cent women) were clear but not 
as marked. This was largely caused by the relatively high number 
of women in receipt of widow's pensions, a result of their 
greater longevity. As has been shown, women were more likely to 
receive an assistance benefit or subsidy, but these paid less 
money and were less reliable. Finally, women (21 per cent) were 
slightly less likely to continue in employment than were men (29 
per cent). Differences in current occupation paralleled those 
which had occurred during prime working years, with domestic 
service exclusively female and construction remaining a male 
reserve.
There were, however, some areas of income maintenance in which 
there were no discernable differences between the sexes. Overall 
levels of access to benefits were roughly equal for men and women 
(53 and 56 per cent, respectively) . Similarly, levels of 
dependence on household and family members were almost identical. 
For both sexes similar proportions (40 and 37 per cent) were 
either completely or substantially dependent on these sources. 
Overall, differences in the types of benefits held and, to a 
lesser extent, continued employment meant that women were in a 
somewhat worse economic position than men. This was also 
reflected in the larger number of women (17 per cent) who were 
reliant on the support of their partner than was the case for men 
(10 per cent).
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Table V:18 Gender comparisons for ex-informal sector* workers.
Income source Male informal Female informal
Ins 7 (20%) 8 (13%)
Ass 9 (26%) 24 (39%)
Spo 2 (6%) 13 (21%)
Emp 15 (43%) 16 (26%)
Hou 12 (34%) 19 (31%)
Fam 10 (29%) 16 (26%)
Fri 3 (9%) 5 (8%)
Oth 8 (23%) 17 (28%)
Source; Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ)
To what extent were these gender differences essentially 
reflections of respondents' principal lifetime occupations? As 
was shown earlier, men (4 9 per cent) were much more likely to 
have worked in the formal sector than women (14 per cent) . By 
comparing income patterns of men and women who worked exclusively 
in the informal sector, it is possible to isolate the gender 
effect. Table V:18 shows that women who had worked in this sector 
were less likely to be in receipt of an insurance benefit than 
were their male counterparts. It is also worthy of note that 
virtually all such women were in receipt of widow's pensions and 
not benefits for which they personally had made contributions. 
By contrast, no male ex-informal sector worker received a 
widower's pension. Likewise, gender differences in access to 
assistance benefits, dependence on spouses and likelihood to 
continue in employment were as clear for informal sector workers 
as they were for the total sample.
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Nevertheless, even gender differences between informal sector 
workers may have been influenced by the type of informal activity 
pursued. As has been shown, the majority of women in this sector 
were domestic servants, whereas men were most frequently engaged 
in construction. The proportion of the former who made sufficient 
contributions (9 per cent) was much lower than for the latter (4 8 
per cent). There is no evidence to suggest that this reflected 
a greater predisposition among males to make contributions, and 
so the disparity must have resulted from a larger element of 
formality within construction, which obliged workers to 
contribute. Conversely, the greater likelihood of men to continue 
working in the informal sector may have reflected the nature of 
building work, which lent itself to occasional odd-jobbing 
chancras much more readily than domestic service, which was 
usually based on regular hours. Likewise, it is possible that 
gender differences for access to assistance benefits simply have 
resulted from higher levels of insurance coverage among men 
rather than greater female participation in local initiatives.
Thus, whilst it is evident that previous employment had a 
significant effect on income patterns, it is unclear whether this 
entirely discounted the influence of gender. Despite the problems 
of separating the effects of these two variables, it is clear 
that women who had worked in domestic service were in a 
particularly disadvantageous position, despite the support of old 
employers. This partly accounted for their activism in local 
organisations.
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Table V:19 Comparisons of income sources between villas.
Income source Villa Jardin Villa Azul
Ins 29 (32%) 11 (20%)
Ass 25 (27%) 16 (29%)
Spo 10 (11%) 9 (16%)
Emp 24 (26%) 13 (24%)
Hou 32 (35%) 21 (38%)
Fam 25 (27%) 14 (25%)
Fri 3 (3%) 6 (11%)
Oth 11 (12%) 13 (24%)
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
It is also useful to draw comparisons between the elderly living 
in Villa Jardin and Villa Azul. Here, again, is important to take 
the effect of past employment into account since residents of VJ 
(32 per cent) were twice as likely to have worked in the formal 
sector as those of VA (16 per cent). This, in turn, led to a 
larger proportion with insurance benefits in the former (33 and 
20 per cent, respectively). Table V:19 shows that there were no 
other clear differences in elderly income sources between the two 
villas. However, as was mentioned earlier, the majority of 
assistance benefits in VJ were DNA subsidies, whilst in VA the 
majority were provincial or municipal pensions. Thus, there were 
two identifiable differences between the villas: the likelihood 
of having worked in the formal sector and the type of assistance 
benefit received.
Table V:20 compares sources of income for respondents aged under 
70 and over 69 years old. It shows a number of predictable
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Table V:20 "Young” versus "old" old.
Income source Aged under 70 years Aged 70 and over
Ins 29 (24%) 21 (34%)
Ass 25 (21%) 24 (39%)
Spo 17 (14%) 6 (10%)
Emp 36 (30%) 6 (10%)
Hou 38 (32%) 24 (39%)
Fam 32 (27%) 16 (26%)
Fri 6 (5%) 4 (7%)
Oth 22 (18%) 16 (26%)
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
disparities. Older respondents were more likely to be eligible 
for benefits and had participated in the labour market at a time 
when there were more opportunities for formal work: hence their 
greater coverage. Younger ones were more willing and able to 
continue in employment, which, in turn, reduced their eligibility 
for benefits. The larger proportion of younger respondents 
relying on income from a partner reflected the greater 
probability that both were still living. There were no clear 
differences for other potential sources of income.
Differences between the two villas and Argentina as a whole were 
much greater than differences between them or their constituent 
groups. As shown in Table V:21, these were evident for principle 
lifetime employment and all sources of income once elderly. 
Differences in access to insurance benefits roughly mirrored the 
relative importance of informal employment. This was only partly 
compensated for the targeting of assistance pensions and grants.
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Table V:21 Comparisons between villas and Argentina as a whole.
Survey Argentina 
(cerca 1990)
Principle 
lifetime 
occupation(a) Formal 29% 78.9 to 80.9% (c)
Informal 23% 13.2 to 11.6%
Domestic 30% 7.9 to 7.5%
Housewife 14% No data
Insurance(b) 28% 60.9%
Assistance(b) 27% 6.9%
Current 
employment(d)
20% 8.4%
Family
support
38% (e) 10.3% (f)
(a) not including rural labour or domestic service, based on 
PREALC's 1982 classification.
(b) coverage of population aged over 65 years old (see appendix 
2 for national estimates).
(c) 1950 and 1980 data.
(d) population over 65 years old.
(e) complete or substantial reliance.
(f) CELADE sample survey.
Sources: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ) ;
PREALC Mercado de trabaio en cifras: 1950-1980, Santiago (1982); 
E.Isuani and J.San Martin La reforma previsional argentina: 
oociones v riesgos, Buenos Aires (1993); ILO Economically active 
population.1950-2025. Geneva (1986); CELADE Argentina: situacion 
v necesidades de la tercera edad. Algunas ciudades selecionadas. 
Santiago (1989).
The table also shows that elderly villeros were more likely to 
remain in employment and receive support from other family 
members. It is understandable that these income sources took on 
more importance in the villas. given the reduced levels of access 
to state benefits.
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As with gender, it is difficult to separate the effect of 
location from that of occupation. If high concentrations of 
informal employment in the villas occurred mainly because such 
workers were unable to live elsewhere, the underlying determinant 
remained occupation. However, it is also possible that residents 
had more difficulty in obtaining formal employment because of 
their status as villeros. For example, employers may have been 
reluctant to take on workers from neighbourhoods facing the 
threat of eradication. In this case, the critical factor was 
location.
Thus, it is often difficult to separate the effects of factors 
such as gender, location and age from those of employment. Rather 
than discount their importance, however, it is useful to 
understand the ways in which they interact with each other.
4) Actual versus potential access to state benefits.
It has already been demonstrated that access to insurance 
benefits by gender and by neighbourhood roughly paralleled the 
relative importance of formal activities and pension 
contributions. However, Table V:22 shows that this was not a 
perfect relationship, since 40 per cent of those who claimed to 
have made sufficient payments were not in receipt of a 
•jubilacion. Even taking into account that this figure may have 
been exaggerated by a number of false testimonies, it cannot be 
entirely discounted. Conversely, a small number of respondents 
who had made insufficient contributions had been able to obtain
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a benefit.
Table V:22 Contributions and receipt of insurance benefit.
Sufficient Some None
None 23 28 93
Employee 28 3 0
Public 3 0 0
Self emp. 3 0 0
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA,VJ and VZ).
Table V:23 Criteria determining eligibility for assistance 
benefits.
Criteria
(cumulative)
Men Women Total
Without 
insurance or 
assistance 
benefit
37 44 81
Over 64 years 
old
21 22 43
Spouse
without
benefit
19 15 34
No potential
household
support*
11 10 21
Serious
health
problems
8 7 15
* Households where fewer members aged under 65 were receiving a 
regular monthly income than the total number of members.
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
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Eligibility criteria for means-tested assistance pensions were 
more complicated and partly depended on the subjective judgement 
of the assessor. Thus, it is less easy to compare patterns of 
potential eligibility and actual access to such benefits. Table 
V:23 selects a number of criteria which were generally applied 
in means testing: age, health, benefits held by spouses and
household income. It shows that over half of those without any 
benefit were aged 65 or over. The number of respondents 
potentially eligible for assistance is gradually reduced as other 
criteria are taken into account. This leaves a total of 14 
respondents who fulfilled all the criteria used here. It should 
be emphasised that these criteria are not necessarily the same 
as those which were used by means testing agencies for the 
various benefits. The fact that a large proportion of those who 
were receiving assistance did not fulfil all the criteria 
indicates that means-testing was inconsistent or less stringent 
than it might have been. Conversely, it is possible that other 
factors were taken into account. These may have included a 
general assessment of the claimants" living conditions, although 
it is probable that residence of a villa in itself would satisfy 
this criterion.
Taken together, Tables V:22 and V:23 show that, according to the 
information they provided, 37 respondents were clearly eligible 
for benefits which they did not receive. In addition, a much 
larger number were apparently no less eligible for state benefits 
than respondents already in receipt of them. Thus, it is 
important to consider what factors helped create these
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disparities between potential and actual access.
Table V:24; Respondents pursuing pension claims.
Men Women Total
Total 15 17 32
Under 6 months 5 7 12
Don't remember 1 2 3
Insurance 7 5 12
Assistance 8 11 19
PAMI supplement 0 1 1
Source: Questionnaire, Buenos Aires 1992-3 (VA, VJ and VZ).
Disparities between potential and actual access to benefits were 
largely the result of a number of administrative failings. As 
mentioned in chapter three, Argentina compared favourably with 
other Latin American countries in terms of the proportion of its 
total social security budget devoted to administration.442 
However, lower expenditure may not have reflected administrative 
efficiency. It is important to take into account their speed and 
effectiveness in delivering services.
Table V:24 shows that 33 respondents were pursuing claims for 
state benefits. For those who had been doing so for over six 
months, the average period of pursuit was three and a half years. 
In seven cases, respondents claimed to have been pursuing claims 
for five or more years. Predictably, a larger number of 
respondents were making claims for assistance pensions than
442Chapter three, pp. 112-113.
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insurance ones. These results were in line with national data for 
insurance pension claims in early 1994, which revealed that 
100,000 were awaiting clarification, with an average delay of 
many months.443
The limited availability of information about the full range of 
benefits and how to obtain them partly accounted for the 
disparities between potential and actual access. A number of 
respondents were seriously misinformed about these procedures. 
Haidee Filipetti in Villa Azul recounted a conversation with her 
terminally ill mother and uncle:
He said "Look, Angelita", (Mother was called Angelita) and he said "Haidee 
won't get the pension." (Mother replied] "Why won't they give it to her, 
why won't they let her have it. Yes, as far as I'm concerned I'm sure 
they'll pay her -an unmarried daughter [in fact, Haidee was also a single 
mother], she's 32, an adult, an only child. Of course she'll get the 
pension!" (I used to care for my mother and everything) . My brother got up 
and said no, I wouldn't.444
A similar case was that of Juan Jugo, who assumed that holding 
an assistance benefit would automatically disqualify him from 
pursuing a claim for a better-paid insurance one.
J J : "I could have had been a iubilado not a pensionado [person in receipt 
of assistance benefits]..."
Interviewer: "And it would be worth your while to get a hundred pesos a 
month more."
J J : "Of course it would. Because if I was a iubilado they'd give me more 
than the thing I get now, wouldn't I...But I'll tell you this, I can't go 
and make a claim for it there [central offices in the Federal Capital], 
because the boys there are going to turn me down because I've already got 
the [assistance] pension.445
443See "En las cajas hay 100,000 tramites jubilatorios 
esperando definicion." in Clarin, Buenos Aires, 23.3.94.
444Tape VA4 142-150.
445Tape VA7 257-283.
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Many respondents who lacked information about claims relied on 
local organisations rather than state agencies to obtain it for 
them. This was particularly important in Villa Jardin, whose 
"Centro Los Jovenes del Noventa" was well'-informed about 
bureaucratic procedures. 446 According to Ana Mitri:
Interviewer: Are you making claims for any other pensions?
AM: No, no. I'd like to but -they gave me some addresses. But I don't
know. What do I know? I don't know where to go to for it. I've got no idea
what goes on. Norma [secretary of the Centro] told me that maybe I could
do something to make a claim. At least something to be sure that they'll
pay you every month. If you want a help: maybe just a little bit, but its
still a help.
Interviewer: And do you have information about this kind of pension?
AM: No. And I don't know where to go....Its a long time since I last saw
her [Norma]. "Maybe you can make a claim for a pension", she said "that's
better than this one [DNA subsidy]" she said "Its possible. There are some 
people who've been getting it for the last ten years" she said...."So", 
she said "It's worth your pursuing this, isn't it.447
Ana Gorostiaga provided a similar testimony:
Interviewer: Are you pursuing any pension claims?
AG:., at this moment, only the one that they're doing over there 
[Centro]...This claim for the pension, for whatever pension it is that 
they're doing now.... Silvia [founder of Centro] told me "Why are you 
waiting?". She, Silvia, had told me that it wasn't right that my husband, 
who should have been a iubilado but hadn't been granted one, was still 
working. And then she sent me to make some photocopies...
Interviewer: Who are paying out this pension?
AG: I don't know. The state. What do I know?...
Interviewer: What part of the state do you think is paying out this
pension?
AG: I don't know. They say that La Plata [seat of provincial government] 
is going to help, La Plata is going to pay. But I don't know when it'll 
pay.448
As was shown in the previous chapter, in the case of VA's Grupo, 
even local community leaders were sometimes ignorant of 
procedures and relied on the expertise of external professionals.
446See chapter four.
447Tape VJ5 105-150.
448Tape VJ3 268-301. Also see tape VJ6 206-222.
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In villas where local organisations were less developed or well- 
informed about pension requirements, elderly individuals had to 
seek advice from other sources, such as lawyers. In some cases 
these provided their services free of charge.449 However, it was 
more frequently the practice to promise such lawyers a share of 
whatever benefits were eventually obtained. According to Venite 
Tibursi:
VT: I'm always going and going to see this lawyer. I'm sick of her... 
Interviewer: And when did you start seeing a lawyer? Recently?
VT: Just now..to see if I could get my iubilacidn. And they still won't 
give me it...When it comes I'll have to pay her.450
As well as an economic cost, working with lawyers often involved 
a degree of risk. According to one elderly villero;
There are lawyers who specialise in this kind of thing [pension 
claims]...but it's always a risk because you never know if you're going to 
die while they they're doing it. If you die the lawyer keeps all the 
iubilacidn for himself. And so there's no willingness to get it done 
fast.451
Another gave a first-hand account of her treatment by an 
unscrupulous lawyer:
You know he [husband] had a lawyer...Then he made a claim because he had 
fallen when he was working. . .both his legs were really bad. . .they sent him 
a lawyer, but this lawyer just disappeared. And he didn't give me back his 
identity papers...nor the papers for his iubilacidn or our marriage 
certificate...and this happened about four years ago. Well, my daughter- 
in-law went over to the pension office to find out what was happening.
449See Eulogia Barreto who obtained free legal advice from 
a lawyer who volunteered her services to the local church (tape 
VA3 217-225) .
450Tape VA8 103-108 and 202-209. See tape VJ6 25-30 for a
similar account.
451Tape VJ2 209-218.
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They told her we had to wait. We had to wait and that that lawyer wasn't 
to interfere any more.452
Obtaining information was less difficult for those who had worked 
in large, formal sector firms, who often received free assistance 
from the company lawyers. Ana Gorostiaga pointed out how 
straightforward the pension claim of her husband, a stevedore, 
had been:
There in the port they did everything for him, they did it all. . .He didn't 
have to go around sorting it out...No, they gave him his iubilacidn right 
there in the port. They made all the contributions. All of them.453
For the majority of those who had worked in the informal sector 
and/or had been self-employed the general lack of information 
about pension procedures made respondents dependent on the good 
will of local organisations or the services of untrustworthy 
lawyers. As has been shown, these third parties themselves often 
had incomplete information about all the available benefits. 
Clearly, then, the failure of state agencies to disseminate 
accurate information represented a serious obstacle to initiating 
and successfully concluding pension claims.
A second problem which confronted claimants was the complexity 
and bureaucracy of the procedure to obtain most benefits. 
According to Carmelo Mesa-Lago:
..the granting of [insurance] benefits [in Latin America] is usually 
conducted through judicial litigation in which the insured have to prove
452Tape VJ5 153-176.
453Tape VJ3 1/330-348.
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their rights through documentation, witnesses, and so forth. This makes 
the process more complicated, time consuming and expensive..454
Such problems could deny even relatively well-informed claimants 
the pensions for which they were potentially eligible. One 
elderly lady described the process of making a claim for an 
assistance pension:
I had to make the claim, go to the tribunal... I had to come and go, you 
know. Sometimes they were there, sometimes there wasn't anybody...1 had to 
go to Wilde [approximately 10 kilometres away] to Tribunal Number One...I 
made the claim for the pension. I did it for almost five years...Do you 
know how much I used to have to go from place to place?455
During the period of interviewing a number of respondents were 
attempting to obtain the PAMI pension supplements which had just 
been introduced. 456 Several had been thwarted by the number of 
visits they needed to make to different government offices. 
Eugenia Borda described the process of obtaining the PAMI 
supplement for her invalid husband:
I went to the [Federal] Capital to do all the paperwork. It was right 
opposite the parliament building. I went there to make the claim for 
him...1 had to go there right away: that was where they sent me. And I did 
all the paperwork and then I had to bring the papers back here so that he 
could sign them and then I had to go back there again taking them the 
papers so that he'd also get this subsidy. After that he got the 50 peso 
subsidy. Also, this was here in PAMI, they sent me back there [to Federal 
Capital] and it took me the whole day because I couldn't find the place. 
I walked around and around and I couldn't find it. At last, when I was 
tired out, I managed to find it. And I did all the papers there. I had to 
bring them here again for him to sign them and then go back.457
454C.Mesa-Lago "social security: ripe..", p. 203.
455Tape VJ7 528-542.
456See chapter three, p. 125.
457Tape VA6 188-206.
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Ana Gorostiaga gave a similar account:
AG: I have to take [PAMI] the papers..They told me you had to go to the 
bank to ask for the supplement but..I went to collect the money and they 
told me it wasn't there yet...You have to take photocopies of your birth 
certificate, everything, his identity papers, his last wage slip..to 
PAMI..its on the corner of Chacabuco and Alsina streets in the [Federal] 
Capital... The lady working there told me that I had to do this and that, 
make a sworn declaration, make photocopies of his last wage slip show his 
identity papers.
Interviewer: And where do they make the sworn statements?
AG: They gave me a form there. I had to call the police [located a
kilometre away from VJ] ..to get it signed in front of them and pay the
contributions which we still had to make.4SB
Often respondents were required to present large numbers of 
documents before they could make their pension claims. These 
included photocopies of their identity papers, receipts for past 
contributions, sworn statements about personal income and the 
wage slips of other relatives. Frequently, these papers were lost 
and obtaining replacements added to the bureaucratic obstacles 
of making a claim. 459 Juanita Morales described how a neighbour 
would be able to obtain a new identity card:
She lost it' recently, but I've already told her to go where everyone else 
goes. They'll give her a new card there. I've already told her. And she 
doesn't remember her [identity] number but it doesn't matter because they 
give it to you just the same..Yes, they do it just the same, because 
they'll go and look in the civil registry.460
These problems were particularly serious for immigrants from 
neighbouring countries many of whom had never obtained official
458Tape VJ3 1/360-388. Her claim that she had to pay 
outstanding pension contributions is confusing, since her husband 
had obtained a nubilacion some years previously. It is possible 
that she confused this with the fee for obtaining the sworn 
statement.
459Tape VA7 235-245.
460Tape VJ6 35-40.
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identity papers in the first place. Similarly, a number of 
respondents who had made pension contributions to provincial 
funds in distant parts of the interior faced great difficulties 
in obtaining replacement copies. Also, those who wished to pursue 
claims for widow's pensions for partners who had not secured the 
iubilacion before their deaths, had to overcome a number of 
severe obstacles.461 Even without these added complications, 
many elderly villeros found organising their paperwork a 
considerable challenge. Ana Gorostiaga described the problems 
besetting her claim for an insurance benefit:
I had a problem with my boss and my boss didn't want to know me after 
that... What I had to do was ask him [employer] for all the papers 
to. .present them to the Ministry of Social Action. I made the claim but my 
papers were wrong because one was signed for the year -I began to work 
there in 1977. I had worked two months. Then in 1979 I came back there 
again. . .and so I had worked there for enough time when I made the claim 
[in 1988]...This is the receipt I have from when I returned there...I've 
got lots of receipts. This is the only one here because I don't know where 
the other ones are because..all the things are jumbled up. I kept them all 
in a box and my son was moving some furniture. He picked it up and it 
broke and there was all the box where I'd put everything..There were lots 
of papers I'd gathered together and put there. I kept them for whatever 
might crop up. They told me to present all the papers that were there to 
a lawyer so that they could get me a pension.462
This experience contrasted with the subsequent claim which Ana 
Gorostiaga made for an assistance pension. Here, the "Centro Los 
Jovenes Del Noventa" took on most of the responsibility for 
handling documentation.
I have to provide two documents. I still need my boy's signature, and the 
signatures of my daughter and her husband and another daughter and her 
husband. That's all, just these papers. Then I hand over all of them to 
them [the Centro]. They're in the file which Norma [secretary of Centro]
461Tapes VA3 195-205 and VJ4 300-305.
462Tape VJ3 1/150-190 (tape VJ6 278-325 provides a similar 
testimony).
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keeps.463
The ability of respondents to obtain information, organise their 
papers and pursue claims varied considerably and was in part 
determined by factors such as education, motivation, health and 
financial resources. Of these, the respondent's health was often 
the critical factor. As shown in Table V:24, 15 respondents
identified as potentially eligible for assistance benefits had 
serious health problems, including blindness and paralysis. In 
some cases other relatives were able to pursue the claim on their 
behalf. 464 Even after the claim had been granted, elderly 
villeros had to find someone to collect the benefit for them 
every month. According to Eugenia Borda:
I'm going to have to waste three or four hours in a queue [which she did 
every month] because..he [husband] can't see any more. And I, because he 
can't stay standing for hours, I have to go. I go to collect it for 
him.465
She also pointed out the financial cost of making claims: bus 
fares, photocopying and other expenses may have been beyond the 
means of the poorest elderly.
You have to have the money to go from place to place, coming and going. 
What if you don't have any?466
463Tape VJ3 1/270-280.
464Tape VA8 188-2 06.
465Tape VA6 161-166. Also, see tape VA4 119-125.
466Tape VA6 2 04-206.
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For Juan Jugo, this had been an insurmountable obstacle:
I made contributions everywhere, but I'm not going to go hunting for them 
because I don't have any money and you can't go in circles from place to 
place if you don't have any. That's why I'm not going to go lookinq for 
all that stuff.467
The time, energy and money which villeros often needed to expend 
in order to obtain benefits, along with uncertainty about when, 
if ever, they would be successful, may have meant that the 
opportunity costs (either real or perceived) of pursuing claims 
out-weighed the final gain. These costs were particularly high 
for those with poor education, the self-employed, the disabled 
and those lacking cash for bus fare and photocopies: the very 
groups most in need of assistance pensions.
A number of respondents were able to circumvent the numerous 
barriers to making claims by using personal contacts or resorting 
to clientelism. In the case of Sra Eulalia Cristobal, several 
years of unsuccessful attempts to obtain an assistance pension 
were brought to a sudden end due to the intervention of her son, 
who worked in the municipal mayor's office:
I waited and waited. Then a lady came here from the municipality [Lanus] , 
the chief. She came to my house and told me "Sra Cristobal your 
contributions are all paid up." And then my elder son and Quindimil 
[municipal mayor] presented me with my papers. Quindimil's from Lands, 
have you heard of him?. . .he [son] came one night with a lady in a car, she 
was Quindimil's secretary. We went off with my son and I was given the 
letter which gives me a pension. Yes, and Quindimil presented it to 
me...He knows me very well because my son works with him. My son is a 
secretary for Quindimil.468
467Tape VA7 271-275.
468Tape VJ7 562-588.
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During informal conversations, another interviewee, Eulogia 
Barreto, made a series of references about cultivating links with 
the local Radical party association as a means to obtaining an 
assistance benefit. However, she was not prepared to discuss this 
in detail when the interview was being taped:
Interviewer: Also, you were speaking to people from the Radical party? 
EB: Yes [laughs nervously].
Interviewer: What came of that?
EB: No, I didn't speak to them, I didn't go there..They sent me some
letters but I didn't go and tell them anything.
Interviewer: What did the letter say?
EB: I didn't bring the letter here [she lived next door].
Interviewer: What did it say more or less?
EB: That I come. That I help them with my vote, so that they, the
Radicals, can keep up the good work.
Interviewer: What are they going to offer you?
EB: They didn't say anything. Work, just work. I didn't speak to them, not 
personally. I didn't go to their offices...
Interviewer: Is it possible that they could help with your pension claim? 
EB: Yes, I think so.
Interviewer: Let's hope so. [Both laugh].469
As has been shown, access to state benefits was, metaphorically 
speaking, something of a lottery. At times it was in the literal 
sense. Chapter three refers to the granting of assistance 
pensions in the early 1950s being turned into a media 
extravaganza. 470 Similar practices were apparent during the 
election campaign of 1988. Several elderly living in Villa Azul 
who had obtained assistance pensions through the Grupo and 
provincial social workers were forced to participate in a stage- 
managed lottery as part of an open-air political rally. Haidee 
Filipetti described the spectacle:
469VA3 225-246.
470Chapter three, p. 104.
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HF: Now they're giving me this pension.
Interviewer: The assistance pension?
HF: Yes, the assistance one I got in a lottery...It was a thing that the 
president of here [the Grupo] Dona Maria [Perez] took me to. We got these 
things like..coupons. Everyone was there -the girl [social worker]. And 
what was that thing called that I signed? The councillor was there too. I 
stayed put and they started the lottery. One person won, then another.. 
Son interrupts: They were from the Province of Buenos Aires.
HF: Bingo! I had the [winning] paper!...1 was waiting there and Maria told 
me "Stay put and if you're in luck they'll pick your number out." "Oh, 
please God, Maria." And there was one lady, then another and then "Haidee 
Filipetti!" It was me! "Oh, look, Maria, it's me!". I was overcome with 
emotion, dear, and they were even filming it and everything. I could 
collect the money right away, they paid me inside a month.
Interviewer: Did all the people [in VA] who got assistance pensions get 
them at this lottery?
Eulogia Barreto [secretary of Grupo] interjects rather nervously: No, no, 
no. I don't think there was anyone else.
HF: [disagreeing with EB] No, no, no. Then they gave out plots of land.
Yes, they gave us plots.
Interviewer: How many people got assistance pensions there?
Son: Twenty-four people, twenty-four, I think.
Interviewer: Were there other lotteries?
EB: No, no. There just seems to have been one. It didn't come back again. 
There seems to have been just the one. I don't know because I didn't go. 
HF: [disagreeing with EB again] No, lots. The little old lady around the
corner. Lots of people got pensions...
Interviewer: Were the press there?
HF: All of them as well as the television. A plane came. The councillor 
came by helicopter.
Son: No, it was the governor of the Province of Buenos Aires. The old one 
when Alfonsin was still in power [Sr Cafiero, a Peronist].471
Eulogia Barreto gave the impression of wishing to play down the 
importance of the lotteries. This paralleled her reticence in 
front of the tape recorder when describing her own political 
contacts. This may have been because, unlike Haidee Filipetti, 
she was aware of the illicit nature of such clientelistic 
practices and preferred discretion. Another interviewee, Juan 
Jugo, made reference to what may have been another stage-managed 
pension presentation in a school.472
Conversely, elderly villeros occasionally lost their benefits due 
to the corrupt practices of officials, lawyers and even
471Tape VA4 208-275.
472See tape VA7 177-190.
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relatives. Again, Haidee Filipetti recounted her experiences:
Interviewer: Your father used to work for the railway?
HF: Yes.
Interviewer: And he had problems with his pension?
HF: Yes.
Interviewer: Could you give me a little more information about this?
HF: It turned out that..father died and so they passed the pension on to 
my mother. My mother got me a card and kept everything [documentation] 
from the railway safe, she kept absolutely everything. She made a card so 
that I could go and collect it for her -a trustee....What happened then? 
..mother died and he [her uncle] came. He said "Look, Haidee", my uncle 
Salvador Corso told me "Look, Haidee, I'm going to take you to the railway 
but you have to give me them [the papers] now. They're going to give you 
money for your mother's funeral.". Because when mother died they had to 
pay for the funeral..And so he took me there. We had to take the receipts 
for the stupid thing [funeral], because you have to have all your papers 
in good order there. We got the receipt for the stupid thing signed. It 
was the man who had attended her, the mortician.
He [uncle] took me and we went upstairs, not to the pension offices but to 
the railway ones. And he said "Here, I've brought her" he said to the main 
boss "This here is the daughter of Augustin Filipetti."..."Good", he [the 
official] said "We're going to pay you, you're due the money for your 
mother's funeral." And I asked him "Aren't I due the pension as well, 
sir?" "No you're not eligible, you won't get it." "And why won't I get any 
of the pension?" "Because you just won't, miss", he said "The railway 
already gave it to your father and mother. The Fraternidad [railway union] 
is different. If your father had been, if he had paid the Fraternidad, 
then yes you would get it." Then he told me, he made me sign, a piece of 
paper like this, he made me sign, so I signed.
Then it turned out that after a long time a neighbour came by. "I'm going 
to take you to a lawyer of mine. You ought to be getting your father's 
nubilacidn. The railway should be paying it you." Well, we went to the 
lawyer's and my neighbour's lawyer told me "Yes, missus, they made you 
sign and now another person is receiving the pension...It should be yours, 
missus, you alone. Its your pension. You've got all the papers." I've got 
all of them, everything. Look at them! I've still got the stuff, the date 
of death. Look at that! "It should have been yours, missus. Why did you 
sign?" "My uncle made me sign. "... This man who loved my mother so much. 
Look what he did to me. They told me that he's the one who's getting 
it.473
There are a number of possible explanations for this sequence of 
events. It is possible, but unlikely, that the lawyer was 
mistaken or lying in order to make a commission. It is more 
probable that Haidee was tricked in some way, since the virtual 
closed shop operating in the railways during the period of her 
father's employment meant that opting out of membership dues to
473Tape VA4 117-213.
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the Fraternidad was very difficult. 474 However, when her mother 
died, some time around 1952, Haidee was only in her early 
thirties and clearly not eligible for a benefit according to the 
criteria applied in the early 1990s. During the 1950s there were 
no assistance benefits at the national targeting single 
mothers475, although it is possible that benefits were available 
through trades unions or local government agencies.476 Thus, it 
is plausible that the "railway office" was staffed by a corrupt 
official, who deprived Haidee of her pension rights.
This was the only reference made by respondents to being cheated 
out of state benefits and so it is unlikely that this was a 
widespread occurrence. Nevertheless, it indicated the 
vulnerability of poorly educated villeros and provided another 
disincentive to actively pursue claims.
5) Conclusions.
As has been shown, the patterns of income for elderly villeros 
and their underlying causes were complex and not always obvious. 
Consequently, few generalisations can be made about their 
economic condition. Whilst levels of insurance coverage were much 
lower than elsewhere in GBA, iubilados still accounted for 28 per
474R. Thompson "Trade union organisation: some forgotten
aspects" in J.Adelman, ed Essays on Argentine labour history, 
1870-1930, London (1992), pp.165-6.
475P.Ross "Policy formation..", pp.336-8.
476Chapter three gives an account of Peronist welfare 
initiatives for the elderly.
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cent of respondents. In the great majority of cases, elderly 
villeros combined income from two or more sources. This reflected 
the inadequacy of benefit values and the low wages paid for such 
part-time employment as changas and laundry work. Support from 
family members was more commonplace than in Argentina as a whole 
but this did not reflect an ethic of helping or prioritising the 
needs of the elderly. Instead, as the various testimonies 
indicated, it was more usual to prioritise the needs of young 
children.
Whilst patterns of elderly villero income maintenance displayed 
some elements of duality between the formal/insurance and 
informal/assistance sectors, this generalisation did not always 
hold true and it disguised the existence of numerous important 
sub-groups of respondents. Among the most disadvantaged were 
women who had worked as domestic servants, those with serious 
health problems and those without any economically secure 
relatives.
The survey also indicates that there was a gap between potential 
entitlement to state benefits and actual access to them. This may 
have been larger for assistance than insurance pensions, 
depending on the eligibility criteria used. The "benefit gap" was 
largely due to the failings of public agencies, including the 
inadequate dissemination of information, needless bureaucratic 
obstacles and delays in following up paperwork. More generally, 
it reflected the attitudes of responsible state bodies and 
government officials, who balked at taking a pro-active approach,
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actually seeking out potential claimants, rather than waiting for 
them to visit offices located in the city centre.
No other studies of potential and actual access to benefits exist 
for Latin America. As such, it is not possible to draw 
comparisons between the villas studied here and other areas. 
There are, however, various reasons for concluding that the 
"benefit gap" was more prominent in the villas than in other 
parts of GBA. A larger proportion of elderly villeros had been 
working in the informal sector and had been either self-employed 
or employed in small firms which were less likely to give them 
assistance with paperwork and legal matters. Moreover, a number 
of studies have shown that levels of educational attainment among 
villeros were significantly lower than other groups. 477 As a 
result, the process of making an insurance pension claim was much 
more challenging for many villeros. If it is recognised that the 
benefit gap J.or assistance pensions was particularly large, the 
villeros' high degree of reliance on such support increased their 
vulnerability. Finally, as was shown both in this chapter and the 
preceding one, effective local organisations specifically 
targeting the needs of the elderly played a significant role in 
facilitating access to benefits. The absence of PAMI-funded 
Centros de Jubilados in the villas studied thus constituted 
another restriction on villeros' access to state support.
Both the high proportion of elderly villeros who had made no 
insurance contributions and their occasional reluctance to pursue
477See Table IV: 1.
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benefit claims could, at times, be explained in terms of 
opportunity costs (either real or perceived) . As has been shown, 
it may not have appeared rational for villeros to defer 
consumption or to trust a share of their income to a large, 
bureaucratic apparatus. Likewise, the efforts required to obtain 
information and overcome administrative obstacles to obtaining 
a benefit may have out-weighed its short-term value. These 
opportunity costs were often greater for elderly villeros than 
for other groups because of their economically marginal status.
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CONCLUSIONS.
Virtually all the existing literature on social security and 
other aspects of income maintenance in Latin America examine the 
impact of a single institution on a broad swathe of groups. This 
thesis takes a different approach, focussing on one relatively 
narrow group (elderly villeros), but including all relevant 
institutions. This enables a more complete investigation which 
includes the historical evolution of both the group and 
institutions studied and a detailed analysis of their position 
in the early 1990s. It draws attention to the ways in which 
institutions combine to provide elderly villeros with a framework 
of opportunities and contraints.
There are a number of historical parallels between the economic 
conditions of elderly villeros in the early 1990s and those of 
newly-arrived immigrants at the start of the century. In both 
cases, the public sector and free market failed to ensure 
satisfactory housing conditions or provide for contingencies such 
as old age and invalidity. Each group sought solutions to these 
hardships amongst themselves, through mutual aid societies and 
low cost accomodation on one hand, or juntas vecinales and NGOs 
on the other. However, it would be dangerous to over-emphasise 
the similarities of these situations. In the first period 
Argentina was enjoying, and would for some time continue to 
enjoy, sustained, rapid economic growth: real wages were
generally increasing and the state was gradually up-grading its 
social policies. In the second the country was emerging from the
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worst of a series of acute economic recessions and the state was 
seeking to reduce its welfare role. Thus, opportunities at the 
beginning of the century for immigrants to seek their own 
solutions were greater than those for the elderly villeros of 
today.
High levels of transatlantic immigration were the principal 
reason why Argentina experienced accelerated demographic ageing 
several decades before most other Latin American countries. This 
was the result of two effects. First, immigrants had lower 
fertility levels than the host population. Secondly, immigrants 
were mostly young adults. This caused a bulge in the national age 
pyramid which gradually worked its way upwards over time. By the 
1930s and 194 0s these "immigrant cohorts" were reaching old age. 
Whilst these cohorts had disappeared by the 1970s, the momentum 
of demographic ageing was sustained by changes in the population 
as a whole.
Premature demographic ageing created the need for effective 
welfare programmes. However, the establishment of a public sector 
welfare monopoly in the middle decades of the twentieth century 
was not a response to demographic trends, nor was it prompted by 
the breakdown of pre-existing structures. Although mutual aid 
societies had run into financial difficulties during the First 
World War, they had continued to grow rapidly until the 1940s. 
Church organisations had also expanded their activities. Instead, 
the public sector monopoly reflected the prevailing 
developmentalist orthodoxy which advocated high levels of state
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intervention in all areas of the economy. This did not involve 
the administrative restructuring and financial rationalisation 
of existing piecemeal state welfare initiatives. Rather, the 
expansion of the system led to the multiplication of
institutional weaknesses. Within 30 years of its instigation, it 
had become apparent that the public sector monopoly in its 
current form was both financially unsustainable in the medium 
term (indeed, it jeopardised the success of the economy as a 
whole) and was failing to provide effective, universal protection 
to groups such as the elderly.
The state welfare monopoly also failed to prevent the rapid 
expansion of villas de emeraencia within Greater Buenos Aires. 
A proportion of the surpluses initially accumulated by social 
insurance funds were channeled into cheap housing programmes but 
this policy was financially unsustainable in the long-run. 
Temporary government camps, such as Villa Carton, generally
deteriorated into villas in their own right.
To what extent was the failure of the state monopoly attributable 
to inherent weaknesses of the public sector? Had the post-war 
performance of the economy been stronger and had state welfare 
programmes been implemented along more rational lines, it is 
conceivable that many of the problems which beset the social 
insurance system could have been avoided or resolved relatively 
painlessly. Some insights can be obtained with reference to the 
cases of Brazil and Mexico, both of which enjoyed impressive
growth in the post-war era, yet these country's welfare systems
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were also suffering severe crises by the 1980s. Moreover, the 
social security'systems of Brazil and Mexico, as in much of Latin 
America, contained similar institutional weaknesses to those 
which afflicted the Argentine one. Many of these resulted from 
a failure to demarcate clearly the respective roles of state and 
government. This encouraged bureaucratic featherbedding and the 
precedence of short-term political objectives over longer-term 
economic rationalism. Thus, the disorganised implementation of 
the state welfare monopoly in Argentina was the inevitable result 
of an inherent weakness in the way the public sector was utilised 
in Latin America.
From the mid-1970s there were increasing indications of a shift 
away from the public sector welfare monopoly. However, this did 
not bring about an improvement in the provision of services to 
the elderly nor did it solve the problem of the villas. Forced 
eradication programmes mainly served to modify the distribution 
of shanties within GBA rather than reduce their total 
populations. Attempts to down-grade the commitment of the state 
to shoring up the social security system met with stiff political 
resistance. Nevertheless, the change in policy orientation 
gradually brought about a number of significant modifications in 
the pattern of large-scale institutional support for groups such 
as the elderly. Greater opportunities were created for the 
participation of NGOs, local associations and private insurance 
companies. However, these were unable to fully compensate for 
gaps in state provision. By the early 1990s more radical changes 
were sought, including the partial privatisation of the national
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social insurance programme.
The historical evolution of welfare programmes had bequeathed an 
unfortunate hybrid of statism and pluralism. Public sector 
agencies were of a scale and complexity associated with an 
embracing welfare state. However, this was not matched by the 
financial resources allocated them. This problem combined with 
a low standard of personnel, many of whom had been recruited for 
political reasons, to reduce the quality and quantity of coverage 
afforded groups such as the elderly. At the same time, attempts 
were made to pass an increasing amount of responsibility onto 
non-state agencies, which were not equipped to meet this 
challenge.
The failure of the welfare system was clearly reflected by the 
experiences of elderly villeros. Among this group, contributory 
pensions were much less widespread than was the case for GBA as 
a whole. This was in large part due to a greater tendency to have 
avoided insurance contributions in the past, although a 
significant minority of unprotected elderly claimed to have made 
some or all such payments. Low levels of insurance coverage had 
been partly, but by no means completely, compensated for by the 
targeting of assistance benefits. Despite this, a number of 
villeros who were clearly entitled to such assistance did not 
receive it. Thus, it was possible to identify gaps between 
potential entitlement and actual access both to insurance and 
assistance pensions. These gaps were largely due to the 
ineffectual administration of state agencies. This included the
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inadequate dissemination of information about available benefits 
and procedures, overly-complex bureaucratic processes and a 
failure to take a pro-active approach to identifying those most 
in need. At the same time, there were sharp discrepancies between 
the benefits promised by the system and the financial provision 
made for them. For insurance programmes this was reflected in 
pension values which fell short of legally-stipulated minimums. 
For assistance it had led to long waiting lists for benefits 
which should have been immediately available.
By the early 1990s, a great variety of non-state institutions 
were seeking to improve the economic condition of elderly 
villeros. In each of the three villas studied outside actors had 
helped establish local associations. These primarily served as 
conduits for resources distributed by state agencies, such as 
local government assistance programmes. They also served as 
sources of information about available benefits and their 
bureaucratic requirements. As such, they provided an important 
bridge between state agencies and the groups which were 
theoretically being targeted. Among such organisations knowledge 
of welfare programmes and contacts (formal or otherwise) with 
external agencies were very varied. This had led to clear 
discrepancies in the types of assistance benefits most frequently 
held in the different villas.
The failure of large-scale institutions to provide adequate 
economic support to elderly villeros meant that many depended 
upon personal strategies for a good part, if not all, of their
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income. Elderly villeros were more likely to continue in 
employment than those living elsewhere, although this usually 
entailed informal or part-time activities. Support from family 
members, particularly those beyond the household, was higher than 
that recorded by surveys of other districts. However, in the 
great majority of cases, elderly villeros received no such family 
support or were themselves the providers. A small but significant 
number of respondents had no income whatsoever and were reduced 
to relying on the charity of neighbours or the contents of 
rubbish tips.
The thesis argues that elderly villeros were "doubly marginal", 
in terms of their age and their residence in shanty towns. This 
was reflected in their education, employment (past and present), 
access to contributory pensions, general expectations and 
political attitudes. In a comprehensive, universal welfare state, 
such a group would receive considerable assistance to compensate 
for its position of relative disadvantage and vulnerability. In 
an economy where welfare coverage is less complete, available 
resources should be focussed on the needs of such groups. Whilst 
there were some indications of assistance targeting in the three 
villas studied, several of the most acutely deprived individuals 
remained without any form of state support. Rather than 
increasing the likelihood of support, restricted mobility 
(through illness, disability or a fear of crime) , a lack of 
education or even a lack of disposable income often served as 
barriers to obtaining benefits.
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The failure of state agencies to reach the most deserving and 
vulnerable elderly would not have been avoided by leaving this 
task to the private and voluntary sectors. The thesis shows that 
NGOs and local initiatives usually had few monetary resources of 
their own to fill this gap. Informal support from friends and 
neighbours was unsystematic and largely restricted to the most 
desparate cases. High unemployment reduced the capacities of both 
the elderly to fend for themselves and family members to provide 
support. Finally, the expansion of private insurance was of no 
relevance, since such companies only sought to include 
individuals with high and reliable income streams.
Rather than reducing the role of the public sector, the best 
prospects of improving the economic condition of the most 
disadvantaged elderly villeros were through the administrative 
reform of assistance agencies and the provision of funding which 
reflected the true number of elderly eligible for benefits. Key 
elements of administrative reform would have been the reduction 
of bureaucratic red tape and increased efforts to actively seek 
out deserving cases, possibly by developing better links with 
local initiatives. Reform should also have included reversing the 
trend of administrative fragmentation, which increased staffing 
costs and led to a complex range of often over-lapping benefits, 
with different eligibility criteria and procedures for making 
claims. A more unified administration and array of benefits would 
have greatly facilitated the dissemination of information to 
target groups and increased the accountability of the agencies 
involved.
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The combined reform and up-grading of assistance for the elderly 
would have been an enormous challenge, requiring considerable 
planning and expertise. One way in which this might have been 
facilitated would have been by bringing such programmes within 
the activities the INSSJP. Through the PAMI programme, the 
Institute had already obtained much experience of providing non­
contributory services to iubilados and had developed a national 
network of community organisations. By extending its activities 
to include all the aged population, it would have been possible 
to avoid bureaucratic duplication and to reduce any dualism 
between insured and non-insured elderly. The privatisation of the 
social insurance system had not threatened the status of the 
Institute, which was considered a separate entity.
What lessons can be drawn from the Argentine case for countries 
in Latin America and beyond which are now experiencing 
accelerated demographic ageing? First, the thesis shows that 
elderly welfare would be best provided by strengthening and 
reforming the role of the public sector, not minimalising it. The 
privatisation of pension programmes may be a short cut to 
reducing administrative efficiency and increasing returns on 
contributions, as well as stimulating capital markets. However, 
it is of no relevance for groups which are unable to make 
insurance contributions, be they to the public or private sector. 
The testimonies of villeros indicate that neo-liberal policies 
which deregulate labour markets and promote the growth of the 
informal sector reduce the capacity of workers to make 
contributions. Such policies will increase the need for social
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assistance as these workers become elderly and may therefore 
simply constitute deferring the cost of provision to future 
generations.
Secondly, efforts should be made to establish effective, 
participative grassroots organisations for elderly, especially 
those experiencing severe poverty. These organisations can be 
used to disseminate information about available benefits and 
procedures. They may also draw attention to individuals in acute 
need and thus facilitate the targeting of assistance.
Thirdly, policies need to consider the elderly as part of a 
household unit rather than as individuals. If the welfare of 
other household members, particularly young children, is ignored, 
elderly individuals are themselves likely to suffer. The same 
problem will arise if employment opportunities for the main 
household breadwinners are reduced.
Finally, the Argentine experience shows that, although 
demographic ageing is in itself a desirable process, it must not 
be considered a costless one. If the material needs, of the 
elderly are not provided for effectively, ageing may simply 
constitute an extension of privation and misery rather than an 
enrichment of lifetime opportunities.
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APPENDIX : QUESTIONNAIRE.
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Accomodation:
-Installed piped water
-Installed electricity (legal or illegal connections) 
-Gas supply (installed in the network or cannister) 
-Exclusive use of bathroom 
-Exclusive use of kitchen
2. Members of household:
Relation Name Age Sex Civil Occupa Benef Income
with head status -tion -its
Civil status: Relation with head: Occupation(s):
l=single
2=partner
3=married
4=separated
5=divorced
6=widow(er)
l=head
2=spouse
3=child
4=father
5=sibling
6=grandchild
7=son-in-law
8=daughter IL
9=other
0=child (under 10) 
l=work full time 
2=seeking work 
3=pensioner 
4=studant 
5=housework 
6=other (specify) 
7=not known 
8=work part time
406
INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE.
A) PERSONAL HISTORY.
1. Sex
2. Age
3. Were you born in this neighbourhood?
-if no: where were you born
when did you come to GBA/this neighbourhood
4. What was your principal lifetime occupation?
5. What social insurance contributions did you make?
6. What other benefits did your employment include?
-compensation for dismissal
-holidays
-aguinaldo
-others
B) PRESENT EMPLOYMENT.
1. At present do you have paid employment?
-if no: are you seeking paid employment at present?
-if yes: What type of employment do you have?
2. Does this employment include:
-compensation for dismissal
-holidays
-aguinaldo
-social insurance
-other benefits
3. Do you work out of economic necessity?
4. If your present employment is not your principal lifetime one, 
for what reasons did it change?
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5. Is your income from employment substantial or slight?
C) PENSIONS.
1. At present, are you in receipt of a pension or iubilacion?
If not, why not?
2. How old were you when you retired?
3. Did you have difficulties obtaining your pension? (specify)
4. What type of pension or benefit do you receive?
Contributory -iubilacion
-invalidity pension 
-widows' pension 
-other (specify)
Non-contributory -ANSES old age benefit
-DNA subsidy 
-other (specify)
5) How much is your benefit worth?
6) Does your benefit cover your basic needs more than adequately,
adequately or less than adequately?
D) TENURE.
1. Are you:
-an owner-occupier 
-a tennant
-living in the home of a relative 
-other (specify)
E) FAMILY AND FRIENDS.
1. What type of support do other household members offer you?
-money
-accomodation 
-general care 
-other (specify)
2. Is this support substantial or slight?
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3. What type of support do you offer other household members?
-money
-accomodation 
-general care 
-other (specify)
[Repeat for relatives living beyond the household]
4. Do you have friends?
-no 
-one 
-a few 
-many
[Repeat questions 1-3 for friends and neighbours]
E) INCOME AND NEEDS.
1. Please indicate if at present your needs are very satisfied, 
satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied:
-money
-health
-housing
-nutrition
-clothing
2. I am going to read you a list of sources of income. Can you tell 
me from which you regularly obtain money?
-employment
-benefit
-rents or savings 
-household members 
-other relatives 
-friends and neighbours 
-local organisations 
-other (specify)
3. For each of these, was the income you received slight or 
substantial?
4. Could you estimate the amount of money you obtained from each of 
these every month?
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G) EVALUATION OF THE INTERVIEW.
1. How reliable were the informant's responses
-mostly reliable 
-some were reliable 
-mostly unreliable
2. How well did the informant appear to understand the questions:
-very badly 
-badly
-reasonably well 
-well
3. How did the informant respond to the interview:
-very negatively 
-negatively 
-indifferent 
-positively 
-very positively
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